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FRAUD, WASTE, OR ABUSE MAY BE REPORTED TO SIGAR’S HOTLINE

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SIGAR’s oversight mission, as defined by the legislation, is to provide for the independent and objective

- conduct and supervision of audits and investigations relating to the programs and operations funded with amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan.
- leadership and coordination of, and recommendations on, policies designed to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of the programs and operations, and to prevent and detect waste, fraud, and abuse in such programs and operations.
- means of keeping the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense fully and currently informed about problems and deficiencies relating to the administration of such programs and operation and the necessity for and progress on corrective action.

Afghanistan reconstruction includes any major contract, grant, agreement, or other funding mechanism entered into by any department or agency of the U.S. government that involves the use of amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan.

(For a list of the congressionally mandated contents of this report, see Section 3.)
Provinces where SIGAR has conducted audit, inspection, and investigation work

Current SIGAR offices

Still undergoing repairs after 2013 insurgent attack
I am pleased to submit to Congress, and to the Secretaries of State and Defense, SIGAR’s 23rd quarterly report on the status of the U.S. reconstruction effort in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan enjoyed a rare moment of optimism this quarter. On April 5, 2014, more than seven million Afghans, 35% of them women, went to the polls to choose a new president and provincial council members, according to the National Democratic Institute. Despite Taliban threats and a string of murderous attacks on foreigners and Afghans in the weeks leading up to the elections, the Afghan National Security Forces managed to keep 6,218 out of 6,423 polling stations open. Early indications reported by Afghanistan’s Independent Election Commission suggest a runoff is likely between presidential candidates Abdullah Abdullah and Mohammad Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai. Both men have promised to sign a bilateral security agreement which would keep some U.S. troops in Afghanistan to support continued training of Afghanistan’s security forces and pave the way for continued reconstruction support.

Despite the prospect of a peaceful, democratic transition of power, grave dangers still remain for U.S.-funded reconstruction. The World Bank has predicted for several years that Afghanistan would suffer an economic contraction as Coalition troops draw down. The country’s domestic revenues for the last Afghan fiscal year (December 21, 2012–December 20, 2013) fell short of Ministry of Finance targets by 11.9%. At the same time, the Afghan government’s expenses have increased, exacerbating an already significant gap between revenue collection and budget expenditures. Afghan revenues in 2014 could cover as little as a third of the country’s $7.5 billion budget. The revenue decline comes at a time when dozens of reconstruction projects and their associated operation-and-maintenance costs are being turned over to the Afghan government.

Some of SIGAR’s work this quarter focused on this issue. Customs revenue has accounted for between 44% and 48% of Afghanistan’s total domestic revenue for the past three fiscal years. Yet a SIGAR performance audit published in April found that, despite the U.S. allocation of $198 million to develop Afghan capacity to assess and collect customs revenue, its potential as a stable source of government income remains uncertain. SIGAR’s auditors found that the single biggest issue limiting collection of customs revenues is corruption. Moreover, U.S. advisors report that Afghan employees who try to properly collect customs duties have been kidnapped and intimidated. Section 1 of this report discusses the threat that corruption poses to the reconstruction effort as a whole.

During my visit to Afghanistan this quarter, I toured the forward operating base at the Torkham Gate Border Crossing on the border with Pakistan. About 80% of Afghanistan’s customs revenues are reportedly collected at this crossing, the country’s busiest. I was told that when U.S. mentors and observers are not present, revenue collection falls. This was not encouraging, especially as the crossing will soon be outside the reach of U.S. personnel because the U.S. military will no longer be able to provide escort to the area.

I continue to have serious concerns about the ability of U.S. agencies to implement and monitor reconstruction programs as U.S. forces withdraw. In February, SIGAR, together with the United States Institute for Peace, convened a symposium to discuss the oversight challenges and identify best practices for remote management and monitoring in insecure
environments. We will soon issue a report on the symposium that will outline the options for oversight post-2014.

The 20 audits, inspections, and other reports SIGAR issued this quarter examined programs and projects worth approximately $31 billion. They identified failures of planning, construction, and oversight. They also raised concerns about International Security Assistance Force plans to sustain their capability-assessment efforts of the Afghan security forces, USAID’s strategy for Afghanistan’s water sector, and the rising cost of installing an additional power-generating turbine at Kajaki Dam. SIGAR also completed two financial audits which identified nearly $14.5 million in questioned costs for this quarter out of almost $75.3 million to date. Section 2 of this report summarizes our findings and recommendations.

Since my last report to Congress, SIGAR has opened 60 new investigations and closed 40, bringing the total number of ongoing investigations to 338. The criminal fines, restitutions, forfeitures, and cost savings to the U.S. government from SIGAR’s ongoing investigations in this reporting period amounted to approximately $6.7 million. SIGAR’s suspension and debarment program referred 16 individuals and 15 companies for suspension or debarment based on allegations that they engaged in fraud and non-performance as part of contracts valued at almost $61 million.

This quarter, I reiterate my concerns about the policies of the U.S. Army’s suspension and debarment program. As I have pointed out in the last four quarterly reports, the Army’s refusal to suspend or debar supporters of the insurgency from receiving government contracts because the information supporting these recommendations is classified is not only legally wrong, but contrary to sound policy and national-security goals. I continue to urge Congress to change this misguided policy and impose common sense on the Army’s suspension and debarment program.

Since 2002, the Congress has appropriated nearly $103.2 billion to rebuild Afghanistan—more than the United States has ever spent on reconstruction of any other nation. SIGAR is concerned about the ability of the Afghan government to sustain the achievements of the past 12 years in light of the increasing gap between its revenues and its obligations. The United States and its allies have been providing budget assistance—either through multinational trust funds or as direct government-to-government aid—to help cover the Afghan government’s budget shortfalls. We will continue to monitor and assess U.S. direct assistance programs. We will also be taking a serious look at program design, implementation, and sustainability in a series of sector-wide audits currently under way.

As Afghanistan embarks on the first democratic transfer of power in its history, my staff and I look forward to working together with Congress, implementing agencies, and other oversight bodies to ensure that U.S. tax dollars are not subject to corruption or waste.

Respectfully,

John F. Sopko
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report provides a summary of SIGAR’s oversight work and an update on developments in the three major sectors of Afghanistan’s reconstruction effort from January 1 to March 31, 2014.* It also includes a discussion of the threat corruption poses to the reconstruction effort. During this reporting period, SIGAR published 20 audits, inspections, alert letters, and other reports assessing the U.S. efforts to build the Afghan security forces, improve governance, and facilitate economic and social development. These reports identified a number of problems, including weaknesses of assessment and oversight, corruption, construction deficiencies, and other threats to health and safety. The criminal fines, restitutions, forfeitures, and cost savings to the U.S. government from SIGAR’s ongoing investigations in this reporting period amounted to approximately $6.7 million. SIGAR investigations also resulted in an arrest, a criminal information, two plea agreements, and six sentencings in the United States. In Afghanistan, two subjects were convicted and sentenced and eight individuals were barred from having military installation access.

SIGAR OVERVIEW

AUDITS

SIGAR produced three performance audits, two financial audits, two inspections, and two inspection alert letters. The performance audits found:

- The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) needs to improve its plans for sustaining capability-assessment efforts of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) after Coalition troops draw down.
- Despite some successes in building the Afghan government’s capacity to assess and collect customs revenue, challenges will limit customs as a sustainable source of revenue for Afghanistan.
- The United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID) strategy for Afghanistan’s water sector needs to be updated to ensure effective oversight and accountability.

The financial audits identified nearly $14.5 million in questioned costs as a result of internal control deficiencies and noncompliance issues. These deficiencies and noncompliance issues included, among other things, inadequate cash disbursement controls resulting in theft of federal funds, missing timesheets, management and administration costs charged to the wrong Afghanistan reconstruction award, failure to conduct vendor suspension and debarment checks, ineligible entertainment expenses, poor record retention, lack of supporting documentation, failure to adhere to procurement procedures, improper approvals for invoices and payment application requests, and failure to complete a road construction project in accordance with award requirements.

The inspection alert letters informed the Department of Defense (DOD) that SIGAR has opened a preliminary investigation into the construction of an incinerator system at FOB Sharana in Paktika Province and the State Department (State) of design and construction defects at a prison in Baghlan Province.

The inspection reports of U.S.-funded facilities discussed the following issues:

- Comments from U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) on SIGAR’s inspection of Salang Hospital
- Whether Camp Monitor in Jowzjan Province is being used as intended

NEW AUDITS AND INSPECTIONS

This quarter, SIGAR initiated six new performance audits, 27 new financial audits, and five new inspections. The six new performance audits will assess:

- The status of all recommendations made to State, USAID, and DOD in financial, inspection, or audit reports
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- U.S. assistance to develop rule-of-law programs in Afghanistan
- Programs and initiatives undertaken by State and USAID to assist Afghan refugees and internally displaced persons
- The extent to which DOD’s Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO) and USAID programs met their goals to develop Afghanistan’s extractives industry

The 27 new financial audits will examine DOD, State, and USAID awards with combined incurred costs of more than $2.3 billion, bringing the total number of ongoing financial audits to 45 with nearly $4.1 billion in costs incurred.

The five new inspections will examine two industrial parks, an ANA slaughterhouse, the ANA Camp Commando complex, and the Afghan Ministry of Defense Headquarters.

SPECIAL PROJECTS
During this reporting period, the Office of Special Projects issued a fact sheet on State’s assistance to Afghanistan. In addition, the office issued inquiry letters on:
- An Mi-17 crash and demolition
- Afghan National Police (ANP) ghost workers
- Document preservation from a review of a decision to build a 64,000-square-foot building
- Communications towers not being used for their intended purpose
- DOD contract data
- Cancelled USAID contracts
- An ANP mobile money pilot program
- A U.S. Department of Agriculture soybean program

INVESTIGATIONS
During the reporting period, SIGAR’s ongoing investigations saved the U.S. government approximately $2.7 million. SIGAR investigations also resulted in an arrest, a criminal information, two plea agreements, and six sentencings in the United States. In Afghanistan, two subjects were convicted and sentenced and eight individuals were barred from having military installation access. Criminal fines, restitutions, and forfeitures amounted to nearly $4 million. SIGAR initiated 60 new investigations and closed 40, bringing the total number of ongoing investigations to 338. In addition, SIGAR’s suspension and debarment program referred 16 individuals and 15 companies for suspension or debarment based on evidence developed as part of investigations conducted by SIGAR in Afghanistan and the United States.

Investigations highlights include:
- An investigation of a trucking company that saved the U.S. government $2.5 million
- Two U.S. soldiers sentenced for bribery and conspiracy
- Two Afghan truck drivers convicted of theft
- Disruption of a human trafficking scheme at Kandahar Airfield
- A U.S. couple convicted of conspiracy to commit fraud
- A U.S. Army sergeant convicted of conspiracy and theft
- A State Department contractor sentenced for receipt of an illegal gratuity

* SIGAR may also report on products and events occurring after March 31, 2014, up to the publication date.
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“An economy can only absorb a certain amount of inputs until it becomes saturated. Additional input goes somewhere else, usually capital flight, usually illicit. In Afghanistan, absorptive capacity [was] reached in the first year of operations. That led to the corruption eruption.”

—Senior USAID official
1 CORRUPTION THREATENS RECONSTRUCTION
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Corruption threatens reconstruction

“Corruption directly threatens the viability and legitimacy of the Afghan state” was the dire warning of an important study issued this quarter by a section of the Joint Staff of the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD). The study, commissioned by General Joseph F. Dunford, Commander of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A), summarized the danger: “Corruption alienates key elements of the population, discredits the government and security forces, undermines international support, subverts state functions and rule of law, robs the state of revenue, and creates barriers to economic growth.” The Joint Staff report drew in part on SIGAR audits and echoed observations made by academics and individuals involved in Coalition efforts to stabilize and develop Afghanistan. Displaying a critical awareness and candor often missing from official documents, the report laid out some key findings:

• The initial U.S. strategy in Afghanistan fostered a political climate conducive to corruption.
• Massive military and aid spending overwhelmed the Afghan government’s ability to absorb it. This, coupled with weak oversight, created opportunities for corruption.
• The lack of a common understanding of the nature of corruption stymied efforts to combat it.
• The lack of political will on the part of both the international community and the Afghan government to combat corruption resulted in a culture of impunity that frustrated anti-corruption efforts.
• The failure to develop a comprehensive U.S. anti-corruption strategy reduced the effectiveness of various anticorruption initiatives.

Surveys, audits, legal proceedings, and observations from Afghans and international observers have long identified corruption as one of the most serious obstacles to the reconstruction effort. Transparency International has Afghanistan tied for last place with Somalia and North Korea as the country perceived as the most corrupt of 177 countries rated. Members of Congress and U.S. officials have expressed growing concern.

Even as U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID) official Donald L. Sampler told a House subcommittee in early April about Afghanistan’s U.S.-funded achievements, he observed that it is “the most corrupt place I’ve ever been to.” The Joint Staff report makes clear that U.S. government efforts helped create an environment in which corruption could flourish.

**U.S. STRATEGY CONTRIBUTED TO CORRUPTION**

The U.S. military used a proxy force—composed largely of warlords associated with Afghanistan’s Northern Alliance—to drive the Taliban and al-Qaeda from power in 2001. However, as several civilian and military analysts have pointed out, and as the military’s latest study reiterates, these warlords often used U.S. support to operate with impunity to increase their political power and improve their economic positions. Afghan political leaders have built allegiances by cutting political deals that put powerful figures in key government positions and allowed them to behave with impunity.

Some of these figures have used their government positions to entrench and expand their patronage networks. In some cases, these patronage networks have morphed into criminal networks involved in everything from extrajudicial land seizures and extortion, to narcotics trafficking and money laundering.

Rule-of-law and democracy scholar Sarah Chayes of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace argues that the military gave short shrift to corruption, even as its presence aggravated the problem:
At every echelon, short-term security imperatives repeatedly trumped corruption concerns. Battalion commanders got cozy with police officials whose men were shaking down locals at every checkpoint, with a blow or an insulting sneer, or were imprisoning people for ransom, or demanding young sons for service as tea-boys—and other activities. Diplomats stood shoulder-to-shoulder with provincial governors who were key nodes in predatory government networks. The CIA insisted on secretly paying off key assets, including Afghan President Hamid Karzai … And Afghans were watching. “People think the Americans must want the corruption,” a former Kandahar neighbor remarked.

Into this environment, the United States poured billions of reconstruction dollars.

TOO MUCH MONEY, TOO LITTLE OVERSIGHT

The Joint Staff report found “the deluge of military and aid money into Afghanistan” overwhelmed the Afghan government’s ability to absorb these funds. This, coupled with weak oversight by U.S. implementing agencies and other international donors, “created ample opportunities for corruption.”

Afghan officials, including President Hamid Karzai, have accused the international community of fueling corruption. Senior U.S. officials have acknowledged that the Afghan president has a point. U.S. Army Major General Herbert R. McMaster, who headed a task force set up in part to combat corruption, told a university audience in Kabul in 2011, “Corruption has been exacerbated by the vast sums of international resources that have entered Afghanistan over the last ten years, often without adequate oversight. . . .”

Reconstruction assistance alone has dwarfed the size of the Afghan economy. For example, according to the World Bank, Afghanistan’s total GDP amounted to about $15.9 billion in 2010. That year, Congress appropriated President Obama’s request for more than $16 billion to build Afghanistan’s security forces, government, and economy. This did not include the tens of billions of dollars spent that year on the U.S. military operations in Afghanistan. Since 2010, Congress has provided nearly $64 billion for reconstruction programs. This is nearly 62% of the $103 billion Congress has appropriated for Afghanistan’s reconstruction since 2002.

In a speech to the Atlantic Council in March this year, Special Inspector General John Sopko posed the question: “How was Afghanistan, with its very poor economy, going to efficiently absorb this largesse, and why would corrupt officials and others looking at floods of poorly supervised cash and an uncertain future not take advantage of the opportunity to take a cut for themselves?”

SIGAR and others have found that U.S. implementing agencies have not always exercised sufficient oversight of their massive spending. SIGAR
Corruption Threatens

Audits and inspections have catalogued lack of planning, contract mis-management, poor quality control, and weak accountability. Consequently, Afghanistan has schools built so badly they are in danger of collapsing, clinics with no doctors or medical supplies, police and army barracks that are not fit to use, and roads that are disintegrating for lack of maintenance.

There are many explanations for the inadequate management and oversight, including poor security, a high turnover of U.S. military and civilian personnel, widespread failure to observe rules, lack of an integrated interagency system to track reconstruction projects, and inadequate imposition of accountability for incompetent or dishonest actions. The result of these and other flaws has been to leave the door open—or open it wider—to corruption.

Coalition efforts to tackle corruption have also been stymied by imprecise descriptions of corruption.

No Clear Definition of Corruption

The Joint Staff report pointed out that the United States and its coalition partners have not had a clear, shared definition of corruption, or a full appreciation of how Afghans perceived corruption. A 2013 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) report on corruption made the same observation, pointing out that “The concept is generally understood the world over but cultural factors, variances in laws between nations, and other factors blur the line between what is acceptable or not in a given country; even the UN Convention Against Corruption does not define

Snow is removed from the Gardez Khowst road. Bribe seeking at highway checkpoints is a common form of corruption in Afghanistan. (USAID/Afghanistan photo)
the term.”13 Afghanistan ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption in 2008. However, as the ISAF report notes, the UN list of terms does not explicitly define “corruption,” but lists a number of “predicate acts” like embezzlement and money laundering.

The Afghan statute that established Afghanistan’s High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption, (or “HOO,” which is also sometimes abbreviated as “HOOAC”) takes a broader official view of corruption, covering conduct that many people would consider dereliction of duty or poor performance rather than overt corruption: unauthorized destruction of official records, exceeding legal scope of authority, “concealing the truth,” and delaying execution of assigned duties.14 As the wording of the HOO statute illustrates, formal definitions of corruption can vary in their expansiveness.

The DOD Joint Staff, citing definitions that revolve around abuse of public office and private gain, pointed out that “The words ‘abuse’ and ‘private’ were often not appropriate” for dealing with conditions in Afghanistan, where gifts to officials and favors for ethnic or tribal patronage networks are normal. ISAF eventually defined corruption as “the misuse of power for personal gain,” but found applying even that loose standard challenging.15 Corruption in Afghanistan includes everything from petty bribery for routine services, nepotism, and tribal preference, to contract fraud, large-scale theft of resources, and subversion of the justice system.

**Petty Corruption on a Grand Scale**
No one knows just how much Afghans pay each year in bribes, but the estimates are substantial. The United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reported last year that in 2012, “half of Afghan citizens paid a bribe while requesting a public service” and “bribes paid to public officials amounted to US $ 3.9 billion,” equivalent to 20% of the country’s gross domestic product.16 The biannual National Corruption Survey by the nongovernmental group Integrity Watch Afghanistan had a much lower number. It estimated that Afghans paid about $1.25 billion in bribes in 2012 compared to $1.07 billion in 2010.17 This survey found that 18% of respondents had paid a bribe to public officials, such as the police. The average respondent had paid four bribes averaging about $190 each—a significant cost for people in a country with a per capita gross domestic product of only $687.18 Integrity Watch is currently reviewing the findings of a new corruption survey which it plans to publish in the coming months. It told SIGAR that its preliminary findings indicate that corruption has become even more of a problem.

These varying estimates—at minimum equivalent to more than half the Afghan government’s domestic revenue—result from bribes paid to public officials for services such as getting a government form stamped or paying a bribe to get through a police checkpoint. The UNODC has pointed out that the scale and pervasiveness of corruption partly reflects Afghan
attitudes and practices. Afghans see corruption as a problem for their country—but also accept some forms of it in ordinary life. The UNODC says 68% of citizens interviewed in 2012 thought it acceptable for civil servants to augment their low salaries with small bribes, while 67% considered it sometimes acceptable for family ties and friendship to determine civil-service hiring.19 The HOO has also described some petty bribery as simply a response to a “difficult, intolerable, time consuming and expensive” process for getting permits, licenses, or document recording, adding “All these processes involve and facilitate petty corruption.”20 While some have argued that this “petty bribery” is the way Afghans have traditionally operated, Sarah Chayes, who ran a business in Kandahar and served as an advisor to ISAF for several years before joining the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, says the bribery occurs within “vertically integrated” networks of corruption:

Western analysts and decision-makers tend to discount what they call “petty corruption”—constant police shake-downs in the guise of traffic enforcement; demands for payment by school principals, doctors, or even the clerk in charge of filling out death certificates . . . and systematic sale of judicial decisions. Many Westerners describe such abuses as merely the greasing of the wheels necessary to “get things done” in developing countries. In fact, such injustices and humiliations are sources of daily outrage to citizens . . . And they are intimately linked to the rent-seeking at the top. For these corrupt networks are vertically integrated. In Afghanistan, the Kandahar bench pays a monthly cut of the bribes local judges extort to the chief justice of the Supreme Court, according to public prosecutors.21

In other words, this petty bribery—or predatory corruption—is a significant feature of the spider web of corruption that has ensnared the financial and justice sectors, impeded revenue collection, tolerated land appropriations, and fed criminal patronage networks.

Grand Corruption Undermines Public Trust

Systemic, large-scale corruption impedes Afghan revenue collection, jeopardizes economic development, and thwarts efforts to establish the rule of law. The U.S. reconstruction strategy includes helping the Afghan government collect more revenues to cover its budget shortfall and become less dependent on the international community for its operating expenses. A SIGAR audit of the Afghan customs system released this quarter found, “Corruption is affecting all levels of the customs process and is the biggest issue affecting Afghan customs processes and revenues.” The audit notes that the extent and impact of customs corruption is “difficult to quantify,” but cites U.S. agencies’ estimates that tens of millions of dollars are lost to smuggling each year and that reducing corruption “could
potentially double the customs revenues remitted to the central government." The audit also notes that the United States has spent at least $198 million since 2009 to improve the Afghan government’s ability to assess and collect customs revenue.22

Since 2012, Afghanistan has not been able to meet its revenue collection targets. Between December 2012 and December 2013, it missed its $2.4 billion target by nearly 12%. U.S. and Afghan officials have told reporters that it could miss its 2014 target of $2.5 billion by as much as 20%. This would mean that the Afghan government will only be able to pay for about a third of its $7.5 billion budget. It will depend on the international community to cover the shortfall. See Section 3 of this report, page 159 for a full discussion of the Afghan budget.

The Afghan government and the international community are hoping that Afghanistan can boost its economy and increase revenues by developing the private sector, particularly in mining. However, plans to develop the country’s energy and mineral resources, described in Section 3 of this report, could also expand the opportunities for grand corruption beyond those currently available through the country’s world-leader status as an opium producer if the government has not established and cannot enforce a legal framework for mine development.

At the same time, corruption seriously hampers efforts to develop a responsible and tax-paying private sector. As the HOO put it, “Corruption constrains private sector investment, increases transaction costs, exposes entrepreneurs to threats of extortion and erodes business confidence via the unpredictability of licensing, property ownership, intellectual and other property rights/contracts.”23

A World Bank analysis comparing the business climates of 185 countries supports this view. Although the World Bank put Afghanistan in 28th place for ease of starting a business, it ranked the country 164th for enforcing contracts and 185th for protecting investors.24 Potential investors might well wonder how great a role corruption plays in those rankings—and how much it might cost them to ensure better treatment.

The Kabul Bank saga, which SIGAR has reported on extensively in both its quarterly report to Congress and its audits of the financial sector, exemplifies how the patronage system and the deliberate failure to prosecute people guilty of gross fraud and abuse is undermining the Afghan economy and putting future development efforts at grave risk. Before its near collapse in 2010, the Kabul Bank was Afghanistan’s largest private bank. Individuals and companies associated with the bank stole about $935 million from the bank, largely through fraudulent loan activity. About 92% of the funds went to 19 well-connected individuals. Afghanistan’s central bank covered the losses, which were the equivalent of more than half the government’s entire domestic revenue in 2010, and represented about 5% of the country’s GDP at the time.
Despite multiple investigations and international pressure to hold the individuals involved in the theft accountable, the Afghan government has recovered only about $174.5 million. The Afghan Attorney General’s Office deliberately slow-walked the investigation and although a few people have received light sentences, most of the key perpetrators, including members of the country’s political elite, have not been brought to justice. (See Section 3, page 167 for an update on the Kabul Bank.)

The Kabul Bank crisis has had a profound impact on the entire financial sector. SIGAR recently issued an audit that found the banking system remains extremely fragile. The central bank lacks capacity and is in desperate need of technical assistance. However, the Afghan government has banned U.S. advisors from working at the central bank. SIGAR auditors concluded that Afghanistan is at serious risk of another banking crisis.25

Failure to reform and regulate the banking sector is putting the country’s future development in jeopardy. For example, the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Extended Credit Facility (ECF) provides medium-term assistance to low-income countries at little or no interest. The loan agreement with Afghanistan is contingent on the government’s making banking and financial reforms that would increase transparency and accountability. These include passing an internationally acceptable anti-money-laundering law—something the Afghan government has refused to do—and facilitating information sharing between the central bank and Afghan law enforcement agencies as well as meeting macroeconomic targets. The IMF will not disburse any ECF funds without a favorable board review. It has not disbursed any funds since 2012 because Afghanistan has not made enough progress on reform.

This quarter, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)—an international body that sets standards to combat money laundering, terrorist financing, and other threats to the integrity of the international financial system—downgraded Afghanistan’s status because of its continued failure to improve its money-laundering countermeasures. Experts have cautioned that Afghanistan is at risk of being blacklisted. A blacklisting, which would make it difficult for Afghan banks to have correspondent relationships with international banks, could be devastating to the financial sector and the overall economy. Afghanistan must have a reliable banking system that observes and enforces internationally accepted rules to attract foreign investment as well as keep international assistance flowing after 2014. For more information on this issue, see Section 3 of this report.

LACK OF POLITICAL WILL TO COMBAT CORRUPTION
The Joint Staff report concluded that neither the international community nor the Afghan government has been fully committed to combating corruption. The study pointed out that Coalition forces did not focus on corruption at all until 2009 for a variety of reasons:
• ISAF did not have the ability to accurately assess the impact of corruption.
• The U.S. military has no programs to train and equip personnel to combat corruption.
• High turnover of staff made it difficult to institute anticorruption measures.

At the same time, the Joint Staff report found, the U.S. military was reluctant to address the problem of corruption unless there appeared to be countermeasures the military could take. Indeed, it said the Afghan setting creates a problem for donor nations attempting to implement both anti- and counter-corruption measures. DOD’s JCOA report notes that anticorruption measures like transparency requirements, accountability control, inspections, and audits limit opportunities for corruption and influence individual behavior, but do not actually sanction wrongdoers. Sanctioning occurs under counter corruption measures that entail both punishment and deterrence. Unfortunately, in Afghanistan, “Counter corruption measures were strongly reliant upon an effective legal system, particularly an independent judiciary.” Afghanistan has neither an independent judiciary nor a legal system focused on rooting out corruption.26

Developing indigenous institutions to combat systemic corruption is extremely difficult. In a study of legitimacy in fragile states, the international Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) observed that “A fundamental problem in many fragile states is that political and economic elites may have very little interest in strengthening state capacity or in constructive engagement with their own citizens, because they do not depend on them for revenue.” Instead, the OECD explained that elites in some poor countries enjoy “unprecedented opportunities for personal enrichment” through smuggling, export deals, and proceeds of trade in illegal narcotics.27

In an April 2014 speech, President Karzai argued that Afghanistan will not successfully address corruption unless it makes progress on government reforms that would provide civil servants with a living wage and secure future. “In order to fight graft, we must reform our administrative system and make sure we pay enough salary to our employees and make sure their future is guaranteed,” he said, “So far, I don’t see signs of success in fighting graft or making government reforms.”28

The HOO has described corruption as a deep-rooted structural problem, exacerbated by both internal and external factors. Among the internal factors, the HOO listed the following:
• weak institutional capacity at national and provincial levels
• weak legislative and regulatory framework
• weak enforcement of laws and regulations
• poor and/or non-merit based recruitment of public officials
Corruption Threatens

- low salaries and insufficient numbers of law enforcement officials
- lack of complaint mechanisms and systems for public scrutiny
- illegal profits from opium trade and cross-border smuggling

The HOO also suggests the international community has contributed to corruption through its “unprecedented large inflows of international assistance” in the form of development and humanitarian aid and contract funds supporting international forces, security firms, and the Afghan National Security Forces.

The HOO, however, is part of the problem. As USAID reported to SIGAR this quarter, the HOO has done very little to combat corruption. USAID’s program to build help the HOO build capacity ended in November 2013. USAID has described the HOO as dysfunctional, ineffective, and politicized. See Section 3 for a discussion of the HOO.

DOD and State have also been very critical of the Afghan Attorney General’s Office, the institution charged by the Afghan constitution with investigating and prosecuting crimes in Afghanistan. SIGAR investigators, working in close cooperation with other federal law enforcement agencies, have helped to identify some of the criminal networks and the degree to which they operate in collusion with Afghan authorities. They have first-hand experience of how difficult it is for Afghan law enforcement to prosecute serious corruption cases. Afghanistan’s Attorney General has deliberately avoided prosecuting either senior officials or individuals with ties to senior officials.

Failure to Develop a Comprehensive Anticorruption Strategy

Although U.S. civilian and military agencies have launched a variety of programs to tackle corruption in Afghanistan, the United States has never had a comprehensive strategy to guide U.S. anticorruption activities in Afghanistan. It was not until the 2010 donor conference in London that the international community specifically raised corruption as a serious concern. That year, the donors and the Afghan government also established the Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (MEC) to address international concerns about corruption. By 2012, at the Tokyo donors’ conference, the donors were far more explicit. They made assistance after 2014 contingent on the Afghan government’s meeting reform benchmarks defined in the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework. These benchmarks, however, tend to be vague and lack measurable outcomes.

Meanwhile, the United States began establishing various task forces to try to understand the pervasive and interlinked nature of corruption. In 2010, the Defense Department established Task Force 2010 to ensure that U.S.-funded contracts did not support the insurgency. It also created Task
Corruption Threatens

Force Shafafiyat—which means “transparency”—to focus on the intersection of corruption with the narcotics trade and the insurgency. The U.S. Embassy Kabul circulated a draft of a comprehensive anticorruption strategy in 2010, but the Secretary of State never formally approved it. SIGAR has repeatedly recommended that the United States develop and implement a comprehensive anticorruption strategy to deal with what General John Allen, the outgoing commander of U. S. Forces in Afghanistan in 2013, described to President Obama as “the existential, strategic threat to Afghanistan.”

While developing such a strategy may not be easy, it is an essential step to tackling a problem that threatens to undermine the entire U.S. effort in Afghanistan.

Developing an Anticorruption Strategy Is Not Easy

International financial institutions and global think tanks have pointed out that corruption cannot be solved easily or quickly. Norway’s internationally funded Chr. Michelson Institute recently published an analysis of donor responses to corruption in Afghanistan, Tanzania, and Zambia. It concluded that available research suggests that development partners “have a limited likelihood of influencing wider corruption trends.” The Norwegian report also suggested that “failed reform efforts can even be harmful by reinforcing the feeling the majority has of being ‘trapped’ in a corrupt ‘game.’” The study posed an important question for policy-makers to consider: “Would it be a mistake to try and ‘take the bull by the horns’ in environments where the bull has a million horns?”

In Afghanistan and other developing countries, the United States and other international donors have called for, promoted, advised on, or finally supported in-country monitoring agencies, democracy, rule of law, higher wages for public employees, independent courts, free press, growth of civil society, and other efforts to undercut corruption. Swedish university researchers examining the results of such efforts in Africa, however, concluded “Few successes have resulted from the investment.” The researchers found that “Insofar as corruption is the expected behavior in a particular society we should expect monitoring devices and punishment regimes . . . to be largely ineffective since there will simply be no actors willing to enforce them.”

People intent on illicit enrichment can and will change their behavior to evade anticorruption measures. A research review by professors at MIT and Harvard found “fairly robust evidence” for believing that “Corrupt officials respond to monitoring and punishments as one would expect from basic incentive theory,” but adds, “the ability of corrupt officials to substitute to alternate forms of corruption and to otherwise adapt to policy changes,

Sources: CMI and the International Centre for Tax and Development (http://www.ictd.ac/en/cmi-chr-michelsen-institute)
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either in the short or long run, suggests that applications of these [anticorruption] principles will be tricky in practice.\textsuperscript{38}

Despite the enormous challenges of implementing an anticorruption strategy, several developments in Afghanistan suggest that an emerging civil society is increasingly focused on exposing and combating corruption. As Special Inspector General John F. Sopko told the Atlantic Council in March this year, “Afghanistan has a growing number of organizations and individuals dedicated to exposing corruption and fostering the rule of law. It has a robust media that has highlighted and reflected Afghan dissatisfaction with corruption.”\textsuperscript{39} The MEC, which has Afghan and international representation, has proved to be an important body that has grappled with serious issues, identified corrupt practices, and made recommendations to improve transparency and accountability. It produced the single most important report on the Kabul Bank scandal. It has also pointed out that the Afghan Attorney General’s Office has not followed legal requirements in hiring prosecutors and needs to raise prosecutors’ salaries “to reduce the incentive for corruption.”\textsuperscript{40} Another MEC corruption-vulnerability assessment reported that Afghanistan’s pension-administration system suffered from opportunities for bribery, fake documents, lack of information on beneficiaries, and “unfair influence of high-ranking government officials.”\textsuperscript{41} Such courageous work from civil society actors like the MEC needs continued multifaceted support from the international community.
SAFEGUARDING FUTURE U.S. RECONSTRUCTION FUNDS

SIGAR has repeatedly called on the U.S. government to develop and implement a comprehensive civilian-military anticorruption strategy to protect the U.S. investment in Afghanistan. To prevent the waste, fraud, and abuse of reconstruction assistance, both the United States and whatever Afghan government emerges from the elections must make fighting corruption a high priority. The United States and its Coalition partners must also encourage the new government to comply with its international agreements and undertake the reforms promised at previous international donor conferences.

Special Inspector General Sopko has outlined areas where SIGAR believes the United States can help Afghans counter corruption. He has urged U.S. implementing agencies to take the following steps:

• Hold U.S. contractors and government employees accountable.
• Insist that the Afghans hold their contractors and government employees accountable.
• Continue to support U.S.-funded anticorruption efforts such as Task Force 2010 and the Afghan Threat Finance Cell.
• Care less about the burn rate and more about how funds are being spent.
• Recognize that too much money, spent too quickly, with too few safeguards, is a recipe for disaster.
• Insist that Afghan ministries develop and maintain good internal controls to receive U.S. funds.
• Provide support for Afghan civil society groups fighting corruption such as the MEC, Integrity Watch, and the nascent independent Afghan media.⁴²

Establishing and sustaining a long-term, coordinated, multi-front attack on corruption is a vital task for stewardship of America’s human and financial stake in Afghanistan, and for the future of the country and its people.
“The costs in Afghanistan—both in lives lost and money spent—have been enormous. If we don’t take advantage of this opportunity and get serious about corruption right now, we are putting all of the fragile gains that we have achieved in this—our longest war—at risk of failure.”

—Special Inspector General John F. Sopko
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SIGAR Chief of Staff Tim Nelson observes Shorandam Industrial Park as he and SIGAR colleagues approach the complex via helicopter. (SIGAR photo by Smythe Anderson)
This quarter SIGAR issued 20 audits, inspections, alert letters, and other reports that looked at programs worth nearly $31 billion. SIGAR questioned the sustainability of Afghanistan’s reconstruction in areas ranging from the Afghan government’s ability to collect customs revenue, to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) plans to sustain their capability-assessment efforts of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). It also uncovered failures of planning, oversight, and construction.

One performance audit found that the ISAF needs to improve plans for sustaining capability assessments of the ANSF. Another performance audit reported that questionable customs data, the withdrawal of international troops, and corruption all limit the future of customs revenue as a stable source of income for the Afghan government. A third performance audit determined that the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) needs to update its strategy for Afghanistan’s water sector to ensure appropriate oversight and accountability, and that four USAID water projects implemented since fiscal year (FY) 2010 show mixed performance results. An inspection warned that it was unclear if an Afghan National Army (ANA) facility in Jawzjan Province was being used as intended.

SIGAR’s financial audits have identified nearly $75.3 million in questioned costs and $140,894 in unremitted interest on advanced federal funds.

SIGAR’s Office of Special Projects wrote to USAID about concerns that the estimated cost of an additional power generating turbine at the Kajaki Dam has more than tripled to $75 million. In addition to other inquiry letters, Special Projects also queried USAID about a list of 17 projects that USAID identified as terminated, and wrote to the Department of Defense (DOD) to warn that key documents had apparently been withheld regarding a SIGAR investigation of decisions that led to constructing a still-unoccupied 64,000-square-foot building at Camp Leatherneck.

During the reporting period, the criminal fines, restitutions, forfeitures, and cost savings to the U.S. government from SIGAR’s ongoing investigations amounted to approximately $6.7 million. SIGAR investigations also resulted in an arrest, a criminal information, two plea agreements, and six sentencings in the United States. In Afghanistan, two subjects were convicted and sentenced and eight individuals were barred from access to the United States Congress.
SIGAR mourns the loss of Strategic Advisor Joel Brinkley, 61, who passed away unexpectedly on March 11, 2014, of complications due to undiagnosed acute leukemia.

Joel had taken up his position at SIGAR only three months earlier after a distinguished career as a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist and author. Most recently, he spent seven years as a professor of journalism at Stanford University. Before that he spent 23 years with The New York Times as a reporter, editor, and foreign correspondent. While at Stanford, Joel wrote a syndicated weekly op-ed column on foreign affairs that appeared in dozens of newspapers and websites in the United States and around the world each week. He wrote and blogged regularly for the World Affairs Journal and was Politico’s foreign affairs writer.

Joel was a native of Washington, D.C., and a graduate of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He began his journalism career at the Associated Press and over the following eight years worked for The Richmond News Leader and The Courier-Journal, of Louisville, Kentucky. He won the Pulitzer Prize in 1980 for his Journal reporting on the Cambodian refugee crisis. After joining the Times in 1983, Joel served as Washington correspondent, White House correspondent, and chief of the Jerusalem bureau. He also spent more than 10 years in editing positions in New York and Washington. He was serving once again as a foreign-affairs correspondent when he left the Times in 2006. He was the author of five books, including his most recent, Cambodia’s Curse: The Modern History of a Troubled Land (Public Affairs Books, 2011).

Joel is survived by his wife, Sabra Chartrand, and two daughters, Charlotte, 15, and Veronica, 10.
military installations. SIGAR’s suspension and debarment program referred 16 individuals and 15 companies for suspension or debarment based on allegations that they engaged in fraud and non-performance in contracts valued at almost $61 million.

SIGAR TESTIFIES ON OVERSIGHT OF THE U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Special Inspector General John F. Sopko testified on April 3, 2014, before the House Subcommittee on National Security of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform on lessons learned from oversight of USAID’s efforts in Afghanistan. Sopko said that since 2002, USAID has obligated over $18 billion to help rebuild Afghanistan. SIGAR has developed a large body of work focused on USAID’s efforts. Taken as a whole, these reports reveal broader lessons about what has worked and what has not—lessons that can be used to inform future contingency operations and, to the extent possible, to strengthen and improve the U.S. government’s continued efforts in Afghanistan through the “Transformation Decade” and beyond.

The first lesson was that reconstruction programs must take into account the recipient country’s ability to afford the costs of operating and sustaining them. Sopko noted that a 2011 report on Afghanistan’s fiscal sustainability, prepared for USAID by Chemonics International Inc., found that even under conservative assumptions, the size of operations and maintenance expenditures associated with all external development spending is almost equal to Afghanistan’s current operating budget. SIGAR has found, however, that USAID has not consistently translated this understanding into a realistic approach for designing and implementing projects.

The second lesson was that reconstruction of a conflict-ridden state is inherently risky and that risk must be properly mitigated. USAID has made substantial progress since the early days of its programs. Most notably, USAID has strengthened its efforts to assess the capacity of a number of Afghan ministries to manage U.S. direct assistance funds. Unfortunately, USAID’s progress in assessing the risks has not been matched by an equally robust strategy to ensure the Afghan government mitigates those risks.

