

**A Report on Security Improvements to the Capitol Complex
Post-January 6, 2021**

Submitted by

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Introduction

The mission of the United States Capitol Police (USCP) is to protect the Members, staff and visitors to the Capitol Complex on a daily basis. In addition, it is tasked with safeguarding the legislative process. It is a unique mission filled with challenges that the general public does not always fully grasp or appreciate. Unlike agencies that protect the White House, the Pentagon, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other buildings, the USCP safeguards a public institution that, but for the restrictions of COVID-19, is regularly open to the public, who can freely access the buildings. The work of the USCP makes it possible for Members to serve their constituents, and to engage in their legislative functions in a safe and secure environment.

On January 6, 2021, the USCP prevailed in that mission. Confronted with a violent mob and vastly outnumbered, the officers displayed resilience, fortitude, and unimaginable bravery. Together with federal, state, and local law enforcement partners, the officers fought to protect the legislative branch. Their eyes inflamed by repeated shots of pepper and bear spray, their bodies assaulted and beaten with bricks, flag poles, rebar, pipes, bats, sticks, and Tasers, among other weapons, the officers fought *for over four hours*. Fighting hand-to-hand, using ingenuity and displaying incredible grit, they did not give up. Congress was able to do its job and *not one* Member, or staff, was physically harmed.

Many officers suffered injuries, and in the wake of the attack the USCP lost Officers Brian Sicknick and Howard Liebengood. On the heels of their deaths, the USCP also lost Officer William Evans in a separate attack on April 2, 2021. Our law enforcement colleagues at the Metropolitan Police Department also suffered loss and injuries in the attack. The physical injuries suffered that day may heal, but the emotional and psychological trauma inflicted will not soon disappear.

However, January 6 exposed critical deficiencies with operational planning, intelligence, staffing, and equipment. Those issues have to be addressed, and that is what the Capitol Police Board (Board) and the USCP are actively doing. The Board and the USCP recognize that the changes already made, those in progress and those planned for the future must be transformational. We thank the Congress for its support and guidance during this process, particularly its support for the Capitol Police Emergency Assistance Act.

The USCP has been thoroughly—and understandably—scrutinized. They have been the subject of oversight at various committee hearings. The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) for the United States Capitol Police has issued 103 recommendations arising out of January 6. The USCP is also being scrutinized by the Government Accountability Office, the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, the committees of jurisdiction within the United States House of Representatives and United States Senate, and other oversight entities. All such entities have also issued or will issue recommendations for reform.

We are pleased to report that a significant portion of the recommendations issued to the USCP have and/or are being addressed. Indeed, of the 103 recommendations issued by the OIG, the Department has implemented and/or addressed over 90 recommendations. The Capitol Police Board created an Inspector General Working Group to review and assist USCP with

responding to all January 6 flash reports issued by the OIG. However, we recognize that more work still remains to be done.

Overview of USCP Post-January 6 Improvements

In less than a year, the USCP has developed, and in many instances implemented, significant strategic, tactical, and operational improvements to *every* USCP Bureau. USCP improvements number in the hundreds, and they include:

- improvements to the way the USCP gathers, analyzes, uses, shares, and disseminates intelligence;
- improvements to the USCP Civil Disturbance Unit (CDU) through state-of-the-art training, new equipment, increased staffing, and increased command and control capabilities;
- recruitment of an expert in National Special Security Events to maximize intelligence, improve communications and coordination, and effectively allocate assets for large and high-profile events;
- participation in large-scale joint exercises, both internally and with federal law enforcement partners;
- routine in-person briefings for uniformed officers at roll calls prior to large and high-profile events;
- development of a Critical Incident Response Plan to obtain immediate and extensive assistance from partner agencies—the Critical Incident Response Plan was employed on September 18;
- distribution of cell phones to all officers to improve communications and to push out time sensitive critical information and intelligence;
- improved and expanded training sessions for recruits, officers, and supervisors;
- expanded wellness and health-related services to address physical and mental injuries and provide resiliency skills department-wide;
- new recruitment and retention initiatives to strengthen and increase our work force; and
- an enhanced public information office to improve the speed and accuracy of information disseminated to the general public and the media.