The third lesson is that oversight is a critical element of reconstruction. SIGAR’s work has shown that USAID’s adoption of oversight techniques has been impressive in some cases, but less so in others. In one of the broadest looks at USAID’s oversight of its Afghanistan programs, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported systematic weaknesses in USAID’s oversight and monitoring of project and program performance.

The fourth and final lesson is that a reconstruction effort must have clearly articulated goals and a sound way to measure progress toward those goals. The necessity of strategic planning is widely acknowledged,
SIGAR oversight activities

Performance audits: provide assurance or conclusions based on an evaluation of sufficient, appropriate evidence measured against stated criteria. Performance audits provide objective analysis so that management and those charged with governance can use the information to improve the program performance and operations, reduce costs, and facilitate decision-making by parties with responsibility to oversee or initiate corrective action for public accountability. Performance audits are conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards (GAGAS) and the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) Quality Standards for Federal Offices of Inspector General.

Inspections: are systematic and independent assessments of the design, implementation, and/or results of an agency’s operations, programs, or policies. SIGAR conducts inspections, in accordance with CIGIE Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation, to provide information to Congress and the public on the quality of construction of facilities and infrastructure throughout Afghanistan; and generally, provides an assessment of the extent to which the facilities were constructed in accordance with the contract requirements, used as intended, and are being maintained.

Financial audits: provide an independent assessment of and reasonable assurance about whether an entity’s reported condition, results, and use of resources are presented in accordance with recognized criteria. SIGAR performs financial audits in accordance with GAGAS, which includes both requirements contained in the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants Statements on Auditing Standards and additional requirements provided in GAGAS. SIGAR also reviews financial audits conducted by independent public accountants (IPA). When an IPA conducts a financial audit, SIGAR conducts reasonable procedures to ensure compliance with GAGAS, based on the intended use of the IPA’s work and degree of responsibility accepted by SIGAR with respect to that work.

But SIGAR has repeatedly found it has often been ignored throughout the Afghanistan reconstruction effort.

Audits
SIGAR conducts performance audits, inspections, and financial audits of programs and projects connected to the reconstruction in Afghanistan. Since its last report to Congress, SIGAR has issued three performance audits, two inspections, two financial audit reports, and two inspection alert letters. This quarter SIGAR also began six new performance audits, bringing the total number of ongoing performance audits to 17. It also initiated 27 financial audits and five inspections. The published performance audit reports raised concerns about ISAF’s plans to sustain their capability-assessment efforts of the ANSF, USAID’s strategy for Afghanistan’s water sector and the mixed performance results of four USAID water-sector projects, and customs as a sustainable source of revenue for the Afghan government. The performance audits made a total of seven recommendations. The financial audits identified more than $14.5 million in questioned costs as a result of internal control deficiencies and noncompliance issues.

Performance Audit Reports Published
This quarter, SIGAR completed three performance audit reports that reviewed Afghan National Security Forces’ plans for sustaining capability-assessment efforts, USAID’s strategy for Afghanistan’s water sector, and Afghan customs revenue.

Audit 14-33-AR: Afghan National Security Forces
Actions Needed To Improve Plans for Sustaining Capability Assessment Efforts
Since 2005, Congress has appropriated almost $53 billion for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund—the single largest U.S. fund for the reconstruction of Afghanistan—to train, equip, and sustain the ANSF. The process of transferring security responsibility to the Afghans is expected to be completed by the end of 2014, coinciding with completion of the drawdown of U.S. and Coalition forces. NATO’s Strategic Plan for Afghanistan calls for the Afghan army and police to achieve a combined surge strength of 352,000 personnel by the end of 2013, and to remain at that level through at least 2015, to allow for continued progress toward a sustainable, secure environment in Afghanistan. SIGAR’s prior work and the work of others have expressed concern with the reliability and consistency of ANSF assessments. Reliable measures of the ANSF’s progress toward becoming a self-sustaining force that is capable of assuming full security responsibility for Afghanistan are critical as the ANSF assume increasing responsibility for their country’s security.
The objectives of this audit were to assess the extent to which (1) ISAF’s tool for evaluating the manning, training, and equipping capacity of the ANSF—the Commander’s Unit Assessment Tool (CUAT)—was consistently applied to assess ANSF units, and (2) ISAF is taking steps to plan for the continued collection, validation, analysis, and reporting of ANSF capacity assessments during the military drawdown and the transition of security responsibility to the Afghan government.

The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008 directs DOD to report on its assessment of the operational readiness of ANSF units. Specifically, the Act requires DOD to report on the number of ANSF units that are capable of conducting operations independently, units that are capable of conducting operations with U.S. and Coalition support, and units that are not ready to conduct operations. To help meet this requirement, from April 2010 through July 2013, the ISAF Joint Command (IJC) used the CUAT as a key tool for assessing and reporting on the ANSF’s manning, training, and equipping capacity.

The CUAT was a two-part assessment of ANSF units. The first part consisted of quantitative data, such as the total number of assigned personnel and equipment on hand. IJC advisor teams then used this data to inform their qualitative evaluations, the second portion of the CUAT, which consisted of one overall assessment and an assessment of 14 component areas. Based on their assessment findings, advisor teams assigned one of six color-coded rating definition levels to the ANSF units in each area and provided narrative comments to justify the assigned rating definition levels.

From August 2011 to July 2013, these rating definition levels were (1) independent with advisors, (2) effective with advisors, (3) effective with partners, (4) developing with partners, (5) established, and (6) not assessed. CUAT assessments, combined with battlefield reporting, commanders’ informal assessments, and other data, served as the basis for DOD’s and ISAF’s overall assessment of the ANSF’s operational effectiveness and readiness during this time.

CUAT rating definition levels for ANSF units assessed from January 2012 to July 2013 show that there has been some improvement in the ANSF’s capacity to man, train, and equip its forces. For example, the number of Afghan National Army (ANA) units rated as “independent with advisors” increased from 20 to 93 between January 2012 and July 2013. However, the number of ANA and ANP units not assessed also increased during this time due to the drawdown of Coalition forces.

Between April 2010 and August 2011, IJC changed the CUAT rating definition level titles four times. Despite these changes, SIGAR’s analysis of the standards supporting each level shows that the standards for the overall assessment generally remained consistent from change to change. However, some thresholds in the standards for some component-assessment areas changed. For example, under the September 2010 revision, an ANA unit
could achieve a rating definition level of “effective with advisors” for equipment if its level of critical equipment was greater than 85% of its authorized equipment level. Under the August 2011 revision, an ANA unit could achieve that same rating definition with “greater than or equal to” 75% of its authorized equipment level.

The CUAT Standard Operating Procedure outlined requirements for advisor teams completing the qualitative evaluation, and encouraged advisor teams to use their judgment when assessing ANSF units to assign rating definition levels and provide comments within the assessment areas. However, the CUAT Standard Operating Procedure did not provide clear guidance on the level of detail necessary to support a team’s rating or what the team’s subjective assessments should contain. This unclear guidance led to disparities in the quantity and quality of information across CUAT assessments and to inconsistent evaluations of ANSF capacity to man, train, and equip its units.

In July 2013, IJC replaced the CUAT with the Regional ANSF Status Report (RASR). IJC officials stated the command replaced the system because ISAF senior leadership found the CUAT to be difficult to read, inconsistently applied, and not useful. In addition, IJC officials expect that the RASR will simplify, streamline, and improve assessments of the ANSF by allowing the command to better track the extent to which ANSF units are able to employ their manning, equipping, and training capacity to successfully engage the enemy in combat.

The RASR uses six color-coded rating definition levels—(1) fully capable, (2) capable, (3) partially capable, (4) developing, (5) established, and (6) not assessed—to evaluate ANSF units at the brigade and regional levels each month. In addition, the RASR focuses on assessing specific components of the units, such as infantry and communications, against one overall and five targeted categories: combined arms, command and control, leadership, sustainment, and training. These five targeted categories replace the one overall assessment and 14 component areas previously used in the CUAT.

As Coalition forces draw down and fewer advisor teams are assigned to ANSF units, IJC officials stated they will have less insight into ANSF capabilities and will rely more on the ANSF for assessment data. Officials said this will decrease their overall confidence in ANSF assessments. IJC, in coordination with the Afghan government, is taking steps to improve the ANSF’s internal-assessment capabilities and is discussing ways to mitigate the risks of declining presence and reduced Coalition oversight of the ANSF. For example, in July and August 2013, the Ministry of Interior (MOI) selected nearly 100 ANP candidates to send to Turkey to learn assessment methodology and develop a new police assessment tool that would standardize assessments across the ANP.

Despite these efforts, ISAF has not developed a plan that details how it will (1) ensure the continued collection, analysis, validation, and reporting of ANSF capability assessments as Coalition forces draw down; and
(2) address the challenges of having fewer advisor teams available to conduct assessments and of relying on the ANSF’s processes for conducting its own internal assessments. Without such a plan, ISAF may not be able to obtain an accurate understanding of ANSF units’ capability—information that feeds into broader assessment reports on the ANSF’s overall effectiveness and readiness.

SIGAR is making one recommendation. Specifically, SIGAR recommends that the ISAF Commander develop and implement a plan for collecting, validating, analyzing, and reporting ANSF capability assessments that details how ISAF will assess the ANSF’s capability with fewer advisors to conduct the assessments and mitigate the challenges associated with the ANSF reporting on its own assessment results.

In providing comments on a draft of this report, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) stated that it “concurs with the overall recommendations,” but “non-concurs with some specific recommendations.” SIGAR deleted one recommendation based on additional information provided by USFOR-A.

Audit 14-47-AR: Afghan Customs
U.S. Programs Have Had Some Successes, but Challenges Will Limit Customs Revenue as a Sustainable Source of Income for Afghanistan

Since 2009, the United States has allocated at least $198 million toward efforts to assist in developing the capacity of the Afghan government to assess and collect customs revenue. USAID administered the Trade Accession and Facilitation for Afghanistan (TAFA) I and TAFA II programs from November 2009 through August 2013. These programs were followed by the Afghanistan Trade and Revenue (ATAR) program acting as a follow-on program beginning in November 2013. The Department of Homeland Security’s Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has operated as the administrator for the Border Management Task Force (BMTF) since its inception in 2006. Through these programs, the United States has worked to develop and reform Afghanistan’s laws, policies, and procedures for customs processes operating at the Afghan Customs Department (ACD) headquarters and customs locations throughout Afghanistan.

This audit (1) assesses the extent to which these USAID and CBP programs achieved their intended outcomes, and (2) examines challenges to creating a stable and lasting source of customs revenue for Afghanistan.

Border control is essential for a nation to control the flow of licit and illicit goods and to assess appropriate tariffs and customs duties. Customs revenue is a major component of Afghanistan’s national budget, which is currently funded through a combination of domestic revenue collections and aid from international donors. For Afghanistan’s three most recent fiscal years, customs revenue collections produced $698 million to $1.1 billion annually, accounting for 44–48% of total domestic revenue collection. However, domestic revenues continue to fall short of expenditures, and
international assistance is expected to decline in coming years. As a result, increasing the Afghan government's collection of domestic revenues is a main objective of both the U.S. and Afghan governments.

The U.S. government—through programs run by USAID and the Department of Homeland Security’s CBP—has provided funding and expertise to assist the Afghan government in developing and reforming its customs assessment and collection capabilities. USAID has administered multiple projects designed to improve the trade and customs environment, including two TAFA programs—called TAFA I and TAFA II—between November 2009 and August 2013, and their successor program, the ATAR, which started in November 2013. The CBP has administered the BMTF, a task force that mentors the ACD, Afghan Border Police, and Afghan Customs Police agents at border control points and inland customs depots.

Among its accomplishments, TAFA has assisted the Afghan government in trade negotiations and significantly reduced the customs processing times and the number of steps required to trade across Afghanistan’s border. Specifically, it has been able to reduce the number of customs process steps at the nine inland customs depots and the Kabul International Airport—customs locations that account for 98% of Afghanistan’s customs revenues—reportedly resulting in annual cost savings to importers and the Afghan government of $39 million.

CBP’s BMTF also appears to have had some successes. For example, the BMTF cleaned and upgraded the Kabul Airport Customs Yard, which, according to CBP officials, resulted in increased efficiency at the Customs
Yard that reduced customs processing time from 10 days to two and created a 37% increase in customs revenue at that location. BMTF reports show that BMTF mentors held more than 7,000 training sessions between 2010 and 2013, and assisted the ACD in conducting more than 670 seizures during that same period.

Nevertheless, SIGAR found that BMTF mentors operate under contracts and subcontracts that do not contain performance metrics. Specifically, the contract documents for BMTF activities do not include a single metric that defines specific, measurable goals for the BMTF mentors to achieve, or performance metrics to measure the program’s success.

Without concrete performance metrics, oversight of the day-to-day and long-term activities of an individual mentor is difficult to achieve or measure in a meaningful way.

According to USAID, CBP, and TAFA officials, corruption is affecting all levels of the customs process and is the biggest issue affecting Afghan customs processes and revenues. The scale and impact of corruption in Afghanistan’s customs process is difficult to quantify. Nevertheless, USAID officials hypothesize that eliminating or significantly reducing corruption in the customs process could potentially double the customs revenues remitted to the central government.

The BMTF also noted that criminal networks use intimidation to smuggle commodities, resulting in the estimated loss of approximately $25 million annually for wheat and rice imports at a single customs location. In a separate estimate, TAFA officials stated that approximately $60 million is lost annually to commercial smuggling. Further complicating efforts to combat criminal and patronage networks are reports from BMTF advisers that Afghan employees are being kidnapped and intimidated because they are listening to the BMTF advisers and properly collecting customs duties.

To help reduce corruption, the Afghan and U.S. governments proposed streamlining and automating customs processes. Two major innovations in the automation of customs processes—a risk management system and an electronic payment system—were started under TAFA. The risk management system, created to facilitate the targeted inspection of cargo based on the type of cargo being carried, broker behavior, and other intelligence sources, is designed to optimize the use of limited security resources and decrease transit times. While the ACD accepted the risk management system in principle, it reportedly considered it too difficult to operate and chose to adopt a scaled-down approach, spreading implementation of specific parts of the risk-management system over a period of years.

Similarly, progress in implementing an electronic payment system for customs duties has been slow. Currently, customs fees in Afghanistan are processed in cash at the inland customs depots where the imported cargo is inspected and assessed customs duties. This system can lead to customs brokers traveling long distances with large quantities of cash to pay
customs fees assessed on imported goods. The current cash-based payment system is inefficient, leaves customs brokers vulnerable to theft, and increases the opportunities for corruption in the customs process.

According to USAID and TAFA program officials, at the conclusion of the TAFA programs in August 2013, the ACD had the equipment and technical knowledge needed to launch a pilot system. However, USAID officials said the electronic payment system had not been implemented, and that the implementation was delayed, in part, due to a proposal by an Afghan official that would allow only one Afghan bank to process all the electronic customs payments. This arrangement would have given the selected bank a monopoly on this revenue stream and a significant, and improper, advantage over its competitors. Although the risk-management system and the electronic-payment system are highlighted in the TAFA and ATAR contract documents as important anticorruption measures, SIGAR found that the ATAR contract does not require the implementing partner to meet annual targets for implementation of the systems.

The future of customs revenues as a stable source of income for the Afghan government remains unclear. The TAFA and BMTF programs achieved some successes in reforming and developing Afghan customs law, policies, and procedures, but larger issues surrounding questionable customs data, the withdrawal of international forces, and corruption remain.

SIGAR recommends that the CBP Acting Commissioner instruct the CBP attaché in Afghanistan to develop clear performance metrics for BMTF mentor operations and submit such metrics to DOD/CENTCOM for incorporation into any future BMTF contracts or task orders. SIGAR also recommends that the USAID Administrator instruct the USAID Mission Director for Afghanistan to (1) direct the ATAR implementing partner to continue to work with Afghanistan’s Tariffs Statistics Unit to reduce discrepancies in customs data and make the reduction in statistical discrepancies a requirement of the contract for the ATAR program, and (2) ensure that annual targets for implementation of anticorruption measures, such as the electronic payment system, are included as performance requirements in the ATAR program contract.

Audit 14-52-AR: Afghanistan’s Water Sector

USAID’s Strategy Needs to Be Updated to Ensure Appropriate Oversight and Accountability

Since March 2006, USAID has invested approximately $580 million in Afghanistan’s water sector to support, among other things, urban and rural water supply and sanitation and agricultural productivity.

The 2010 U.S. Inter-Agency Water Strategy for Afghanistan lays out efforts across U.S. agencies to achieve a consolidated approach to water sector development. USAID plays a central role in guiding U.S. government efforts and has funded nine water projects since FY 2010. SIGAR’s report focuses on four of these projects.
Knowing whether USAID’s efforts are properly targeted, measured, and achieving their goals and objectives is vital to supporting Afghanistan’s water sector. The objectives of this audit were to determine the extent to which (1) USAID met key objectives of the 2010 U.S. Inter-Agency Water Strategy for Afghanistan and (2) four USAID water projects implemented since 2010 are meeting their project goals and objectives.

SIGAR found that USAID did not meet three key objectives in the 2010 U.S. Inter-Agency Water Strategy, which was developed by USAID, the Department of State, USFOR-A, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), and others. For example, USAID did not meet the strategy’s objective to implement an agency work plan that would, among other things, link projects and activities to the goals cited in the strategy. The strategy stated that each U.S. agency, including USAID, should develop and implement an annual work plan detailing its activities for meeting the strategy’s goals.

Rather than develop an agency work plan, however, USAID intended to use the work plan for a proposed water program—the $653 million Water Resources Development Program—as the “agency work plan.” However, this program was never implemented because USAID did not have the funds to do so. As a result, no work plan was developed to meet the water strategy’s provision. Without a work plan that links projects and activities to goals, it is unclear the extent to which individual USAID water projects contribute to the U.S. government’s broader efforts to develop Afghanistan’s water sector, and USAID may have additional difficulty planning and implementing ongoing water sector development efforts.

USAID also did not meet the strategy’s objective to use key performance indicators to measure and evaluate its performance toward meeting the strategy’s goals. The strategy itself identified potential outputs and outcomes, such as increasing agricultural productivity and improving soil and water conservation, but USAID has not evaluated its projects’ performance against these indicators. As a result, USAID cannot determine how its work achieves the strategy’s goals. Another objective of the strategy called for USAID to update the strategy to reflect changing needs in Afghanistan’s water sector and make it a “living document.” However, this did not occur. For example, since the strategy was completed in 2010, USAID has changed its priorities away from large infrastructure projects—such as dams and commercial water and sewer systems—toward building capacity at Afghan ministries to manage these projects themselves. Despite these changes in priorities, the strategy has not been updated, nor does it take into account the political and security transition when most military forces are expected to withdraw from Afghanistan. By failing to update the strategy to reflect current priorities, USAID risks planning and implementing water projects that are not aligned with its goals for the development of Afghanistan’s water sector.
SIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

USAID officials stated that even though the agency did not meet the strategy’s objectives, some of the strategy’s goals have been realized through implementation of individual projects. However, the four key projects implemented since FY 2010 that SIGAR reviewed showed mixed performance results, making it difficult to affirm USAID’s assertion.

For example, USAID spent approximately $43.3 million on its Sustainable Water Supply and Sanitation (SWSS) project to increase access to sustainable sources of clean water for domestic use among Afghanistan’s rural population. However, the project did not meet some performance goals and could not measure other performance goals because of budget cuts, unrealistic performance targets, and higher-than-estimated costs. As a result, USAID’s investment in and SWSS’s overall impact on Afghanistan’s water supply and sanitation service is unclear. In another project, USAID spent about $3.5 million for 27 watershed assessments to identify potential sites for small irrigation dams and micro-hydropower projects across Afghanistan. However, USAID did not use the assessments as intended and did not share them in a timely manner with other U.S. and Afghan agencies. As a result, the assessments could already be outdated and of limited value for developing water projects.

SIGAR recommends that USAID (1) develop a new water sector strategy for Afghanistan with updated short-, medium-, and long-term goals and objectives that reflect USAID’s current water sector priorities; (2) develop and implement a performance measurement plan upon completion of the new strategy that can be used to evaluate USAID’s performance in meeting the new strategy’s goals and objectives; and (3) ensure this strategy includes clear lines of responsibility and accountability of who within USAID will implement the strategy. See page 39 for the status of SIGAR’s recommendations.

New Audits Announced This Quarter
This quarter SIGAR initiated audits of the status of audit recommendations made by SIGAR to the State Department (State), USAID, and DOD. SIGAR also initiated audits reviewing U.S. assistance to Afghanistan’s rule of law sector, to internally displaced persons and refugees, and to develop Afghanistan’s mining, oil, and gas (extractives) industry. The agency also announced an expansion of the scope of its audit on the ANA’s National Engineer Brigade.

Audit Recommendations to State, USAID, and DOD
The Office of Management and Budget Circular A-50 and the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, require that SIGAR prepare semiannual reports summarizing its activities for the preceding six-month period. The Act requires that the report include a description of recommendations for corrective action made by SIGAR during the reporting period; an
identification of each significant recommendation identified during previous reporting periods for which corrective action has not been completed; a list of each audit, inspection, and evaluation report issued by SIGAR during the reporting period; where applicable, the total dollar value of questioned costs and the dollar value of recommendations that funds be put to better use; and a description and explanation of the reasons for any significant management decision with which SIGAR is in disagreement. Since its inception, SIGAR has used its quarterly report to fulfill these reporting requirements. However, SIGAR has determined that initiating these three audits would allow for greater in-depth analysis and reporting to better inform Congress on the status of its recommendations.

These three audits will review the status of all recommendations made to State, USAID, and DOD in financial, inspection, or audit reports. Specifically, SIGAR plans to (1) identify the status of all recommendations made and review actions taken or planned to address any open recommendations, and (2) report these actions to Congress as required by Office of Management and Budget Circular A-50 and the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended.

**U.S. Assistance for Rule of Law Programs in Afghanistan**
In one of a series of sector-wide audits, SIGAR is initiating an audit of U.S. government efforts to assist and improve the rule of law in Afghanistan. This audit is a more broadly scoped follow-up to SIGAR’s January 2014 audit report (SIGAR 14-26-AR) that focused on the Department of State’s justice sector training programs. Specifically, SIGAR plans to (1) identify U.S. government programs or initiatives to develop rule of law in Afghanistan; (2) assess the progress that these programs or initiatives have made achieving the objectives of the U.S. Government Rule of Law Strategy; and (3) identify challenges, if any, that the U.S. government has encountered in achieving its rule of law objectives and the extent to which it has addressed these challenges.

**Assistance for Afghan Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees**
In May 2012, the House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations expressed concerns with the dramatic rise in conflict-induced displacement in Afghanistan. The Committee urged the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan to ensure that U.S. government strategies to address these issues, such as the Country Assistance Strategy, are incorporated into other existing regional and planned international development strategies. This audit will examine U.S. agencies’ efforts to protect and assist Afghan refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). Specifically, SIGAR plans to (1) describe the programs and initiatives State and USAID have implemented to assist Afghan refugees and IDPs, and determine the
extent to which these efforts have achieved U.S. goals and objectives; (2) identify the methods and tools the agencies use to determine and verify the total number of Afghan returnees, refugees still in neighboring countries, and IDPs; and (3) evaluate the agencies’ efforts to develop a long-term reintegration strategy for Afghan refugees and IDPs.

**Afghanistan’s Extractives Industry**

This audit will focus on the extent to which the DOD’s Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO) and USAID programs met their goals to develop Afghanistan’s extractives industry and the challenges, if any, to creating a stable and lasting source of extractives revenue for Afghanistan. According to the TFBSO, the current estimated value of Afghanistan’s mineral deposits is about $900 billion in addition to sizable hydrocarbon reserves. These deposits could generate more than $2 billion in annual royalty and tax revenues for the Afghan government. This audit will review U.S. efforts to develop Afghanistan’s extractives industry and strengthen the Afghan Ministry of Mines and Petroleum’s ability to regulate and grow the extractives sector. Specifically, SIGAR plans to determine (1) the extent to which TFBSO and USAID efforts to develop the extractives industry in Afghanistan met their stated goals and (2) the challenges, if any, to creating a stable and lasting extractives industry as a source of revenue to Afghanistan.

**The ANA’s National Engineer Brigade**

*(Expansion of Scope of Audit Announced Last Quarter)*

On November 26, 2013, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction announced an audit of DOD efforts to train, equip, and sustain the ANA’s National Engineer Brigade (NEB). During SIGAR’s initial fieldwork, staff found that the NEB is a component of a broader program to build ANA engineering capacity, including regional ANA Corps Engineer Kandaks (CEK). The training, equipping, missions, and assessments of the NEB and CEKs are similar and interdependent. Therefore, SIGAR finds it necessary to review not only the NEB, but also the CEKs. The revised objectives of this audit are to (1) assess the extent to which DOD efforts to train, equip, and sustain the NEB and CEKs will build an independent and capable engineering operations for the ANA; and (2) identify challenges, if any, to building and sustaining the NEB and CEKs.

**Financial Audits**

SIGAR launched its financial audit program in 2012, after Congress and the oversight community expressed concerns about oversight gaps and the growing backlog of incurred-cost audits for contracts and grants awarded in support of overseas contingency operations. SIGAR competitively selects independent accounting firms to conduct the financial audits and ensures
that the audit work is performed in accordance with U.S. government auditing standards. Financial audits are coordinated with the federal inspector general community to maximize financial-audit coverage and avoid duplication of effort.

This quarter, SIGAR completed two financial audits of U.S.-funded cooperative agreements to rebuild Afghanistan. SIGAR also announced 27 new financial audits of DOD, State, and USAID awards with combined incurred costs of more than $2.3 billion, bringing the total number of ongoing financial audits to 45 with nearly $4.1 billion in costs incurred, as shown in Table 2.1.

SIGAR issues the financial-audit reports to the implementing agencies, which are responsible for making the final determination on questioned amounts. Since the program’s inception, SIGAR’s financial audits have identified nearly $75.3 million in questioned costs and $141,894 in unremitted interest on advanced federal funds. When the implementing agency determines that a questioned amount is unallowable, the agency issues a bill for collection. To date, funding agencies have issued bills for collection for 12 of the 22 completed audits to recover more than $5.1 million in questioned amounts. It takes time for implementing agencies to carefully consider audit findings, and final determinations remain to be made for several of SIGAR’s issued financial audits.

SIGAR’s financial audits have four specific objectives:

- Express an opinion on whether the Fund Accountability Statement for the award presents fairly, in all material respects, revenues received, costs incurred, items directly procured by the U.S. government, and balance for the period audited in conformity with the terms of the award and generally accepted accounting principles or other comprehensive basis of accounting.

- Evaluate and obtain a sufficient understanding of the audited entity’s internal control related to the award; assess control risk; and identify and report on significant deficiencies including material internal control weaknesses.

- Perform tests to determine whether the audited entity complied, in all material respects, with the award requirements and applicable laws and regulations; and identify and report on instances of material noncompliance with terms of the award and applicable laws and regulations.

- Determine and report on whether the audited entity has taken adequate corrective action to address findings and recommendations from previous engagements.

A list of completed, new, and ongoing financial audits can be found in Appendix C of this quarterly report.

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<th>Table 2.1</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SIGAR’S FINANCIAL AUDIT COVERAGE</strong> ( $ BILLIONS )</td>
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<tr>
<td>22 Completed Audits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 Ongoing Audits</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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Notes: Numbers have been rounded. Coverage includes auditable costs incurred by recipients of U.S.-funded Afghanistan reconstruction contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements.

Source: SIGAR Audits Directorate.

**Questioned amounts**: the sum of potentially unallowable questioned costs and unremitted interest on advanced federal funds.

**Questioned costs**: costs determined to be potentially unallowable. The two types of questioned costs are ineligible costs (violation of a law, regulation, contract, grant, cooperative agreement, etc., or an unnecessary or unreasonable expenditure of funds) and unsupported costs (those not supported by adequate documentation or proper approvals at the time of an audit).

**Bill for collection**: a letter or form sent to a debtor for the amount due, including interest, administrative charges, and late penalties, if applicable.

**Fund Accountability Statement**: a special-purpose financial statement that includes all revenues received, costs incurred, and any remaining balance for a given award during a given period.
Financial Audits Published

This quarter, SIGAR completed two financial audits of U.S.-funded cooperative agreements to rebuild Afghanistan. These financial audits identified nearly $14.5 million in questioned costs as a result of internal-control deficiencies and noncompliance issues. These deficiencies and noncompliance issues included, among other things, inadequate cash-disbursement controls resulting in theft of federal funds, missing timesheets, management and administration costs charged to the wrong Afghanistan reconstruction award, failure to conduct vendor suspension and debarment checks, ineligible entertainment expenses, poor record retention, lack of supporting documentation, failure to adhere to procurement procedures, improper approvals for invoices and payment-application requests, and failure to complete a road construction project in accordance with award requirements.

Financial Audit 14-34-FA: USAID’s Health Service Support Project: Audit of Costs Incurred by Jhpiego Corporation

USAID awarded Jhpiego Corporation (Jhpiego) a cooperative agreement to implement a Health Service Support Project (HSSP) in Afghanistan. The purpose of the project was to improve the quality of health-care services provided to Afghan women of reproductive age and children under the age of five. SIGAR’s audit covered the period July 1, 2006, through October 31, 2012, and was performed by Williams Adley and Company-DC LLP (Williams Adley). It covered $60,449,801 in expenditures.

Williams Adley found that the Fund Accountability Statement presented fairly, in all material respects, revenues received and costs incurred under the cooperative agreement. Nevertheless, Williams Adley found that Jhpiego did not take adequate corrective action on four findings identified from prior audits or assessments. In addition, Williams Adley reported two internal-control findings and three instances of noncompliance. These findings prompted the auditors to question $301,956 in costs—$46,025 in ineligible costs and $255,931 in unsupported costs. The audit also found that Jhpiego had not remitted an estimated $10,954 in interest income on funds drawn from its letter of credit in excess of its immediate cash needs.

Given the results of the audit, SIGAR recommended that the USAID Mission Director for Afghanistan:

- Determine the allowability of and recover, as appropriate, $301,956 in questioned costs ($46,025 ineligible and $255,931 unsupported) identified in the report.
- Recover, as appropriate, the estimated $10,954 in interest income on funds Jhpiego drew from its letter of credit in excess of its immediate cash needs.
- Advise Jhpiego to address the two internal-control findings identified in the report.
• Advise Jhpiego to address the three compliance findings identified in the report.

**Financial Audit 14-39-FA: USAID’s Strategic Provincial Roads Program: Audit of Costs Incurred by International Relief and Development Inc.**

USAID awarded International Relief and Development Inc. (IRD) a cooperative agreement to provide support for the Strategic Provincial Roads program. The objective of the program was to improve stability and security in eastern and southern Afghanistan by rehabilitating or constructing provincial roads and increasing institutional capacity to maintain the rehabilitated roads. The program also had an outreach component with a budget of $32.4 million that included (1) arranging memoranda of understanding with tribal leaders, (2) training and safety awareness programs, and (3) a range of infrastructure development projects to enhance the vitality of the roads. The audit, performed by Mayer Hoffman McCann P.C. (MHM), covered the period November 30, 2007, through December 31, 2012, and total expenditures of $317,448,948.

MHM issued a qualified opinion on the fair presentation of the Special Purpose Financial Statement because of the identification of $14,179,351 of questioned costs, which represents a material misstatement. MHM identified two prior audit findings pertinent to the SPR program and found that IRD had not taken adequate corrective action to address one of them. The prior finding related to controls over payments to subcontractors. MHM noted a similar condition in a new finding and, as a result, concluded that adequate corrective action had not been taken. MHM reported 12 internal-control deficiencies and 10 instances of noncompliance, which prompted the auditors to question $14,179,351 in costs. These questioned costs included $2,580,239 in ineligible costs and $11,599,112 in unsupported costs.

Given the results of the audit, SIGAR recommended that the USAID Mission Director for Afghanistan:

• Determine the allowability of and recover, as appropriate, $14,179,351 in questioned costs identified in the report.
• Advise IRD to address the 12 internal control findings identified in the report.
• Advise IRD to address the 10 compliance findings identified in the report.

**INSPECTIONS**

This quarter, SIGAR published two inspection reports. One report concerned comments from USFOR-A on an inspection report published last quarter of Salang Hospital in Parwan Province. Another inspection report found that it was unclear whether Camp Monitor in Jowzjan Province is being used as intended. SIGAR also issued two inspection alert letters and initiated five new inspections.
Inspection Reports Published

**Inspection 14-31a-IP: Salang Hospital: Comments from USFOR-A**

Last quarter SIGAR reported on its inspection of the 20-bed Salang Hospital in Parwan Province. The inspection found a lack of power and water that severely limited service at the hospital. Because USFOR-A’s official comments were not provided on a draft of SIGAR’s inspection report at the time of its publication last quarter, SIGAR issued the comments and its response separately this quarter. With regard to SIGAR’s first recommendation, USFOR-A agreed to hold accountable those contracting officer(s) who may have failed to provide the required contract oversight. Specifically, USFOR-A will investigate why Salang Hospital was not built in accordance with contract specifications and, if necessary, take corrective actions against the contracting officer(s) responsible for oversight and management of the hospital construction project.

USFOR-A also agreed with SIGAR’s recommendation to perform a physical inspection of the hospital and, if needed, determine corrective actions to be taken to ensure the building’s structural integrity. With regard to SIGAR’s recommendation to determine why required documents were not placed into the Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) database and to identify and hold accountable the contracting officer(s) responsible for this problem, USFOR-A did not concur, citing U.S. Central Command’s Joint Theater Support Contracting Command’s (C-JTSCC) comment that contracting officers have no authority to enter documents into CIDNE and that the responsibility lies instead with the Commander’s Emergency Response Program project manager and/or purchasing officer. In SIGAR’s view, USFOR-A’s and C-JTSCC’s comments indicate agreement with the spirit of the recommendation and SIGAR has revised it accordingly to direct it to the correct officials. USFOR-A also indicated that the missing documents have been found and placed in the database. SIGAR will close the recommendation once it verifies that all missing documents have been placed in CIDNE.

**Inspection 14-41-IP: Camp Monitor: Most Construction Appears to Have Met Contract Standards, but It Is Unclear If Facility Is Being Used as Intended**

As of April 2013, DOD had obligated $9.2 billion from the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund for hundreds of ANA and ANP infrastructure projects. One of these ANA projects, Camp Monitor, was built in Jowzjan Province, in northern Afghanistan bordering Turkmenistan. On December 4, 2010, the Kabul Regional Contracting Center awarded the first of five contracts to construct Camp Monitor. The first contract, with a 120-day period of performance, was awarded to Fazlullah Construction and Engineering Company (FCEC)/UI Projects Joint Venture for $830,000 to construct three open-bay
barracks. Subsequently, Kabul Regional Contracting Center awarded two additional contracts for three more barracks, latrines, an administration building, and force-protection walls. The Regional Contracting Command–North also awarded two contracts for guard towers; a firing range; additional force-protection walls; a dining facility; a power plant; a water well; a leach field; a 5,000-gallon fuel point; and for connecting water, sewer, and electrical systems. The combined value of the five contracts was $3.9 million.

For this inspection, SIGAR assessed whether (1) construction had been completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards, and (2) the facilities were being used as intended and maintained.

The agency conducted its Camp Monitor site inspection on March 2, 2013. The facilities SIGAR inspected at the time appeared to be well constructed, but the agency’s inspectors could not fully assess the camp’s lighting, heating, water, sewer, and other mechanical systems because the generators were not operational at the time of SIGAR’s inspection in March 2013. The camp’s greatest shortcoming was the lack of a dining facility, which prevented the ANA from occupying and using the facility. The Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) addressed the problem by providing $1.2 million in direct assistance to the Afghan government to construct the dining facility, and Afghan personnel in January 2014 told U.S. officials that the dining facility was under construction and
60% complete, with 700 ANA personnel using the base. However, SIGAR is concerned that CSTC-A officials could not provide SIGAR inspectors with any oversight information regarding the status of the dining facility’s construction or whether the ANA was currently occupying the camp. As a result, the U.S. government is relying solely on the Afghan government to report on the spending of U.S.-provided funding, the progress of construction, and how the camp is being used.

Camp Monitor is located in an area that can no longer be reached by U.S. civilian employees because it sits outside the so-called “oversight bubble.” The “oversight bubbles” are defined by the ability of the U.S. government to provide both adequate security and rapid emergency medical support to civilians traveling to the area. As a result, SIGAR inspectors can no longer access this area and cannot independently verify that the dining facility is being constructed in accordance with the contract requirements or whether the camp is being used as intended.

In SIGAR’s view, oversight by CSTC-A or NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) is needed to ensure funds are being spent properly, construction of the dining facility is completed in accordance with requirements, and the camp is being used as intended.

**Inspection Alert Letters**

This quarter, SIGAR’s Audit and Inspection Directorate issued two alert letters.

**Alert Letter 14-42-AL: FOB Sharana Incinerators**

On March 18, 2014, SIGAR wrote to DOD to announce that it has opened a preliminary investigation into USACE’s decision to accept substandard work on the construction of an incinerator system at FOB Sharana in Paktika Province. SIGAR issued a report examining the construction of the incinerators in December 2013. The report found that the system was completed nearly three years behind schedule and that the incinerators had unaddressed construction deficiencies. As a result, they were never used and $5.4 million was wasted. USACE subsequently conducted an inquiry in which it found that the incinerator facility was constructed in accordance with the contract technical specifications and that none of the personnel assigned to perform oversight of the incinerator contract failed to appropriately perform their duties. Upon request, USACE submitted nine documents to SIGAR that, according to USACE, were used for its inquiry. However, SIGAR’s analysis of the nine documents continues to raise concerns about why the contractor was not held responsible for the construction deficiencies and calls into question the thoroughness of USACE’s inquiry.
Alert Letter 14-45-AL: Baghlan Prison Construction

On April 2, 2013, SIGAR wrote to State to inform the department of design and construction defects at a prison in Baghlan Province built by a contractor hired by State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) in December 2013. SIGAR announced its inspection of Baghlan prison in December 2013. Although SIGAR has been unable to conduct a physical inspection of the prison because of security concerns, its review of the contract files found serious structural damage. The structural damage resulted in at least one of the prison’s housing units being demolished. The designs indicate that this unit and other buildings at the site were built using unreinforced brick walls between concrete columns. Subsequent information provided by INL confirms that the facilities were built using an inadequate amount of reinforcing steel. Although INL officials told SIGAR that any rebuilt structure(s) will use the same construction materials and methods that were previously used, SIGAR believes that INL should, for security and safety reasons, instead use sufficient steel-reinforced masonry, such as concrete-masonry units with rebar.

New Inspections Announced This Quarter

This quarter, SIGAR initiated five new inspections. Each inspection will assess whether (1) construction has been or is being completed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards; and (2) the parts of the facility, if any, that are occupied are being used as intended and properly maintained. These five inspections will assess:

- The Afghan Ministry of Defense Headquarters, a $142 million facility located in Kabul
- The ANA Camp Commando Complex near Kabul
- The ANA Slaughterhouse Facility in Pol-i-Charki District in Kabul
- The Gorimar Industrial Park in Balkh Province
- The Shorandam Industrial Park in Kandahar Province

STATUS OF SIGAR RECOMMENDATIONS

The Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, requires SIGAR to report on the status of its recommendations. This quarter, SIGAR closed 46 recommendations contained in 14 audit and inspection reports. These recommendations resulted in over $22 million of savings to the U.S. taxpayer. Corrective actions taken for the closed audit recommendations this period include:

- The de-obligation of over $22 million from expired USAID grants. (Audit 12-9);
- The recovery of nearly $332,000 in ineligible and/or unsupported contract costs paid by the U.S. Government. (Financial Audits 13-2, 13-4, 13-5, 13-8, 14-9, 14-11, 14-14, and 14-29); and
• The establishment of a review process to check the validity of Risk Management Company licenses prior to approving USAID contract awards for security advisory services.

For one audit report, the remaining open recommendation was closed because the corrective action was overtaken by events when the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) overseeing the planned use of electrical equipment was disbanded before a plan of action could be completed. (Audit 13-7)

From 2009 through March 2014, SIGAR published 130 audits, alert letters, and inspection reports and made 410 recommendations to recover funds, improve agency oversight, and increase program effectiveness. SIGAR has closed 77% of these recommendations. Closing a recommendation generally indicates SIGAR’s assessment that the audited agency has either implemented the recommendation or otherwise appropriately addressed the issue. In some cases, a closed recommendation will be the subject of follow-up audit work.

The Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, also requires SIGAR to report on any significant recommendations from prior reports on which corrective action has not been completed. In this quarter, SIGAR continued to monitor agency actions on recommendations in 29 audit and inspection reports. There was one audit with recommendations over 12 months old where the agency had not yet proposed a corrective action that SIGAR believes would resolve the identified problem. The audit report was titled *Afghan National Army: Controls Over Fuel for Vehicles, Generators, and Power Plants Need Strengthening to Prevent Fraud, Waste and Abuse* (Audit 13-4). Released in January 2013, it questioned the process used to order, receive, and pay for petroleum, oil, and lubricants for ANA vehicles. Additionally, there are three audit and inspection reports over 12 months old where SIGAR is waiting for an agency to complete the agreed-upon corrective action.

SIGAR is currently performing audits of the agency resolution process at the Departments of Defense and State, and USAID. The audits are examining the status the status and oversight process for reaching audit resolution at these agencies.

**SPECIAL PROJECTS**

The Inspector General’s Special Projects team was created to examine emerging issues and deliver prompt, actionable reports to federal agencies and the Congress. The team conducts a variety of assessments, producing reports on all facets of Afghanistan reconstruction. The directorate is made up of auditors, analysts, investigators, lawyers, subject-matter experts, and other specialists who can quickly and jointly apply their expertise to emerging problems and questions.
During this reporting period, SIGAR’s Office of Special Projects asked DOD to take immediate action to retain and preserve all records related to issues surrounding the planning and construction of a 64,000-square-foot building at Camp Leatherneck in Helmand Province. Special Projects wrote to CSTC-A to warn that the United States might be unwittingly helping to pay the salaries of non-existent members of the ANP. It wrote to State and DOD about communications towers built with reconstruction funds that are not being and may never be used for their intended purpose, and it queried USAID about 17 cancelled projects. The office also issued an inquiry letter to USAID about concerns that the estimated cost to install an additional power generating turbine at Kajaki Dam has increased significantly. Special Projects is planning to examine aspects of human-trafficking issues to determine whether prime contractors and subcontractors employed by the U.S. military are adequately conforming to federal laws and regulations designed to protect the health and safety of thousands of foreign workers laboring at bases in Afghanistan.

Inquiry Letter 14-35-SP: Mi-17 Crash and Demolition
On February 18, 2014, SIGAR wrote to Special Operations Joint Task Force-Afghanistan to ask about the crash of an Mi-17 helicopter from the Ministry of Interior’s Special Mission Wing in Nangahar Province on November 25, 2013. SIGAR inquired about the Afghan government’s process for investigating military aircraft incidents, whether an incident report had been completed, and whether U.S. military advisors participated in these investigations. SIGAR wrote that the issue merits review because the Mi-17 aircraft were purchased for the Special Mission Wing with funds provided by U.S. taxpayers for the support of Afghan security forces. It also highlights the importance of helping the Afghans identify equipment maintenance and repair priorities prior to providing them with additional replacement aircraft.

Inquiry Letter 14-36-SP: Afghan National Police Ghost Worker and Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan Financial Management
On February 19, 2014, SIGAR wrote to CSTC-A to express concern that the United States might be unwittingly helping to pay the salaries of non-existent members of the ANP.

The issue of “ghost workers” is not a new one for SIGAR. In 2011, a SIGAR audit report raised questions about the United Nations Development Program’s (UNDP) management of the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), which is used to pay ANP salaries. SIGAR auditors found that neither the Afghan Ministry of Interior nor the UNDP could verify payroll data. SIGAR concluded that there was “limited assurance that only ANP personnel who worked received pay.”
SIGAR noted that there is a very significant amount of U.S. taxpayer money at stake in this program. Since 2002, the international community has contributed $3.17 billion to LOTFA. The United States has provided 38% of that amount—approximately $1.21 billion.

In recent discussions with officials from the European Commission and the European Anti-Fraud Office about oversight issues, SIGAR learned that the European Union (EU) is withholding €100 million (half of its €200 million contribution to LOTFA), due to concerns about how that money is being used, including the possibility of payments to ghost workers and other instances of financial mismanagement. SIGAR was told the Commission does not intend to release this funding until proper controls are in place to ensure that LOTFA funds are used as intended.

Special Inspector General Sopko raised the issue of ghost workers and the European Commission’s concerns with senior CSTC-A officials on his November visit to Afghanistan. None of the officials were aware of any investigations of ghost workers or of the EU’s decision to withhold funds from LOTFA.

SIGAR asked CSTC-A to provide any evidence it has of this problem and to identify any efforts to coordinate with other donors to LOTFA in order to share information on possible mismanagement of donor funds. SIGAR is encouraged by recent information that CSTC-A is taking specific actions to address these issues including strengthening CSTC-A’s independent audit capabilities and performing assessments scrutinizing Afghan financial processes.

Inquiry Letter 14-37-SP: Communications Towers
On February 25, 2014, SIGAR wrote to DOD and State to ask for information about the construction of communications towers in Afghanistan that are not being used and may never be used for their intended purpose.

SIGAR staff learned that sometime during 2011–2012, State entered into a contract with MNM Communications Inc. for the design and construction of six communications towers that, when completed, would be three times taller than any existing towers in their vicinity. The towers were to provide cell phone support and be made available to Afghan telecommunications providers for television and radio broadcasters, who it was anticipated would want to access these towers to extend their area of broadcast coverage in southwestern Afghanistan.

The tower project was proposed and implemented by State’s Political Affairs Section (PAS), Office of Strategic Communications (STRATCOM) at the U.S. Embassy Kabul. On June 20, 2011, STRATCOM issued a Task Order Proposal Request for the design/build of six communications towers in southwestern Afghanistan at an estimated total cost of between $5 million and $10 million. The contract to design and build the six towers was awarded to MNM Communications Inc. for $7.2 million. Construction of all six towers was
completed during 2012. Four of these towers are located in Helmand Province, one is located in Kandahar Province, and one is located in Ghazni Province.

According to information received by SIGAR, PAS/STRATCOM greatly underestimated the cost of the contracts to operate, maintain, and market the towers. PAS/STRATCOM had set a $2 million limit on contract costs, but bids received were four to five times higher than the limit. As a result of the high bids, the decision was made to not award these service contracts. SIGAR was also told that DOD cancelled the Expeditionary Cellular Communications project, and according to information received, the U.S. government lost most of its potential use for the towers.

Research by SIGAR found that this program may have been intended to provide continuous uninterrupted cell phone coverage for forces in Afghanistan operating in remote areas. Some of the towers may have been designated by State as “excess property,” which allows them to be turned over to DOD. On May 18, 2013, one tower at Camp Leatherneck was transferred to the DOD garrison for $150,000. SIGAR asked State and DOD for more information on the decision to construct these six communications towers, the reasons for their lack of utilization, their future use, subsequent sale, or transfer. In a March 28 response, DOD acknowledged that one of the towers was transferred to DOD and is not currently being utilized. DOD reported that the five remaining towers are under State control. An extensive response was received from State and is currently being evaluated.

**Inquiry Letter 14-38-SP: 64,000-Square-Foot Building Review**

**Document Preservation**

On February 27, 2014, SIGAR wrote to DOD to request that it take immediate action to retain and preserve all records relating to issues surrounding the planning and construction of an unoccupied 64,000-square-foot building at Camp Leatherneck. SIGAR had written in July and again in December asking for information about why the building, originally intended to serve as a command headquarters in support of the troop surge in Helmand Province, which ended in September 2012, had been built. In the most recent letter, Special Inspector General Sopko wrote that it had come to his attention that his request for the preservation and retention of records may not have been honored, which DOD acknowledged. DOD subsequently issued a retention order, and the department is currently assembling the requested documents for SIGAR’s review.

**Inquiry Letter 14-40-SP: Kajaki Unit 2 Project**

On March 11, 2014, SIGAR sent an inquiry letter to USAID regarding the cost of the installation of an additional power generating turbine at the Kajaki Dam.

In December 2010, USAID awarded a contract to Black and Veatch Special Projects Corporation (Black & Veatch) to complete the Kandahar
Helmand Power Program (KHPP). KHPP is one of USAID’s largest active programs in Afghanistan, with a total estimated cost of about $266 million. This project had six components, including the installation and commission of an additional turbine for the Kajaki Dam, known as the Kajaki Unit 2 Project. In January 2013, at the request of the Afghan government, USAID removed the requirement for the installation of Kajaki Unit 2 from its KHPP contract with Black & Veatch and transferred responsibility to the Afghan government. However, USAID did not reduce the original total estimated cost of $266 million for the program, but instead modified the contract to fund technical assistance support to the Afghan government. USAID then obligated an additional $75 million under an existing grant with the Afghan government to fund the installation of the turbine unit.

With the additional funding provided for the Kajaki Unit 2 project, the cost for all six components of the original KHPP consequently increased to $345 million. SIGAR is concerned that with this cost increase KHPP may no longer be economically viable. According to a 2012 USAID economic analysis of KHPP, the costs of the program would outweigh its benefits if actual costs exceeded the original cost estimate of $266 million costs by more than 16%. In other words, based on the original cost estimate of $270 million for the KHPP, any cost increase exceeding $43 million (16%) would make the KHPP economically unviable. SIGAR’s analysis showed that the cost increase of $75 million for the turbine unit represents a discounted-value increase of $59 million (22%) for the overall KHPP.

USAID disagreed with SIGAR’s letter in a response dated March 28, 2014. USAID stated that the $75 million estimate was aligned with USAID’s 2012 cost estimate. USAID also noted that the agency made a contract modification that decreases KHPP’s ceiling by $38 million. USAID asked SIGAR to consider the U.S. government’s broader policy and economic goals in implementing the project. USAID stated that its investment is not simply based on direct economic returns, but predicated on significant security and governance objectives.

In a follow-up letter, SIGAR stated it appreciates that USAID’s investment is not based on cost alone and that a contract modification did take place. However, SIGAR maintains that by USAID’s own analysis, KHPP has very nearly reached the threshold of economic viability.

**Inquiry Letter 14-43-SP: DOD Contract Data Request**

On March 19, 2014, SIGAR wrote to DOD reiterating an earlier request for detailed information for all contracts, cooperative agreements, and grants for reconstruction in Afghanistan for the period from FY 2002 through February 28, 2013. In April 2013 DOD provided the requested contract, cooperative agreement, and grant data to SIGAR in response to the earlier SIGAR request.
The data submitted in April 2013 totaled approximately $23 billion in obligations. However, high-level fund data in the Defense Finance and Accounting Services (DFAS) database indicated that, as of March 31, 2013, obligations for the Afghanistan Security Force Fund alone totaled $44 billion. The significant difference between the total of DOD's contract data and that indicated in the DFAS database led SIGAR to conclude that it does not have complete data or has not received information that would allow the agency to reconcile the two. SIGAR personnel met with representatives of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) (Policy) and OSD (Comptroller). The OSD officials agreed that there were significant gaps in the initial contract, cooperative agreement, and grant data submission and agreed to re-examine what data is available and provide a narrative explanation for the data that is not available.

**Inquiry Letter 14-44-SP: Cancelled USAID Contracts**

On March 25, 2014, SIGAR wrote to USAID requesting information on 17 projects in Afghanistan that USAID had identified as terminated since 2008. SIGAR noted that it appeared that USAID cancelled multiple programs after some $212 million had been disbursed. SIGAR's letter also raised two general questions: why did USAID not take action earlier to terminate or cancel some of these contracts, and, given that multiple programs were cancelled due to either the contractor “no longer meeting the needs” of the partner entity, or lack of cooperation from the partner entity, to what extent are these issues curtailing USAID reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan? USAID has since provided extensive information on these cancelled contracts which SIGAR is currently reviewing.

**Fact Sheet 14-49-SP: Department of State Assistance to Afghanistan: $4 Billion Obligated Between 2002 and 2013**

To provide more effective oversight and to meet SIGAR’s reporting requirements to monitor contracts and reconstruction activities in Afghanistan, SIGAR has requested information from U.S. government agencies concerning how and where U.S. funds appropriated for the reconstruction of Afghanistan are spent. This report provides an analysis of the information obtained in State’s response.

According to SIGAR analysis of State data, State obligated nearly $4 billion for reconstruction in Afghanistan between the beginning of FY 2002 and March 2013. State awarded reconstruction funding through contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements. Recipients of State reconstruction awards included for-profit entities, non-profit non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and individuals.

State awarded 1,874 contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements to 771 organizations and individuals. Nearly 90% of awards by total award amount were issued for the governance and rule of law project sector,
which includes peacekeeping initiatives and activities intended to develop the ANP and the Afghan judiciary system. Other project sectors for State funding included landmine removal, support to cultural activities and civil society, education, humanitarian aid, human rights, and economic development.

Contracts accounted for the majority of State reconstruction funds by total value, with $3.5 billion. Grants accounted for a total of $350.7 million. Cooperative agreements accounted for a total of $108.8 million of total State Department reconstruction funds for Afghanistan.

The top recipient of State reconstruction funding by total awards was DynCorp International Limited Liability Corporation (DynCorp). DynCorp received approximately $2.8 billion in contracts, accounting for 69% of total State Department reconstruction awards. The majority of DynCorp contracts were for governance and rule-of-law activities such training and equipping the ANP. DynCorp contracts included police trainers, construction of police infrastructure, and fielding police equipment and vehicles. PAE Government Services Incorporated (PAE) received the second-largest amount of total State reconstruction awards, receiving $598 million in contracts. PAE contracts supported development of the rule of law, including police training, counternarcotics advising, and justice sector development.

Of the total reported awards between the beginning of FY 2002 and March 2013, 98% of awards by total value were scheduled to be complete by the end of calendar year 2013. On April 14, 2014, SIGAR released a fact sheet summarizing data provided by the State Department on the agency’s spending on reconstruction in Afghanistan. The report analyzed the data by type of legal instrument, kind of project, and project completion status.

**Inquiry Letter 14-50-SP: ANP Mobile Money Pilot Program**

On April 16, 2014, SIGAR wrote U.S. military commanders in Afghanistan to inquire about the current status of an MOI pilot program using mobile-money technology to pay salaries to the ANP. These salary payments are funded in part by U.S. taxpayers through direct-assistance funds to LOTFA. Despite the promise of reducing corruption, the pilot has since produced mixed results.

Established in 2009, the pilot demonstrated early success in reducing administrative corruption. As late as March 2013, media reported that Afghan police officers participating in the pilot thought they had received a 30% salary increase because middlemen were no longer able to skim cash from legitimate salary payments. However, SIGAR uncovered information that Afghan police commanders began registering their own phone numbers in lieu of those of their subordinates, and resumed their past practice of claiming a portion of the salaries paid out to individual police officers.
Inquiry Letter 14-51-SP: USDA Soybean Program

On April 17, 2014, SIGAR wrote to the Secretary of Agriculture requesting information on a U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)-sponsored program to promote soybean cultivation and consumption in Afghanistan. Following a staff visit to a USDA-funded soybean processing factory outside Mazar-e-Sharif, SIGAR became concerned that a key component of the program faces significant sustainability challenges due to a lack of raw materials for processing, ineffective technical assistance, and a lack of local demand for soybean products in Afghanistan. SIGAR requested justification and cooperative agreement documents as well as any plans the USDA had implemented to address challenges to the success of the program.

INVESTIGATIONS

During the reporting period, SIGAR’s ongoing investigations saved the U.S. government approximately $2.7 million. SIGAR investigations also resulted in an arrest, a criminal information, two plea agreements, and six sentencings in the United States. In Afghanistan, two subjects were convicted and sentenced and eight individuals were barred from having military installation access. Criminal fines, restitutions, and forfeitures amounted to nearly $4 million. SIGAR initiated 60 new investigations and closed 40, bringing the total number of ongoing investigations to 338, as shown in Figure 2.1. In addition, SIGAR’s suspension and debarment program referred 16 individuals and 15 companies for suspension or debarment based on allegations that they engaged in fraud and non-performance as part of contracts valued at almost $61 million.

Investigation Results in $2.5 Million Savings to U.S. Government

SIGAR initiated an investigation into allegations that the Afghan trucking company Kandahar Mahali Transit & Forwarding Limited (KMT) submitted 51 false Transportation Movement Requests (TMRs) to the CENTCOM Joint Theater Support Contracting Command (C-JTSCC) at Camp Phoenix in Kabul, Afghanistan. The investigation determined that 43 of the 51 TMRs were fraudulent. During the course of the investigation, C-JTSCC identified an additional 305 questionable TMRs submitted by KMT. Further investigative efforts revealed that 262 of these were fraudulent as well.

On February 17, 2014, the contracting officer at the C-JTSCC/General Support Contracting Center (GSCC) provided SIGAR with a copy of the letter of concern informing KTM of its three-week suspension. The total value of the fraudulent TMRs withheld from payment amounted to over $2.5 million, a significant savings to the U.S. government.

Criminal Information: a written accusation made by a public prosecutor, without the participation of a grand jury. The function of an information is to inform the defendant of the nature of the charge made against him, and the act constituting such charge so that he can prepare for trial and to prevent him from being tried again for the same offense.

Source: Black’s Law Dictionary.
Two Former U.S. Soldiers Sentenced for Bribery and Conspiracy

On February 3, 2014, in the U.S. District Court of Colorado, Stephanie Charboneau was sentenced to 87 months incarceration, three years supervised release, and restitution of $1,225,000. SIGAR initiated the investigation when information was obtained that Charboneau, Sergeant Christopher Weaver, and Jonathan Hightower, a former contractor, were alleged to have conspired with Afghan nationals to help them steal fuel from the base in exchange for cash.

Agents from SIGAR, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (CID), and the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) executed search warrants at the homes of Weaver and Charboneau in Colorado and Hightower in Texas. During the course of these searches, Weaver, Charboneau, and Hightower all admitted to conspiring with an Afghan representative of the company Afghan American Army Services to facilitate the theft of fuel from FOB Fenty.

Weaver and Hightower also implicated Staff Sergeant Bilah Abdullah in the same scheme. When interviewed by SIGAR agents in June 2012, Abdullah admitted to receiving $50,000 in bribes from Afghan contractors. A criminal information was eventually filed against Abdullah and on
March 13, 2014, he was sentenced to 12 months plus one day incarceration, two years supervised release, and restitution of $466,250.

Weaver and Hightower have already been prosecuted for their role in this conspiracy.

**Two Convicted From FOB Ghazni Sting Operation**

On March 4, 2014, Chief Prosecutor Rashid of the Afghan Attorney General’s Office, Ghazni Province, informed SIGAR that on February 3, 2014, the Ghazni Public Security Division convicted two Afghan truck drivers, Khairullah and Yar-Mohammad, of theft and sentenced them both to two years in prison and a fine of $500.

SIGAR’s investigation began on December 9, 2013. A U.S. soldier assigned to download fuel at the base informed a SIGAR agent that an Afghan driver representing Deans Logistic and Transportation Company had offered to pay him cash in return for leaving fuel in his truck. SIGAR immediately contacted the Ghazni prosecutor and proposed that a sting operation be set into motion. The prosecutor and the soldier agreed to participate in the operation that resulted in the arrest of the two truck drivers.

**SIGAR Disrupts Human Trafficking at Kandahar Airfield**

SIGAR disrupted a human-trafficking scheme this quarter at Kandahar Airfield (KAF). The investigation began when a SIGAR special agent attended a meeting in January 2014 at the office of RONCO, a company hired to conduct entrance and exit interviews of all contractor employees at KAF. At this meeting, a Sri Lankan working at KAF for a Canadian company specializing in passenger and cargo transport in Afghanistan told RONCO that his supervisor solicited a $600 payment from him during his job interview. The supervisor informed the Sri Lankan that the payment was required to reimburse the company for his airfare to Afghanistan.

On March 1, 2014, SIGAR interviewed the Sri Lankan employee, who admitted to paying his supervisor $600. During the interview, he identified other Sri Lankans employed by the Canadian company who made similar payments, as required by management. On March 20, 2014, SIGAR conducted interviews of six other Sri Lankan men employed by the company and confirmed four of the six paid their supervisor out of their first few paychecks.

SIGAR Agents subsequently interviewed the supervisor, who admitted to forcing his employees into paying him. SIGAR provided the information to the company director, who advised he would promptly terminate the employee and arrange for his departure home. Additionally, the company agreed to reimburse the employees what they had paid to the supervisor. The supervisor was referred to the Army for debarment on March 31, 2014.
Tennessee Couple Sentenced for Conspiracy to Commit Fraud

On February 14, 2014, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Keith and Angela Johnson were sentenced for conspiracy to commit wire fraud in a scheme to steer more than $10 million in military subcontracts through kickbacks and the use of assumed names. Keith Johnson received a sentence of 30 months in prison, a supervised release for two years, and a forfeiture of over $2 million to be paid in conjunction with his wife, whose sentence also included a prison term of six months and two years supervised release.

SIGAR, DCIS, FBI, and Army CID opened the investigation after an Army CID report alleged that Keith Johnson, a program manager for a U.S. contractor, and his family members were steering supply contracts and rigging bids contracts to a company owned and operated by Angela Johnson and another relative. Keith Johnson had his wife establish a separate company and then positioned her as the sales manager. Other close associates of the Johnson couple had established other companies to allow Keith Johnson to steer contracts to them. These associates then reportedly paid kickbacks to Keith Johnson through a shell company operated in the name of Johnson’s relative. The Tennessee couple used part of the proceeds for extravagant purchases, including luxury vehicles and jewelry.

John Eisner and Jerry Kieffer, two co-conspirators involved in this scheme, pled guilty, and were sentenced in 2013.

Keith Johnson, Angela Johnson, and two of their companies were proposed for debarment on January 8, 2014, and on February 24, 2014, all of them were debarred for a period of eight years. Kieffer was proposed for debarment on January 8, 2014, and on February 20, 2014, was debarred for a period of six years. Eisner and his company were proposed for debarment on January 8, 2014, and on March 6, 2014, were debarred for a period of six years.

U.S. Army Sergeant Sentenced for Conspiracy and Theft

On March 7, 2014, in the Eastern District of North Carolina, former Sergeant First Class Mauricio Espinoza, U.S. Army, was ordered to serve 51 months in a federal prison, followed by three years supervised probation, and to pay $114,034 in restitution. A federal bench warrant had been issued for Espinoza’s arrest because of his failure to appear in the Eastern District of North Carolina court for sentencing in January 2014.

A SIGAR initiative to review and analyze postal money-order purchases by personnel deployed in Afghanistan had identified Espinoza and Staff Sergeant Philip Wooten as being involved in suspicious monetary transactions. Both men were assigned to the 7th Special Forces Group based at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, when they stole about $225,000 in U.S. funds earmarked for the reconstruction effort. Espinoza deployed to Afghanistan during his March 2014 trip to Afghanistan, Special IG Sopko presents retirement credentials to Special Agent Danny Min. (SIGAR photo by Elizabeth Faulkner)
as a paying agent, while Wooten was responsible for contracting with local vendors. Between July 2009 and April 2010, the two conspired to steal funds meant for Afghan contractors and falsified payment receipts to cover up the scheme. In some instances, they submitted inflated civil work project bids to the finance office for approval, then paid the vendor less than the approved amount and pocketed the difference for themselves. They converted the money into U.S. dollars and shipped some of it back to the United States via postal money orders. Wooten was convicted and is currently serving his sentence.

U.S. Army Sergeant Pleads Guilty
On February 19, 2014, Sergeant Albert Kelly III of Fort Knox, Kentucky, pled guilty to charges of theft of government property and aiding and abetting in the theft of fuel at FOB Salerno. A criminal information was filed against Kelly on November 11, 2013.

From November 2011 until January 2012, Kelly permitted the diversion of fuel-delivery trucks from FOB Salerno to other locations, where the trucks were downloaded and the fuel stolen. To conceal the diversions, Kelly falsely certified that the diverted fuel had in fact been delivered and downloaded at FOB Salerno. In exchange for assisting in the fuel-theft missions and diverting approximately 25,000 gallons of fuel, Kelly received approximately $57,000 from an Afghan trucking company. The total loss to the government was approximately $100,000.

Investigation Saves the U.S. Government More Than $150,000
SIGAR initiated an investigation that saved the U.S. government $156,669 after a contracting officer at Camp Phoenix in Afghanistan noticed 45 TMRs that appeared to be fraudulent. The C-JTSCC, CSCC referred the case to SIGAR. A review of the TMRs determined they were all generated and submitted by Rahmat Siddiqi Transportation Company (RSTC) and that each of the TMRs had been paid prior to the discovery. When informed of the investigative findings, the CSCC issued a demand letter for overpayment to RSTC. On January 14, 2014, DFAS confirmed that an offset of payment had been issued on a RSTC contract in order to collect the debt of $156,669 owed by the company.

Investigation Uncovers False TMRs
SIGAR initiated an investigation after a contracting officer alleged that the trucking firm Speedline Handling and Logistics (SHL) had submitted false TMRs to the C-JSCC at Camp Phoenix in Kabul, Afghanistan. Investigative efforts determined that five of the SHL TMRs were fraudulent. SIGAR informed the contracting officer, who responded with a memo indicating he withheld payment for all five TMRs. The investigation resulted in a cost savings of $30,887.
State Department Contractor Sentenced
On January 14, 2014, in the U.S. District Court of Delaware, Kenneth Brophy received a sentence of one year unsupervised probation, a $3,000 fine, and $30,000 forfeiture. In September 2013, the court accepted Brophy’s guilty plea to count two of his indictment, receipt of an illegal gratuity by a public official. On March 25, 2014, the State Department Office of Inspector General’s (OIG) Office of Investigations provided SIGAR with a copy of a State letter dated March 24, 2014, debarring Brophy from soliciting or performing U.S. government contracts as either a contractor or sub-contractor for a three-year period commencing January 27, 2014.

SIGAR initiated this joint investigation of Brophy with the FBI and State OIG after receiving allegations that Brophy, a State Department contract employee for INL at the U.S. Embassy Kabul during 2009, accepted bribes and had otherwise engaged in corruption in connection with his employment. On April 2, 2013, Brophy was indicted in a three-count indictment charging him with conspiracy, receipt of an illegal gratuity by a public official, and willful receipt by an executive-branch employee of an illegal payment in consideration of assistance in the prosecution of a claim against USACE. At INL, Brophy had supervised construction contracts of Afghan police facilities, including the renovation of the Pol-i-Charkhi Prison by an Afghan contractor. The contractor paid Brophy $30,000 in exchange for his lobbying USACE to reinstate the Afghan company’s contract previously terminated due to unsatisfactory performance. Brophy assisted company officers in drafting documents for submission to USACE, provided general advice regarding the Afghan company’s communications with USACE, and personally lobbied a USACE official to re-instate the contract.

Contractor Barred from U.S. Military Installations in Afghanistan
A SIGAR investigation found that James Ethridge, vice-president of Fernridge Strategic Partners (FSP), accepted a $100,000 loan from his subcontractor, Etihad Hamidi Group of Companies (Etihad). The subcontractor provided the first $30,000 of the loan to Ethridge in cash. Etihad deducted the remaining $70,000 due the company on its subcontract work to FSP. Etihad later offered to forgive $40,000 of the loan FSP owed Etihad in exchange for five third country national badges that would allow Etihad employees access to KAF to develop work for Etihad outside the established subcontract between FSP and Etihad. SIGAR briefed the KAF Deputy Garrison Commander the case. He subsequently debarred Ethridge from all U.S. installations in the Afghanistan Combined Joint Operations Area because having individuals on the base with improper badges could have endangered U.S. troops.
Afghan Truck Drivers Barred from U.S. Military Installations in Afghanistan

On February 5, 2014, the 831st Transportation Battalion notified SIGAR's office at Bagram Airfield (BAF) that four flatbed trucks from the trucking company ATC Logistics were parked at the entry control point at BAF awaiting access to the base. Soldiers at the entry control point had discovered a discrepancy between the names on the manifest and the names of the drivers of the four trucks.

Subsequently, a SIGAR special agent interviewed the four drivers. Each stated they were hired to replace the original truck driver because the original driver had been blacklisted and was prohibited from entering the base. Upon completion of the interviews, the special agent submitted a request for the four drivers to be barred from every U.S. military installation in Afghanistan. Captain Steven Brady, CJTF-10 Chief of Administrative Law, granted the request.

Suspensions and Debarments

This quarter, SIGAR’s suspension and debarment program referred 16 individuals and 15 companies for suspension or debarment based on evidence developed as part of investigations conducted by SIGAR in Afghanistan and the United States. Of these 31 contractors, 14 individuals, and 15 companies were referred for debarment based on allegations that they engaged in fraud and non-performance as part of contracts valued at $60,512,177. These referrals bring the total number of individuals and companies referred by SIGAR since 2008 to 433–encompassing 230 individuals and 203 companies to date, as shown in Figure 2.2 on the following page.

As of the end of March 2014, the efforts of SIGAR to utilize suspension and debarment to address fraud, corruption, and poor performance in Afghanistan have resulted in a total of 72 suspensions and 154 finalized debarments of individuals and companies engaged in U.S.-funded reconstruction projects. An additional seven individuals and companies have entered into administrative compliance agreements with the U.S. government in lieu of exclusion from contracting.

Suspensions and debarments are an important tool for ensuring that agencies award contracts only to responsible entities. SIGAR's program addresses three challenges posed by U.S. policy and the contingency contracting environment in Afghanistan: the need to act quickly, the limited U.S. jurisdiction over Afghan nationals and Afghan companies, and the vetting challenges inherent in the use of multiple tiers of subcontractors. SIGAR continues to look for ways to enhance the government’s responses to these challenges through the innovative use of information resources and investigative assets both in Afghanistan and the United States.

SIGAR makes referrals for suspensions and debarments—actions taken by U.S. agencies to exclude companies or individuals from receiving federal
contracts or assistance because of misconduct—based on completed investigations that SIGAR participates in. In most cases, SIGAR's referrals occur in the absence of acceptance of an allegation for criminal prosecution or remedial action by a contracting office and are therefore the primary remedy to address contractor misconduct. In making referrals to agencies, SIGAR provides the basis for a suspension or debarment decision by the agency as well as all of the supporting documentation needed for an agency to support that decision should it be challenged by the contractor at issue. Based on the evolving nature of the contracting environment in Afghanistan and the available evidence of contractor misconduct and/or poor performance, at times SIGAR has found it necessary to refer individuals or companies on multiple occasions for consideration by agency suspension and debarment officials.

SIGAR's emphasis on suspension and debarment is exemplified by the fact that of the 433 referrals for suspension and debarment that have been made by the agency to date, 406 have been made since the second quarter of 2011. During the 12 month period prior to April 2014, the efforts of SIGAR's suspension and debarment program resulted in actions by agency suspension and debarment officials to exclude 125 individuals and companies from contracting with the U.S. government. SIGAR's referrals over this period represent allegations of theft, fraud, poor performance, financial support to insurgents, and mismanagement as part of reconstruction contracts valued at $563,621,648.
Debarment of Mesopotamia Group

During the previous quarter, the efforts of SIGAR’s suspension and debarment program resulted in debarment of Mesopotamia Group, John Dawkins, Candice Boulware, and Geoffrey Nordloh based upon false claims of approximately $5,000,000 as part of a U.S. Army contract to provide medical-equipment maintenance to ANA hospitals. SIGAR’s investigation found that Mesopotamia Group had provided inadequately trained personnel, substandard repairs to equipment, and a complete lack of calibration or record keeping, all in violation of the terms of the contract. This lack of performance was illustrated by the inability of staff at the Dawood National Military Hospital to use any of its ventilators to aid victims of an October 2007 suicide bomb attack on a Kabul bus that resulted in the deaths of 13 Afghans and second incident at Herat Provincial ANA Hospital where an improperly attached regulator prevented hospital staff from using a breathing incubator during surgery, contributing to the death of an Afghan soldier. On repeated occasions, Mesopotamia Group allegedly refused to provide its staff with the resources to address these problems while billing the entire amount the contract allowed, regardless of whether the work was actually completed according to the terms of the contract. Based upon the allegations in SIGAR's referral, the Army proposed Mesopotamia Group, John Dawkins, Candice Boulware, and Geoffrey Nordloh for debarment on May 7, 2013. Following the submission of information in response to this proposal for debarment, the Army determined on February 20, 2014, that a final debarment was in the best interests of the government. As a result, all were excluded from contracting with the government for a period of three years, ending on May 7, 2016.

OTHER SIGAR ACTIVITIES

SIGAR Speaks Before Public Policy Group and Professional Associations

In this reporting period, Special Inspector General Sopko spoke about SIGAR's work to the Atlantic Council, a bipartisan forum for the discussion of challenges facing the United States and its European allies; the Professional Services Council, the national trade association of the government professional and technical services industry; and the National Sheriffs’ Association.

Sopko told the Atlantic Council on March 20, 2014, that allowing corruption to continue unabated in Afghanistan will likely jeopardize all the United States has accomplished in 12 years of reconstruction. The inspector general pointed out that SIGAR has been sounding the alarm for some time on the need to address corruption. He noted that a U.S. military study recently drew upon SIGAR audits to make three points. First, the initial
U.S. strategy in Afghanistan not only failed to recognize the significance of corruption, but may have even fostered a political climate conducive to corruption. Second, massive military and aid spending overwhelmed the Afghan government’s ability to absorb the assistance. Third, the lack of a comprehensive, coordinated anticorruption strategy reduced the effectiveness of U.S. anticorruption efforts.

Sopko went on to say that with a new government coming into Afghanistan, the international community has a window of opportunity to tackle corruption. If the United States and its allies get it right, they can create a model for future contingencies and help the Afghan people build a country that does not become another failed criminal state and a safe haven for terrorists.

Sopko spoke to the Professional Services Council Dialogue Lunch Series on February 18, 2014. He told the group that after the contracting community brought its concerns about the illegal taxation of U.S. contractors in Afghanistan to SIGAR, the agency produced an audit recommending that the U.S. government develop a consistent position on appropriate taxation of contractors supporting its efforts in Afghanistan. SIGAR also urged Congress to seek reimbursement from the Afghan government for taxes levied in violation of its agreements with U.S. agencies. Congress has since passed legislation requiring DOD to withhold assistance for Afghanistan in an amount equal to the total of all taxes assessed by the Afghan government on assistance provided by DOD. Sopko asked members of the contracting community to let SIGAR know about their successes, in-country challenges, impediments, and suggested improvements for future reconstruction efforts.

At the National Sheriffs’ Association on January 23, 2014, Sopko described the work of SIGAR’s Investigations Directorate and called upon the sheriffs to establish a partnership with SIGAR. He observed that many local law enforcement officers are currently in the National Guard or Reserve or were formerly in the military. Many have served in Afghanistan, and have seen things or may have information that could help SIGAR fight fraud, waste, and abuse of U.S. taxpayer funds. “My hope here today,” Sopko said, “is that we can build on the relationships we’ve already forged, and create new ones—especially with your brave colleagues who have served their nation, and who can help fight crimes against the United States and our reconstruction effort.”

**SIGAR Addresses NATO Conference**

On February 25–26, 2014, at the request of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), SIGAR attended the “Building Integrity Education and Training Discipline Conference” at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe in Mons, Belgium. The conference, hosted by NATO’s Political Affairs and Security Policy Division, aimed to further NATO
education and training requirements for strengthening transparency, accountability, and integrity to reduce the risk of corruption in the defense and security sector. Conference participants represented over 20 countries, including NATO members’ civilian and military staff; representatives of Georgia, Moldova, Serbia, Sweden, and Ukraine; NATO international staff from the Integration, Partnerships, and Cooperation Directorate; international organizations such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE); and third-party organizations such as the Defense Academy of the United Kingdom, the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, and representatives from Afghanistan’s and Colombia’s ministries of defense.

Deputy Inspector General Gene Aloise presented to the conference on the topic of “lessons learned” in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. NATO and its members were particularly interested in SIGAR’s perspective as the only organization participating in the Building Integrity working group with a specific, unique mission to promote transparency and accountability of NATO-supported contingency operations and reconstruction efforts within Afghanistan. While SIGAR’s efforts are ongoing, Aloise made some broad observations. First, he said more money does not necessarily lead to better results. Many in the international donor community have told SIGAR...
that too much foreign aid has been pumped in Afghanistan too quickly—in fact, some experts have suggested that the massive infusion of international donor funds in Afghanistan has fueled corruption. Second, oversight must be a policy priority. Support from senior government officials is critical to ensure that the international community maintains accountability and transparency in reconstruction efforts from the onset, not just after the money has been spent. Third, international donors need to better understand how corruption and patronage networks operate within a host country, and know how money flows in and out, so donors can identify theft and misuse of foreign assistance funds.

Aloise also described ways NATO member countries can improve contract-management practices for future reconstruction efforts. He suggested that contract managers and implementers should be given the flexibility to adjust contract scope and requirements as security and logistical conditions change on the ground. He proposed that contract managers and administrators place more focus on recordkeeping and documentation, not only to understand work being currently conducted, but also to provide much needed institutional knowledge for meeting the challenges of frequent staff turnover. He said that staff responsible for managing contracts must have the requisite training and experience to do their jobs. Finally, he urged that agencies funding contracts hold their contractors accountable for poor performance.

NATO intends to incorporate the information SIGAR provided into training requirements and education curricula to better prepare NATO staff for financial management and oversight of future reconstruction activities. NATO hopes to also use SIGAR's insights and perspectives to help prepare a “best practice” guide that NATO civilian and military staff will use in the field. SIGAR and NATO cooperation will not end with the conference. SIGAR plans to maintain this successful relationship and share insights with NATO from its one-of-a-kind mission to provide oversight of Afghanistan reconstruction.

SIGAR Convenes Symposium on Third-Party Monitoring in Insecure Environments

On February 12, 2014, SIGAR, in conjunction with the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), convened an international symposium on “Monitoring and Management in Insecure Environments: Applying Best Practices to Afghanistan.” Special Inspector General Sopko conceived the symposium as a means for U.S. government agencies, international donors, think tanks, and others to discuss best practices, techniques, and technologies for conducting effective project management and oversight in insecure environments. The symposium grew out of SIGAR's concerns about the rapidly shrinking oversight access to reconstruction sites in Afghanistan
SIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

as Coalition troops are withdrawn. A report on the symposium will be published shortly.

SIGAR Completes New Strategic Plan
This quarter SIGAR completed a new strategic plan to guide its programmatic and management decisions in 2014–2016. The U.S.-funded reconstruction effort in Afghanistan, now in its 12th year, is designed to support Afghanistan as it transitions to controlling its own security, governance, and development. The success of the entire reconstruction effort depends in large measure on how this transition unfolds. SIGAR’s new strategic plan will help the agency adapt its oversight work to the changing environment in Afghanistan, ensuring that its efforts continue to help the executive branch and congressional stakeholders protect U.S. taxpayers’ interests.

House Budget Committee Credits SIGAR
The House Budget Committee credited SIGAR in its FY 2015 Budget Resolution with highlighting several examples of wasteful spending of reconstruction funding, including multi-million-dollar infrastructure projects that have never been used, nor will be used for the intended purpose, if at all. The committee said it will continue to closely monitor the use of Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War On Terror (OCO/GWOT) funds to ensure taxpayer dollars are spent effectively and efficiently in achieving U.S. strategic goals overseas. It said continued reports of waste, fraud, and abuse will be taken into consideration as OCO/GWOT funding levels are determined.
SIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

SIGAR BUDGET
SIGAR received a budget of $49.65 million for FY 2014 in the Consolidated Appropriations Act from Congress. The budget supports SIGAR’s oversight activities and products by funding SIGAR’s five directorates: (1) Audits and Inspections, (2) Special Projects, (3) Investigations, (4) Management and Support, and (5) Research and Analysis.