The USCP made improvements in five critical areas: training, equipment and personnel, operational planning, CDU, and intelligence and incident command. The advancements made in these areas have improved safety on the Capitol campus and are outlined below.

Training

No law enforcement agency can be effective if its officers are unprepared. Preparation cannot be achieved without training. Thus, training is a top priority for the USCP and its importance has been re-emphasized.

In the months following January 6, the USCP embarked on a concerted effort to dramatically improve officer training at every level and rank. The USCP is taking a comprehensive approach to enhancing physical, in-service, and entry-level training, with a particular focus on the CDU and the front line officers. Although COVID-19 has delayed timelines, the following steps have been taken to enhance Department-wide training, including:

- increased staffing at the Department's Training Services Bureau;
- mandatory training for armor up, shelter-in-place, and lock down drills, for both House and Senate chambers;
- tactical positioning training for Uniformed Services Bureau officers beginning January 17, 2022;
- purchase of state-of-the-art, 360° VirTra police simulator training;
- participation in daily truck interdiction and monitoring exercises;
- engagement in joint exercise maneuvers with the CDU, SWAT team, and the D.C. National Guard; and
- increased number of recruit officer training classes.

The USCP does have a continued need for additional training staff, as well as a larger training facility that could better accommodate the USCP's size and mission. These needs have been included in the USCP's upcoming Fiscal Year 2023 budget request.

Equipment and Personnel

Of course, officers cannot effectively do their jobs without the proper equipment. Notwithstanding COVID-related supply chain delays, the USCP efforts in the distribution and upgrading of equipment are particularly robust. Guided by the best practices of other federal law enforcement agencies and its own internal review, the USCP has ordered and Capitol Police officers will be provided, among other things:

- new hard riot gear, including ballistic helmets;
- high-impact and splash droplet eye protection;
- fire retardant suits;
- respirators with voice protection;
- impact protective gloves;
- portable decontamination kegs; and
- expanded oxygen supply kits;

The USCP has also increased its equipment orders to include:

- new shields—of various sizes--which will be stored in strategic locations throughout the Capitol grounds;
- three additional Long Range Acoustical Devices;
- single- and multi-shot 40 MM launchers;
- a dedicated response vehicle;
- electronic control devices; and
- FN303 and pepper ball systems.

On a parallel track, the USCP improved, and where necessary developed, operational equipment inventory tracking and storage processes, as well as expanded equipment storage facilities. Equipment deployment strategies have also been approved. USCP is receiving equipment on a staggered basis due to global supply chain issues, but anticipate having all new inventory in place by March 2022.

USCP sworn and civilian employees are the life blood of the Department. However, since 2016, the USCP mission has expanded as a result of increased threats to Members as detailed later in the report, projects and facility acquisitions that require additional postings and the pre-screener initiative. In addition, there is an increased need to bolster CDU staffing. Post-January 6th, the Department has attrited 136 officers, either through retirements (many officers who joined the Department in the post-9/11 hiring surge are reaching 20 years of service) or voluntary departures. This is in addition to the 175 officers who are on some form of approved leave, to include Family and Medical Leave and leave associated with January 6th. This fact, along with the temporary closure of the Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers (FLETC) as a result of the global pandemic, have contributed to the USCP's shortfall of 447 officers, causing a rise in mandatory overtime requirements and adding stress to a work force already stretched thin.

This staffing shortfall is the biggest challenge facing the USCP. However, working with the various oversight committees of jurisdiction and the Board, the USCP has developed a two-part strategy to address personnel concerns and relieve officer stress while still maintaining required levels of security.

The first pillar of the USCP's strategy involves the contracting of security officers to staff posts that the USCP has identified as suitable for security officer coverage (such as interior posts where individuals have already been screened by sworn personnel at building entrances) or where the USCP must maintain a tactical advantage. This provides the fastest option to supplement the sworn workforce and provide USCP officers the opportunity for increased leave and training opportunities. In addition, the USCP is increasing recruit classes at FLETC with the goal of bringing on 280 additional officers per year to get ahead of attrition rates. Finally, the Department is exploring re-employed annuitant and lateral hiring initiatives, has issued retention bonuses and hazard pay, and is exploring specialty pay for CDU units.