SIGAR STAFF
Since its last report to Congress, SIGAR increased its staff, bringing the FY 2014 total staffing number to 203 federal employees. At the end of the quarter, SIGAR had 37 authorized personnel at the U.S. Embassy Kabul and 10 authorized at Afghan locations outside the U.S. Embassy. SIGAR staff members were stationed at five locations across the country, including Kandahar and Bagram Airfields, Mazar-e-Sharif, Camp Leatherneck (closed in March 2014, whereupon SIGAR agents moved to Kabul), and USFOR-A headquarters in Kabul. SIGAR employed a local Afghan in its Kabul office to support investigations and audits. In addition, SIGAR supports its work with staff assigned to short-term temporary duty in Afghanistan.

This quarter, SIGAR had 14 personnel on temporary duty in Afghanistan for a total of 252 days.

BG John Michel, Commanding General of the NATO Air Training Command-Afghanistan with SIGAR auditors and other NATC-A personnel at Kabul airport. (SIGAR photo)
Victoria A. Butler, director of Research and Analysis since 2009, will step down in May 2014 after managing more than 20 SIGAR Quarterly Reports to Congress. Under Butler’s leadership, the Quarterly Report has become the nation’s most authoritative source of information about the U.S.-funded reconstruction of Afghanistan. Before joining SIGAR, Butler was the lead author for the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s principal lessons-learned report, *Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience*. Earlier she worked as a foreign correspondent in Asia and Africa for *Time*, NBC News, Voice of America, and the Associated Press. She is the author of *Sudan: The Land and the People* (Marquand Books, 2005). Butler also served as a spokesperson for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Washington, D.C., and led a team for the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia to develop print, television, and radio products to inform Cambodians about elections managed by the United Nations. Upon leaving the Research and Analysis Directorate, Butler will take a new post as Strategic Advisor to SIGAR.
“Today there is reason for celebration in Afghanistan. Millions turned out to vote, with Afghan National Security Forces looking out for the safety of Afghan people as they cast votes at more than 6,000 polling sites. Clearly, this is an important step in the first democratic transfer of power in Afghanistan’s history.”

—Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman
Army General Martin Dempsey

Source: American Foreign Press Service article, April 5, 2014.
3 RECONSTRUCTION UPDATE
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Photo on previous page
Afghan women show voter cards and vote-confirming inked fingers after casting ballots in the April 5 national elections. (UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan photo by Shamsuddin Hamedi)
OVERVIEW
The following section summarizes the status of U.S. funding and developments SIGAR observed this quarter in the security, governance, and economic sectors of the reconstruction effort in Afghanistan.

The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2014 provided an additional $6.6 billion for Afghanistan relief and reconstruction for fiscal year (FY) 2014, bringing the cumulative total appropriated to approximately $103.2 billion. On March 4, 2014, the President submitted his budget proposal for FY 2015. Amounts requested for several of the largest reconstruction funds, such as the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, remain to be determined until a decision is made about the scope of the enduring U.S. presence in Afghanistan.

During this reporting period, Afghanistan succeeded in holding presidential and provincial council elections despite ongoing concerns about security as the United States and its Coalition partners proceeded with their troop withdrawals. President Karzai declined to sign the bilateral security agreement with the United States, putting future U.S. assistance in question. However, the international community concluded that the Afghan government had made some progress towards instituting the reforms needed to ensure donor support after 2014. Meanwhile, Afghan revenues continued to miss their targets, increasing the already substantial gap between budget requirements and revenue collection.

At least seven million Afghans (of whom 35% were females) voted in the elections on April 5, 2014. The Independent Election Commission Chairman, Yousaf Nuristani, announced on April 20 that partial results representing 49.67% of polling stations showed presidential candidate Abdullah Abdullah with 44.47% and Mohammad Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai with 33.18% of the vote. Under Afghan law, if no presidential candidate gains more than 50% of the vote, there will be a runoff between the top two candidates.

Despite early reports to the contrary, the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) announced on April 13 that there were more reports of serious instances of fraud than during the 2009 election. The ECC said it was too early to determine the seriousness of the allegations. If President Hamid Karzai hands power this year to one of the candidates in the April 5 election, it will be the first democratic transfer of power in Afghanistan’s history.

The general security situation remained in flux. Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) provided security for the elections. Despite a violent lead-up that included a number of attacks on foreigners in Kabul, the elections faced
fewer violent attacks than in 2009, and attacks were mostly concentrated in the north, east, and west, rather than the south as in previous elections. Karzai refused to sign a bilateral security agreement negotiated with the United States, causing U.S. officials to warn that the United States might pull all of its troops out of the country after 2014 and drastically cut back its aid. However, the two leading candidates for president both told The Wall Street Journal that they would sign the agreement.

In March, General Joseph F. Dunford, Commander of the International Security Assistance Force and U.S. Forces–Afghanistan, told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the Afghan security forces would deteriorate without continued assistance. Dunford also initiated a report on corruption released in February. The report concluded that “Corruption directly threatens the viability and legitimacy of the Afghan state.”

In March, Afghanistan’s Minister of Interior held a meeting to discuss the disbandment of the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF). Established in 2009, the APPF took over protecting people, facilities, infrastructure, and construction sites from private security companies. Although the Afghan National Police are expected to assume some of the APPF’s security responsibilities, the plan raised questions about who will protect many reconstruction projects in the future. Since the creation of the APPF in 2009 through FY 2012, the United States provided more than $51 million dollars to build the force.

The Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board—a high-level decision-making body responsible for strategic coordination between Afghanistan and the international community—met in January to measure Afghan and donor progress on fulfilling Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework requirements agreed to at the Tokyo Conference in July 2012. In a statement, the board concluded that both sides made “sound progress” while acknowledging that much still needed to be done.

At the same time, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an intergovernmental body that sets standards and promotes measures to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, downgraded Afghanistan to its “dark-gray list.” The FATF said Afghanistan had failed to address its anti-money-laundering deficiencies and pass legislation that would address those deficiencies. If Afghanistan does not show satisfactory improvement, it could be downgraded to the “black list” in June 2014, damaging its banking relationships around the world and further weakening the banking sector.

Afghanistan’s domestic revenues for the Afghan FY 1392 (December 21, 2012–December 20, 2013) missed Ministry of Finance budget targets by 11.9%. Domestic revenues paid for only 37% ($2 billion) of Afghanistan’s total budget expenditures ($5.4 billion) in FY 1392; donor grants covered the remainder.

DOD reported that the Village Stability Operations, a bottom-up counterinsurgency strategy aimed at connecting local governance to the Afghan
district and national government, has largely ended, with the exception of the Afghan Local Police component. According to DOD, only two Village Stability Platforms and 16 District Stability Platforms (DSP) hosting U.S. special operations forces remain active. The DSPs are scheduled to complete their mission by October 31, 2014.

The United States provides on-budget assistance to Afghanistan through direct payments to Afghan government entities and through contributions to multinational trust funds. Since 2002 the United States has provided nearly $9 billion in on-budget assistance. This includes about $5.4 billion to Afghan government ministries and institutions, and more than $3.6 billion to three multinational trust funds—the World Bank’s Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), the United Nations Development Plan’s Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), and the Asian Development Bank’s Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund (AITF). Table 3.1 shows U.S. on-budget assistance to Afghan government entities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>U.S. ON-BUDGET ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN, SINCE 2002 ($ MILLIONS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government-To-Government</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>$4,274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>1,060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Multilateral Trust Funds</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOTFA</td>
<td>$1,210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARTF</td>
<td>1,977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AITF</td>
<td>412</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FUNDING FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

Since 2002, Congress has appropriated nearly $103.2 billion for Afghanistan relief and reconstruction. Of this amount, more than $87.9 billion (85%) was appropriated to the seven major reconstruction funds, as shown in Table 3.2.

A significant amount of reconstruction funding remains to be spent in the years following the withdrawal of U.S. and NATO combat forces. As of March 31, 2014, approximately $17.9 billion of appropriated funds remained for possible disbursement, as shown in Figure 3.1. These funds will be used to complete on-going, large-scale infrastructure projects, such as those funded by the AIF and ESF; train, equip, and sustain the ANSF; combat narcotics production and trafficking; and, advance the rule of law, strengthen the justice sector, and promote human rights. Most of the funding in the pipeline has yet to be obligated. Only $6.7 billion of the $17.9 billion remaining has been obligated.

TABLE 3.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Appropriated</th>
<th>Obligated</th>
<th>Disbursed</th>
<th>Remaining</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASFF</td>
<td>$57.33</td>
<td>$48.92</td>
<td>$46.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERP</td>
<td>3.67</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td>2.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIF</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFBSO</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD CN</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>2.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESF</td>
<td>17.53</td>
<td>14.66</td>
<td>11.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCLE</td>
<td>4.42</td>
<td>3.55</td>
<td>2.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total 7 Major Funds</strong></td>
<td><strong>$87.90</strong></td>
<td><strong>$73.64</strong></td>
<td><strong>$66.95</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Reconstruction Funds</td>
<td>7.23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Operations</td>
<td>8.05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$103.17</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Numbers have been rounded. Amount remaining reflects the total disbursement potential of the seven major reconstruction funds after deducting approximately $3 billion that expired before being obligated. Obligated and disbursed DOD CN funds reflect amounts transferred to the military services and defense agencies to be spent for Afghanistan.

Source: SIGAR analysis of appropriating legislation and quarterly obligation and disbursement data provided by DOD, State, and USAID.

While reconstruction appropriations have been trending downward since FY 2010, the FY 2015 budget request for the largest USAID and State accounts is higher than the amount appropriated to those accounts for FY 2014. The President requested $1.2 billion for the ESF and $325 million for INCLE for Afghanistan for FY 2015. Combined, these amounts are 28% lower than the FY 2014 request but 44% higher than the amount ultimately appropriated for FY 2014 in P.L. 113-76.
Congress appropriated nearly $8.1 billion to the seven major reconstruction funds for FY 2013. Of that amount, more than $5.6 billion remained for possible disbursement, as of March 31, 2014, as shown in Table 3.3 and Figure 3.2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY 2013 AMOUNTS APPROPRIATED, OBLIGATED, AND DISBURSED</th>
<th>Appropriated</th>
<th>Obligated</th>
<th>Disbursed</th>
<th>Remaining</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASFF</td>
<td>$4,946</td>
<td>$2,360</td>
<td>$1,890</td>
<td>$3,056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERP</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIF</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFBSO</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD CN</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESF</td>
<td>1,623</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCLE</td>
<td>569</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total 7 Major Funds</strong></td>
<td><strong>$8,096</strong></td>
<td><strong>$3,108</strong></td>
<td><strong>$2,327</strong></td>
<td><strong>$5,611</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Numbers have been rounded. Amount remaining reflects the total disbursement potential of the seven major reconstruction funds after deducting approximately $157 million that expired before being obligated. Obligated and disbursed DOD CN funds reflect amounts transferred to the military services and defense agencies to be spent for Afghanistan.

Source: SIGAR analysis of appropriating legislation and quarterly obligation and disbursement data provided by DOD, State, and USAID.

Congress appropriated nearly $6.5 billion to the seven major reconstruction funds for FY 2014. Of that amount, nearly $6.4 billion remained for possible disbursement, as of March 31, 2014, as shown in Table 3.4 and Figure 3.3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY 2014 AMOUNTS APPROPRIATED, OBLIGATED, AND DISBURSED</th>
<th>Appropriated</th>
<th>Obligated</th>
<th>Disbursed</th>
<th>Remaining</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASFF</td>
<td>$4,727</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$4,727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERP</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIF</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFBSO</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD CN</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESF</td>
<td>852</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCLE</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total 7 Major Funds</strong></td>
<td><strong>$6,466</strong></td>
<td><strong>$69</strong></td>
<td><strong>$11</strong></td>
<td><strong>$6,455</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Numbers have been rounded. Amount remaining reflects the total disbursement potential of the seven major reconstruction funds. Obligated and disbursed DOD CN funds reflect amounts transferred to the military services and defense agencies to be spent for Afghanistan.

Source: SIGAR analysis of appropriating legislation and quarterly obligation and disbursement data provided by DOD, State, and USAID.
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International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement 81
International Reconstruction Funding for Afghanistan 82
STATUS OF FUNDS

To fulfill SIGAR’s legislative mandate, this section details the status of U.S. funds appropriated, obligated, and disbursed for reconstruction activities in Afghanistan. As of March 31, 2014, the United States had appropriated approximately $103.17 billion for relief and reconstruction in Afghanistan since FY 2002. This total has been allocated as follows:

- $58.84 billion for security
- $25.96 billion for governance and development
- $7.55 billion for counternarcotics efforts
- $2.78 billion for humanitarian aid
- $8.05 billion for civilian operations

Figure 3.4 shows the major U.S. funds that contribute to these efforts.

### U.S. FUNDS SUPPORTING AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS ($ BILLIONS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Funding Sources ($)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASFF</td>
<td>$57.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERP</td>
<td>$3.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIF</td>
<td>$1.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFBSO</td>
<td>$0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD CN</td>
<td>$2.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESF</td>
<td>$17.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCLE</td>
<td>$4.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>$15.27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Agencies

- Department of Defense (DOD): $65.95
- USAID: $17.53
- Department of State (State): $4.42
- Distributed to Multiple Agencies: $15.27

### Notes

Numbers have been rounded.

**Multiple agencies include DOJ, State, DOD, USAID, Treasury, USDA, DEA, BBG, and SIGAR.**

**Sources:**

**ASFF:** Afghanistan Security Forces Fund

**CERP:** Commander’s Emergency Response Program

**AIF:** Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund

**TFBSO:** Task Force for Business and Stability Operations

**DOD CN:** DOD Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities

**ESF:** Economic Support Fund

**INCLE:** International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement

**Other:** Other Funding

*Figure 3.4 shows the major U.S. funds that contribute to these efforts.*
As of March 31, 2014, cumulative appropriations for relief and reconstruction in Afghanistan totaled approximately $103.17 billion, as shown in Figure 3.5. This total can be divided into five major categories of reconstruction funding: security, governance and development, counternarcotics, humanitarian, and civilian operations. For complete information regarding U.S. appropriations, see Appendix B.

The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, provided an additional $6.62 billion for FY 2014, as shown in Figure 3.6. Of this amount, nearly $4.73 billion was appropriated to the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), bringing cumulative funding for the ASFF to nearly $57.33 billion, approximately 55.6% of all reconstruction funding.43

The amount provided to the seven major U.S. funds represents nearly 85.2% (more than $87.90 billion) of total reconstruction assistance since FY 2002. Of this amount, nearly 83.8% (nearly $73.64 billion) has been obligated, and nearly 76.2% (more than $66.95 billion) has been disbursed. An estimated $2.88 billion of the amount appropriated these for funds has expired.

The amount provided to the seven major U.S. funds represents nearly 85.2% (more than $87.90 billion) of total reconstruction assistance since FY 2002. Of this amount, nearly 83.8% (nearly $73.64 billion) has been obligated, and nearly 76.2% (more than $66.95 billion) has been disbursed. An estimated $2.88 billion of the amount appropriated these for funds has expired.

FIGURE 3.5

CUMULATIVE APPROPRIATIONS BY FUNDING CATEGORY, AS OF MARCH 31, 2014 ($ BILLIONS)

Notes: Numbers have been rounded. FY 2014 figures for State and USAID accounts reflect draft allocation amounts and are subject to final Congressional approval. DOD reprogrammed $1 billion from FY 2011 ASFF. DOD reprogrammed $1 billion from FY 2012 ASFF. P.L. 113-6 rescinded $1 billion from FY 2012 ASFF. DOD reprogrammed $178 million from FY 2013 ASFF. DOD transferred $101 million from FY 2011 AIF to FY 2011 ESF to fund an infrastructure project to be implemented by USAID.

On March 4, 2014, the President submitted his budget proposal for FY 2015; however, the proposal contains a placeholder for DOD overseas contingency operations funding until conditions permit a decision about the scope of the enduring U.S. presence in Afghanistan. As reported in prior quarters, a significant amount of reconstruction funding appropriated in the previous fiscal year remains to be obligated. Nearly $4.83 billion of the $7.46 billion appropriated to four of the largest U.S. reconstruction funds for FY 2013 remained available for obligation, as shown in Table 3.5.

FIGURE 3.6
APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR, AMOUNT, AND CATEGORY ($ BILLIONS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Governance/Development</th>
<th>Counternarcotics</th>
<th>Humanitarian</th>
<th>Civilian Operations</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td></td>
<td>$10.04</td>
<td>$6.18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$16.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>$10.39</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$16.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$16.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$16.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$14.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$14.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$14.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$6.62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Numbers have been rounded. FY 2014 figures for State and USAID accounts reflect draft allocation amounts and are subject to final Congressional approval. DOD reprogrammed $1 billion from FY 2011 ASFF. DOD reprogrammed $1 billion from FY 2012 ASFF. P.L. 113-136 rescinded $1 billion from FY 2012 ASFF. DOD reprogrammed $1.78 billion from FY 2013 ASFF. DOD transferred $101 million from FY 2011 AIF to FY 2011 ESF to fund an infrastructure project to be implemented by USAID.

**AFGHANISTAN SECURITY FORCES FUND**

The Congress created the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) to provide the ANSF with equipment, supplies, services, training, and funding, as well as facility and infrastructure repair, renovation, and construction.\(^{45}\) The primary organization responsible for building the ANSF is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan.\(^{46}\) A financial and activity plan must be approved by the Afghanistan Resources Oversight Council (AROC) before ASFF funds may be obligated.\(^{47}\)

The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, appropriated nearly $4.73 billion for the ASFF for FY 2014, increasing total cumulative funding to nearly $57.33 billion.\(^{48}\) As of March 31, 2014, more than $48.92 billion of total ASFF funding had been obligated, of which nearly $46.65 billion had been disbursed.\(^{49}\) Figure 3.7 displays the amounts made available for the ASFF by fiscal year.

DOD reported that cumulative obligations increased by more than $1.04 billion over the quarter, and cumulative disbursements increased by nearly $1.27 billion.\(^{50}\) Figure 3.8 provides a cumulative comparison of amounts made available, obligated, and disbursed for the ASFF.

---

**ASFF FUNDS TERMINOLOGY**

- **Appropriations:** Total monies available for commitments
- **Obligations:** Commitments to pay monies
- **Disbursements:** Monies that have been expended


---

Notes:
- $DOD$ reprogrammed $1 billion of FY 2011 ASFF.
- $DOD$ reprogrammed $1 billion of FY 2012 ASFF; another $1 billion was rescinded in P.L. 113-6.
- $DOD$ reprogrammed $178 million of FY 2013 ASFF.

ASFF BUDGET ACTIVITIES

DOD allocates funds to three budget activity groups within the ASFF:
- Defense Forces (Afghan National Army, ANA)
- Interior Forces (Afghan National Police, ANP)
- Related Activities (primarily Detainee Operations)

Funds for each budget activity group are further allocated to four sub-activity groups: Infrastructure, Equipment and Transportation, Training and Operations, and Sustainment. The AROC must approve the requirement and acquisition plan for any service requirements in excess of $50 million annually and any non-standard equipment requirement in excess of $100 million.

As of March 31, 2014, DOD had disbursed nearly $46.65 billion for ANSF initiatives. Of this amount, more than $30.90 billion was disbursed for the ANA, and more than $15.39 billion was disbursed for the ANP; the remaining nearly $353.76 million was directed to related activities.

As shown in Figure 3.9, the largest portion of the funds disbursed for the ANA—more than $11.54 billion—supported ANA troop sustainment. Of the funds disbursed for the ANP, the largest portion—nearly $5.70 billion—also supported sustainment of ANP forces, as shown in Figure 3.10.

---

**Figure 3.9**


- Infrastructure: $5.03
- Equipment and Transportation: $11.33
- Training and Operations: $3.00
- Sustainment: $11.54

Total: $30.90

**Figure 3.10**

ASFF DISBURSEMENTS FOR THE ANP BY SUB-ACTIVITY GROUP, FY 2005–MAR 31, 2014 ($ BILLIONS)

- Infrastructure: $2.72
- Equipment and Transportation: $3.61
- Training and Operations: $3.37
- Sustainment: $5.70

Total: $15.39

---

**COMMANDER’S EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROGRAM**

The Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) enables U.S. commanders in Afghanistan to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements in their areas of responsibility by supporting programs that will immediately assist the local population. Funding under this program is intended for small projects that are estimated to cost less than $500,000 each. Projects with cost estimates exceeding $1 million are permitted, but they require approval from the Commander of U.S. Central Command; projects over $5 million require approval from the AROC. CERP-funded projects may not exceed $20 million.

The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, appropriated $30 million for CERP, increasing total cumulative funding to nearly $3.67 billion. Of this amount, DOD reported that nearly $2.29 billion had been obligated, of which nearly $2.26 billion had been disbursed as of March 31, 2014. Figure 3.11 shows CERP appropriations by fiscal year, and Figure 3.12 provides a cumulative comparison of amounts appropriated, obligated, and disbursed for CERP projects.

### Figure 3.11
**CERP APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Appropriated ($ Millions)</th>
<th>Obligated ($ Millions)</th>
<th>Disbursed ($ Millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004-2010</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Figure 3.12
**CERP FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Appropriated ($ Billions)</th>
<th>Obligated ($ Billions)</th>
<th>Disbursed ($ Billions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>As of Dec 31, 2013</td>
<td>$3.67</td>
<td>$2.29</td>
<td>$2.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As of Mar 31, 2014</td>
<td>$3.67</td>
<td>$2.29</td>
<td>$2.26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Numbers have been rounded. Data may include inter-agency transfers.

AFGHANISTAN INFRASTRUCTURE FUND
The Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (AIF) was established in FY 2011 to pay for high-priority, large-scale infrastructure projects that support the U.S. civilian-military effort. Congress intended for projects funded by the AIF to be jointly selected and managed by DOD and State. The AROC must approve all AIF-funded projects and the execution plan.30 Thirty days before obligating or expending funds on an AIF project, the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State are required to notify the Congress with details of the proposed project, including a plan for its sustainment and a description of how it supports the counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan.60

The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, appropriated $199 million for the AIF, increasing total cumulative funding to more than $1.22 billion.61 This figure excludes $101 million of FY 2011 AIF funds transferred to the FY 2011 Economic Support Fund for USAID’s AIF-funded infrastructure project. As of March 31, 2014, nearly $885.58 million of total AIF funding had been obligated, of which more than $228.99 million had been disbursed.62 Figure 3.13 shows AIF appropriations by fiscal year, and Figure 3.14 provides a cumulative comparison of amounts appropriated, obligated, and disbursed for AIF projects.

Notes: Numbers have been rounded. Updated data resulted in a lower obligation figure than reported last quarter.

a FY 2011 figure excludes $101 million that was transferred to USAID to execute an AIF project.

TASK FORCE FOR BUSINESS AND STABILITY OPERATIONS

In 2010, the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO) began operations in Afghanistan aimed at stabilizing the country and countering economically motivated violence by decreasing unemployment and creating economic opportunities for Afghans. TFBSO projects include activities that facilitate private investment, industrial development, banking and financial system development, agricultural diversification and revitalization, and energy development.63

TFBSO has two separate funding streams, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and the Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA), account.

Through March 31, 2014, the TFBSO has been appropriated more than $112.24 million for FY 2014, increasing cumulative appropriations for the task force to more than $804.39 million.64 Of this amount, more than $726.01 million had been obligated and nearly $550.13 million had been disbursed.65 Figure 3.15 displays the amounts appropriated for TFBSO projects by fiscal year, and Figure 3.16 provides a cumulative comparison of amounts made available, obligated, and disbursed for TFBSO projects.

National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA): Funds authorized for TFBSO in the NDAA are used for activities directly related to reconstructing Afghanistan.

Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA): Funds TFBSO receives from the OMA account are used to pay for sustainment of U.S. assets, civilian employees, travel, security, and other operational costs.
DOD DRUG INTERDICTION AND COUNTER-DRUG ACTIVITIES

DOD’s Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities fund (DOD CN) supports efforts to stabilize Afghanistan by combating the drug trade and related activities. DOD uses the DOD CN to provide assistance to the counternarcotics effort by supporting military operations against drug traffickers; expanding Afghan interdiction operations; and building the capacity of Afghan law enforcement bodies—including the Afghan Border Police—with specialized training, equipment, and facilities.66

DOD CN funds are appropriated by Congress to a single budget line for all military services. DOD reprograms the funds from the Counter-narcotics Central Transfer Account (CTA) to the military services and defense agencies, which track obligations of the transferred funds. DOD reported DOD CN accounts for Afghanistan as a single figure for each fiscal year.67

DOD reported that DOD CN received nearly $320.79 million for Afghanistan for FY 2014, bringing cumulative funding for DOD CN to nearly $2.93 billion since FY 2004. Of this amount, nearly $2.61 billion had been transferred to the military services and defense agencies for DOD CN projects, as of March 31, 2014.68 Figure 3.17 shows DOD CN appropriations by fiscal year, and Figure 3.18 provides a cumulative comparison of amounts appropriated and transferred from the DOD CN CTA.

**Figure 3.17**

**DOD CN APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Appropriations ($ Millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>$40</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>$350</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>$450</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>$400</td>
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<td>2009</td>
<td>$450</td>
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<td>2011</td>
<td>$450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>$400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>$350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>$400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 3.18**

**DOD CN FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Appropriated ($ Billions)</th>
<th>Transferred ($ Billions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>$2.94</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>$2.88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>$2.62</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
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<td>2008</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>$2.48</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>$2.48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>$2.48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Numbers have been rounded. Updated data resulted in a lower appropriation figure for FY 2013.

a DOD reprograms all funds to the military services and defense agencies for obligation and disbursement.

ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUND

Economic Support Fund (ESF) programs advance U.S. interests by helping countries meet short- and long-term political, economic, and security needs. ESF programs support counter-terrorism; bolster national economies; and assist in the development of effective, accessible, independent legal systems for a more transparent and accountable government.

The ESF was appropriated $852 million for FY 2014, bringing cumulative funding for the ESF to more than $17.53 billion. Of this amount, more than $14.66 billion had been obligated, of which nearly $11.71 billion had been disbursed. Figure 3.19 shows ESF appropriations by fiscal year.

USAID reported that cumulative obligations as of March 31, 2014, decreased by approximately $3.1 million from the amount reported last quarter. Cumulative disbursements as of March 31, 2014, increased by nearly $538.83 million over cumulative disbursements as of December 31, 2013. Figure 3.20 provides a cumulative comparison of the amounts appropriated, obligated, and disbursed for ESF programs.
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL AND LAW ENFORCEMENT

The U.S. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) manages an account for advancing rule of law and combating narcotics production and trafficking—the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account. INCLE supports several INL program groups, including police, counternarcotics, and rule of law and justice.72

State reported that INCLE was appropriated $225 million for FY 2014, bringing cumulative funding for INCLE to nearly $4.42 billion. Of this amount, nearly $3.55 billion had been obligated, of which nearly $2.95 billion had been disbursed.73 Figure 3.21 shows INCLE appropriations by fiscal year.

State reported that cumulative obligations as of March 31, 2014, increased by more than $9.65 million compared to cumulative obligations as of December 31, 2013. Cumulative disbursements as of March 31, 2014, increased by nearly $103.45 million over cumulative disbursements as of December 31, 2013.74 Figure 3.22 provides a cumulative comparison of amounts appropriated, obligated, and disbursed for INCLE.

Notes: Numbers have been rounded. FY 2014 figure reflects draft allocation amount for Afghanistan and is subject to final Congressional approval. Data may include inter-agency transfers.

INTERNATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING FOR AFGHANISTAN

In addition to assistance provided by the United States, the international community provides a significant amount of funding to support Afghanistan relief and reconstruction efforts. As noted in previous SIGAR quarterly reports, most of the international funding provided is administered through trust funds. Contributions provided through trust funds are pooled and then distributed for reconstruction activities. The two main trust funds are the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) and the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA).75

 Contributions to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund

The largest share of international contributions to the Afghan operational and development budgets comes through the ARTF. From 2002 to March 20, 2014, the World Bank reported that 33 donors had pledged nearly $7.81 billion, of which nearly $7.03 billion had been paid in.76 According to the World Bank, donors had pledged approximately $902.04 million to the ARTF for Afghan fiscal year 1393, which runs from December 21, 2013, to December 20, 2014.77 Figure 3.23 shows the 11 largest donors to the ARTF for FY 1393.

FIGURE 3.23

ARTF CONTRIBUTIONS FOR FY 1393 BY DONOR, AS OF MARCH 20, 2014 ($ MILLIONS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Total Commitments: $902</th>
<th>Total Paid In: $121</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>300</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC/EU</td>
<td>83</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Numbers have been rounded. FY 1393 = 12/21/2013-12/20/2014.
As of March 20, 2014, the United States had pledged more than $2.26 billion and paid in nearly $1.98 billion since 2002. The United States and the United Kingdom are the two biggest donors to the ARTF, together contributing 46% of its total funding, as shown in Figure 3.24.

Contributions to the ARTF are divided into two funding channels—the Recurrent Cost (RC) Window and the Investment Window. As of March 20, 2014, according to the World Bank, more than $2.97 billion of ARTF funds had been disbursed to the Afghan government through the RC Window to assist with recurrent costs such as salaries of civil servants. The RC Window supports the operating costs of the Afghan government because the government’s domestic revenues continue to be insufficient to support its recurring costs. To ensure that the RC Window receives adequate funding, donors to the ARTF may not “preference” (earmark) more than half of their annual contributions for desired projects.

The Investment Window supports the costs of development programs. As of March 20, 2014, according to the World Bank, more than $3.26 billion had been committed for projects funded through the Investment Window, of which nearly $2.34 billion had been disbursed. The World Bank reported 19 active projects with a combined commitment value of more than $2.03 billion, of which more than $1.11 billion had been disbursed.

Contributions to the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) administers the LOTFA to pay ANP salaries and build the capacity of the Ministry of Interior. Since 2002, donors have pledged nearly $3.18 billion to the LOTFA, of which more than $3.17 billion had been paid in, according to the most recent data available. The LOTFA’s sixth support phase started on January 1, 2011. Phase VI was initially planned to end on March 31, 2013, but after two extensions, the planned end date is currently December 31, 2014. In the 33 months since Phase VI began, the UNDP had transferred more than $1.39 billion from the LOTFA to the Afghan government to cover ANP and Central Prisons Directorate staff remunerations and an additional $33.44 million for capacity development and other LOTFA initiatives. As of September 30, 2013, donors had committed nearly $1.65 billion to the LOTFA for Phase VI. Of that amount, the United States had committed nearly $659.11 million, and Japan had committed more than $614.76 million. Their combined commitments make up more than 77% of LOTFA Phase VI commitments. The United States had contributed nearly $1.21 billion to the LOTFA since the fund’s inception. Figure 3.25 shows the four largest donors to the LOTFA since 2002, based on the latest data available.
SECURITY CONTENTS

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Afghan National Army 96
Afghan Air Force 102
Afghan National Police 103
ANSF Medical/Health Care 107
Removing Unexploded Ordnance 108
Counternarcotics 109
As of March 31, 2014, the U.S. Congress had appropriated more than $58.8 billion to support the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Most of these funds ($57.3 billion) were channeled through the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) and provided to the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A). Congress established the ASFF to build, equip, train, and sustain the ANSF, which comprises the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP). Of the $57.3 billion appropriated for the ASFF, approximately $48.9 billion had been obligated and $46.6 billion disbursed as of March 31, 2014.87

This section discusses assessments of the ANSF and the Ministries of Defense and Interior; gives an overview of U.S. funds used to build, equip, train, and sustain the ANSF; and provides an update on efforts to combat the cultivation of and commerce in illicit narcotics in Afghanistan. This section also discusses the challenges to transitioning to Afghan-led security by the end of 2014.

**KEY ISSUES AND EVENTS THIS QUARTER**

Key issues and events this quarter include General Joseph F. Dunford’s testimony before the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, continuing U.S. concerns over the lack of a signed U.S.-Afghan Bilateral Security Agreement, the Center for Naval Analysis’ release of its independent assessment of the ANSF, the disbanding of the Afghan Public Protection Force, and the release of focus group findings gauging the public perception of the Afghan Local Police.

**General Dunford Warns Congress: ANSF Needs Continued U.S. Support**

On March 12, General Joseph F. Dunford, Commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A), warned lawmakers that the ANSF will need ongoing support if they are to succeed in their role of keeping Afghanistan secure. He told the Senate Armed Services Committee, “If we leave at the end of 2014, the Afghan security forces will begin to deteriorate. The security environment

“If we leave at the end of 2014, the Afghan security forces will begin to deteriorate.”

—General Joseph F. Dunford

General Dunford told the House Armed Services Committee on March 13 that the ANSF has made progress in countering the Taliban threat, but identified areas where they will need ongoing assistance. He told lawmakers, “After watching the Afghan forces respond to a variety of challenges since they took the lead in June, I don’t believe the Taliban insurgency represents an existential threat to them or the government of Afghanistan.” He also said, “Although the Afghans require less support in conducting security operations, they still need assistance in maturing the systems, the processes and the institutions necessary to support a modern national army and police force. They also need continued support in addressing capability gaps in aviation, intelligence and special operations. To address these gaps a ‘train, advise and assist’ mission will be necessary after this year to further develop Afghan self-sustainability.”

**Bilateral Security Agreement**

The Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) between the United States and Afghanistan to determine the legal status of U.S. forces in Afghanistan after 2014 remains unsigned. The final status of the BSA will have a profound impact on the U.S. military footprint in Afghanistan after 2014, the willingness of the United States and the international community to continue to finance reconstruction programs, and on Afghanistan’s ability to maintain progress in the security, governance, and economic sectors. Last quarter, the U.S. and Afghan governments reached agreement on a draft text of the BSA and a Loya Jirga (tribal assembly) approved the document. President Hamid Karzai refused to sign it. However, the two leading candidates in Afghanistan’s April 2014 presidential election have said they will sign the BSA if elected, according to the *The Wall Street Journal.*

The BSA would allow U.S. military trainers and counterterrorism forces to remain in Afghanistan after the end of this year. The size of the remaining contingent of U.S. forces has yet to be determined. According to media reports, ISAF commander General Joseph F. Dunford has recommended a post-2014 force of 12,000 troops: 8,000 U.S. and 4,000 international. While most of these troops would support, train, and advise the ANSF, approximately 2,000 would conduct counter-terrorism operations.

**Independent Assessment of the ANSF**

This quarter, the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA), a non-profit research organization, released its independent assessment of the ANSF. The Department of Defense (DOD) selected CNA in response to a 2013 National Defense Authorization Act requirement for “an independent assessment of the strength, force structure, force posture, and capabilities required to make the [ANSF] capable of providing security for their own country.”
The CNA study predicts that the insurgency in Afghanistan will be a greater threat in 2015–2018 than it is now due to the reduction in U.S. and NATO forces and continued presence of insurgent sanctuaries in Pakistan.94 The CNA report forecasts that the Taliban will keep pressure on the ANSF, expand its influence in areas vacated by Coalition forces, encircle key cities, and conduct high-profile attacks in Kabul and other cities. It also said that the Taliban will conserve resources in the short term as it recovers from years of Coalition operations before launching “a larger and more intense military effort.”95

The CNA assessment concluded that if the ANSF are successful through 2018, a negotiated political settlement is more likely in 2019–2023.96 To do this, the ANSF needs a strength of 373,400 personnel, with some changes to its existing force structure, through 2018.97 According to CNA, the ANSF’s current force strength is 382,000.98 This figure differs from SIGAR’s current total of 336,388 because it is based on authorized—rather than assigned—force levels and includes Afghan Local Police (ALP), which are not included in SIGAR’s total; ALP are counted separately in this report. In addition, CNA concluded that the ANSF and the ministries that support the ANA and the ANP will require international assistance and advisors “through at least 2018” with “similar authorities to the mission in Afghanistan today.”99 This will also require the continued commitment of the international community. According to CNA, “withdrawal of international community support is likely to have consequences up to and including renewed civil war in Afghanistan and increased instability in the region.”100

Afghan Public Protection Force to be Disbanded

According to DOD, President Karzai directed on February 17 that the state-owned enterprise managing the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) be dissolved and that APPF personnel and functions be incorporated into the Ministry of Interior (MOI).101 On March 8, 2014, Afghanistan’s Minister of Interior held a meeting to discuss the disbandment of the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) and alternatives for continuing to provide security for convoys and Coalition installations.102

According to DOD, four security areas will be impacted by the APPF transition: national projects, private sector, convoy and road security, and international projects.103

Security of national projects will transition from APPF to the ANP. For protection of private-sector sites, the Ministry of Finance is working out legal details of a process for private customers to pay for security services. Convoy and road security will shift from APPF to ANP with greater responsibility for provincial police and a new highway patrol unit. A rapid-response force and MOI transportation brigade will also help ensure adequate convoy security, according to DOD. For international projects, a joint commission of international and MOI representatives is working to

“Withdrawal of international community support is likely to have consequences up to and including renewed civil war in Afghanistan and increased instability in the region.”

—Center for Naval Analysis

develop a way forward, given procedures and legal restrictions vary among countries and organizations. According to DOD, details of the new APPF entity will be worked out during a transition period of undetermined duration. After the transition, MOI envisions that security for international installations will be provided by “special ANP police” who work for a “special annex” of ANP. This entity would have its own bank account at the Ministry of Finance and its own payment scheme. The MOI said that while these ANP personnel cannot be called “guards,” they may have only limited law enforcement powers and will function as guards. Because highway security is already an ANP function, the ANP cannot receive compensation for providing convoy security. The MOI said there would be no fee for convoy security, according to DOD.

Since the creation of the APPF in 2009 through FY 2012, the United States provided more than $51 million to stand up the force. The state-owned enterprise raises its own revenue by providing contract security services to U.S. and international agencies.

For more information on the APPF, see “Afghan Public Protection Force” on page 96 in this section.

Public Perception of the Afghan Local Police
This quarter, the Special Operations Joint Task Force-Afghanistan (SOJTF-A) released the findings of a focus group survey to gauge the public’s perception of the ALP. During the survey, 28 focus groups consisting of six to ten community members and village elders were asked a series of questions about the ALP. While focus groups in the northern and southern districts had the most negative perception of the ALP, all focus groups agreed that the ALP improves community security. The ALP received mixed marks for fighting local crime and were criticized for participating in community dispute resolution in several districts. According to SOJTF-A, several participants noted that since the ALP came under control of the ANP, they have turned to corruption and criminality to offset salaries that are not always paid on time.

The focus group survey identified both strengths and weaknesses in the ALP. Among the ALP’s strengths are ALP members’ local knowledge, their constant presence in villages, and opportunities they provide local youth through recruitment. Weaknesses included insufficient training and a lack of adequate equipment as well as “the predatory practices of some ALP members on neighboring communities that lack their own ALP units.” Respondents also noted factionalism and tribal discrimination in the ALP recruitment process.

For an update on the ALP program, including force strength, see “Afghan Local Police” on page 95.
SECURITY

SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
According to the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General, the security situation in Afghanistan remains volatile. In his March 7 report to the UN Security Council, the Secretary-General said that 2013 had the second highest level of violence since the fall of the Taliban; 2011 had the highest. Armed clashes and improvised explosive device (IED) events accounted for 75% of all security incidents. The number of armed clashes was up 51% compared to the number in 2012. Afghan forces have proved capable of defending territory, but they have also suffered significant casualties.109 Between November 16, 2013, and February 15, 2014, the number of security incidents increased by 24% over the number recorded during the same period in the prior year. As part of that increase, the UN recorded 35 suicide attacks compared to 17 the previous year.110

U.S. FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN
According to DOD, the number of U.S. forces serving in Afghanistan as of February 1, 2014, is 33,200.111 Since operations began in 2001, a total of 2,178 U.S. military personnel have died in Afghanistan—83% of whom were killed in action—and 19,523 were wounded as of April 4, 2014.112

USFOR-A stores ammunition in munitions storage areas such as this one in Shindand. (SIGAR photo by Ron Riach)

COMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING CONTRACTING RULES STILL AN ISSUE
DOD contracting has been on the Government Accountability Office’s (GAO) high-risk list since 1992—almost a quarter of a century.113 A January 2012 contracting shura in Kabul produced broad agreement among U.S. military commands in Afghanistan that widespread noncompliance with existing rules and guidance was a continuing problem. A June 2012 DOD report to Congress mentioned the shura and 26 agreed-upon follow-up measures.114
In its April–September 2013 semiannual report to Congress, however, the DOD Office of Inspector General (OIG) noted that “The Department continues to struggle to consistently provide effective oversight of its existing contracting efforts.” In preparation for its October 2013, and later for its January and April 2014 reports to Congress, SIGAR asked DOD to identify steps taken to improve compliance with existing regulations. SIGAR also asked if noncompliance continued, if any accountability measures had been adopted to impose substantial individual consequences for noncompliance, and if anyone had in fact faced consequences. To date, DOD has provided no answer. More than two years after the shura consensus and after three requests for information, SIGAR finds this pattern of nonresponse troubling.

ANSF STRENGTH
This quarter, ANSF's assigned force strength was 342,809, according to data provided by CSTC-A. This is 97% of the ANSF's end strength goal of 352,000 personnel. DOD's goal to reach 352,000 ANSF by 2014 (187,000 ANA by December 2012, 157,000 ANP by February 2013, and 8,000 Air Force by December 2014) has mostly been met. The ANA and ANP are within 2% of their target end strength and the Air Force (expected to reach its goal at the end of the year) is within 15%, as shown in Table 3.6. However, as noted below, ANA strength now includes civilian personnel.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ANSF Component</th>
<th>Current Target</th>
<th>Status as of 3/2014</th>
<th>Difference Between Current Strength and Target End-Strength Goals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghan National Army</td>
<td>187,000 personnel by 12/2012</td>
<td>182,777 (98%)</td>
<td>-4,223 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan National Police</td>
<td>157,000 personnel by 2/2013</td>
<td>153,269 (98%)</td>
<td>-3,731 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Air Force</td>
<td>8,000 personnel by 12/2014</td>
<td>6,763 (85%)</td>
<td>-1,237 (15%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANSF Total</td>
<td>352,000</td>
<td>342,809 (97%)</td>
<td>-9,191 (3%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


ANA Civilians Still Count Toward ANSF Strength
SIGAR has long been concerned about the issue of civilians constituting a part of Afghanistan’s Army. In July 2012, CSTC-A told SIGAR that civilians were included in the assigned strength of the ANA. In October 2012, CSTC-A said that civilians had been accounted for and removed from the ANA’s “end strength number.” CSTC-A also said that civilians were not included in the end strength of the ANA in January and April 2013. However, in July and October 2013, CSTC-A reported that the ANA’s “military strength” again included civilians. In January 2014, CSTC-A told
SIGAR that 9,336 civilians were being counted as part of the ANA and Afghan Air Force. This quarter, CSTC-A reported 9,486 civilians in the ANA and Air Force.

According to CSTC-A, the 187,000 authorized positions in the ANA include civilians and that “civilians have to be reflected against ANA end strength if the 352K goal [352,000] is to be the point of comparison.”

In February 2012, a DOD OIG report identified the issue of and risks associated with civilians being counted as part of the ANA. In that report, DOD OIG found that ANA finance officers had “coded” civilian personnel as military or armed forces personnel and included them for payment by CSTC-A, despite an agreement between NTM-A/CSTC-A and the Ministry of Defense (MOD) that only military personnel would be reimbursed. At that time, CSTC-A finance personnel were unaware that civilians had been included for military pay.

According to the CNA independent assessment released this quarter, “uniformed ANSF positions in the MOD and MOI should be civilianized. If civilians with the appropriate expertise cannot be recruited or trained for these positions—or if active-duty ANSF personnel cannot be transitioned to the civil service—then ANSF force structure will need to be increased to accommodate them.”

**ANSF Assessment**

Assessments of the ANA and ANP are indicators of the effectiveness of U.S. and Coalition efforts to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANSF. These assessments also provide both U.S. and Afghan stakeholders with updates on the status of these forces as transition continues and Afghanistan assumes responsibility for its own security. Since August 15, 2013, ISAF has used the Regional Command ANSF Assessment Report (RASR) to rate the ANSF.

SIGAR has actively monitored ANSF assessment reporting and has issued two audit reports on the systems and processes used to rate ANSF capability—one in 2010 and another in February 2014. SIGAR’s February 2014 report found that the ISAF Joint Command (IJC) developed the RASR because the old Commander’s Unit Assessment tool (CUAT) was too difficult to read, inconsistently applied, and not useful. The RASR is the third different assessment tool used to rate the ANSF since 2005.

According to IJC, the RASR is a “holistic intelligence, operational, and sustainment assessment and reporting mechanism” of the ANSF. The RASR uses rating definition levels (RDLs), based upon ANSF capabilities, to assess ANSF units at the brigade level. The RDLs use a simplified assessment matrix that is tailored to the specific unit type (e.g. infantry, intelligence, signals) and identifies the capabilities a unit must possess in order to be assessed “Fully Capable.” According to IJC, “this simplified system is easily observable, not as labor intensive or complex as the previous
system], and could form the basis of Afghan ‘self reporting’ as ISAF continues to draw down.”\textsuperscript{132}

SIGAR’s report found that as Coalition forces withdraw, the IJC will have less insight into the ANSF’s capabilities and rely more on the ANSF for assessment data. However, the report noted that “ISAF has not developed a plan that details how it will (1) ensure the continued collection, analysis, validation, and reporting of ANSF capability assessments as Coalition forces draw down and (2) address the challenges associated with having few advisor teams available to conduct assessments and relying on the ANSF’s processes for conducting its own internal assessments.”\textsuperscript{133}

The RASR rates ANA brigades in six areas,\textsuperscript{134}

- Combined Arms (planning and conducting joint operations using multiple types of weapons)
- Leadership
- Command & Control
- Sustainment
- Training (conducting training)
- Attrition

For the ANA, the latest RASR report provides assessments of 24 brigades (22 brigades within corps and two brigades of the 111th Capital Division). Of those, 83% were “fully capable” or “capable” of planning and conducting joint and combined arms operations. This is a decrease from the 88% assessed at those levels last quarter; however, this was due to one brigade not being assessed this quarter. Last quarter, that brigade was assessed as “capable.” In most assessment categories, the ANA’s capability either stayed the same or showed some improvement.\textsuperscript{135} Most declines were due to one brigade not being assessed this quarter, as shown in Table 3.7.

According to the latest RASR report, the total number of “on hand” High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) gun trucks decreased by

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{ANA RASR ASSESSMENTS, QUARTERLY CHANGE} & \textbf{Fully Capable} & \textbf{Capable} & \textbf{Partially Capable} & \textbf{Developing} & \textbf{Not Assessed} \\
\hline
\textbf{Combined Arms Operations} & 9 & 8 & -1 & 12 & 12 & 3 & 3 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\
\textbf{Leadership} & 16 & 15 & -1 & 16 & 15 & 3 & 3 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\
\textbf{Command & Control} & 11 & 9 & -2 & 13 & 14 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\
\textbf{Sustainment} & 7 & 6 & -1 & 13 & 11 & 2 & 4 & 6 & 2 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\
\textbf{Training} & 6 & 6 & 1 & 13 & 13 & 4 & 3 & -1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\
\textbf{Attrition} & 0 & 1 & 1 & 7 & 9 & 2 & 0 & 0 & 17 & 14 & -3 & 0 & 0 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{ANA RASR ASSESSMENTS, QUARTERLY CHANGE}
\end{table}

Note: Attrition assessment is based on the following monthly attrition rates: 0–1.99% = Fully Capable; 2–2.99% = Capable; 3%+ = Developing

400 vehicles. IJC noted that two brigades with significant reductions reported the decrease was the result of “an effort to turn in damaged and excess equipment.”136 In most categories, the ANA meets or exceeds the amount of equipment it is authorized to have to fulfill its mission. However, not all of its equipment is “mission capable.” For example, in the case of HMMWV gun trucks, the ANA has 158% of the trucks it needs; however, since not all of those trucks are “mission capable,” its material readiness for those vehicles is 101%—still above the rate needed to fulfill its mission.137 However, IJC noted that sustainment continues to be an impediment for progress for the ANA, mainly as a result of delivery and resupply issues.138

Attrition also continues to be a major challenge for the ANA as 61% of brigades (not including the one brigade that was not assessed) are still considered “developing” which means that attrition in these brigades is 3% or more. However, this is a notable improvement from December 2013 when 71% were rated as “developing.” In other areas, most ANA brigades were rated “fully capable” or “capable,” including leadership (91%), command and control (100%), sustainment (74%), and training (83%).139

The RASR rates ANP components in six areas:140

- Law Enforcement Operations (making arrests and prosecuting those arrested)
- Leadership
- Command & Control
- Sustainment
- Training (conducting training)
- Attrition

For the ANP, the latest RASR report provides assessments of 18 of 21 regional ANP components—the Afghan Uniform Police (AUP), Afghan Border Police (ABP), and the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP)—in seven different zones.141 Of the 18 that were assessed, 83% were “fully capable” or “capable” of carrying out law enforcement operations (making arrests and prosecuting those arrested), as shown in Table 3.8.

**TABLE 3.8**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ANP RASR ASSESSMENTS, QUARTERLY CHANGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fully Capable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q1 Q2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law Enforcement Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command &amp; Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attrition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Attrition assessment is based on the following monthly attrition rates: 0–1.99% = Fully Capable; 2–2.99% = Capable; 3%+ = Developing

IJC noted that ANP material readiness (equipment levels) rates showed improvement in some areas and a decline in others. In addition, access to MOI-sponsored training for ANP personnel is low due to “disorganized MOI training events.” Attrition also continues to be a challenge for the ANP as 50% of regional components are still considered “developing” which means that attrition in these units is 3% or more. In other areas, the ANP regional components are mostly “fully capable” or “capable”: leadership (89%), command and control (78%), sustainment (89%), and training (78%).

**MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND MINISTRY OF INTERIOR ASSESSMENTS**

DOD reported that this quarter the MOD and the MOI continued to increase their capacity to perform critical functions. To rate the operational capability of these ministries, NTM-A uses the Capability Milestone (CM) rating system. This system assesses staff sections (such as the offices headed by assistant or deputy ministers) and cross-functional areas (such as general staff offices) using four primary and two secondary ratings:

- CM-1A: capable of autonomous operations
- CM-1B: capable of executing functions with Coalition oversight
- CM-2A: capable of executing functions with minimal Coalition assistance
- CM-2B: can accomplish its mission but requires some Coalition assistance
- CM-3: cannot accomplish its mission without significant Coalition assistance
- CM-4: exists but cannot accomplish its mission

Like last quarter, SIGAR was provided the CM ratings for only 37 MOD staff sections and cross-functional areas, down from 46 in prior quarters. According to CENTCOM, there was no change in MOD capability since last quarter, as shown in Figure 3.26. This is the first time no quarterly changes in MOD capability were reported to SIGAR.

All 32 staff sections at the MOI were assessed; five progressed and none regressed since last quarter, according to CENTCOM. Those whose ratings increased this quarter were:

- Deputy Minister for Security–Force Readiness (CM-1A)
- Chief of Staff Office of the Legal Affairs (CM-1B)
- Deputy Minister for Administration–Training Management (CM-1B)
- Deputy Minister for Counter Narcotics (CM-2A)
- Deputy Minister for the Afghan Public Protection Force (CM-2B)

Three MOI staff sections are now rated CM-1A (capable of autonomous operations): the Chief of Staff Public Affairs Office, the Deputy Minister for Security Office of the Afghan National Civil Order Police, and the Deputy Minister of Security for Force Readiness.
As of March 15, 2014, the ALP comprised 26,647 personnel, all but 887 of which were fully trained, according to the NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (NSOCC-A). The current goal is to have 30,000 personnel by the end of December 2014.148

As of March 31, 2014, nearly $196 million of the ASFF had been obligated and expended to support the ALP. According to NSOCC-A, the ALP will cost $121 million per year to sustain once it reaches its target strength.

To date, 23,246 AK-47 rifles and 4,045 PKM machine guns—both Russian designed—have been provided to the ALP.149

According to NSOCC-A, between March 1, 2013, and February 28, 2014, the ALP had a retention rate of 84.9%. During that period, 572 ALP personnel quit their job, 226 were fired, 1,165 were undefined administrative losses, and 1,623 were other losses (also undefined). NSOCC-A reported that 1,144—or about 4.8% of the force—were killed in action (KIA).150

According to the CNA independent assessment released this quarter, CNA “interviewees in theater told us that the Chief of the ANA General Staff does not want [ANA Special Forces] to be formally associated with the ALP program, in part due to the ALP’s past record of human rights violations.”
abuses.” CNA noted that “it does not appear that the government of Afghanistan intends for the [ANA Special Forces] to continuing raising ALP after 2014.”

**AFGHAN PUBLIC PROTECTION FORCE**

The Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), a state-owned enterprise under the authority of the MOI, provides facility and convoy security services in Afghanistan. Following President Karzai’s 2010 decree disbanding private security companies (PSCs) and transferring protection responsibilities to the APPF, the Afghan government implemented a bridging strategy for a phased transition to the public security company.

As part of that strategy, security for military installations was scheduled to be transferred to the APPF in March 2013. In October 2012, however, IJC told SIGAR that meeting the deadline was “extremely unlikely.” As of March 31, 2014, only five military forward operating bases (FOBs) were secured by APPF personnel; 43 FOBs were still secured by PSCs. This quarter, the APPF comprised 22,727 personnel, according to CSTC-A. This quarter, the APPF had 480 active contracts for their services.

The United States has provided more than $51 million to support the APPF, of which $34 million was provided in FY 2012; no FY 2013 funds were spent on the APPF. Of the $34 million provided in FY 2012, most funds were for APPF vehicles ($17 million). The rest was for APPF facility construction, weapons, radios, training, and other equipment and services.

According to CSTC-A, the most recent assessment of the APPF’s capability indicates that the APPF is capable of “planning, executing, and sustaining full spectrum security services with advisory support.”

**AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY**

As of March 31, 2014, the United States had obligated $32.4 billion and disbursed $30.9 billion of ASFF funds to build, train, and sustain the ANA.

**ANA Strength**

As of March 31, 2014, the overall end strength of the ANA was 189,540 personnel (182,777 Army and 6,763 Air Force), according to CSTC-A. However, as noted previously, these numbers include 9,236 ANA civilians and 250 Air Force civilians. The total is more than 97% of its combined end strength goal of 195,000 ANA personnel. While the numbers of assigned personnel in the ANAs six combat corps, the 111th Capital Division, and the Special Operations Force declined, the number of personnel in training or awaiting assignment increased, as shown in Table 3.9. Personnel absent without leave (AWOL) fell by half, from 10,251 last quarter to 5,141.
According to the CNA independent assessment released this quarter, “Afghanistan has a significant need for special operations forces [SOF], but the ANSF cannot support more SOF.”\(^\text{161}\) CNA also said “ANA SOF currently depend on the U.S. and ISAF for logistics, intelligence, and air mobility. Simply increasing the number of ANA SOF personnel without addressing these support requirements would not increase the overall capability of SOF to disrupt insurgent and terrorist networks.”\(^\text{162}\)

### ANA Attrition

Attrition continues to be a major challenge for the ANA. Between February 2013 and February 2014, 43,887 ANA personnel were dropped from ANA rolls. The ANA has also suffered serious losses from fighting. Between March 2012 and February 2014, the ANA had 2,166 personnel KIA and 11,804 wounded in action.\(^\text{163}\)

### ANA Sustainment

As of March 31, 2014, the United States had obligated $12 billion and disbursed $11.5 billion of ASFF funds for ANA sustainment.\(^\text{164}\)

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#### TABLE 3.9

**ANA STRENGTH, QUARTERLY CHANGE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ANA Component</th>
<th>Authorized Q4 2013</th>
<th>Q1 2014</th>
<th>Quarterly Change</th>
<th>Assigned Q4 2013</th>
<th>Q1 2014</th>
<th>Quarterly Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>201st Corps</td>
<td>18,130</td>
<td>18,130</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>18,749</td>
<td>17,489</td>
<td>-1,260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>203rd Corps</td>
<td>20,798</td>
<td>20,798</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>21,098</td>
<td>20,029</td>
<td>-1,069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>205th Corps</td>
<td>19,097</td>
<td>19,097</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>18,963</td>
<td>17,891</td>
<td>-1,072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>207th Corps</td>
<td>14,879</td>
<td>14,879</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>14,320</td>
<td>13,806</td>
<td>-514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>209th Corps</td>
<td>15,004</td>
<td>15,004</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>15,364</td>
<td>14,554</td>
<td>-810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>215th Corps</td>
<td>17,555</td>
<td>17,555</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>18,132</td>
<td>16,310</td>
<td>-1,822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111th Capital Division</td>
<td>9,174</td>
<td>9,174</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>9,276</td>
<td>8,921</td>
<td>-355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Operations Force</td>
<td>11,013</td>
<td>12,149</td>
<td>+1,136</td>
<td>10,756</td>
<td>10,458</td>
<td>-298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Echelons Above Corps(^a)</td>
<td>36,002</td>
<td>34,866</td>
<td>-1,136</td>
<td>25,992</td>
<td>29,727</td>
<td>+3,735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THS(^b)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15,915(^c)</td>
<td>24,356(^d)</td>
<td>+8,441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilians</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9,113</td>
<td>9,236</td>
<td>+123</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ANA TOTAL**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authorized</th>
<th>Assigned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>161,652</td>
<td>161,652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>178,816(^e)</td>
<td>182,777</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ANA + AAF TOTAL**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authorized</th>
<th>Assigned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>169,022</td>
<td>168,749</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>185,386(^f)</td>
<td>189,540</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Q4 2013 data is as of 12/30/2013; Q1 2014 data is as of 3/31/2014.

\(^a\) Includes MOD, General Staff, and Intermediate Commands

\(^b\) Trainee, Transient, Holdhee, and Student; these are not included in counts of authorized personnel

\(^c\) Includes 5,010 cadets

\(^d\) Includes 4,701 cadets

\(^e\) Q4 2013 assigned total includes 10,251 AWOL personnel


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ANA Salaries, Food, and Incentives
As of March 31, 2014, CSTC-A reported that the United States had provided $2.2 billion through the ASFF to pay for ANA salaries, food, and incentives since FY 2008. CSTC-A also estimated the annual amount of funding required for the base salaries, bonuses, and incentives of the ANA at $693.9 million. This is an increase from the estimate provided last quarter of $542 million per year. CSTC-A noted that funding is provided assuming the ANA is staffed at 100% of its authorized strength.

ANA Equipment, Transportation, and Sustainment
Determining the amount and cost of equipment provided to the ANA remains a challenge. After a year of decreasing total costs for weapons procured for the ANA, this quarter CSTC-A reported an increase. Between April 2013 and December 2013, the total reported cost for weapons purchased for the ANA decreased from $878 million to $439 million. However in March 2014, CSTC-A reported total costs of $461 million. The trend in total ANA weapons, vehicles, and communication equipment costs is shown in Table 3.10.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3.10</th>
<th>CUMULATIVE U.S. COSTS TO PROCURE ANA WEAPONS, VEHICLES, AND COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT ($ MILLIONS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2013</td>
<td>$878.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2013</td>
<td>622.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2013</td>
<td>447.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2014</td>
<td>439.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2014</td>
<td>461.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: SIGAR has sought clarification as to why these cumulative totals have declined in some quarters. See text.


In the past, CSTC-A has provided several explanations for the decreasing cost: a $153 million correction in the total cost of some equipment and accounting for nearly $102 million in donated equipment that was not U.S.-funded, an extensive internal audit that revealed double-counted equipment, and discovery of incorrect pricing during an internal audit. Moreover, CSTC-A noted that although the cost for donated weapons was not included, “the refurbishment and transportation cost of donated weapons was included because [reconstruction] funds were used.”

The ongoing corrections to the cost of equipment procured—a cumulative total that should rise rather than fall every quarter—raises questions about the accountability of U.S. funds used to equip the ANA. SIGAR is currently conducting an audit of ANSF weapons accountability.

Additionally, CSTC-A reported the cost of ANA equipment remaining to be procured has decreased from $99 million last quarter to $89 million this quarter.
As of March 31, 2014, the United States had obligated $11.4 billion and disbursed $11.3 billion of the ASFF for ANA equipment and transportation.\textsuperscript{174} Of these funds, $5.4 billion was used to procure vehicles, weapons and related equipment, and communications equipment. Nearly 81% of that $5.4 billion was for vehicles and transportation-related equipment, as shown in Table 3.11.

The United States has also procured $1.3 billion in ammunition for the ANA and $7 billion worth of other equipment and supplies to sustain the ANA. According to CSTC-A, this latter amount was determined by subtracting the cost of weapons, vehicles, communications equipment, and ammunition from overall equipment and sustainment costs.\textsuperscript{175}

### ANA Infrastructure

As of March 31, 2014, the United States had obligated $6 billion and disbursed $5 billion of the ASFF for ANA infrastructure.\textsuperscript{176} At that time, the United States had completed 328 infrastructure projects (valued at $4 billion), with another 71 projects ongoing ($1.5 billion) and 12 planned ($232 million), according to CSTC-A.\textsuperscript{177}

This quarter, the largest ongoing ANA infrastructure projects were brigade garrisons for the 2nd Brigade/201st Corps in Kunar (at a cost of $116 million), the 3rd Brigade/205th Corps in Kandahar ($91 million), and the 1st Brigade/215th Corps in Helmand ($87 million).\textsuperscript{178} Last quarter, the largest ongoing project was phase one construction of the MOD headquarters in Kabul ($108 million).\textsuperscript{179} SIGAR has initiated an inspection of that project. In addition, 12 projects were completed this quarter at a cost of $176 million and two contracts worth $20 million were terminated.\textsuperscript{180}

According to CSTC-A, the projected operations and maintenance (O&M), sustainment, restoration, and minor construction cost for ANA infrastructure for FY 2015 through FY 2019 is $953 million:\textsuperscript{181}

- FY 2015: $209 million
- FY 2016: $186 million
- FY 2017: $186 million
- FY 2018: $186 million
- FY 2019: $186 million

### Table 3.11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Equipment</th>
<th>Procured</th>
<th>Remaining to be Procured</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weapons</td>
<td>$439,229,147</td>
<td>$32,390,974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>4,385,763,395</td>
<td>14,784,960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications Equipment</td>
<td>612,205,922</td>
<td>51,610,799</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$5,437,198,464</strong></td>
<td><strong>$98,786,733</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/30/2013.

While in Afghanistan in March 2014, Special IG Sopko visited the Afghan Ministry of Defense’s headquarters building, which is currently under construction. (SIGAR photo by Smythe Anderson)
CSTC-A noted that any estimated post-transition costs are based on current capacity levels and do not take into account any future policy decisions which could impact future cost estimates.\textsuperscript{182}

**ANA and MOD Training and Operations**

As of March 31, 2014, the United States had obligated and disbursed $3 billion of the ASFF for ANA and MOD training and operations.\textsuperscript{183} This quarter, NTM-A's response to SIGAR's request for information on ANA training raised some questions about the status of U.S.-funded training programs. According to NTM-A, the number of ANA students enrolled in training as of March 18 was 4,363.\textsuperscript{184} This is the third quarter in which the number of enrollees has fallen. Last quarter, 17,706 ANA personnel were enrolled in some type of training, which was down from 43,942 enrolled in September 2013.\textsuperscript{185} NTM-A did not provide an explanation for the quarterly changes in training enrollment. In a separate response to SIGAR, CSTC-A noted that there were 19,655 ANA personnel in training or awaiting assignment. An additional 4,701 personnel were ANA cadets.\textsuperscript{186}

**ANA Literacy**

Despite its goal to have 100,000 ANSF personnel (both ANA and ANP) functionally literate by December 2014, NTM-A does not know how many trained personnel are still in the ANSF. While NTM-A tracks the number of ANSF personnel that have received training, it does not how many have been lost to attrition.\textsuperscript{187} NTM-A told SIGAR that ANSF are solely responsible for tracking their own personnel.\textsuperscript{188} NTM-A estimated that “due to attrition less than 20% of the ANSF will be functionally literate by December 2014.”\textsuperscript{189}

As of this quarter, 85,535 ANSF personnel—including 47,731 ANA personnel—have completed level 3 literacy training. NTM-A expects to reach its goal of 100,000 functionally literate by December 2014. In response to a SIGAR question about the number of ANA personnel who have completed the level 3 training and are still in the ANA, NTM-A said that the answers were “unattainable due to insufficient ANA personnel tracking and skill/education tracking systems.”\textsuperscript{190}

Since 2009, NTM-A has viewed increasing literacy rates as critical to developing a capable, professional, and sustainable ANSF. An NTM-A commander estimated that the ANSF's overall literacy rate in 2010 was 14%.\textsuperscript{191} At the time, NTM-A set a goal of having the ANSF achieve 100% proficiency for level 1 literacy and 50% proficiency at level 3 literacy by the end of 2014.\textsuperscript{192}

Level 1 literacy is the ability to read and write single words, count up to 1,000, and add and subtract whole numbers. At level 2, an individual can read and write sentences, carry out basic multiplication and division, and identify units of measurement. At level 3, an individual has achieved functional literacy and can “identify, understand, interpret, create,
communicate, compute, and use printed and written materials.” However, in an audit report released last quarter, SIGAR found that U.S.-funded literacy contracts do “not require NTM-A/CSTC-A to independently verify students’ proficiency at the three literacy levels.”

NTM-A’s goals were based on the ANSF’s 2009 authorized strength of 148,000 personnel rather than on the current authorized strength of 352,000. SIGAR’s audit also found that NTM-A’s ability to measure the effectiveness of the literacy program is limited because none of the contracts requires independent verification of testing for proficiency or identifies recruits in a way that permits accurate tracking as they move on to army and police units.

As of February 28, 2014, NTM-A reported that ANA personnel who have completed a literacy program include:

- 162,268 level 1 graduates
- 48,988 level 2 graduates
- 47,731 level 3 graduates

Since 2010, the United States has funded three literacy contracts for the ANSF. Each has a base year and a five-year limit—one-year options may be exercised in August of each year—and a maximum cost of $200 million. According to NTM-A, these contractors were providing literacy trainers to both the ANA and the ANP. They have assigned 736 literacy trainers to the ANA:

- OT Training Solutions, a U.S. company, was providing 297 trainers.
- Insight Group, an Afghan company, was providing 202 trainers.
- The Higher Education Institute of Karwan, an Afghan company, was providing 237 trainers.

The estimated cost of these contracts—including contracts for ANP literacy training—for 2014 is $25 million.

**Women in the ANA and Afghan Air Force**

This quarter, the ANA reported to CSTC-A that 723 women serve in the ANA—672 in the Army and 51 in the Air Force. Of those, 244 were officers, 260 were non-commissioned officers (NCOs), 46 were enlisted, and 173 were cadets. However, according to CSTC-A, Coalition advisors believe that these numbers are overstated and include civilians. CSTC-A noted that, next quarter, the MOD is expected to modify the way personnel are counted to only reflect active duty military personnel and not civilians.

The current recruitment and retention goal, last published in September 2013, is for 10% of the ANA to be women. To achieve this goal, the ANA has waived a requirement that the recruitment of women be balanced among Afghanistan’s various ethnic groups. The latest female officer candidate school class has 29 cadets: 18 Hazara, nine Tajik, and two Sadat. In addition, the ANA is using television advertisements to increase its recruitment of women. U.S. advisors at the Afghan National Army Officer Academy
continue to champion the idea that “women in Afghanistan are a talent pool the ANA cannot afford to ignore.” The ANA’s 12-week Basic Warrior Training course includes a class on behavior and expectations of male soldiers who work with ANA women.\textsuperscript{201}

Despite progress, the goal of 10\% of the ANA to be women remains a distant milestone. Women make up less than 1\% of the force. CSTC-A recognized that “training alone is not sufficient to change deep-seated cultural and religion-based attitudes toward women in the ANA. This training is a critical first step, but behavior will almost certainly not change significantly until male ANA personnel have the experience of working alongside well-trained, capable females.”\textsuperscript{202}

The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2014, Public Law 113–66, provides $25 million to be used for the programs and activities to support the recruitment, integration, retention, training, and treatment of women in the ANSF.\textsuperscript{203}

This quarter, the NATO Air Training Command-Afghanistan (NATC-A) reported that the Afghan Air Force has 88 aircraft, excluding aircraft “no longer in service (crashed)” and nine Mi-17 helicopters that are on loan to Afghanistan’s Special Mission Wing (SMW).\textsuperscript{204}

The United States has a considerable investment in the Afghan Air Force. Between FY 2010 and FY 2012 alone, the United States provided more than $5 billion to support and develop the 6,513-person Afghan Air Force—including over $3 billion for equipment and aircraft. In addition, DOD requested an additional $2.9 billion—including $1.24 billion for equipment and aircraft—in FYs 2013 and 2014 for the Afghan Air Force, as shown in Table 3.12.

| U.S. FUNDING TO SUPPORT AND DEVELOP THE AFGHAN AIR FORCE, 2010–2014 (\$ THOUSANDS) |
|-----------------------------------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| Funding Category                             | FY 2010        | FY 2011        | FY 2012        | FY 2013 (request) |
| Equipment and Aircraft                       | $461,877       | $778,604       | $1,805,343     | $169,779        | $1,068,329     |
| Training                                     | $62,438        | $187,396       | $130,555       | $188,262        | $192,354       |
| Sustainment                                  | $143,784       | $537,650       | $571,639       | $473,946        | $777,748       |
| Infrastructure                               | $92,200        | $179,600       | $113,700       | 0               | 0              |
| **Total**                                    | **$760,299**   | **$1,883,250** | **$2,621,237** | **$831,987**    | **$2,038,431** |

Since last quarter all the Mi-35 attack helicopters (totaling six, of which five were operational) were removed from the Afghan Air Force inventory. NATC-A did not provide a reason for the removal of those aircraft.

A SIGAR audit initiated in November 2013 is examining U.S. support for the Afghan Air Force.

According to the CNA independent assessment released this quarter, “Afghanistan has a significant need for air support, but the [Afghan Air Force] cannot support more air power than is currently planned.” CNA also noted that the Afghan Air Force is “struggling to find sufficient numbers of qualified recruits to grow to its planned size” and “even if additional recruits are found, only a small number could be fully trained by 2018.”

**AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE**

As of March 31, 2014, the United States had obligated $16.2 billion and disbursed $15.4 billion of ASFF funds to build, train, and sustain the ANP.

**ANP Strength**

This quarter, the overall strength of the ANP totaled 153,269 personnel, including 109,184 Afghan Uniform Police (AUP), 21,616 Afghan Border Police (ABP), 14,477 Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), 5,916 students in training, and 2,076 “standby” personnel awaiting assignment. Of the 109,184 personnel in the AUP, 22,562 were MOI headquarters staff or institutional support staff. In addition, the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) were also rolled into the AUP which may, in part, account for the AUP’s 2,400 increase since last quarter. Overall, the ANP’s strength increased 3,803 since last quarter, as shown in Table 3.13 on the following page.

According to CSTC-A, unlike the ANA, the MOI does not report ANP personnel who are on leave, AWOL, sick, or on temporary assignment in its
ANP Sustainment

As of March 31, 2014, the United States had obligated $5.9 billion and disbursed $5.7 billion of ASFF funds for ANP sustainment.211 This includes the nearly $1.27 billion that the United States has contributed to the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) to support the ANP.212

ANP Salaries

From 2008 through March 31, 2014, the U.S. government had provided $1.09 billion of ASFF, paid through the LOTFA, to pay ANP salaries, food, and incentives (extra pay for personnel engaged in combat or employed in specialty fields), CSTC-A reported.213

According to CSTC-A, when the ANP reaches its final strength of 157,000 personnel, it will require an estimated $510.7 million per year to fund salaries ($268.4 million) and incentives ($242.3 million). This is a decrease from the estimated $628.1 million reported last quarter—mainly because food will no longer be covered by CSTC-A.214

ANP Equipment, Transportation, and Sustainment

As of March 31, 2014, the United States had obligated and disbursed $3.6 billion of ASFF funds for ANP equipment and transportation.215 Most of these funds were used to purchase weapons and related equipment,
vehicles, and communications equipment. More than 83% of U.S. funding in this category was for vehicles and vehicle-related equipment, as shown in Table 3.14.

**TABLE 3.14**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Equipment</th>
<th>Procured</th>
<th>Remaining to Be Procured</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weapons</td>
<td>$187,251,477</td>
<td>$4,825,066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>1,966,075,183</td>
<td>3,744,582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications Equipment</td>
<td>211,062,672</td>
<td>544,573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$2,364,389,332</strong></td>
<td><strong>$9,114,221</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


This quarter, CSTC-A reported no change in the total cost of the weapons, vehicles, communications equipment, and ammunition procured for the ANP. As with the ANA, determining the cost of equipment provided to the ANP remains a challenge. CSTC-A reporting in this area has been inconsistent, raising questions about visibility and accountability for U.S. funding used to procure equipment for the ANP. For example, CSTC-A’s estimate of the total cost of U.S.-funded ANP weapons procured fell from $369 million in July 2013 to $137 million in October 2013. At the time, CSTC-A said the decrease in total cost was due to actual, contracted equipment pricing being lower than estimated pricing. Then CSTC-A said in December 2013, the increase was “caused by inclusion of weapons procured through alternate funding vehicles.” Although the cumulative cost of equipment—a figure which should only go up or stay the same—has declined since July 2013, the total cost this quarter did not change from last quarter, as shown in Table 3.15.

CSTC-A’s estimate of the total cost of vehicles procured for the ANP has been decreasing until this quarter. In July 2013, CSTC-A stated the total cost of vehicles was $2.65 billion. In October 2013, CSTC-A stated the actual cost of vehicles procured was $2.03 billion. According to CSTC-A, the “decrease in the number procured from last quarter (July 2013) is a result of an extensive internal audit that revealed some equipment had been double-counted.” In December 2013, the total cost of ANP vehicles procured again fell, this time to $1.97 billion. According to CSTC-A, the reason for the decrease from the prior quarter was “due to actual obligated, contracted equipment pricing being higher.” It is not clear why a higher price would result in an overall decrease in the cost of vehicles procured to date. The total cost this quarter did not change from last quarter.

The United States has also procured $312 million in ammunition for the ANP and $1.5 billion worth of other equipment and supplies to sustain the ANP. According to CSTC-A, this latter amount was determined by subtracting the cost of weapons, vehicles, communications equipment, and ammunition from overall equipment and sustainment costs.
ANP Infrastructure

As of March 31, 2014, the United States had obligated $3.3 billion and disbursed $2.7 billion of ASFF funds for ANP infrastructure. At that time, the United States had completed 636 infrastructure projects (valued at $3 billion), with another 97 projects ongoing ($544 million) and 11 planned ($55 million), according to CSTC-A.

This quarter, 25 projects valued at $116 million were completed and four valued at $73 million were terminated. The largest ongoing ANP infrastructure projects were administrative facilities ($59.5 million) and building and utilities ($34.3 million) at the MOI Headquarters and an ANCOP patrol station in Helmand ($28.5 million).

According to CSTC-A, the projected O&M, sustainment, restoration, and minor construction cost for ANP infrastructure for FY 2015 through FY 2019 is $485 million:

- FY 2015: $102 million
- FY 2016: $98 million
- FY 2017: $95 million
- FY 2018: $95 million
- FY 2019: $95 million

CSTC-A noted that any estimated post-transition costs are based on current capacity levels and do not take into account any future policy decisions which could impact future cost estimates.

ANP Training and Operations

As of March 31, 2014, the United States had obligated and disbursed $3.4 billion of ASFF funds for ANP and MOI training and operations. This quarter, according to NTM-A, the United States is no longer funding any ANP training courses. Since the beginning of 2014, a previously U.S.-funded ANP training course that was being held in Turkey is now NATO-funded. NTM-A continues to provide advisor support to the ANP.

Last quarter, 9,513 ANP personnel were enrolled in some type of U.S.-funded training, according to NTM-A.

ANP Literacy

NTM-A’s literacy program for the ANP uses the same three contractors, follows the same curriculum, and uses the same standards as the ANA’s literacy program described earlier in this section. Like the ANA, NTM-A tracks the number of ANP personnel that have received training, but NTM-A does not know how many trained personnel are still in the ANP. NTM-A told SIGAR that the ANSF is solely responsible for tracking its personnel.

As of February 28, 2014, ANP personnel who have completed a literacy program include:

- 92,740 level 1 graduates
- 57,395 level 2 graduates
- 37,804 level 3 graduates
However, in an audit report released last quarter, SIGAR found that U.S.-funded literacy contracts do “not require NTM-A/CSTC-A to independently verify students’ proficiency at the three literacy levels.”

According to NTM-A, the contractors were providing 454 literacy trainers to the ANP:

- OT Training Solutions, a U.S. company, was providing 263 trainers.
- Insight Group, an Afghan company, was providing 61 trainers.
- The Higher Education Institute of Karwan, an Afghan company, was providing 130 trainers.

**Women in the ANP**

As in prior quarters, the number of women in the ANP is increasing, but progress has been slow toward reaching the goal to have 5,000 women in the ANP by the end of 2014. This quarter, ANP personnel included 1,743 women—226 officers, 728 NCOs, and 789 enlisted personnel—according to CSTC-A. This in an increase of 539 women since August 22, 2011. CSTC-A said that “the ANP is currently focused more on finding secure areas (i.e., positions with appropriate facilities for females) for recruits than increasing recruiting to reach this target.” Despite an increase this quarter, women make up only 1% of the force.

However, according to CSTC-A, the Minister of Interior recently signed off on a plan that would emphasize achieving the goal of 5,000 women in the ANP by the end of solar year 1393 (March 20, 2015). CSTC-A supports the MOI’s efforts by providing advisors on the recruitment and training of women. This advising has focused on recruiting and enrolling women in “safe units in order to prevent much of the abuse and harassment that has been reported by international agencies.” In addition, Coalition advisors have created an ANP training curriculum on human, gender, and child rights. As of this quarter, 25,059 ANP personnel have received that training. The course covers topics such as eliminating violence against women, international criteria for human rights, and self-defense for women in law enforcement.

The FY 2014 National Defense Authorization Act, Public Law 113–66, provides $25 million to be used for the programs and activities to support the recruitment, integration, retention, training, and treatment of women in the ANSF.