The second pillar focuses on employee wellness to maintain a healthy work force. The list of accomplishments in this area is substantial. For example,

- the USCP will soon inaugurate the Howard C. Liebengood Center for Wellness so employees have a central location for all their wellness needs;
- increased the USCP Fitness Center contract staff by 4 Wellness Specialists to support, among other things, enforcement of COVID protocols and provide 24-hour access to personal health and wellbeing plans;
- implemented Adapted Physical Readiness Testing for new sworn recruits to promote social distancing;
- revised physical ability tests, such as bench presses and sprints, to align with requirements of other federal agencies;

- contracted with the Center for Mind Body Medicine and the U.S. Marshals Service to provide trauma and resiliency skills to the workforce;
- in the process of hiring 3 Wellness Specialists and 3 Trauma Informed Specialists to permanently expand wellbeing and resiliency services;
- implemented a Wellness Support Dog program with the addition of two support dogs;
- implemented a Peer Support Program and detailed trained, sworn officers to the Wellness Program to provide the Peer Support for other sworn officers; and finally,
- provided Trauma-Informed mental health support through a contract with the House Office of Employee Assistance.

Operational Planning

The USCP took a significant step in shoring up its operational planning by hiring a former U.S. Secret Service official with extensive experience in major event and National Special Security Event planning to help oversee a new department-wide operational planning process. The USCP now take a multi-phased approach to the event planning process, with a focus on information gathering, intelligence, asset determination, internal coordination, and execution. The USCP created and implemented the Department's first Critical Incident Response Plan to formalize assistance requests from partner agencies. The USCP continues to work on developing its own Special Event Assessment Rating – or SEAR—similar to the system employed by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), to establish a scale for resource planning.

All of these efforts undergird progress on operational coordination and management, which includes the creation of Incident Action Plans (IAPs) for all large and high-profile events. This has been a game-changer. IAPs are now disseminated Department-wide in advance of all large and high-profile events, and serve as a comprehensive blue print for intelligence, operational, command, and communications plans, and include media, logistics, and deployment components as well. The Department now also engages in inter-agency coordination calls before all large and high-profile events, pre- and post-event officer briefings and readouts, resource realignments, the dissemination of use-of-force and other relevant bulletins, after-action reports, and other measures designed to improve overall coordination and efficiency.

This new operational planning process was used in the lead-up to the September 18th demonstration event where the Department integrated local law enforcement assets in the training, planning and deployment of those assets for the event. The Department also worked with federal partners, such as the Department of Health and Human Services for assistance with medical needs, and the National Guard, having them on standby for ready access. In addition, the Department requested a SEAR rating from DHS to assist in planning. It should be noted that the SEAR rating for the event rose from a level 5 to a level 3 SEAR, an acknowledgment that the intelligence surrounding the event was increasing. Finally, the USCP, in conjunction with the Architect of the Capitol (AOC) and Capitol Police Board, deployed temporary fencing around Capitol Square. To reduce risk and avoid disruption, the fencing was deployed during non-core business hours and removed immediately after the event, with little to no disruption to the Capitol Complex. While the event was peaceful, the USCP nevertheless received some criticism due the cost and perceived over-deployment of assets. However, the event provided real-time

validation of the operational planning changes instituted by the Department and is proof-positive of why the Capitol Complex is safer today than it was on January 6th.

Civil Disturbance Unit (CDU) Enhancements

The USCP is focusing a great deal of our effort on front-line officers, the CDU. Many of the improvements already mentioned are directed to the CDU teams. The USCP has taken, and continues to take, significant steps to strengthen their effectiveness and increase officer protection. From providing dozens of training classes—with both state and federal agencies—to conducting table top exercises and refresher courses for officers and officials, the USCP has made great strides. Keeping officers safe as they protect the congressional community is our paramount objective.