**ANSF MEDICAL/HEALTH CARE**

As of March 31, 2014, the United States has funded construction of 176 ANSF medical facilities valued at $155 million with an additional 11 projects ongoing valued at $15 million. In addition, Coalition forces obligated $11.7 million in contracts to provide the ANSF with medical training, according to CSTC-A. Since 2006, Coalition forces have procured and fielded $48 million in ANSF medical equipment.
This quarter, CSTC-A reported the ANSF health care system had 966 physicians out of 1,203 authorized. Of these, 611 were assigned to the ANA and 355 were assigned to the ANP. The ANSF also had 1,889 nurses, physicians’ assistants, and other medical personnel out of 2,234 authorized. In addition, the ANSF had trained 4,828 medics since 2010, but it was not clear if all of those trained medics were still in service. According to NTM-A, 5,022 medic positions are authorized. NTM-A also noted that 1,288 trauma medics had been trained by DynCorp and were currently equipped and working in their field.245

REMOVING UNEXPLoded ORDNANCE

Since FY 2002, the U.S. Department of State has provided more than $283 million in funding for weapons destruction and demining assistance to Afghanistan, according to its Bureau of Political-Military Affairs’ Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA).246 Through its Conventional Weapons Destruction program, State funds five Afghan nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), five international NGOs, and a U.S. government contractor. These funds enable clearance of areas contaminated by explosive remnants of war and support removal and destruction of abandoned weapons that insurgents might use to construct IEDs.247

From January 1 through December 31, 2013, State-funded implementing partners cleared nearly 24 million square meters (more than nine square miles) of minefields, according to the most recent data from the PM/WRA.248 An estimated 518 million square meters (more than 200 square miles) of contaminated areas remain to be cleared, as shown in Table 3.16. The PM/WRA defines a “minefield” as an area contaminated by landmines, and a “contaminated area” as an area contaminated with both landmines and explosive remnants of war.249

On April 9, The Washington Post reported that “dozens of children have been killed or wounded” after encountering unexploded ordnance—grenades, rockets, and mortar shells—the remnants of U.S. military

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date Range</th>
<th>AT/AP Destroyed</th>
<th>UXO Destroyed</th>
<th>SAA Destroyed</th>
<th>Fragments Cleared</th>
<th>Minefields Cleared (m²)</th>
<th>Estimated Contaminated Area Remaining (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/1–3/31/2013</td>
<td>1,984</td>
<td>100,648</td>
<td>105,553</td>
<td>3,722,289</td>
<td>7,978,836</td>
<td>552,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/1–6/30/2013</td>
<td>1,058</td>
<td>18,735</td>
<td>49,465</td>
<td>1,079,807</td>
<td>5,586,198</td>
<td>537,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/1–9/30/2013</td>
<td>1,243</td>
<td>21,192</td>
<td>98,306</td>
<td>1,673,926</td>
<td>4,229,143</td>
<td>521,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/1–12/31/2014</td>
<td>8,211</td>
<td>2,460</td>
<td>54,240</td>
<td>3,064,570</td>
<td>5,729,023</td>
<td>518,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>12,496</td>
<td>143,035</td>
<td>307,564</td>
<td>9,540,592</td>
<td>23,523,200</td>
<td>518,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: AT/AP = anti-tank/anti-personnel ordnance. UXO = unexploded ordnance. SAA = small-arms ammunition. Fragments are reported because their clearance requires the same care as for other objects until their nature is determined.

munitions.250 According to the article, the military has left about 800 square miles of land that once served as firing ranges. So far, the U.S. military has only cleared about 3% of the contaminated land. The rest of the land could take two to five years to clear at an expected cost of $250 million. However, due to lack of planning, funding has not yet been approved.251

COUNTERNARCOTICS
As of March 31, 2014, the United States has provided $7.5 billion on counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan since 2002. Congress appropriated most of these funds through two channels: the State Department’s International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account ($4.4 billion), and the DOD Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities (DOD CN) fund ($2.9 billion).252

The United States’ drug control policy has shifted in recent years from eradication to interdiction and agricultural development assistance that aims to provide farmers with alternative livelihoods.253 The Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN) is the lead government agency for developing counternarcotics policy, coordinating activities with other governmental and international agencies as well as implementing various drug interdiction and reduction programs. The MCN is also working to insert counternarcotics into the activities of the entire government by “mainstreaming” counternarcotics efforts into other existing national strategies and programs.254

The Counter Narcotics Justice Center (CNJC), which includes the Counter Narcotics Tribunal and the Criminal Justice Task Force (CJTF), investigates, prosecute and tries major narcotics and narcotics-related corruption cases. The CJTF is a vetted, self-contained unit comprised of investigators, prosecutors, and first instance and appellate court judges.255 The Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) conducts interdiction operations with DOD and ISAF elements providing training and support.256 USAID funds agriculture and alternative livelihood programs, which are discussed in the Economic and Social Development section of this report on page 179.

According to an April 2014 United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) report on drug use, “Afghanistan is the world’s largest producer and cultivator of opium poppies,” accounting for nearly “three quarters of the world’s illicit opium.”257 The latest UNODC Opium Survey estimates that 209,000 hectares are under opium-poppy cultivation, an all-time high and a 30% increase from 2012.258 This expansion occurred despite the goal outlined in Afghanistan’s draft National Drug Control Strategy for 2012–2016 of reducing the cultivation of poppy by 50% from its 2011 baseline of 131,000 hectares.259 Eighty-nine percent of the opium fields are located in nine provinces in the country’s southern and western regions, as shown in Figure 3.27 on the following page.260
Opium cultivation has significant social, political, and economic repercussions for the country and the region. The drug trade undermines the Afghan government because it funds the insurgency, fuels corruption, and distorts the economy. Moreover, the number of domestic addicts is growing. Earlier this year the executive director of UNODC pointed out that “more must be done to confront [the] drug trade, [and the] rise in domestic addiction.” Domestic addiction poses a serious threat to public health, good governance, and sustainable development.

**Drug Use in Afghanistan**

The most recent Afghanistan National Urban Drug Use Survey, conducted by State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), in 2012 estimated the number of adult drug users (aged 15 years and older) above 1.3 million, or more than 7.5% of the population. An earlier 2009 UNODC survey shows how the problem has been increasing. The 2009 survey estimated that one million Afghans were dependent on drugs. UNODC surveys have shown a climb in regular opium usage from 150,000...
users in 2005 to approximately 230,000 in 2009 (a 53% increase). Meanwhile, regular heroin users had grown from 50,000 in 2005 to approximately 120,000 in 2009 or 140% increase. The 2009 UNODC survey also revealed a high number of parents—as high as 50% in the north and south of the country—providing opium to their children.264

INL funds a number of drug prevention and treatment initiatives as well as eradication, interdiction, and other law enforcement efforts.265 However, according to State, U.S. and Afghan efforts have contributed to the concentration of poppy cultivation in limited, remote, and largely insecure areas of the country.266

Governor Led Eradication Program

INL funds the Afghan government’s Governor Led Eradication (GLE) Program. The MCN, in partnership with UNODC, is responsible for verifying poppy cultivation and eradication.267 According to INL, the Afghan government’s eradication target for 2014 is 22,500 hectares. In 2013, governors eradicated 7,348 hectares, a decline from the 9,672 hectares eradicated in 2012, but still above the 2010 level of 2,316 hectares and the 2011 level of 3,810 hectares.268 Although poppy cultivation expanded in 2013, INL told SIGAR that the MCN has placed increased focus on eradication in provinces close to poppy-free status in order to further increase the number of poppy-free provinces.269 Since 2008, eradication efforts have affected on average less than 4% of the annual national poppy crop, as shown in Figure 3.28.

FIGURE 3.28

HECTARES OF POPPY CULTIVATED AND ERADICATED, 2008–2013 (THOUSANDS)

Note: A hectare is 10,000 square meters, or almost 2.5 acres.
GLE occurs at different times of the year depending on the climate of the province, according to INL. Results are tracked on a cumulative basis by the MCN, and are subjected to UNODC satellite verification on a rolling basis.\(^{270}\)

In preparation for the 2014 eradication season, the MCN hosted a December conference for governors at which provincial leaders determined eradication targets. Another conference was held in January for the Afghan line ministries to coordinate efforts to support the GLE campaign. On January 26, 2014, a new Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed between INL and the MCN to renew the GLE program for another year. The MOU also modified a few aspects of the program, including new advance payment regulations and the creation of a new joint INL-MCN bank account.\(^{271}\)

The 2014 eradication season began on March 3, 2014, in Helmand. Kandahar, Farah, and Nimroz are scheduled to begin eradication campaigns in mid-April.\(^{272}\) The fact that this year’s poppy-growing cycle and eradication efforts coincided with Afghan elections is likely to negatively impact eradication levels in 2014, as security forces were less available to support eradication activities.\(^{273}\)

**Good Performer’s Initiative**

INL also supports the MCN’s efforts to achieve and sustain poppy-free provinces through the Good Performer’s Initiative (GPI). Under the current terms of the GPI program, a province is eligible for $1 million in GPI development projects for each year that it achieves poppy-free status, according to INL. INL told SIGAR that the completion of GPI projects in a given province incentivizes continued counternarcotics performance in the year ahead, shows provincial leadership and citizens that there are tangible benefits to countering poppy cultivation, and reinforces the writ of the government in the province, district, and community.\(^{274}\) Since the start of the GPI program in 2007, more than 200 development projects either have been completed or are in process in all 34 of Afghanistan’s provinces, including: school construction, road and bridge projects, irrigation structures, farm machinery projects, and hospital and clinic construction.\(^{275}\)

As of February 28, 2014, a total of 209 GPI projects with a value of $106.7 million had been approved. Of those, 108 were completed, 95 were ongoing, and six were nearing completion.\(^{276}\) INL is collaborating with the MCN to redesign the GPI program to incentivize action on counternarcotics issues and focus on support for rural alternative livelihoods.\(^{277}\)

**Demand Reduction**

With INL support, the Afghan government has established drug treatment centers to help address domestic drug dependency throughout the country. Nevertheless, as described in the Afghan government’s latest Drug Demand Reduction Policy, 99% of Afghanistan’s drug addicts are not receiving
treatment at the 50 drug treatment centers currently providing services. 278 During this quarter, INL continued work with UNODC and the Colombo Plan to support treatment centers and rehabilitation services for men, women, and children in Afghanistan. INL supports 76 treatment programs of the 113 programs in the country. 279 This quarter it provided support for the training of clinical staff, treatment services, and outpatient and village-based demand reduction, while continuing to implement a transition plan to transfer 13 treatment programs to Afghan authorities. The transition plan includes building staff capacity and promoting continued cooperation between the MCN and MOPH. INLs transition plan will continue through 2017, with additional programs transitioning to Afghan control each year. 280 INL said it seeks to create uniformity among the treatment centers nationwide and help incorporate existing Afghan treatment professionals into the Afghan government civil service structure. Under the plan, treatment programs will transition to the Afghan government as INL support to individual programs slowly decreases over the coming years. 281

Counter Narcotics Community Engagement

INL also funds the Counter Narcotics Community Engagement (CNCE) program which aims to promote poppy-free status for provinces. CNCE, implemented through Sayara Media Communications, targets farmers through national and local public awareness and media campaigns in opium poppy-growing areas. According to INL, CNCE is implemented in close coordination with the MCN, ensuring that messages are distributed through the media, provincial conferences, shuras, scholarly events, and youth outreach events. CNCE includes a capacity-building component to ensure the MCN develops the capability to take direct responsibility for CN media relations, public awareness, and behavioral change activities, with the goal of ensuring lasting success beyond conclusion of the program. 282

Aga Khan Foundation Grant

INL administers a grant to the Aga Khan Foundation to help sustain the shift away from poppy cultivation in six key provinces: Bamyan, Takhar, Badakhshan, Daykundi, Samangan, and Baghlan. The grant allows the foundation to work with district- and cluster-level development councils, local NGOs, and provincial line departments to increase licit livelihood opportunities as a platform for sustaining transitions away from a dependence on poppy cultivation. The grant aims to strengthen community-level linkages between the Afghan National Drug Control Strategy and the Afghan National Development Strategy. 283

International Cooperation

The United States was among the 127 countries that attended the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) meeting in Vienna, Austria, on
March 13–21, 2014. The CND, a United Nations body responsible for drug control matters, has two functions. It oversees the application of international drug control treaties and acts as the governing body for the UNODC, including approving the UN International Drug Control Programme’s budget. As part of those responsibilities, the CND monitors the world drug situation, develops strategies on international drug control, and recommends measures to combat the world drug problem, including through reducing demand for drugs, promoting alternative development initiatives, and adopting supply reduction measures. The CND provides a forum for the United States to work with multilateral partners to coordinate and discuss global drug issues, including illicit narcotics in Afghanistan.

The 2014 CND meeting addressed a number of issues relevant to the growing narcotics problem in Afghanistan, including: supply and demand reduction, international cooperation, and UNODC activities. In addition, special side events included discussions on Afghan and Pakistani customs and the trafficking of Afghan opiates. The CND members have begun planning for the UN General Assembly Special Session on Drugs to take place in 2016.

Ministry of Counter Narcotics Capacity Building Program
This quarter, the MCN and INL signed the MCN Capacity Building Program/Advisor Support MOU. The program, which was renewed for 18 months, provides funding for 24 local and national advisors and helps build the MCN’s capacity. INL tracks and evaluates the program’s effectiveness using a performance measuring plan being implemented to track and evaluate the advisors’ effectiveness. According to INL, this process not only helps stakeholders monitor the success of the Advisor Support program, but also improves the MCN human resources department’s employee evaluation practices. In addition, this quarter INL assisted in the installation of information technology equipment for the MCN’s headquarters.

Effect of the Coalition Drawdown on Counternarcotics Operations
According to DOD, the drawdown of Coalition forces has hurt the CNPA and other Afghan counternarcotics agencies. The impact has been most pronounced in Helmand and Kandahar—the focus of the Coalition surge and subsequent withdrawal. Vetted counternarcotics units like the Intelligence and Investigation Unit, the Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU), Technical Investigative Unit, and the National Interdiction Unit (NIU) have also suffered from the drawdown, most significantly by losing access to ISAF-provided enablers.

These factors have, in part, resulted in a decrease in operations and seizures. According to the Consolidated Counterdrug Database, these decreases included the following:
• Counternarcotic operations decreased 17% (624 in FY 2011 at the height of the ISAF surge to 518 in FY 2013)
• Heroin seizures decreased 77% (10,982 kg in FY 2011 to 2,489 kg in FY 2013)
• Opium seizures decreased 57% (98,327 kg in FY 2011 to 41,350 kg in FY 2013)

The decrease in overall counternarcotic missions was likely the result of reduced partnering of ISAF with Afghan forces conducting counternarcotic operations. According to DOD, the majority of Afghan seizures are a result of routine police operations near population centers or transportation corridors, such as at checkpoints or border crossings. Drug labs, storage sites, and major trafficking networks are concentrated in rural areas that are increasingly off limits to Afghan forces due to the ISAF drawdown and declining security in these areas. Despite the marked decreases in drug seizures, DOD told SIGAR that the Afghan counternarcotics units have shown increased ability over the past year to successfully conduct complex counter-network drug investigations and operations without Coalition assistance.292

INL maintains helicopters at Kandahar Airfield to support U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) missions in southern Afghanistan. The CNPA operates at both the national and provincial levels; CNPA detachments exist in both Kandahar and Helmand.293

Interdiction Operations
From January 1, 2014, to March 14, 2014, Afghan security and law enforcement forces conducted 66 drug interdiction operations resulting in the detention of 71 individuals. These operations included routine patrols, cordon and search operations, vehicle interdictions, and detention operations. Afghan operations during this period also resulted in the seizures of the following narcotics contraband:294

• 7,701 kg of hashish/marijuana
• 2,873 kg of opium
• 269 kg of heroin
• 4,654 kg of precursor chemicals

The U.S. military provided general logistics and intelligence support, while the DEA provided mentorship and support to specialized Afghan investigative units. The U.S. intelligence community provided supplemental targeting and analytical support to Coalition mentors.295

According to DOD, most interdiction activities occurred in eastern Afghanistan and in Kabul Province. Previously, interdictions were concentrated in southern and southwestern Afghanistan, where the majority of opiates are grown, processed, and smuggled out of the country. This shift is

Precursor chemical: substance that may be used in the production, manufacture and/or preparation of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.

likely a result of the Coalition drawdown as the threat to interdiction forces in eastern Afghanistan and Kabul Province are generally less than the threat in the south and southwest. The U.S. forces conducted only one unilateral drug operation during this reporting period, detaining one individual and seizing 200 kg of marijuana. All other U.S. interdiction efforts were partnered with Afghan forces as ISAF continued its drawdown.296

Interagency groups, including the Combined Joint Interagency Task Force-Nexus (CJIATF-N) and the Interagency Operations Coordination Center (IOCC), continued to support combined Afghan and ISAF interdiction efforts. Both CJIATF-N and IOCC integrated data from military and law enforcement sources to enable operations against corrupt-narco-insurgent elements. All operations were coordinated with and received support from U.S. and Coalition military commanders on the ground.297

INL and DOD share in developing Afghanistan’s counternarcotics police vetted units. For example, DOD and INL both provide funding for the CNPAs NIU. DOD funding helped build three Regional Law Enforcement Centers (RLECs), while INL funding helped pay sustainment costs for the Kunduz RLEC, handed over to the Afghans in 2013, and the Herat RLEC, which is still funded by INL. DOD also funded training for the provincial CNPAs and funds mentors who are based at the CNPA headquarters. At the operational level, DEA and specialized CNPA units such as the NIU typically use a mix of INL/Airwing and Afghan SMW aircraft during operations.298

Interdiction Results
Since 2008, a total of 2,649 Afghan and Coalition interdiction operations have resulted in 2,712 detentions and seizure of the following narcotics contraband:299

- 736,810 kg of hashish
- 368,398 kg of opium
- 47,214 kg of morphine
- 27,359 kg of heroin
- 416,591 kg of precursor chemicals

However, as shown in Figure 3.29, seizures have affected on average only 1% of the total opium produced annually.

Aviation Support
During this reporting period, Department of State aircraft provided a total of 223.7 flight hours, conducted 123 sorties, moved 642 passengers, and transported 35,437 pounds of cargo.300 According to INL, State’s “Embassy Air” will support INL poppy reconnaissance flights in late March. Counternarcotics support to the DEA consisted of 10.3 flight hours supporting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance mission profiles; 34.4 flight hours supporting interdiction efforts; and 146 flight hours supporting
Afghan NIU and DEA passenger movements. Additionally, DEA support included 17.9 flight hours during training. During the month of February, a task force consisting of DEA, DOD Special Operations Forces, and host-nation personnel supported a mission originating from Kandahar Airfield that resulted in the confiscation and destruction of 1,120 kg of marijuana and hashish in addition to the collection of two persons under confinement. Embassy Air also supported the SIGAR delegation from March 9 to March 12.301

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GOVERNANCE

As of March 31, 2014, the United States had provided nearly $26 billion to support governance and economic development in Afghanistan. Most of this funding, more than $17.5 billion, was appropriated to the Economic Support Fund (ESF) administered by the State Department and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).302

KEY EVENTS

Afghanistan held presidential and provincial council elections on April 5. Approximately seven million Afghans (of whom 35% were females) voted.303 Eight presidential candidates and 2,595 provincial candidates (including 299 females) participated in the election.304 Of the provincial council candidates, 70% were reported to be between the ages of 25 and 35.305 The election faced fewer violent attacks than in 2009, and attacks were mostly concentrated in the north, east, and west, rather than the south as in previous elections.306

On April 7, the chief of the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) told journalists that the April 2014 election appeared to be less fraudulent than the 2009 presidential election, but he noted that it was too early to determine the seriousness of the complaints.307 On April 13, however, the ECC announced that there were more reports of serious instances of fraud than during the 2009 election.308

The Independent Election Commission (IEC) Chairman, Yousaf Nuristani, announced on April 20 that partial results representing 49.67% of votes (3,451,982 votes from 34 provinces) showed presidential candidate Abdullah Abdullah with 44.47% and Mohammad Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai with 33.18% of the vote.309 Full preliminary results are due on April 24.310 A summary of the partial results appears in Table 3.17.

In other news, First Vice President Muhammad Qasim Fahim died from natural causes on March 9, 2014. Mr. Fahim was a former Northern Alliance commander and ethnic Tajik leader.311 President Karzai nominated Yunus Qanooni, another ethnic Tajik formerly with the Northern Alliance, as Mr. Fahim’s replacement following consultations with politicians from northern Afghanistan and former anti-Soviet commanders.312 On March 25, parliament approved Mr. Qanooni.313

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Candidate</th>
<th>Number of Votes</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Abdullah Abdullah</td>
<td>1,535,212</td>
<td>44.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai</td>
<td>1,145,400</td>
<td>33.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Zalmai Rassoul</td>
<td>354,921</td>
<td>10.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdul Rab Rassoul Sayyaf</td>
<td>240,963</td>
<td>6.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qutbuddin Hilal</td>
<td>94,488</td>
<td>2.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gul Agha Shirzai</td>
<td>55,744</td>
<td>1.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammad Daoud Sultanzoy</td>
<td>16,890</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedayat Amin Arsala</td>
<td>8,364</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Votes</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,451,982</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The partial results represent approximately 49.67% of the votes cast from 34 provinces. According to the Independent Election Commission, the results were based on votes whose authenticity had been verified.

ELECTIONS

Despite threats from insurgents, Afghanistan successfully held presidential and provincial council elections on April 5. According to the National Democratic Institute (NDI), a nongovernmental organization funded by USAID to support the Afghan election process, the turnout of an estimated seven million voters was unexpectedly high, causing some polling stations to run out of ballots and prompting extension of polling hours. According to NDI, as of April 7 it was too early to evaluate the effects of anti-fraud measures and to make a final assessment of the electoral process.\(^{314}\)

The head of the IEC was quoted as saying a run-off election, if required, may occur in either late May or early June.\(^{315}\)

Of the 11 presidential candidates approved by the ECC in November, three withdrew prior to the election. Candidates Abdul Qayum Karzai and Sardar Mohammad Nader Naim withdrew from the race and offered their support to former foreign minister Zalmai Rassoul on March 6 and March 26, respectively. Former defense minister Abdul Rahim Wardak withdrew from the race on March 16, but made no announcement of support.\(^{316}\) The remaining candidates were Abdullah Abdullah, Daud Sultanzoy, Mohammad Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai, Zalmai Rassoul, Qutbudin Hilal, Mohammed Sahfiq Gul Agha Sherzai, Abdul Rab Rassoul Sayaaf, and Hedayat Amin Arsala.\(^{317}\)

On March 19, the ECC announced the disqualification of 116 out of 2,713 provincial council candidates for failing to meet either the education or age requirements, or for failing to appear before the ECC to defend themselves against complaints.\(^{318}\) This announcement concluded the ECC’s review of the 2,212 complaints leveled against provincial council candidates.\(^{319}\) According to NDI, the ECC has disqualified 205 provincial council candidates since November 2013.\(^{320}\) The ECC has also referred 200 complaints to the Afghan Attorney General’s Office (AGO) for possible criminal prosecution.\(^{321}\)

During this reporting period, the ECC also warned, and in one case fined, presidential candidates for violations of the election law. The violations included improper use of government assets. Presidential candidate Ghani received a 50,000 afghani (AFN) fine—approximately U.S. $871—for continuing to use armored vehicles provided to him when working for the government. The ECC warned two other candidates against using government resources, but indicated evidence was insufficient to warrant more than a letter. Presidential candidate Sultanzoy was accused of threatening a reporter; the ECC referred his case to the AGO.\(^{322}\) On April 1, the ECC fined candidate Rassoul 300,000 AFN—approximately U.S. $5198—and candidate Sherzai 100,000 AFN—approximately U.S. $1733—for improperly benefiting from government resources and insulting another candidate respectively.\(^{323}\)

According to NDI, despite a widespread perception that candidates exceeded their campaign spending limits, the IEC and ECC had almost no
ability to monitor candidate compliance of these regulations. At one point they called on civil society and the general public to report any overspending by candidates.\textsuperscript{324}

**U.S. Support for the Elections**

The U.S. government funded programs providing technical support, outreach, and polling, as well the deployment of both domestic and international observers to help the Afghan government hold free and fair elections. USAID contributed $55 million to the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Enhancing Legal and Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow-Phase II (ELECT II) to help the Afghan government prepare for and manage the elections. The United Kingdom, the European Union, Italy, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and Japan contributed the remainder of the $129 million that ELECT II estimated was necessary to support the elections.\textsuperscript{325}

The U.S. Embassy Kabul announced in late January that it had cancelled funding for a series of opinion polls following accusations that the polls were an attempt to manipulate the outcome of the elections. A U.S. Embassy Kabul spokesman told reporters such accusations of bias were baseless.\textsuperscript{326}

USAID provided assistance for electoral monitoring through its Supporting Political Entities and Civil Society (SPECS) program. SPECS awarded sub-grants to four Afghan civil society organizations to deploy approximately 2,200 domestic elections observers (1,253 male and 947 female) to 34 provinces and 270 districts.\textsuperscript{327} According to NDI, more than triple the number of domestic monitoring groups applied for IEC accreditation this year compared to 2009. In the 2009 elections, the IEC accredited 21 observer groups and 9,228 domestic observers. In 2014, the IEC accredited 67 domestic election monitoring groups and issued 11,357 accreditation cards.\textsuperscript{328}

USAID supported international election observation missions through awards to three organizations: NDI, Democracy International (DI), and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). NDI and DI received six-month awards, February 1–August 1, 2014, designed to cover a potential run-off campaign. The OSCE election support team planned to be in Afghanistan for eight weeks beginning in early March 2014.\textsuperscript{329}

More than 417 foreign observers from 17 organizations registered as election monitors for the April 2014 election. This was significantly fewer than the 1,200 who observed the 2009 presidential poll. On March 20, the Serena Hotel in Kabul was attacked and one of the NDI election monitoring party was among those killed.\textsuperscript{330} Recent news reports indicated that several international observer missions have either withdrawn or significantly reduced their presence following the Serena Hotel attack. The OSCE mission initially withdrew, but sent back half of their 15-person advisory team. NDI withdrew its international observers after one of them died in the Serena Hotel attack.
attack; however, NDI reported that 101 NDI Afghan staff observed the elections at 327 polling stations in 26 provinces. DI chose not withdraw any of its 18-person team, but refrained from sending an additional 10 observers.331

In February, the USAID Office of Inspector General issued an audit of their June 2011 to June 2013 review of USAID's election assistance programs in Afghanistan. The audit found that:332

- USAID assistance has strengthened Afghan institutions’ ability to promote electoral credibility, inclusiveness, and transparency.
- USAID had not finalized support arrangements for electoral dispute resolution, and its support for civic outreach and education, electoral observation and monitoring, and women’s participation had limitations.
- USAID-supported debate and discussion culminated in the approval of two laws that established a permanent electoral complaints commission and set out a clear process for appointing commissioners to oversee the bodies responsible for administering elections and resolving electoral disputes.
- The sustainability of some USAID-supported activities including the funding and staffing of the IEC and civil society organizations (CSO) remains problematic.
- Monitoring and reporting weaknesses characterized some aspects of electoral assistance.

SIGAR previously reported extensively on the election support programs. Please see pages 110–119 of the October 2013 Quarterly Report for more detail. A summary of USAID programs intended to support the 2014 presidential and provincial elections appears in Table 3.18.

**Preparations for the Election**

According to the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Afghanistan, technical preparations for the April 2014 elections, which included plans for fraud prevention and mitigation, were superior to previous election cycles.333 According to USAID, the Afghan government met the

### Table 3.18

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>End Date</th>
<th>Total Estimated Cost ($)</th>
<th>Cumulative Disbursements as of 3/31/2014 ($)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Civic Engagement Program (ACEP)</td>
<td>12/4/2013</td>
<td>12/3/2018</td>
<td>$70,000,000</td>
<td>$1,341,817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhancing Legal and Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow (ELECT) II</td>
<td>9/28/2013</td>
<td>9/27/2014</td>
<td>55,000,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Reform and Civic Advocacy (AERCA)</td>
<td>7/1/2009</td>
<td>12/31/2015</td>
<td>38,702,682</td>
<td>29,122,253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporting Political Entities and Civil Society (SPECs)</td>
<td>7/7/2013</td>
<td>7/6/2016</td>
<td>18,000,000</td>
<td>5,478,876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Election Observation (NDI)</td>
<td>2/1/2014</td>
<td>8/1/2014</td>
<td>4,000,000</td>
<td>490,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Election Observation (DI)</td>
<td>2/1/2014</td>
<td>8/1/2014</td>
<td>3,999,925</td>
<td>761,829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Support Team to Afghanistan (OSCE)</td>
<td>2/20/2014</td>
<td>7/15/2014</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 4/7/2014.
four elections-related targets for Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework “hard deliverables” by (1) updating and maintaining an election timeline, (2) appointing qualified elections commissioners, (3) swiftly implementing the new elections law, and (4) coordinating security-related elections preparations and implementing voter registration drives.334

Despite the improvements, ensuring female participation in the election process remained a challenge. According to NDI, the voter-registration process indicated that women in less secure regions were less likely to apply for voter cards. Both the IEC and the ECC had difficulty meeting their targets for recruiting female personnel across the country. As of mid-March, the IEC reported that women comprised 21% of its 3,200 district field coordinators, slightly higher than previous elections but significantly short of its 50% target. The IEC also sought to recruit women for its civic and voter education program. Although it did not reach its 50% goal, about 33% of its 1,428 educators were women. There were stark differences between regions, with female representation ranging from 40% to 50% in northern and western provinces to as little as 8% to 19% in southern and eastern provinces. Although the ECC’s goal was to have women comprise 30% of its staff, as of mid-March women accounted for only 10% of its staff. Only six of the 102 provincial commissioners sworn in were women.335

According to USAID, the IEC continued to register new voters at the 41 registration centers in 34 provincial capitals until two weeks before polling day. These included returnees, people who changed constituency, and those whose old voter cards were lost or damaged. As of February, the IEC had registered an additional 3,557,260 voters, of whom 1,228,578 (34.58%) were female.336

Opportunities for Fraud

Early reports on the elections indicated that there was much less fraud committed than in the 2009 elections. On April 7, the chief of the ECC told journalists that despite a total of 122 fraud-related complaints lodged against the presidential candidates, the April 2014 election appeared to be less fraudulent than the 2009 presidential election. He noted that it was too early to determine the seriousness of the complaints.337 The two front-runners, Abdullah and Ghani, reportedly said the 2014 elections were “much cleaner” and “the scale of the fraud is not massive.”338 On April 9, the Free and Fair Election Forum of Afghanistan (FEFA) reported that initial observations from their 9,500 elections observers suggested election irregularities and fraud occurred less often than in 2009. FEFA did, however, report proxy voting (wherein a person casts a vote on behalf of someone else) at 507 polling stations and ballot stuffing at 141 stations.339

On April 13, however, the ECC announced that there were more reports of serious instances of fraud than during the 2009 election. The ECC has recorded a total 870 incidents of fraud classed as “Priority A,” complaints
considered serious enough to affect the outcome of the election, higher than the 815 incidents recorded in 2009. The ECC stated that it may be necessary to extend the complaint review period to further accommodate complaints from the provinces.\textsuperscript{340}

On April 16, the FEFA and the Transparent Election Foundation of Afghanistan stated that elections authorities have not allowed domestic monitoring groups to observe vote counting and the complaints adjudication process. Both the IEC and ECC rejected this criticism. The IEC said observers have been able to observe the vote counting. Although the ECC is investigating roughly 1,400 cases of possible voting irregularities, the ECC said it had not yet begun to review fraud cases and therefore has not invited domestic observer groups to adjudication meetings.\textsuperscript{341}

Independent observers highlighted the potential for fraud in Afghanistan's chaotic voter registration system. NDI pointed out that Afghanistan has no voter registry, voter list, or census, making it impossible to conduct accurate checks on voter registration and determine accurate voter participation figures.\textsuperscript{342} The Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN) reported that a large discrepancy between the estimated number of voters and the actual number of voter cards might facilitate election manipulation. The total number of legal voter-registration cards issued stands at approximately 21 million, something the AAN previously said it found “unbelievable.”\textsuperscript{343}

No one knows how many Afghans are eligible to vote. Both the IEC and NDI estimated that about 12 million Afghans are eligible to vote, while the European Union has cited an estimated 13.5 million.\textsuperscript{344} The IEC spokesman said the IEC does not know the true number of voters because multiple registrations have produced twice as many registration cards as the estimated number of eligible voters. Furthermore, the IEC spokesman said voter-registration cards do not have an expiration date, were not tracked in a database, and are valid for any election. Without a voter list, there was no way to check eligibility on the election day.\textsuperscript{345}

According to NDI, female voters are not required to have their photo taken during the registration process, which makes proxy registration and registration of “ghost” voters possible. Figures indicating a higher number of female registrants in some of the more conservative areas of the country (for example 47% in Paktika compared to only 33% in Kabul) raise questions about the potential for fraud and election irregularities. In addition, there are no safeguards against multiple registrations and use of multiple cards obtained in previous registration drives.\textsuperscript{346}

According to the AAN, the IEC is looking into the possibility that a considerable proportion of the ballot shortages reported on election day may have been caused by partial stuffing of ballot boxes before polling stations opened or hiding papers to be subsequently filled in after hours.\textsuperscript{347} According to NDI, the IEC provided 600 ballots per polling station with the expectation that it would take at least 10 hours to go through 600 ballots at
Governance

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one minute per voter.\textsuperscript{348} However, several polling centers reported that they ran out of ballots by noon.\textsuperscript{349}

The IEC has instituted several changes to mitigate fraud. These include:
- improving tracking of ballots through packing numbers displayed on individual ballots, incorporating results forms and results sheet envelopes
- adding security features on the ballot
- employing both an invisible ultraviolet ink and indelible ink to identify those who have voted
- using transparent tamper-resistant evidence bags\textsuperscript{350}

The IEC also announced plans to distribute election materials to polling centers much closer to the date of the election to prevent tampering. Moreover, the IEC decided not to have polling centers in private homes, as in past elections, but in government buildings such as schools or clinics. Votes were to be counted on-site.\textsuperscript{351}

The Ministry of Interior (MOI) announced arrests and suspensions for attempted election manipulation. In one case, the MOI suspended three senior police officers, a lieutenant general, and two colonels for interference—such as backing a particular candidate—in the election process.\textsuperscript{352} The day before the election, the MOI also announced the arrest of five people, including an IEC employee who served as a district field coordinator, for attempting to sell 4,000 voting cards in Kabul. Police in Kunar Province also arrested a 10-year-old boy for carrying approximately 12,000 fake voter cards in Kunar Province.\textsuperscript{353}

NDI pointed out that in past elections, the areas of the country most affected by the insurgency and beyond the scrutiny of observers were also the most plagued by fraud.\textsuperscript{354}

Election Security

Afghan authorities began planning security for the 2014 elections much earlier than in the past. NDI considered this a significant improvement over the 2009 presidential election, when the list of polling stations was released just days before the election.\textsuperscript{355} The MOI established a special commission on electoral security to work in close coordination with the IEC.\textsuperscript{356} The plan called for the Afghan National Police (ANP) to guard polling stations while the Afghan National Army (ANA) provided a second perimeter of defense.\textsuperscript{357} The Afghan Local Police (ALP) were not asked to guard election sites due to concern that they are affiliated with various provincial candidates, but were deployed in the second or third security perimeters.\textsuperscript{358}

On March 30, the IEC announced an updated, final list of polling sites, with 748 of 6,770 proposed polling sites to be closed, partially to mitigate fraud.\textsuperscript{359} The most affected provinces included Ghazni (60 centers), Herat (31 centers), Nangarhar (115 centers), and Zabul (32 centers).\textsuperscript{360} Zabul and
Nuristan Provinces were particularly affected, with, respectively, 58.1% and 82.8% of the designated polling stations closed on election day. On election day, 205 of the final estimate of 6,423 centers did not open, primarily due to insecurity, with the largest number of closures in Herat and Nangarhar. In total, approximately 13% of the polling centers initially planned for the 2014 elections were not open on April 5.

In a review of the 2009 presidential elections, DI found that bad actors exploited the reality that fewer observers, agents, and IEC officials were able to be present at polling locations in insecure areas. The DI report quotes the UNDP’s ELECT project:

> The [Afghan] security forces indicated they could secure all locations and had to be pushed for a more realistic assessment—either they did not want to admit for political reasons, that they were not in control of significant parts of the country, or were directly complicit in lining up the process for fraud. ... Security forces insisted on polling centres opening that could not be secured and where fraud eventuated.

The report further quotes UNDP ELECT, stating that it had “powerfully advocated resistance to security ministries’ calls for polling centres almost certain to be for ‘ghost voters.’”

Last quarter, the leader of the Islamist party Hizb-e Islami, Golbuddin Hikmatyar, reversed his previous boycotts of Afghan elections and asked his supporters to participate in the April 2014 election. A Hizb-e Islami spokesman later qualified the support as being limited to presidential candidate Qutbuddin Hilal, who is himself a former head of Hizb-e Islami’s political commission.

Insurgents conducted several high-profile attacks and attempted to intimidate voters in the run-up to the election. Especially in the rural south and east, the Taliban planted statements warning voters to boycott the election or face violence. Three presumptive presidential front-runners (Abdullah, Ghani, and Rassoul) cancelled their appearances in televised debates scheduled for early April due to security threats in Kabul. Some presidential candidates did hold large campaign gatherings across the country, but those were mostly confined to provincial capitals as many districts were deemed too insecure.

Insurgents attacked the IEC headquarters in Kabul hours before the election commission was due to announce details of how many polling stations would be opened. There were also reports of a provincial council candidate being kidnapped and killed in Sar-e Pul Province; five IEC personnel kidnapped in Nangahar Province; insurgents announcing the planting of mines along roads to dissuade voters in Ghazni Province; and an attack against a regional IEC office in eastern Kabul that killed a provincial council candidate. In addition, insurgents mounted attacks against several presidential campaigns, including candidates.
Afghan election officials reported that from June 1, 2013, to April 3, 2014, they recorded 160 security-related incidents against electoral bodies, with the highest number reported from Herat Province. In the week preceding the polls, there were 116 threats recorded against the polling centers and electoral activities in 25 provinces.373 The IEC was quoted as saying that there were no attacks on any polling centers in Kandahar Province in the south.374 In the east, however, the U.S. commander of Training, Advise, and Assist Command Southeast was quoted saying, election day was “one of the most violent days in Afghanistan.” He also acknowledged that it is easier to defend against attacks that are expected, such as those during the election, but it is much harder for the Afghan security forces to sustain that level of defense.375

To improve security as well as increase female voter turnout, the MOI launched the Female Searcher Program, which, according to the MOI, recruited and trained up to 13,000 female volunteers to serve as subsidized personnel to conduct body searches of women at each of Afghanistan’s more than 6,400 designated polling centers. Deploying women to search female voters is important because Afghan custom forbids men to touch unrelated women. The goal of this project was prevent women with weapons—or men disguised as women—from entering polling places to conduct attacks.376

As it is customary for Afghan women to travel under the escort of male relatives, the MOI allocated resources to support the travel of male relatives to accompany its female searcher personnel, according to NDI.377 State contributed $1.7 million to this $3.7 million project via UNDP’s Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA). State said the process was initially impeded by significant logistical hurdles, but reports indicate that female searchers were deployed and working in urban areas.378

NATIONAL GOVERNANCE

The United States provides assistance to Afghan governing institutions to build capacity to perform critical services and thereby increase their legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan population in two ways: through contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements, and increasingly, through on-budget assistance.379 In this final year of the security transition, the U.S. government is particularly focused on increasing the financial and program-management capabilities of Afghan government institutions. It is using a combination of capacity building and on-budget programs to achieve this end.380

According to the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Afghanistan, the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF) serves as the cornerstone of international engagement and is the agreed instrument for deploying civilian development assistance in Afghanistan.381 The international community and Afghan government agreed to the TMAF at the Tokyo Conference of donors in July 2012. The TMAF set out 16 commitments, called indicators under the agreement, for the Afghan government
**TABLE 3.19**

| U.S. ASSESSMENT OF GOVERNANCE-RELATED TOKYO MUTUAL ACCOUNTABILITY INDICATORS AND HARD DELIVERABLES |
|---|---|---|
| Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework Indicator | Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework "Hard Deliverable" | Hard Deliverable Met? (Yes/No)* |
| **Representational Democracy and Equitable Elections** | | |
| Develop, by early 2013, a comprehensive election timeline through 2015 for electoral preparations and polling dates. | Develop, by early 2013, a comprehensive election timeline through 2015 for electoral preparations and polling dates. | Yes |
| Ensure that a robust electoral architecture is developed in a secure, participatory, and transparent manner to enable successful and timely elections. | The government engages in a consultative and transparent process for all upcoming senior Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) appointments, which results in the selection of qualified and well respected IEC senior appointees, so they have broad support. | Yes |
| | The government actively supports the implementation of a legislative framework to be passed by the National Assembly by June 2013. The framework is to meet international standards and include an impartial, credible, and independent electoral complaint resolution mechanism. | Yes |
| | Government ministries coordinate and work closely with the IEC to help ensure timely and successful implementation of the IEC’s: (i) voter registration plan which complements e-tazkers; (ii) operations plan which includes security planning, capacity building, fraud mitigation, and inclusive voter outreach. | Yes |
| **Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights** | | |
| Ensure respect for human rights for all citizens, in particular for women and children, and allow the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) and civil society organizations to perform their appropriate functions. | AIHRC commissioners are appointed in accordance with Article 11 of the AIHRC Law and Paris Principles, and drawing on consultation with cross-section of civil society organizations. The appointment process will enable AIHRC to retain its ‘A’ accreditation by the International Coordination Committee of National Human Rights Institutions. | No |
| Demonstrated implementation, with civil society engagement, of both the Elimination of Violence Against Women Law (EVAW), including through services to victims as well as law enforcement, and the implementation of the National Action Plan for Women (NAPWA) on an annual basis. | The Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MOWA), Ministry of Interior (MOI) and Attorney General’s Office (AGO) coordinate to produce a detailed report on the application of the EVAW law in each province. The report should include: the number of EVAW cases brought to the police, disposition of each case (whether prosecuted or not) and the outcome of the prosecuted cases. The data collected should be made public and serve as a baseline for future analyses of EVAW law implementation. | No |
| Enact and enforce the legal framework for fighting corruption including, for example, annual asset declarations of senior public officials including the executive, legislative, and judiciary. | Collect the asset declarations forms from high-ranking government officials (per Article 154 of the Constitution), and publish them on the High Office of Oversight (HOO) website to be available for the public and mass media. Declared assets will continue to be verified based on Afghan law and HOO capacity. | No |
| **Government Revenues, Budget Execution and Sub-National Governance** | | |
| Through more efficient, transparent, and accountable customs and tax systems, raise the ratio of revenue collection to GDP from 11% to 15% by 2016, and to 19% by 2025. | N/A | N/A |
| Improve budget execution to 75% by 2017. | N/A | N/A |
| Enact a legal framework to clarify roles, and responsibilities of government agencies at national, provincial, and district levels, in line with the 2010 Sub-National Governance Policy. | N/A | N/A |
| Develop a provincial budgeting process that includes provincial input into the relevant ministries’ formulation of budget requests, linked to a provincial planning process in which Provincial Councils have their consultative roles. | Develop a provincial budgeting process for FY 1393 that includes provincial input into the relevant ministries’ formulation of budget requests, linked to a provincial planning process in which provincial councils have their consultative roles. | Yes |

*These assessments of progress were used to inform the TMAF incentive funds disbursement decisions.

and nine for the international community. Under the framework, follow-up mechanisms were also put in place to monitor progress at Senior Officials Meetings. In the run-up to the first meeting on July 3, 2013, the TMAF indicators were augmented with intermediate targets called “hard deliverables” for both the Afghan government and the international community.382

A Special Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) meeting was held on January 29, 2014, to assess TMAF progress and to formulate guidance in anticipation of a new Afghan government following the elections.383 The progress of governance-related TMAF indicators and hard deliverables is discussed throughout this quarterly report. Table 3.19 summarizes the TMAF indicators and hard deliverables along with the latest assessment of progress.

**On-Budget Assistance**

To improve governance and align development efforts with Afghan priorities, international donors at the 2010 London Conference committed to increase the proportion of development aid delivered on-budget through the Afghan government to at least 50%. The donors, including the United States, reiterated this pledge at the July 2012 Tokyo Conference.384 However, donors conditioned their support on the Afghan government’s fulfilling a set of commitments outlined in the TMAF. These commitments include, among other things, improved management of public funds.385

The United States is providing on-budget assistance through bilateral agreements with seven Afghan government entities and through contributions to two multi-donor trust funds: the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) and the Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund (AITF).386 The ARTF, administered by the World Bank, provides funds to both the Afghan government’s operating and development budgets in support of Afghan government operations, policy reforms, and national priority programs.387 The AITF, a multi-donor trust fund administered by the Asian Development Bank, coordinates donor assistance for infrastructure projects in Afghanistan.388 According to USAID, the majority of on-budget funding has been and will continue to be directed through the multi-donor trust funds, particularly the ARTF.389

As shown in Table 3.20 on the following page, USAID expected to spend $986 million dollars on direct bilateral assistance. It also expects to contribute almost $2.7 billion to the ARTF and more than $180 million to the Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund (AITF).390

According to USAID, the actual disbursement of funds through bilateral on-budget programs is slower than either side would like. USAID attributes the low budget-execution rate to limited Afghan government capacity and the risk-mitigation measures USAID applies to on-budget assistance.391

The U.S. and Afghan governments have differing ways of measuring U.S. progress toward fulfilling its commitments to provide more funding through the Afghan government budget.392 USAID says the Afghan government only
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Considers funds “on budget” when they are disbursed (when money has actually been spent), while USAID counts commitments and obligations (when the donor reserves the funds for a specific purpose but money has not been spent) as on-budget support.393

Capacity-Building Programs

USAID capacity-building programs seek to improve ministries’ performance to prepare, manage, and account for on-budget assistance. As shown in Table 3.21, programs include USAID’s $31 million Leadership, Management, and Governance Project that aims to strengthen Afghanistan’s financial-management systems, and the capacity of the Ministry of Public Health and the Ministry of Education to meet requirements set at the 2010 Kabul International Conference for increased on-budget aid.394 USAID is also funding the $5 million Ministry of Women’s Affairs Organizational Restructuring and Empowerment (MORE) project, which among other things assists the

TABLE 3.20

USAID ON-BUDGET PROGRAMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>On-Budget Partner</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>End Date</th>
<th>Total Estimated Cost ($)</th>
<th>Cumulative Disbursements as of 3/31/2014 ($)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power Transmission Expansion and Connectivity (PTEC)</td>
<td>Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (DABS)</td>
<td>1/1/2013</td>
<td>12/31/2016</td>
<td>342,000,000</td>
<td>4,781,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership Contracts for Health (PCH) Program</td>
<td>Ministry of Public Health</td>
<td>7/20/2008</td>
<td>1/31/2015</td>
<td>236,455,840</td>
<td>164,648,037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribution to Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund (AITF)</td>
<td>Multiple (via Asian Development Bank)</td>
<td>3/7/2013</td>
<td>3/6/2018</td>
<td>180,300,000</td>
<td>105,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheberghan Gas Development Project</td>
<td>Ministry of Mines and Petroleum</td>
<td>5/15/2012</td>
<td>4/30/2015</td>
<td>90,000,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kajaki Dam Unit 2</td>
<td>DABS</td>
<td>4/22/2013</td>
<td>12/31/2015</td>
<td>75,000,000</td>
<td>1,632,194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADF (Agriculture Development Fund)</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock</td>
<td>7/18/2010</td>
<td>12/31/2014</td>
<td>74,407,662</td>
<td>29,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Education, Literacy, and Technical-Vocational Education (BELT) Community Based Education</td>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
<td>10/29/2013</td>
<td>10/28/2017</td>
<td>56,000,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Education, Literacy, and Technical-Vocational Education Textbooks</td>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
<td>11/16/2011</td>
<td>12/31/2014</td>
<td>26,996,813</td>
<td>21,955,403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash Transfer Assistance to Support the Civilian Technical Assistance Plan (CTAP)</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
<td>9/30/2009</td>
<td>9/30/2014</td>
<td>36,256,560</td>
<td>28,810,610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan Workforce Development Program (AWDP)</td>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
<td>9/18/2013</td>
<td>4/3/2016</td>
<td>30,000,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash Transfer Assistance for Civil Service Reform</td>
<td>Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission</td>
<td>10/31/2011</td>
<td>2/28/2014</td>
<td>15,000,000</td>
<td>13,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-Government Resource Center</td>
<td>Ministry of Communications and IT</td>
<td>8/28/2013</td>
<td>6/1/2016</td>
<td>3,900,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *This includes all USAID contributions to the ARTF.

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 4/7/2014.
ministry to improve its financial management, as required for future on-budget assistance.\textsuperscript{395}

**National Assembly**

USAID has noted that the Afghan parliament has very little power because it does not have authority to determine its own budget and rarely initiates legislation.\textsuperscript{396} Most bills originate in the executive branch.\textsuperscript{397} According to USAID, both houses of parliament require subject-matter expertise to analyze and draft legislation.\textsuperscript{398}

During the quarter, elections and the parliamentary recess limited the parliament's work. The parliament passed the national budget in early January before going on recess from January 21 to March 6, 2014.\textsuperscript{399} According to State, parliament's return was delayed a few days following the unexpected death of First Vice President Marshall Fahim. On March 25, the *Wolesi Jirga* (the lower house) confirmed Yunus Qanooni as First Vice President to replace Fahim.\textsuperscript{400}

In March, neither house of parliament could conduct business because a majority of representatives were absent. For example, on March 18, only 24 of the 102 members of the *Meshrano Jirga* (the upper house) were present, less than half the 52 members required for a quorum. Fifty sitting senators were contesting the provincial council elections and many others were campaigning for presidential candidates.\textsuperscript{401} On March 31, the Wolesi Jirga had only 12 of 246 members present; a quorum requires 125.\textsuperscript{402}

USAID funds the $23.5 million Assistance to Legislative Bodies of Afghanistan project (ALBA) to help Afghanistan’s parliament operate as an independent and effective legislative, representative, and oversight body.\textsuperscript{403} In the last quarter, ALBA focused on initiatives to help members of parliament and their staff to improve their capacity. According to USAID, one of the most important initiatives this quarter was courses held for secretariat staff during the parliamentary recess. ALBA has also continued supporting development of the Parliamentary Anti-Corruption Caucus, establishing relations between the group and the Independent Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (MEC). In addition, ALBA continued

### Table 3.21

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Afghan Government Partner</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>End Date</th>
<th>Total Estimated Cost ($)</th>
<th>Cumulative Disbursements as of 3/31/2014 ($)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leadership, Management, and Governance Project</td>
<td>Ministry of Public Health</td>
<td>9/25/2011</td>
<td>9/24/2016</td>
<td>$32,000,000</td>
<td>$15,657,888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Women’s Affairs Organizational Restructuring and Empowerment (MORE)</td>
<td>Ministry of Women’s Affairs</td>
<td>12/20/2012</td>
<td>12/19/2015</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>2,202,306</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 4/7/2014.
to help the caucus develop its internal organization, formal charter, and other foundation documents. Finally, throughout January 2014, ALBA closely monitored the consideration and passage of the revised 1393 budget, which the parliament had rejected in December 2013.404

**SUBNATIONAL GOVERNANCE**

The United States government supports initiatives at the subnational level to give Afghans a greater stake in their own government. The goal is to make local government more visible, accountable, and responsive to the Afghan people, particularly in the south and east, where the insurgency has been tenacious.405 These programs target rural areas, including districts and villages, as well as provincial centers and municipalities.

USAID said the Afghan government faces a number of challenges to filling civil service positions at the provincial and local levels. It noted that insecurity presents a significant obstacle in some areas of Afghanistan, although quantifying recruitment impact is very difficult. In addition, many positions have specific education requirements that limit the pool of candidates. Verifying educational background for candidates with degrees obtained outside of Afghanistan poses additional difficulties.

The Independent Appointment Board of the Civil Service Commission (IARCSC) plans to review its appointment procedures to address gaps in the current system and adopt a competency-based appointment system. However, USAID noted these efforts will take a couple of years to complete.406

This quarter, USAID was able to provide data on the status of civil service staffing and vacancies of 14 provinces plus Kabul. Figure 3.30 summarizes the civil servant staffing and vacancies for five Ministries in 14 provinces outside Kabul, based on IARCSC figures. Kabul was not included because USAID did not provide information about the number of employed civil servants in several ministries.407

In a yearly report released in February on protection of civilians in armed conflict, the United Nations Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) found that insurgents continued to target and kill Afghan government employees, civilians accused by insurgents of spying for the government, community leaders, and off-duty police officers or ANP performing solely civilian law-enforcement functions. In many cases, the Taliban claimed responsibility for the killings on their public website. Targeted killings were most prevalent in the eastern region, with 184 incidents, followed by the southern (129 incidents), southeast (90), northern (92), western (58), central (49), and northeast (35) regions. Nangarhar Province had the highest number of targeted killing incidents documented by UNAMA, followed by Kandahar with 77 incidents and Kunar with 67.408

This quarter, DOD reported that the Village Stability Operations (VSO), a bottom-up counterinsurgency strategy aimed at connecting local governance
According to DOD, only two Village Stability Platforms and 16 District Stability Platforms (DSP) hosting U.S. special operations forces remain active. The DSPs are scheduled to complete their mission by October 31, 2014.409

According to DOD, the impact of VSO varies from village to village, district to district, and province to province, making it difficult to make broad assessments of this theater-wide program.410 DOD used a combination of team assessments and surveys to assess VSO progress and impact. U.S. special operations forces used a number of governance-related indicators to inform their VSO assessments. These included:411

- the presence or absence of a district governor, district attorney, or chief of police
- the number of villagers attending district bazaars or councils
- the presence of medical facilities
- school attendance

DOD's latest district assessment report, completed in February 2014, found that the VSO has had a positive impact on local governance, enabling district governors and other Afghan ministry representatives to spend more time at their district centers.412 According to the report, of the 47 districts where the Coalition provided oversight and support to VSO, 53% had “adequate” or “effective” governance. The remaining 47% had “poor” or
“ineffective” governance. All districts in the report showed the same status for governance over the past year, except for one that improved from “adequate” to “effective.”

At the same time, DOD noted that it found much of the quarterly VSO survey data to be untrustworthy because of fraudulent or fabricated data included in some surveys conducted by local Afghan polling contractors. Surveys from November 2010 to February 2012 showed local views of district governance as extremely positive, with community council performance, district government performance, and local dispute-resolution mechanisms all registering over 80% satisfaction.

**Rural Stabilization Programs**

USAID has several stabilization programs aimed at helping the Afghan government extend its reach into unstable areas and build local governance capacity. These programs include USAID’s four Stability in Key Areas (SIKA) projects, the two Community Cohesion Initiative (CCI) programs, and $2.67 billion in U.S. support to the ARTF which funds the Afghan government’s National Solidarity Program (NSP) (of which $865 million had an explicit earmark for NSP). Table 3.22 summarizes total program costs and disbursements to date.

USAID intended the four SIKA programs to “be seen as an extension of the [Afghan government], not as increased foreign presence,” and stipulated that SIKA “must work within Afghan structures” in order to partner with the Afghan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD). The four SIKA contracts require the MRRD, the primary partner for the SIKA programs, to have representation in the district in order to operate in that district. The degree of required MRRD presence ranges from an individual MRRD representative who comes to work on “a semi-regular basis” (SIKA South) to MRRD representation that is able to effectively operate and monitor SIKA activities in the district as well as provide support and leadership (SIKA West).

### Table 3.22

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>End Date</th>
<th>Total Estimated Cost ($)</th>
<th>Cumulative Disbursements as of 3/31/2014 ($)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stabilization in Key Areas (SIKA) East</td>
<td>12/7/2011</td>
<td>9/6/2015</td>
<td>177,054,663</td>
<td>53,868,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Cohesion Initiative (East, South, Southwest)**</td>
<td>3/1/2012</td>
<td>2/28/2015</td>
<td>161,499,422</td>
<td>7,373,529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIKA South***</td>
<td>4/10/2012</td>
<td>4/9/2015</td>
<td>117,324,445</td>
<td>31,969,249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIKA West</td>
<td>1/29/2012</td>
<td>8/31/2015</td>
<td>62,998,824</td>
<td>25,658,723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIKA North</td>
<td>3/15/2012</td>
<td>6/14/2015</td>
<td>45,633,274</td>
<td>16,390,620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Cohesion Initiative (North, West)**</td>
<td>9/10/2013</td>
<td>9/9/2015</td>
<td>36,221,640</td>
<td>45,185</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:

*This includes all USAID contributions to the ARTF. According to the agreement with the World Bank, donors can only express a preference on how their donations are used up to 50% of their total contribution. USAID has explicitly preferenced $865 million of its ARTF contributions for the National Solidarity Program.

** Disbursement data is for activities only and does not reflect operational expenditures.

***The disbursement data includes the totals for both SIKA South awards.

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 4/7/2014.
The amount of Afghan government participation in physically monitoring projects varies among regions. For example, this quarter USAID reported that 82% of the monitoring of SIKA East projects was conducted exclusively by SIKA East personnel without Afghan government participation.\(^{419}\) Approximately 64.5% of SIKA South monitoring visits to the project site during the quarter were conducted exclusively by SIKA South personnel.\(^{420}\) In the north, USAID reports that all grant monitoring visits were conducted either in partnership with the Afghan government or by the Afghan government alone.\(^{421}\) For SIKA West, USAID reports that in the month of February, 70% of grant monitoring visits to the community project site were conducted either in partnership with the Afghan government or by the Afghan government alone.\(^{422}\)

According to USAID, the MRRD and the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) increasingly provide leadership and guidance for SIKA through developing materials for trainings and aiding in grant implementation. A SIKA sustainability conference was previously planned for late January/February 2014 to lay out the parameters for graduating SIKA districts in order to transfer program responsibilities to the Afghan government. According to USAID, planning for the sustainability conference and handover strategy continues, with the date and agenda to be determined.\(^{423}\)
USAID’s Community Cohesion Initiative (CCI) programs, split between one program covering the east, south, and southwest, and another covering the north and west, aim to build what USAID calls “resilience” in areas that are vulnerable to violence and insurgent exploitation. CCI implements initiatives, such as local community-development projects that engage community leaders and government officials in their identification and oversight. The CCI also supports peace-advocacy campaigns at sporting events.

In contrast to SIKA, USAID has not explicitly defined the Afghan government’s role in implementing the CCI. Although the CCI does not require the presence of the Afghan government to go forward with activities, Afghan civil servants are supposed to play an important role in grant monitoring and oversight of the vast majority of CCI activities. According to USAID, this serves both to improve oversight and to strengthen ties by bringing government officials to local communities.

USAID reports that the CCI contractor conducted 32% of all grant monitoring on its own, while Afghan government personnel conducted approximately 38% of the grant monitoring visits. CCI also scheduled 2,373 visits by Afghan government officials to 508 activity sites in 12 provinces. Of these visits, 17% are at provincial centers, 36% are at district centers, and 47% are in villages at the project sites.

The ARTF supports both Afghanistan’s operating and development budget. As part of the development budget it funds the Afghan government’s National Solidarity Program (NSP), which was designed to strengthen community level governance and to improve the access of rural communities to essential services by channeling resources to democratically elected Community Development Councils (CDCs).

Although NSP was described in a 2011 Senate Foreign Relations Committee majority staff report as the best example of a national program that reinforces the social compact between the Afghan state and citizens, SIGAR has raised questions regarding the ability of the Afghan government to effectively oversee the program, particularly in insecure areas. USAID previously “preferred” (earmarked) funds to the NSP, via the ARTF, to advance counterinsurgency objectives in areas newly under Afghan government control. To its credit, USAID stopped preferencing funds to NSP after reviewing documents, including a 2011 SIGAR audit, that found that NSP is implemented in very insecure areas but does not mitigate violence or improve attitudes toward the government in those areas. USAID acknowledged a lack of evidence that NSP increases stability in insecure parts of Afghanistan and adjusted its funding accordingly. USAID had preferenced a total of $865 million directly for NSP. According to USAID, NSP does achieve some positive results, including community-level engagement in decision-making. However, USAID does not rely on the program to achieve specific development objectives. While
USAID continues to engage with the World Bank to seek improvements in programs like NSP as a part of the broader effectiveness of the ARTF portfolio, USAID does not consider NSP to be a significant element of its assistance strategy in Afghanistan.435

During the quarter, the USAID Measuring Impacts of Stabilization Initiatives (MISTI) project, a third-party monitoring and evaluation program that evaluates the impact of USAID stabilization programs, issued a final performance evaluation of the Community Development Program (CDP).436 CDP ran from March 2009 through August 2013, cost $264 million in disbursements, implemented 337 infrastructure projects across 19 provinces of Afghanistan, and employed 373,859 laborers on a short-term basis. CDP adopted stabilization objectives beginning in September 2010 and implemented labor-intensive projects primarily in rural areas. The evaluation focused its findings on CDP’s fourth and fifth program phases, in which CDP implemented 73 projects in seven provinces of eastern and southern Afghanistan from April 2012 through August 2013.437 CDP featured direct implementation, wherein the prime USAID implementer managed all aspects of project implementation, including security, with the result that they were much faster and more flexible than many other USAID contractors working in similar areas.438

The MISTI evaluation found theories of change associated with CDP that differed between the implementer, which emphasized keeping combat-age men in key areas busy to reduce the numbers available to join the insurgency or participate in criminal activities, and USAID staff, who emphasized the importance of linking communities to the Afghan government.439

USAID and the CDP implementer requested that the MISTI evaluation team avoid sending interviewers to villages while CDP projects were ongoing in a district as a security measure. Because the evaluation team was not allowed to visit project sites during implementation, it was sometimes hard to locate enough laborers or stakeholders from each of the sample projects.440 The report noted the consequences of this approach:

[CDP]’s request that evaluation team members visit project areas only after all CDP projects in the district had been finished meant that the evaluation team could not verify numbers of laborers reported. When the evaluation team presented its preliminary results to [CDP], one [CDP] staff member said, “There is no way your staff went to that site,” implying that the area was too dangerous. This raises at least two questions: If project sites are too dangerous for third-party evaluators, how was [CDP] able to implement projects and independently monitor them? How was USAID able to verify the project’s reports? Where it is not secure enough to monitor or verify projects, it should be assumed that the risk for corruption is extremely high. Implementing projects without proper monitoring should be done when the benefits—in this case, contributing to the military strategy—clearly outweigh the sizeable risks.441
The evaluation found that one of the most challenging aspects of CDP procurement was the bidding process. The practice of accepting the lowest bid for materials works well in a competitive environment, but CDP’s environment was not always conducive to fair and effective competition. Several respondents from the communities noted that prices for materials were high. Having so few suppliers in the local area may have led to collusion for higher-than-normal quotes, even if the bidding process was technically followed. The evaluation noted that procurement was one of the few avenues for local powerbrokers to attempt exploitation. In Kandahar, respondents noted that influential community members and even district governors received contracts.442

The evaluation also found that CDP projects faced very high risk for corruption and fraud, particularly in the most dangerous areas, where fewer people had access and it was easier to evade the CDP checks and balances.443 USAID had limited ability to detect problems because its on-site monitors lived on military bases and could visit projects only on military-supported trips. CDP used systems to attempt to dissuade and identify corruption. Still, many problems were found during CDP implementation, and local interviewers recorded numerous additional allegations of corruption, notably the problem of “ghost workers,” absent or imaginary employees who may appear on payrolls.444 CDP reportedly implemented more robust monitoring procedures following an incident in the latter half of 2012 in which CDP local staff colluded in fabricating payroll sheets that were approved by the CDP provincial manager without sufficient review.445

The MISTI evaluation left its findings related to project outcomes unresolved. The evaluation interviewers asked community respondents who was responsible for bringing the project. The most common responses included an NGO (some named the implementer by name), USAID, the provincial reconstruction team, the Afghan government, and community elders. The MISTI report did not provide a breakdown of the attribution results, making it hard to determine which institutions were most frequently perceived to have been responsible for the CDP projects. The report also noted it had to rely upon a few positive anecdotes to determine whether CDP reduced the supply of labor available for anti-government elements or criminal activities.446

Urban and Provincial Centers
USAID’s four Regional Afghan Municipalities Program for Urban Populations (RAMP UP) programs concluded this quarter. The programs, which were extended to March 2014, aimed to improve the capacity of the provincial and urban levels of government to improve budgeting and, in the case of municipalities, increase revenue collection.447 Table 3.23 details USAID’s RAMP UP programs.
Provincial Budgeting

International donors continue to track the provincial budgeting progress as a key deliverable of the TMAF. According to USAID, provincial input into budget formulation and expenditure, including submissions of provincial directorates (central-ministry representatives at the provincial level), is critical to the Afghan government’s ability to meet the essential needs of the population. USAID reported to SIGAR that the Afghan government met the one TMAF hard deliverable for provincial budgeting by developing a draft provincial budget policy.

According to USAID, the current provincial budgeting policy differs from previously unsuccessful 1386 (2007) and 1391 (2012) provincial budgeting pilots because it focuses simultaneously on central line ministries and provincial line directorates. The earlier pilots of 1386 and 1391 concentrated their reform efforts on provincial governors and provincial ministry representatives with little attention given to central line ministries. The 1386 pilot targeted only the three provinces of Balkh, Panjshir, and Kandahar; the 1391 pilot extended to all 34 provinces. Both pilots provided fixed allocations to a handful of major line ministries to fund development project proposals submitted by their respective provincial directors. In both earlier pilots, emphasis was put on training provincial officials, but the effort ultimately fell short.

The 1391 pilot incorporated lessons learned from the 1386 pilot and used professional trainers to provide capacity-building training to provincial line directorates. In addition to fixing an allocation for key line ministries’ provincial directorates, the 1391 pilot provided training in budget formulation to provincial staff, but did not include central ministry personnel. Ultimately, disagreements between the Afghan government and donors over the source of funding for the proposed projects resulted in the cancellation of the pilot project’s.

It is USAID’s assessment that the new policy stresses collaboration between the ministries, provincial directorates, and provincial governor’s offices with consultation and input from provincial councils. The policy reportedly encourages improved allocation of budgetary resources across

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**Table 3.23**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>End Date</th>
<th>Total Estimated Cost ($)</th>
<th>Cumulative Disbursements as of 3/31/2014 ($)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>6/10/2010</td>
<td>3/31/2014</td>
<td>$101,046,401</td>
<td>$95,590,637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>6/10/2010</td>
<td>3/31/2014</td>
<td>95,000,000</td>
<td>90,936,407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>2/8/2011</td>
<td>3/31/2014</td>
<td>40,000,000</td>
<td>37,715,295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>11/14/2010</td>
<td>3/31/2014</td>
<td>34,177,405</td>
<td>31,033,010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 4/7/2014.
all 34 provinces; provincial consultation, planning and monitoring; and the role of provinces in budget execution. The policy also provides for increasing the capacity of both ministries and directorates to plan, budget, and finance operations as well as maintain assets.453

In the 1393 budget, $3 million has been allotted to each of the 11 least developed provinces and $1 million has been allotted to each of the remaining 23 provinces as a discretionary, contingency fund.454 Project proposals are expected to be submitted to a Public Financial Management (PFM) Committee headed by the provincial finance director, and including the provincial governor’s office, the director of economy, and the director of women’s affairs. The PFM Committee, in consultation with the Provincial Council, will assess the project proposals for submission to the Ministry of Finance. Once the projects are approved, the provinces will be responsible for all procurements, disbursements, and oversight associated with the approved projects.455 According to the UN Secretary-General, the outcome of this third pilot will be used to evaluate prospects for the implementation of a more general, decentralized fiscal policy.456

RECONCILIATION AND REINTEGRATION

The current U.S. Civil-Military Framework states that political reconciliation between the Afghan government and insurgency is “the solution to ending the war in Afghanistan.”457 However, the UN Secretary-General recently described progress toward the establishment of a formal peace process as limited.458

Reconciliation

According to State, there has been no noticeable progress in the ability of the Afghan High Peace Council (HPC) to garner support for reintegration and reconciliation efforts during the quarter.459 State reported that the HPC continues to conduct regular meetings, but State has no visibility on the results.460 During the quarter, both the Afghan national security advisor and the HPC chairman were quoted saying that constitutional protections for women would not be sacrificed to further peace negotiations with insurgent groups.461

High-level reconciliation efforts remained opaque during the quarter. News reports underscored some of the challenges the Afghan government faces in trying to negotiate with the Taliban. For example, there were reports in February of a meeting in Dubai of former Taliban officials who expressed the desire for a peaceful settlement to the Afghanistan conflict. The Afghanistan National Security Council praised this as progress.462 A few days later, one of the Taliban officials who reportedly attended the meeting was killed in Peshawar, Pakistan. An Afghan presidential spokesman condemned the killing. The body of the murdered Taliban official was later
transferred to his home province via a military helicopter. The presidential spokesman was quoted as saying, “Whenever Taliban leaders show willingness to talk to the Afghan side, they are targeted and killed.”

However, in a statement attributed to the Taliban, the group indicated that it did not participate in the Dubai meeting and that it remains opposed to direct talks with the Afghan government.

Reacting to news reports last quarter of secret meetings between President Karzai’s office and the Taliban, an HPC spokesman disavowed any knowledge of such meetings. Later in February, the HPC issued a statement that the HPC had met with a faction of the Taliban and that both sides agreed to continue dialogue.

On April 10, the HPC announced that talks with the Taliban would resume in the United Arab Emirates “soon,” without disclosing a specific date. The HPC expected to meet with Agha Jan Mutasim, a former Taliban leader who had previously held talks with the HPC in Dubai. The next day, however, Agha Jan Mutasim was reported to be missing in a news report that was later confirmed by the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Since SIGAR’s last quarterly report to Congress, an HPC spokesman was suspended after he made controversial remarks such as calling Osama bin Laden a martyr and blaming the conflict in Afghanistan on foreign interference due to the U.S. presence.

Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program

The Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP), an Afghan-led reintegration program targeted towards low-level foot soldiers and their commanders, is financed through $182.3 million in contributions from 12 donor nations. Operational funding for the program is provided by seven donor nations.
nations (primarily Japan and Germany). The United States provides funding towards community-recovery efforts administered by the World Bank.\(^{409}\)

According to the Force Reintegration Cell (FRIC), an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) element supporting the APRP, the APRP Joint Secretariat and Provincial Joint Secretariat Teams continue to make outreach a priority. For example, the APRP recently mounted a countrywide women’s campaign that gathered more than 250,000 women’s signatures in a petition for peace.\(^{470}\)

The FRIC also reports 96 small grant projects and 1,228 Afghan government projects are under way in 31 provinces and 136 districts.\(^{471}\)

During this quarter, 426 new reintegrees joined the program, increasing the total to 8,025 reintegrees, as shown in Figure 3.31. According to FRIC, there is a current backlog of approximately 500 reintegration candidates who have been fully vetted at the provincial and national level, and who will complete the enrollment process as soon as 2014 funds are available.\(^{472}\)

According to State and the FRIC, the APRP has a robust vetting process to confirm that individuals who want to join the program are actually insurgents. Afghan civil government and ANSF officials at the provincial and national levels are responsible for processing reintegrees. The international role is limited to being able to access the Reintegration Tracking and Monitoring Database.\(^{473}\)

FIGURE 3.31

CUMULATIVE REINTEGREES BY REGIONAL COMMAND

Note: Sources did not explain why the cumulative number decreased in RC-West and RC-South this quarter; the current number of confirmed recidivists is 16 individuals.

GOVERNANCE

RULE OF LAW AND ANTICORRUPTION

The geographic coverage and effectiveness of Afghanistan’s formal justice sector is unclear. In his Presidential Decree 45, President Karzai requested that the Supreme Court activate all inactive courts in the provinces and districts, and staff them with professional personnel by March 21, 2013. The Supreme Court of Afghanistan and the AGO reported that all districts have assigned prosecutors and all districts have functioning courts. However, insecure districts with no prosecutors or judges physically present are still labeled “functioning” so long as cases are processed in provincial capitals. A news report quoted the chief of the appellate court in Ghazni Province saying 14 of its 18 districts have no judges present due to growing insecurity. Residents therefore must either travel to the provincial capital or use informal dispute resolution.

USAID says it is unclear what proportion of trials in insecure provinces take place in the districts as opposed to the provincial capital. Judges assigned to insecure provinces appear to hold court in the provincial capitals, with cases primarily filed in the provincial center and not the districts because of insecurity and the lack of facilities. In Kandahar, rule-of-law officials do not reside in their districts and have limited effectiveness in most of the province. The fact that prosecutors are absent in several Kandahar districts has led to police releasing detainees following informal discussions with local elders, rather than adhering to formal procedures.

According to USAID, Afghan legal professionals cite the lack of suitable work facilities and financial hardships associated with living in their assigned districts as reasons for not taking up residence. For example, the judge assigned to Zharey District provides judicial services from Kandahar City and visits the district infrequently because it lacks a courthouse and adequate office space. USAID cited one positive example of two judges and a prosecutor who were consistently present in Arghandab District, partially due to the presence of a courthouse with housing facilities for the officials.

SIGAR announced this quarter that it is initiating an audit of U.S. government efforts to assist and improve the rule of law in Afghanistan. SIGAR plans to (1) identify U.S. government programs or initiatives to develop rule of law in Afghanistan; (2) assess the progress that these programs or initiatives have made achieving the objectives of the U.S. Government rule of law Strategy; and (3) identify challenges, if any, that the U.S. government has encountered in achieving its rule of law objectives and the extent to which it has addressed these challenges.

Project Summary

The United States has provided assistance to the formal and informal justice sectors through several mechanisms. These include the USAID Rule of Law Stabilization Formal and Informal Components (RLS-F and RLS-I), the
USAID Assistance to Afghanistan Anti-Corruption Authority Program (4As), and the State Department Justice Training Transition Program (JTTP). These and other rule-of-law and anticorruption programs are detailed in Table 3.24.

RLS-F provides assistance to the formal justice sector to increase access to justice, strengthen the capacity of the legal education system, and promote transparency and accountability at the district, provincial, and national levels. USAID reports that RLS-F improves the capacity of sitting judges and court staff by providing comprehensive legal training. RLS-F includes the Supreme Court formal training program for new judges. USAID previously reported that 81% of Afghan judges have completed this course. RLS-F has also implemented public outreach efforts to strengthen civic awareness of Afghan legal rights and the country’s judicial processes.

RLS-I provides assistance to the traditional justice sector to increase the quality of justice services provided and facilitate linkages of formal and traditional justice sectors. According to USAID, RLS-I has enhanced the dispute-resolution skills of community leaders in 48 districts in southern, eastern, and northern Afghanistan. With USAID assistance, 5,192 elders have pledged to cease some traditional practices such as baad, the practice of exchanging women to settle a dispute. USAID reports that 67 women’s elders groups have been established.

USAID says it is finalizing an impact evaluation of RLS-I, but initial findings include: (1) disputants who seek the mediation services of RLS-I elders showed improved perceptions of procedural fairness and overall justice; (2) the more knowledge the elder has, the more satisfied people are with the dispute resolution; and (3) RLS-I participants gain and retain knowledge, with higher gains for relevant, practical knowledge, such as family or inheritance law.

The State Department’s JTTP provides regional training to justice-sector officials, including police, prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys, on a wide range of criminal justice topics, including anticorruption. JTTP also provides mentoring on specific cases and legal issues to justice sector officials, including prosecutors and judges. According to State, beneficiaries of JTTP training have demonstrated increased capacity and knowledge.

### Table 3.24

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>End Date</th>
<th>Total Estimated Cost ($)</th>
<th>Cumulative Disbursements as of 3/31/2014 ($)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rule of Law Stabilization-Formal Component</td>
<td>7/16/2012</td>
<td>7/14/2014</td>
<td>$22,581,128</td>
<td>$15,967,182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of Law Stabilization-Informal Component</td>
<td>7/16/2012</td>
<td>3/13/2014</td>
<td>$15,651,679</td>
<td>$14,520,833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fight Corruption Tooth and Nail</td>
<td>7/4/2012</td>
<td>7/3/2014</td>
<td>$997,000</td>
<td>$528,783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAPS Anti-Corruption Grant</td>
<td>6/7/2012</td>
<td>6/6/2014</td>
<td>$1,292,379</td>
<td>$664,707</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 4/7/2014.
leading to improved effectiveness. However, State did not provide an assessment of the state of Afghan court administration. 483

The Supreme Court and the Formal Justice Sector
According to State, there were no notable rulings by the Supreme Court during the quarter. 484

Afghan Correctional System
The inmate population of Afghanistan’s prisons managed by the General Directorate of Prisons and Detention Centers (GDPDC) has continued to increase at a rate of 16.4% annually over the past five years, leading to overcrowding, according to State. 485 The UN Secretary-General reported that Afghanistan’s general prison population grew from 12,000 in 2008 to 29,000 in January 2014, with a growing number of hunger strikes over conditions of detention as well as inconsistent application of prisoner releases. 486

The Ministry of Justice’s Juvenile Rehabilitation Directorate (JRD) incarcerated 1,233 juveniles. This total does not include detainees held by any other Afghan governmental organization as State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) does not have access to data for other organizations. 487

Overcrowding is a persistent, substantial, and widespread problem within GDPDC facilities. As of January 20, 2014, the total male provincial prison population was at 296% of capacity, as defined by International Committee of the Red Cross’s (ICRC) minimum 3.4 square meters per inmate. The total female provincial prison population was at 135% of the ICRC recommended capacity. Information on the capacity of GDPDC-operated district detention centers and the JRD’s juvenile rehabilitation centers is not available. However, anecdotal reporting by INL advisors visiting facilities indicates that overcrowding is a substantial problem in many provinces. 488

In April, SIGAR issued an alert letter regarding an $11.3 million prison built by an INL contractor in Baghlan Province. Although security concerns prevented SIGAR from physically inspecting the prison, the agency’s review of contract files found evidence of serious structural damage that resulted in at least one housing unit being demolished. 489 According to INL, the construction design specifications required compliance with International Building Code (IBC) standards, as well as seismic reinforcement, and, in accordance with these requirements, the facilities were built using reinforced brick. 490 The designs indicate that this unit and other buildings at the site were built using unreinforced brick walls between concrete columns. SIGAR recommended that INL reconsider its plan and direct that the structures be rebuilt using reinforced masonry between concrete columns, which SIGAR believes is called for in the IBC. 491 INL stated that it will continue to comply with IBC standards in any future reconstruction contracts in Afghanistan. 492
Anticorruption

Afghan anticorruption efforts demonstrated no significant progress during the quarter. State is aware of one new case this quarter involving a high-level official, but has not yet reviewed the case file and cannot comment on the quality of the evidence. The chief prosecutor in Balkh Province was charged with embezzlement and abuse of power for diverting flour shipments at the Uzbek border. The Afghan government continues to prosecute lower-level government officials for corruption, but prosecutions are generally not pursued for those beyond the lowest-level supervisors.493

Special Inspector General John F. Sopko spoke at the Atlantic Council on March 20, 2014, to point out that allowing corruption to continue unabated in Afghanistan will likely jeopardize all the United States has accomplished in 12 years of reconstruction. For more information, see Section 2, page 55.