Recognizing the strategic and tactical importance of CDU officers, the Department is looking to elevate the status of the CDU and incentivize its officers to keep the units intact. To that end, the USCP intends to create eight hard platoons staffed by officers assigned to the Uniformed Services Bureau and Operational Services Bureau. Each of these platoons will be permanent units whose members—officers as well as commanders—stay together. This internal integration will build rapport, consistency, camaraderie, and the strong commitment needed for these first responders to do their jobs effectively. CDU will be provided enhanced training modeled after the U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Park Police, and other agencies with needs similar to the USCP's, who have had success with this model.

The USCP has fortified the CDU by the establishment of a new unit—the Bike Response Team. The Department can now deploy 100 trained and certified officers, as well as eight trained and certified officials, to complement CDU operations. The entire Bike Response Team was stood up and launched for action in four months.

Informed by the weapons used on January 6, the Department also conducted a review and upgrade of all CDU equipment. To that end, the USCP ordered (and in many instances already issued) eye protectors, portable decontamination kits, shot launchers, and other protective equipment. The Department's operational bureaus further developed a quarterly inventory process and internal controls for munitions. All damaged and/or expired shields were replaced, and the USCP developed tactical plans to store additional equipment throughout strategic locations on the Capitol complex.

In addition, the training provided to CDU has been significantly enhanced. The following is a list of training provided specifically for CDU:

- held three CDU Basic Training Courses and trained 110 officers and officials – 40 hour course;
- held three CDU Refresher Training Courses prior to the September 18 demonstration – 16 hour course;
- held six PR-24 heavy baton courses and trained 164 officers and officials – 8 hour course;

- trained twenty-four FN-303 Operators of Less-than-Lethal weapons, trained 97 officers and officials – 8 hour course;
- trained three FN-303 Armorer/Instructors – 8 hour course;
- trained seven CDU Instructors to teach 40MM – 24 hour course;
- trained seven Containment and Emergency Response Team Instructors to teach 40MM – 24 hour course;
- trained five Officers in Level 1 Public Order Training by Secret Service – 40 hour course;
- deployed one Officer to Seattle Police Crowd Management Training – 8 hour course;
- deployed one Captain to Seattle Police Crowd Management Training – 8 hour course;
- conducted multiple USCP/National Guard Training Exercises – Multiple 3 hour courses;
- deployed eight CDU Officials to Virginia Beach Police Department CDU Commanders Course – 4 hour course;
- trained two Instructors in Pepper Ball Armorer Course – 16 hour course;
- hosted a USCP Public Order Commanders Course for 30 personnel – 40 hour course for CDU Commanders;
- hosted six USCP CDU Table Top Exercises;
- conducted hazardous materials refresher training for 84 personnel – 32 hour course;
- developed CDU Specialty Assignment Plan and Vacancy Announcement;
- designated CDU Captain to oversee all CDU training and operations; and
- redesigned CDU Incident Action Plans for improved event planning.

This wide array of training has yielded a more cohesive, better equipped, and better trained CDU to protect the Capitol campus.

Intelligence

Much of the criticism leading up to January 6th centers on the failure of law enforcement, particularly the USCP, to properly review, analyze, and disseminate available intelligence. Since January 6th, the USCP has made dramatic changes to the way it gathers, analyzes, and disseminates intelligence.

It must be emphasized, however, that the USCP had begun strengthening its intelligence apparatus before the insurrection. Prior to January 6th, the USCP had already recognized that its core intelligence component—the Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division (IICD)--has become a decentralized structure with informational silos, a reality that hampered its intelligence role and mission. The USCP was aware that it needed to expand the IICD into a centralized bureau with over-arching responsibility for the intelligence function. Thus, the USCP's current efforts build upon a pre-existing foundation of change. This continuous focus has yielded significant improvements, including:

- a nation-wide search for a permanent intelligence director—the Department is in the final stages of the process and expects to make a selection in the coming weeks;
- the development of a USCP intelligence product that is now shared with the Intelligence Community;
- the issuance of a daily intelligence report distributed to *all* officers;
- daily intelligence briefing for Department leadership;
- quarterly in-person intelligence briefings at roll calls;
- bi-weekly classified intelligence briefings;
- the sharing of intelligence assessments with external law enforcement partners;
- the coordination and lead role in calls with intelligence partners in advance of large and/or high-profile events;
- the revision of all intelligence SOPs, a process that is currently underway;
- the development of new position descriptions for all Intelligence Research Specialists that align with OPM position descriptions;
- the realignment of Task Force officers to enhance intelligence sharing and dissemination; and
- receipt of authorization for increasing staffing.

The USCP will continue to be forward-looking and proactive in its efforts to create a proven and reliable intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination program.

Incident Command

Since January 6th, the USCP has formalized the process for designating incident commanders for large and high-profile events, and developed contingency plans that anticipate and account for gaps in commander communications with officers.

The development and implementation of Incident Action Plans before every large or high-profile event helps ensure that the USCP is never again confronted with another January 6th. Indeed, incident action plans are designed to align to the Incident Command Structure model. Thus, the USCP has revised and improved its internal planning process to include increased involvement by all affected divisions to ensure all commanders are prepared for any event. The USCP has incorporated enhanced contingency plans into the overall planning process to account for unforeseen circumstances. The USCP also implemented and mandated standardized after-action-reports that solicit input from all ranks to provide “lessons learned” to inform future event planning.

The USCP has also made significant inroads into fortifying one of the critical pillars of event planning—inter-agency coordination. On this front, the Department has made many advancements, including:

- development of the first Critical Incident Response Plan to formalize the receipt of assistance from partner agencies;
- execution of specific memoranda of understanding to facilitate inter-agency coordination and assistance;
- implementation of a radio patch with external partner agencies from the National Capital Region (NCR) to improve inter-operability; and

- increased number of published reports for events occurring outside the NCR.

Capitol Police Board

The Board appointed J. Thomas Manger as the permanent USCP Chief of Police in July 2021 and empowered him to take charge and make decisions. The Board fully supports Chief Manger as he completes his evaluation of the department and his leadership team, and is committed to providing him with the resources and support needed to successfully lead the Department forward.

The Board has documented and streamlined its policies and procedures for submitting, reviewing, and approving requests from USCP to ensure coordination among all members of the Board. The Board approved an updated Manual of Procedures, codifying the Board's new commitment to transparency with Congressional stakeholders. The updated Manual includes a requirement that Board members regularly review the policies and procedures to acknowledge their understanding, and ensure adherence to the processes outlined therein. In addition, the Board has streamlined its review and approval process (to include the implementation of an all-electronic approval process). Over the next year, the Board Deputies plan to investigate Board governance software systems that could enable even easier coordination and collaboration on requests from USCP.

The Board's updated Manual of Procedures added new meetings with Congressional Oversight that will allow for direct information sharing and solicitation of frank feedback, as long as it does not infringe on the protection of sensitive and classified information. The Board's meeting minutes will also be available to the same Congressional Oversight stakeholders upon request.

Congress recently passed legislation that allows the U.S. Capitol Police (USCP) to request assistance from the National Guard without approval from the Board. Following the passage of the law, the Board revised its Manual of Procedures to make clear the USCP Chief of Police has the concurrent ability to appoint Special Police Officers without a Board declaration of emergency pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 1974(a).

Conclusion

Based on the above security enhancements, and those that are on-going, we are confident that the Capitol complex is more secure today than prior to January 6, 2021. In addition, the changes and improvements made by the USCP has transformed the USCP into a better prepared law enforcement agency. However, we cannot afford to be complacent. The safety and security of the U.S. Capitol, the Congress, and the legislative process remain our top priorities.

The United States Capitol Police and the Capitol Police Board is appreciative of the support from House and Senate Leadership and the Oversight Committees. We fully understand the need to restore confidence in our ability to fulfill our mission each day, no matter the circumstances. The men and women of the USCP proved their mettle on January 6th. As the security leadership for the Legislative Branch, we take full responsibility for restoring confidence in security. We have accomplished a great deal with more work to be done.