The Department of Defense’s Joint Staff issued a report on corruption in February. The study, initiated by ISAF Commander General Joseph F. Dunford, quoted former ISAF Commander General John Allen as saying that “Corruption is the existential, strategic threat to Afghanistan.”494 The report found that: (1) U.S. initial support of warlords, reliance on contracting for military logistical support, and the deluge of military and aid spending overwhelmed the absorptive capacity of the Afghan government and created an environment that fostered corruption and impeded later counter/anticorruption (CAC) efforts; (2) the necessary preconditions for combating corruption do not exist due to an initial delayed U.S. understanding of the nature of Afghan corruption, decreasing levels of physical security, lack of political will on the part of both the international community and the Afghan government, and lack of effective popular pressure against corruption resulting in a large-scale culture of impunity that frustrated CAC efforts; and (3) there was an improvement in understanding of the corruption issues and supported intelligence-driven CAC planning and operations but lack of unity of effort reduced the effectiveness of CAC operations and the persistent lack of political will on the part of the Afghan government rendered almost all countercorruption efforts moot.495

According to the report, there are two lines of effort to combat corruption: anticorruption and countercorruption. Anticorruption measures are those aimed at limiting the opportunities for corruption. They include transparency and accountability control measures, inspections, audits, and actions to influence individual behavior. The report pointed out that anticorruption measures inconvenienced corrupt actors but did not sanction them for their actions, which possibly helped further a culture of impunity in Afghanistan. In contrast, countercorruption measures are corrective in nature, focus on sanctioning corrupt individuals, and provide a deterrent against corruption. However, Afghanistan lacks the effective legal system, and particularly an independent judiciary which
the countercorruption measures require. According to the report, without this, the international coalition’s countercorruption actions are usually a step behind the corrupt actors.496

The report offered several criticisms of the U.S. approach to Afghanistan reconstruction including weak oversight of subcontractors, the inability to account for spending, and the emergence of a perverse incentive to demonstrate progress through increased spending at the tactical level that undercut oversight.497 The report also questioned the value of international CAC initiatives, noting that the use of classified intelligence created legal dilemmas when the information could not be shared with the Afghan court system. In addition, improved understanding of prime contractors was not replicated at the subcontractor level. Moreover, the report found that on the whole ISAF’s CAC effort remained Kabul-centric and lacked visibility outside of headquarters. Finally, the report concluded that the Afghan government impeded international CAC efforts by conducting illusory corruption reform and slow-rolling domestic reform, such as delaying appointments to the Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (MEC).498

This quarter, there were reports of subnational Afghan government officials being accused of corruption related to wheat distribution. The governor of Nuristan Province, along with the directors of disaster management and rural reconstruction and development, were removed from office for the theft of hundreds of tons of government wheat.499 Similarly, a district governor in Ghazni Province has reportedly been suspended after being accused of selling 90 tons of improved wheat seed meant for distribution to local farmers.500

Afghan Attorney General’s Office
There were no significant changes in the technical capacity or effectiveness of the AGO. The AGO declined offers from State to train AGO prosecutors in investigative methods, and cancelled numerous scheduled meetings with State. According to State, the election made the pursuit of high-level corruption cases less likely.501

The Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF) is the investigatory arm for the AGO internal control and monitoring unit.502 According to State, the MCTF continues to be an increasingly capable investigatory force but is stymied by the AGO’s refusal to pursue corruption cases.503

Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (MEC)
According to USAID, the MEC has sufficient technical capacity to carry out its mandate to develop anticorruption recommendations and benchmarks; monitor and evaluate the government and international community efforts to fight corruption; and report to the Afghan president, parliament, people,
and international community. The MEC remains one of the only effective organizations engaged in the fight against corruption in Afghanistan. The MEC’s two main donors, Denmark and the United Kingdom (UK), have been working with the MEC to improve some of the administrative deficiencies found by UK auditors several months ago. According to USAID, donors and the U.S. government are impressed with the MEC’s ability to confront the Afghan government on serious corruption issues.504

In April, the MEC issued its fifth six-month-report that covers their work and recommendations from July 1 to December 31, 2013.505 SIGAR has previously reported on these recommendations (for example, please see pages 137–138 in the January 30, 2014, and October 30, 2013, quarterly reports). The MEC reported that it is monitoring more than 40 Afghan government institutions and international organizations. In the report, the MEC introduced a rating system for 23 institutions (or type of institutions such as the international community/donor) for the amount of cooperation and effort in responding to MEC recommendations. According to the MEC, the best performing institutions are the IEC, Da Afghanistan Bank, the Ministry of Mines and Petroleum, and the Supreme Court. The worst-performing institutions are ISAF, the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriations, the Kabul Bank Special Tribunal, and the Afghanistan Investment Support Agency.506

The MEC recently stated that the Afghan government has not effectively implemented asset registration and verification procedures for high-ranking Afghan officials, opening the door for embezzlement. According to the MEC, a properly implemented asset registration and verification system is an effective tool in fighting corruption. The MEC found that the High Office of Oversight and Anticorruption (HOO) has been able to register the assets of officials to some extent, but not annually as required; that the HOO has failed to verify the assets they have registered and did not refer illicit enrichment cases to the Attorney General’s Office; and that the HOO’s Asset Registration and Declaration Department suffers from low staff capacity.507

High Office of Oversight and Anticorruption

State and USAID have reported previously that the HOO is dysfunctional, ineffective, and politicized.508 USAID reports that the HOO has adequate administrative and technical capacity to carry out its programs and mandate.509 However, the HOO suffers from a lack of political will and seriousness of purpose at the upper echelons of government in fighting corruption, especially when it involves the powerful and political elite. The new HOO director has not increased productivity and continues to request donor assistance to build capacity in HOO staff. According to USAID, the donor community is reluctant to invest more at this time because it has not seen sufficient results from the funding it has already invested in the HOO.510
According to the UN Secretary-General, the HOO registered the assets of 2,975 government officials. The HOO has published information on the asset registration of 44 senior government officials, and asset verification has been completed for 33 high-level government officials, including the president, vice presidents, ministers and governors. The verification of the asset declarations of an additional 32 senior officials is under way.511

According to USAID, 1,150 Afghan officials are confirmed to have completed an asset-declaration form, although HOO claims the number is between 2,500 and 5,000. The HOO maintains that 7,000 officials are required to file asset-declaration forms. USAID admits that there is no way to independently verify the HOO’s figures and notes that while most officials are required to disclose annually, most of those who have declared have done it only once since 2010. 512 Because of this, the Afghan government failed to meet its TMAF hard deliverable regarding the collection and publishing of the assets of high-ranking officials. 513

### CSTC-A Oversight of MOD and MOI Direct Contributions

According to DOD, the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) has for the first time introduced a “financial levers strategy” that is meant to use direct financial contributions to the MOD and MOI as a lever to change Afghan government behaviors. See Figure 3.32. Once audit or assessment findings are communicated to the relevant ministry, CSTC-A will begin the process. On Day 30, the commanding general

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**FIGURE 3.32**

**COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND–AFGHANISTAN (CSTC-A) FINANCIAL LEVERS STRATEGY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DAY X</th>
<th>DAY 1</th>
<th>DAY 15</th>
<th>DAY 30</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Audit or assessment related to Ministry of Defense (MOD) or Ministry of Interior (MOI) uncovers an issue.</td>
<td>CSTC-A ministerial advisor receives briefing of audit/assessment results. Audit recommendations letter goes to audited organization.</td>
<td>Auditor follows up with MOD/MOI to determine status of audit recommendations and any progress in rectifying problems identified.</td>
<td>CSTC-A commander or deputy sends letter of audit recommendations to MOD or MOI showing all “open” and “closed” recommendations. Intent is to elevate issues and address open recommendations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DAY 45</th>
<th>DAY 46</th>
<th>DAY 60</th>
<th>DAY 61</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Review board confirms consensus at CSTC-A that findings are not being addressed and recommendations are not being followed in a timely fashion.</td>
<td>First lever pulled: 50% disbursement delay to affected budget code, or more serious follow-on actions occur if MOD or MOI ignore audit recommendations and do not respond.</td>
<td>Another CSTC-A follow-up determines status of audit recommendations.</td>
<td>Second lever pulled: Commitment letter funding decreased, or disbursement delayed to affected budget codes by 100%. Higher-level budget code has broader implications for MOD or MOI.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DOD, CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 12/30/2013.
or deputy commanding general of CSTC-A will send a letter of audit recommendations with all open and closed recommendations to the MOD or MOI. If an issue is not resolved by a review board on Day 45, CSTC-A will delay disbursement of 50% of the affected funds or take more serious action if warranted. On Day 60, CSTC-A will conduct a follow-up to determine the status of audit recommendations. Finally, on Day 61, CSTC-A will either decrease funding on the commitment letter or delay disbursement of the affected funds.\textsuperscript{514}

The levers strategy seeks to change behavior at the ministry level. The first audit to go through the process reached the 45/46-day mark around December 23, 2013.\textsuperscript{515} From August through October 2013, CSTC-A audited the MOI payroll. CSTC-A issued an audit report to the MOI in early November 2013. The audit contained findings related to pension deductions being erroneously calculated; payroll issues including late payments, inadequate withholding of payroll taxes, and improper deduction of pension contributions; and cooperative-stores funding that is unconstitutional, not accessible to its contributors, and with fees that exceed estimated operating costs. The MOI has responded to the audit by issuing a decree to stop all cooperative-store pay deductions.\textsuperscript{516}

According to CSTC-A, there are several mechanisms for monitoring U.S. direct contributions to the Afghan budget for the Afghan security forces. CSTC-A uses a bilateral commitment letter to ensure that the Afghan government understands the terms and conditions surrounding the proper utilization of CSTC-A funds (including the purpose, time, and amount) and the possible consequences of improper use of funds.\textsuperscript{517} Direct-contributions funding is provided to the Ministry of Finance, and later allotted to MOD and MOI, incrementally on an as-required basis.\textsuperscript{518}

It is CSTC-A’s assessment that once funds enter the Afghan government’s bank account, oversight becomes significantly more challenging. CSTC-A currently compares on a weekly basis the reported Afghanistan Financial Management Information System (AFMIS) expenditures (by five-digit expenditure code) to the approved amounts in the commitment letter. CSTC-A notes, however, that AFMIS is a manual-entry system and its reliability is only as good as the Afghan government official who is entering the data. If CSTC-A observes that the spending of an expenditure code exceeds the amount specified in the commitment letter by any amount, then CSTC-A will investigate. Similarly, CSTC-A acts if it observes execution of any amount on a budget code that is not specified in the commitment letter.\textsuperscript{519}

CSTC-A says it can reconcile U.S. direct contributions to MOI and MOD through an analysis of disbursements and expenses through AFMIS, but is currently examining, in collaboration with USAID, an alternate approach for providing direct contributions following a Department of Defense Inspector General audit. CSTC-A is analyzing the method used by USAID
in which the Afghan government establishes a special bank account granting USAID full audit rights over the account. According to CSTC-A, this arrangement could provide CSTC-A with another tool for strengthening accountability over direct contributions. Currently, CSTC-A direct contributions are pooled with all sources of Afghan government revenues (including other donor nations and domestic revenues) deposited in the single treasury account of the central bank. According to CSTC-A, this approach has the advantage of being more simple and provides the Afghan government more flexibility, but requires additional effort from CSTC-A to reconcile the reported use of funds.\textsuperscript{520}

CSTC-A also uses audits designed to detect and correct improper spending to monitor high-risk areas such as fuel and pay. CSTC-A has initiated 12 audits over the last several months to examine payroll accountability and the purchases of clothing, fuel, and utilities in the Ministries of Defense and Interior.\textsuperscript{521}

**HUMAN RIGHTS**

**Gender Equity**

In January, the Afghan Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MOWA) released their first report on the implementation of the Elimination of Violence Against Women (EVAW) Law. According to UNAMA, this report reinforced UNAMA’s findings from a December 2013 report and shows that too many cases are resolved through mediation rather than the criminal justice system.\textsuperscript{522} The report found a total of 4,505 reported cases of violence against women—on average 35 cases per 100,000 women—in 32 of the 34 provinces. The five most reported types of cases were beating/battery and laceration (40.5%), murder (7.3%), abuse (5.4%), denial of food (5.4%), and forced marriage (5.1%).\textsuperscript{523} The current state of the reported cases include resolution through mediation and other processes (41%), resolution through the formal legal system (11.5%), and still in progress (47%).\textsuperscript{524}

According to USAID, the Afghan government failed to meet the TMAF hard deliverable to produce a detailed report on the application of the EVAW law in each province. The advanced draft of the report that was supplied to donors prior to the January 28, 2014, Special Joint Coordination Monitoring Board had a disparity between the reported number of cases by the MOI, Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), or MOWA and the reported number of arrests, prosecutions, and convictions; a lack of complete data in the provinces; a lack of coordination between provincial justice institutions and provincial MOWA offices; a lack of technical support in the provinces; and the lack of an adequate and centralized data collection system for Kabul and the provinces.\textsuperscript{525}
The new European Union Ambassador to Afghanistan stated in March that the Afghan government has not demonstrated a sufficient sense of urgency with regard to women’s rights in Afghanistan and lacks a strong policy on the matter.526

There was controversy this quarter regarding a portion of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC). Following a six-year drafting process, Article 26 of the CPC, which dealt with those who cannot be questioned as witnesses in criminal proceedings, was approved by parliament and signed into law, but was later amended through a decree by President Karzai.527 There was concern that Article 26 would impact the prosecution of domestic violence and child abuse by restricting relatives of abusers from appearing as witnesses. The European Union, the U.S. Embassy Kabul, and other international donors issued statements requesting an amendment of the article.528

According to State, the final version of the CPC is a vast improvement over the original version passed by parliament. However, civil society groups have raised concerns over how the CPC will be effectively implemented.529 According to USAID, the positive amendments were due to the strong advocacy and pressure of civil society, which is reflective of how much more active and organized Afghan civil society has become throughout the past decade.530 According to Human Rights Watch, the revised Article 26 language still exempts too many family members from being called to court as witnesses and therefore poses a serious challenge for successful prosecution of violence against women and witness protection.531

Refugees and Internal Displacement

According to State, the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) recorded no new refugee outflows in the region in this quarter. In the first two months of 2014, returns totaled 965 individuals, which is 57% lower than the 2,265 returns during the same period in 2013. The decrease in the rate of returns can be attributed to the uncertain security situation in Afghanistan, the unknown outcome of the April 2014 Afghan presidential and provincial council elections, and the extension of proof-of-registration cards for Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Return trends also decline during the winter season with February being the lowest month historically. Afghans remain among the largest group of asylum seekers worldwide with 38,653 claims in 2013.532

As of February 28, UNHCR recorded a total number of 654,664 registered conflict-affected Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) compared to 647,779 registered IDPs since January 31. According to State, the actual number of internally displaced could be much higher, but is difficult to verify.533

In February, the Afghan government launched a new national policy on internal displacement. It set forth the roles and responsibilities of various Afghan government ministries and agencies and their development and humanitarian partners. According to the UN Secretary General, an
implementation strategy is currently being developed.534 Under the new policy, the Afghan government bears the primary responsibility to provide emergency assistance, longer term support, and protection to displaced persons in Afghanistan. According to UNHCR, the responsibility exists regardless of the cause of displacement. It also applies whether displaced persons are living in settlements, with host families, in rural or in urban settings, and inside or outside their province of origin. The policy ensures that Afghans will have the right to integrate in the place where they are living, return to their place of origin, or to relocate to a new place. Displaced people cannot be encouraged or compelled to return or relocate to areas where their lives will be at risk.535

The Government of Pakistan began issuing new refugee cards that will be valid until the end of 2015 to more than 1.6 million registered Afghan refugees. Pakistan’s Cabinet decided in July of 2013 to further extend the temporary stay of Afghan refugees. According to UNHCR, the refugee card is important as it provides for Afghans to legally remain in Pakistan and thereby protects against risks such as extortion, arbitrary arrest, and detention as well as deportation under Pakistan’s Foreigners Act. The process will be carried out in two phases. During February-June 2014 all expired cards will be replaced. In the second phase, from July to the end of the year, Pakistan will register and issue individual cards to some 150,000 children born during the past five years. An additional 330,000 Afghan children below the age of 18 will receive birth certificates for the first time under this initiative.536

The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) issued a report that found that rapid urban growth has been fuelled by the repatriation of refugees, internally displaced persons fleeing conflict and disasters, and economic migration. According to NRC, the arrival of IDPs and refugee returnees in Afghanistan’s cities has created precarious living conditions, including a constant risk of forced evictions. Afghan domestic law does not have clear legal standards for eviction. Evictions are planned and carried out with no genuine consultation, inadequate notice, no due process, and without compensation. NRC found that in the vast majority of cases, evicted IDP and returnee families have no prospect of being relocated to adequate alternative housing by either the government or private land-owners.537

**Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission**

According to State, the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) continues to make significant progress in increasing awareness about human rights issues, documenting the current human rights situation, speaking out about abuses, and monitoring the ongoing elections. However, the Afghan government’s process for appointing AIHRC commissioners created concern over the AIHRC’s independence that could threaten its reaccreditation ranking.538
On January 28, the International Coordinating Committee (ICC) published the findings of its review of the AIHRC. The ICC currently rates the AIHRC as having “A” status, signifying compliance with the Paris Principles and reflecting institutional legitimacy and credibility. The review, conducted every five years, concluded with a decision to defer the question of AIHRC’s status for one year. The ICC, while expressing great respect for AIHRC’s work and effectiveness, noted with concern the Afghan government’s process of appointing new commissioners, the lack of sufficient female staff, and the dependence on donor funding. The ICC stressed the need for the AIHRC to address those concerns with the Afghan government by November 2014, failing which it would be recommended for a downgrading to a lower “B” status. Because of this, the Afghan government failed to meet the TMAF hard deliverable regarding the appointment of AIHRC commissioners. State reported that the current donors remain committed to supporting the AIHRC despite the uncertainty of its international rating.

DATA QUALITY ASSESSMENT OF THE SURVEY OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE

SIGAR reported last quarter on the annual A Survey of the Afghan People issued by the Asia Foundation. USAID currently funds approximately 26% of the survey’s cost through a $750,000 grant. At the conclusion of last quarter, USAID finalized a data-quality assessment of the survey. USAID’s report noted that the Asia Foundation survey, the only publicly available study of nationwide perceptions in Afghanistan since 2006, has become controversial due to a wide discrepancy between the survey’s reported optimism and opinions captured in other surveys. According to the report, analysts and organizations working on the ground in Afghanistan often dismiss the survey, while policy makers and key decision makers tout it as evidence of the progress the international community has made in Afghanistan.

According to the USAID assessment, the Asia Foundation made a number of changes to improve the quality of the survey in 2013 including changes to the survey plan, instrument, method, and analysis. Some of these changes sought to better capture the opinions of Afghans living in insecure areas. The 2013 survey introduced what the Asia Foundation describes as “intercept interviews” to capture perceptions of Afghans living in inaccessible areas. The Foundation ‘intercepted’ respondents from insecure areas in a secure or accessible location, such as a bazaar, hospital, or travel point. The assessment notes that this is not an ideal method for capturing opinions from insecure areas.

Another change included the hiring of a third-party monitoring company to observe the survey implementation process. The third-party monitor,
however, was not able to conduct truly independent monitoring of the survey process because the survey implementer did not define ahead of time their survey schedule so that the monitor was not able to plan monitoring site visits in advance using a random selection of survey sampling points. Instead, the monitor had to rely on guidance from the survey implementers in order to observe the survey process. Consequently, there was no assurance that survey implementers did not guide the third party to monitor the best enumerators performing the surveys rather than conduct a random sampling of enumerators.548 Despite these changes, the assessment team found continuing areas of concern, including the process of replacing sampling points, misunderstanding by some enumerators of the randomized respondent selection process, and weak survey questions. According to the report, these findings illustrate continuing weaknesses in the survey.549
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ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

As of March 31, 2014, the U.S. government has provided nearly $26 billion to support governance and economic development in Afghanistan. Most of the appropriated funds flowed into four major programs and accounts, as shown in Table 3.25.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fund</th>
<th>Managing Agency</th>
<th>Appropriated</th>
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<tr>
<td>ESF</td>
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<td>$17.5</td>
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<td>CERP</td>
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<td>TFBSO</td>
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<td>AIF</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$23.2</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.25

Of the $23.2 billion appropriated for these funds, approximately $18.6 billion had been obligated and $14.7 billion disbursed, as of March 31, 2014.

KEY EVENTS

This quarter saw a number of developments that could have a profound impact on the Afghan economy during the coming year. Afghanistan was downgraded to a “dark-gray” list by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) for insufficient progress made on improving its anti-money laundering regulations. Afghanistan could be blacklisted to the high-risk, non-cooperative jurisdiction category in June if satisfactory improvement is not made, affecting its banking relationships around the world and further weakening its banking sector.550

The Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB)—a high-level decision-making body responsible for strategic coordination between Afghanistan and the international community—met in January to measure
Afghan and donor progress on fulfilling Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework requirements and to provide guidance for the new government. In a statement, the board concluded that both sides made “sound progress” while acknowledging that challenges remain ahead.551

Afghanistan’s domestic revenues in Afghan fiscal year (FY) 1392 (December 21, 2012–December 20, 2013) missed Ministry of Finance (MOF) budget targets by 11.9%.552 Domestic revenues paid for only 37% ($2 billion) of Afghanistan’s total budget expenditures ($5.4 billion) in FY 1392; donor grants covered the remainder.553

At the same time, the Afghan government approved its FY 1393 national budget (December 21, 2013–December 20, 2014), totaling $7.65 billion, a 23% increase over FY 1392.554

During this reporting period, the International Monetary Fund’s Extended Credit Facility arrangement review and disbursement remain delayed due in part to insufficient Afghan progress toward meeting domestic-revenue collection and legislative requirements.555

Finally, the Afghan government has not held any more people accountable for the Kabul Bank scandal, nor has it made significant cash recoveries this quarter.556 Moreover, the government continues to delay passing the new mining law, hindering significant private investment in the mining sector.557

**ECONOMIC PROFILE**

Afghanistan’s GDP growth has slowed significantly over the last year. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) all projected that Afghanistan’s GDP growth (excluding opium production) will fall from about a high of 14% in 2012 (due to a near-record-breaking wheat and cereal harvest) to an estimated 3–4% for 2013. They attribute the decline in GDP growth to increasing uncertainty about the volatile political and security environment. The World Bank, IMF and ADB project GDP growth in 2014 to remain at around 3.5%.558 With an expected reduction in international aid and spending after 2014, the Bank projects average real GDP growth at about 5% annually through 2018 under its baseline scenario. More uncertainty, fueled by insecurity and instability, could further dampen growth.559 By contrast, Afghanistan’s economy grew by an annual average of 9.4% during the years it was boosted by international military spending and development assistance from 2003 to 2012.560

The services and agriculture sectors have been the most important components of GDP. Increased public spending buoyed demand in 2013 for services, the leading contributor to GDP, from 2005–2012, although it slowed considerably in 2013, according to the World Bank.562 However, in 2013 the ADB found weakened demand in industry and services due to business and consumer uncertainty about insecurity, lower spending by international security forces, and the winding down of a large number
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

of development projects in advance of the 2014 drawdown. Non-poppy agriculture remains the second leading contributor to real GDP, typically accounting for between a quarter and a third of GDP, but output and income fluctuate with the weather.

Fiscal Sustainability

The Afghan government’s revenues declined as a percentage of GDP in 2013 (9.6%)—compared to 10.3% in 2012 and 11% in 2011—as public spending increased, according to the World Bank. Afghan government expenditures are expected to continue rising, largely due to spending on security, service delivery, building essential infrastructure, and operations and maintenance.

The World Bank describes Afghanistan’s fiscal outlook as subpar and likely to delay progress to self-reliance. Afghanistan’s fiscal gap between government revenue and expenditures is growing. The Bank estimates a large financing gap of 25% of GDP ($7 billion) in 2018 and a similar gap of 20% of GDP in 2025. This will limit Afghanistan’s ability to pay for discretionary services without significant donor support and is likely to delay its progress to self-reliance.

Budget

On January 15, 2014, Afghanistan’s parliament approved the country’s FY 1393 national budget (December 21, 2013–December 20, 2014), totaling approximately $7.55 billion—$4.94 billion for the operating budget and $2.61 billion for the development budget. Budget expenditures will focus on security (44% of the total budget), infrastructure (14%), education (13%), agriculture (8%), and health (4%).

Revenue Generation

Last year, the Afghan MOF projected domestic revenue for FY 1392 (December 21, 2012, to December 20, 2013) at $2.4 billion (at the January 2013 currency-exchange rate of 51.6 afghanis (AFN) to the U.S. dollar), an increase of 40% over FY 1391 (March 2012 to December 2012), noting a 12 month to nine month comparison. However, in FY 1392, the MOF reported total domestic revenues missed MOF budget targets by 11.9%. Figure 3.33 on the following page depicts the disparity between the government’s domestic revenues—derived primarily from taxes and customs duties—and budget operating expenditures from FY 1388 to FY 1392.

The World Bank noted that domestic revenues paid for only 37% or $2 billion of Afghanistan’s total budget expenditures of $5.4 billion in FY 1392; donor grants covered the rest. The World Bank and the ADB attributed Afghanistan’s weak revenue performance to a slowdown in economic activity, changes in the structure of imports, and corruption, particularly in customs collections.

Opium production is not calculated in official GDP figures (GDP was more than $21 billion in 2013), although it figures prominently in the economy. Farm-gate price of the opium economy is estimated at 4% of GDP by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), which also calculated exports of opium and its derivatives, such as heroin and morphine, at 14% of GDP (almost $3 billion) in 2013.

Source: UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2013, 12/2013, pp. 10, 12.

Donor grants are expected to finance approximately $4.8 billion of Afghanistan’s $7.55 billion FY 1393 national budget. Of the donor grants, $2.76 billion will go toward the operating budget and $2.07 billion will go toward the development budget.

The Afghan economy continues to grow, albeit at a reduced rate of growth, 3–4% in 2013 and 2014 versus approximately 14% in 2012. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimates the Afghan population is growing by 2.29% a year, so real growth of at least that rate is required to prevent per capita GDP, a key measure of economic wellbeing, from declining.

As noted earlier, domestic revenues declined to 9.6% of GDP in 2013, one of the lowest in the world. Afghanistan’s commitments under the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework call for it to increase revenues to 15% of GDP by 2016 and to 19% by 2025. The Bank warned that the current decline in revenue poses risks to long-term sustainability and to achieving Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework targets, upon which donor assistance is predicated.
U.S. officials told SIGAR that corruption is the biggest issue affecting Afghan customs processes and revenues. USAID added that political will and inefficient systems also affect Afghan customs processes and revenues; customs revenue is a major component of Afghanistan’s national budget.

Afghanistan’s 2008 National Development Strategy proposed streamlining and automating customs processing procedures in order to reduce corruption. However, as the U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID) Afghanistan Trade and Revenue (ATAR) program contract documents noted, “a major predictor of sustainability is [Afghanistan’s] political will to implement reforms and combat corruption.”

In one example of the impact of political will on stemming corruption, USAID reported that following the resignation of Nangahar Province Governor Sherzai to run for president, there was a noticeable difference in approach at the Torkham border crossing point (BCP) regarding revenue collection. Illegal taxes, which had been designated as regional construction fees imposed by the “Governor’s House” administration, ended. The new governor closed all weigh bridges between Torkham BCP and Jalalabad to stem corruption, and there are no reported instances of threats against any customs staff, according to USAID’s ATAR.

Trade
As a land-locked nation, Afghanistan is highly dependent on other countries for its trade, transit, security, and stability. Pakistan is Afghanistan’s largest trading partner, followed by the United States, the European Union, and regional neighbors.

In its latest analysis, the World Bank found that Afghanistan’s trade deficit widened in 2012 to the equivalent of 41.9% of GDP. Total exports in 2012 increased approximately 3% to $2.76 billion, while total imports rose about 11% to $11.4 billion. This gap was largely offset by foreign aid. International assistance allowed for an overall surplus in Afghanistan’s balance of payments and a record $7.1 billion in international reserves at the end of 2012. Reserves declined to $6.9 billion in June 2013.

World Trade Organization Accession
One milestone that Afghanistan is supposed to achieve under the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework is membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) by the end of 2014. USAID reported that from a technical standpoint, Afghanistan is positioned to accede to the WTO in time to meet the deadline. However, a SIGAR audit of Afghanistan’s customs revenue collection showed that Afghanistan still requires external assistance to negotiate international trade agreements, as evidenced by USAID support of Afghan accession to the WTO.
This quarter, USAID reported that Afghanistan completed all bilateral market access negotiations as well as circulated draft concessions and commitments schedules on goods and services to its WTO Working Party. The Afghan government postponed a Working Party meeting scheduled for March 31 because of its regulation banning travel by Afghan officials until after the elections. Afghanistan must still pass a series of 24 WTO-compliant laws and seven regulations. The U.S. government is providing technical assistance in these efforts.588

### Afghanistan Trade and Revenue Project

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>End Date</th>
<th>Total Estimated Cost ($)</th>
<th>Cumulative Disbursement, as of 3/31/2014</th>
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<td>11/7/2013</td>
<td>11/6/2017</td>
<td>$77,754,267</td>
<td>$1,920,915</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 4/7/2014.

The ATAR Project is USAID’s most recent effort designed to (1) support Afghanistan’s accession to the WTO, (2) facilitate support bilateral and multilateral regional trade agreements, and (3) improve and streamline the government’s ability to generate revenue. Expected outcomes include Afghanistan’s 2014 accession to the WTO and implementation of its associated legal and regulatory requirements; increased exports to neighboring countries along with expedited cross-border transit; more government revenue from increased customs collections and implementation of a value-added tax; and greater public awareness of trade opportunities.589

This quarter, ATAR reviewed the streamlined procedures of its predecessor program, Trade Accession and Facilitation for Afghanistan (Tafa). It found that a number of extraneous customs clearing processes had worked their way back into the system, negating some of savings to Afghan businesses and the government. ATAR is working to reintroduce best practices and focus on capacity building. It is planning an awareness campaign for traders that will explain the official customs process and promote a hotline to report corruption.590

### Extended Credit Facility Arrangement

The three-year, $129 million ECF loan agreement signed in November 2011 makes disbursements contingent upon completion of program reviews, as determined by IMF Management and the Executive Board. So far, the IMF has released two disbursements of $18.2 million—one at the initial ECF approval, and the second after the first Board review in June 2012. Neither the second IMF review, originally planned for December 2012, nor the third, originally planned for March 2013, has been completed.591
This quarter, the Afghan government again made insufficient progress on the specific banking and financial structural reforms required by the IMF to qualify for another ECF Board review and accompanying disbursement of loans. The IMF has not provided a complete or formal accounting of all ECF benchmarks and performance targets. However, the Afghan government has neither submitted an internationally acceptable revised Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) law to parliament, nor met domestic revenue collection targets set forth under the ECF Arrangement, according to Treasury. Insufficient progress this quarter led the United States to withhold $15 million in bilateral incentive funding linked to Afghan progress toward its ECF commitments.

The existence of an ECF agreement is important to the international community because it demonstrates the Afghan government’s political will to enact necessary reforms. Adherence to the IMF benchmarks and fulfilling macroeconomic requirements also has a direct effect on the levels of foreign aid the international community contributes to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF). In solar year 1390 (March 2011–March 2012), the donor community withheld 85% of the total $933 million in donations to the ARTF until the IMF approved a new ECF agreement for Afghanistan in November 2011.

In November 2013, the World Bank and donors discussed whether to disburse some or any ARTF Incentive Program (IP) funds. While Afghanistan achieved several ARTF IP benchmarks, its long delay in sufficiently completing required ECF benchmarks prompted the recommendation to withhold some funds. However, if the donor community determined that this ECF delay constituted a ‘lapse’ in the program, ARTF IP funds would have to be withheld entirely. Some $44.8 million was eventually released based on achievement of four ARTF IP benchmarks and IMF guidance that the ECF program is still active.

The current ECF expires in November 2014. The new Afghan government will determine its level of engagement with the IMF, including whether to negotiate a new ECF. In the interim, Treasury said that IMF staff and Afghan authorities have agreed on the continued monitoring of structural reforms and quantitative performance.

**Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework**

The Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF), established by the Afghan government and international community at the donors’ conference in 2012, was created to structure international development assistance to Afghanistan through 2017. The donors made their assistance conditional on the Afghan government fulfilling its commitments described in the Framework.

At the Senior Officials Meeting in July 2013, the United States announced the establishment of a $175 million bilateral incentive program to support Afghan reforms with the stipulation that “funds will only be available if
specific progress is made.” The program is to provide these funds in two tranches—$75 million and $100 million—with disbursements dependent on Afghan progress.597

Tranche I ($75 million) is linked to five areas.599

1. Elections
2. Governance, Rule of Law & Human Rights
3. Integrity of Public Finance and Commercial Banking
4. Government Revenues, Budget Execution, and Subnational Governance
5. Inclusive and Sustained Growth and Development

On January 29, 2014, the Special Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB), comprising the Afghan government, donors, and the United Nations, met to assess progress on fulfilling TMAF requirements and to agree upon required next steps for continuing progress toward unmet commitments.600 On March 6, 2014, USAID announced it released $30 million in Tranche I bilateral incentive funding after determining that the Afghan government made sufficient progress in two of five areas—Elections and Government Revenues, Budget Execution, and Subnational Governance.601

Fifteen million dollars was disbursed to the World Bank’s ARTF Recurrent Cost Window for progress in Elections—creating election timelines, appointing election committee commissioners, implementing election laws, and cooperating on election security. The United States will also disburse an additional $15 million for progress in Government Revenues, Budget Execution, and Subnational Governance for developing a draft provincial budgeting policy.602

The United States told Afghanistan that the $15 million linked to Governance, Rule of Law & Human Rights and the $15 million linked to Integrity of Public Finance and Commercial Banking will not be disbursed because of insufficient progress in those areas. A significant factor in withholding funds linked to Integrity of Public Finance and Commercial Banking was the lack of progress the Afghan government has made in meeting conditions required for the IMF to conduct its ECF reviews. The remaining $15 million for Inclusive and Sustained Growth and Development requires Afghanistan to make what the United States deems sufficient progress in passing a new minerals law. The United States will make a final determination on April 16, 2014.

Tranche II funding will be developed with Afghanistan’s new government.603

**BANKING AND FINANCE**

The World Bank reported that Afghanistan’s banking and financial sector, which has not recovered from the 2010 Kabul Bank crisis, suffers from inadequate regulation and oversight, undercapitalization, and a loss of consumer confidence.604 In State’s view, the banking sector faces both
political and economic risks, which could be mitigated if a draft banking law that enhances oversight and the Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism Law were enacted and implemented.605

In 2011, the United States offered conditional assistance to the central bank—Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB)—which was declined. Conditions included:

- Afghanistan staying on track to meet its obligations under the IMF ECF program;
- Kabul Bank shareholders not being involved in the banking sector (formally or informally);
- Clear communication from President Karzai that Treasury advisors would be welcomed;
- Clear roles, objectives, progress benchmarks, and obligations, in writing, for Treasury's technical advisors;
- The cessation of public statements by Afghan officials that the United States was responsible for the Kabul Bank crisis;
- That Afghanistan's financial sector plan would need to instill confidence in Treasury in return for its support.606

A SIGAR audit released last quarter concluded that without U.S. assistance, and only limited World Bank and IMF involvement, the banking sector remains unstable and at risk of further instability, threatening sustainable economic and financial growth.607

Treasury has previously said many Afghan banks are undercapitalized and that lending is concentrated in a small number of sectors with loans largely going to related parties—outside businesses that are controlled by the same individuals or groups that own the bank. This can create a conflict of interest and increases the risk that the bank may incur losses to benefit the businesses. Treasury has also characterized the banking sector as highly dollarized, which may expose Afghan financial institutions to currency risks.608

According to Treasury, these are symptoms of the underlying underdeveloped economy as well as the weak quality of Afghan banks and regulatory institutions. Treasury said most banking systems reflect their host economies to some degree and progress addressing those underlying factors is naturally slow in an impoverished environment such as Afghanistan.609

Few Afghan banks operate in accordance with international standards. Audits of major banks in Afghanistan conducted in the wake of the Kabul Bank scandal have revealed “systemic fragility and vulnerability in all areas of banking governance and operations,” according to a 2013 World Bank report.610 State said Afghanistan’s banks also suffer from political interference and lack of oversight.611 In addition, Afghanistan’s controls against money laundering and terrorist financing are widely viewed as deficient.612

The general Afghan population distrusts banks, preferring to borrow and save with family and friends, and transfer money through informal, trust-
honor-based *hawala* networks.\(^6^{13}\) Indicating a declining banking sector in the wake of the Kabul Bank crisis, commercial loans plummeted, according to the World Bank, and the banking sector's loan-to-deposit ratio dropped from 56.8% in 2010 to 23% in 2012.\(^4^{11}\) Afghans also prefer to use foreign currency rather than their national currency, the afghani (AFN), which is depreciating against the dollar.\(^5^{15}\) In early January 2012, a U.S. dollar cost about 49 AFN; on March 31, 2014, it cost about 58 AFN, according to the Afghan central bank.\(^6^{16}\)

**Banking Law**

The Council of Ministers approved a new banking law on January 28, 2013, but more than a year later it remains pending before parliament. Treasury maintains that the legislation strengthens corporate governance provisions, regulates capital requirements and large exposures, enhances bank supervision, and facilitates bank resolution. If enacted, the law will help prevent, mitigate, and respond to the problems in the financial sector. According to Treasury, failure to enact it will likely lead to weaker financial-sector governance and supervision. DAB will have less authority to enforce banking regulations, key existing vulnerabilities will remain in the banking sector, and bank supervisors will have less protection and authority in the conduct of their duties. In the event of another bank collapse, there would still not be a clear legal framework in place for the resolution process for the troubled bank.\(^6^{17}\)

**Money Laundering**

On February 14, 2014, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) noted that Afghanistan had failed to address deficiencies and make necessary progress in improving its Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) regime. FATF specifically recommends Afghanistan—which has developed a AML/CFT action plan, but is categorized as a jurisdiction not making sufficient progress—address its deficiencies by taking the following steps:

- adequately criminalizing money laundering and terrorist financing;
- establishing and implementing a legal framework to identify, trace, and freeze terrorist assets;
- implementing an adequate oversight program for all financial sectors;
- establishing and implementing adequate procedures for confiscating money-laundering assets;
- establishing a fully functional and operational financial-intelligence unit; and
- establishing effective controls for cross-border cash transactions.\(^6^{18}\)

These recommendations are identical to those the FATF issued in June 2013.\(^6^{19}\) As such, the FATF plenary in February 2014 downgraded Afghanistan to the “dark-gray list” for failure to address its AML/CFT

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**Loan-to-Deposit Ratio:** is used to assess a bank’s liquidity (short-term viability) by dividing its total loans by its total deposits, expressed as a percentage. It is used to calculate the financial institution’s ability to cover customer demands to withdraw funds. If the ratio is too high, the bank may have insufficient liquidity to cover unforeseen requirements. If it is too low, banks may not be earning as much as they could.

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**Financial Action Task Force (FATF):** an intergovernmental policy-making body that sets standards and promotes effective implementation of legal, regulatory, and operational measures for combating money laundering, terrorist financing, and other related threats to the integrity of the international financial system.

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deficiencies and pass AML/CFT legislation that would address those deficiencies. If Afghanistan fails to pass AML/CFT legislation that addresses these deficiencies, it faces further downgrading to the FATF Public Statement, known as the “black list,” at the next plenary in June 2014.⁶²⁰ Afghanistan could join nine other countries currently on that list—Algeria, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Myanmar, Pakistan, Syria, Turkey, and Yemen. Iran and North Korea are on a more severe black list and have “countermeasures” in place against them. A FATF downgrade would further weaken Afghanistan’s banking sector. In extreme cases where the international financial system is deemed threatened, FATF members may be asked to apply financial countermeasures, such as rejecting correspondent account relationship requests from high-risk countries to open branches and subsidiaries in their jurisdictions.⁶²¹ It may also affect whether aid and assistance can be moved through Afghan banks.⁶²²

On November 30, 2013, several of Afghanistan’s banks lost U.S. dollar correspondent banking relationships with German-based Commerzbank. This major money-center bank ended its dealings with Afghan banks to reduce risk and exposure to heightened regulatory scrutiny in the wake of huge fines several British banks agreed to pay to settle U.S. accusations that they laundered money. According to Treasury, it is possible that other banks will also sever their correspondent relationships with Afghan banks.⁶²³

The Kabul Bank
Afghanistan’s Attorney General’s Office (AGO) filed no new charges, launched no new prosecutions, and indicted no additional beneficiaries in connection with the near collapse of Kabul Bank this quarter, despite both primary and appellate court orders to do so or explain why it did not.

State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) noted the beneficiaries of the fraud have millions of dollars worth of assets that could be subject to forfeiture.⁶²⁴ The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) again raised the issue of pursuing additional prosecutions with the AGO this quarter, to no avail. The Attorney General said that “investigations were ongoing,” a claim DOJ told SIGAR was not credible. The evidence needed to prosecute additional shareholders and beneficiaries is the same that has already been used to prosecute the two main perpetrators of the fraud—bank ex-chairman Sherkhan Farnood and ex-CEO Khalilullah Ferozi.⁶²⁵ In January 2014, the AGO convened an appellate court-ordered meeting in which uncharged shareholders—together with ex-chairman Farnood and ex-CEO Ferozi—were to meet with the defendants, the prosecutors, and the Kabul Bank receiver to resolve disputes over defendants’ monetary liabilities. Only two shareholders appeared. A second meeting is planned, but is not yet scheduled. According to DOJ, the Financial Dispute Resolution Commission, which was set up to help settle civil cases that cannot be resolved by the Kabul Bank Receivership, insists

Correspondent Accounts: Accounts maintained by foreign financial institutions at U.S. banks in order to gain access to the U.S. financial system and take advantage of services and products that may not be available in the foreign financial institution’s jurisdiction.

Money-Center Banks: Institutions that lend and borrow with governments, large corporations and regular banks.

Before its near-collapse in 2010, the Kabul Bank had been Afghanistan’s largest private bank, distributing most civil salaries on behalf of the Afghan government. Over 92% of $935 million that was stolen from the bank went to 19 individuals and companies associated with the bank. Afghanistan’s central bank, DAB, covered these losses, equivalent to 5–6% of Afghanistan’s GDP at that time.\textsuperscript{627} On March 5, 2013, the Special Tribunal of the Supreme Court on Kabul Bank issued its judgment of 21 individuals charged with fraud. The two leaders of the fraud, ex-chairman Sherkhan Farnood and ex-CEO Khalilullah Ferozi were given modest five-year prison sentences and required only partial restitution. The AGO appealed the verdict on March 16, 2013.\textsuperscript{628} The appellate court’s decision is still pending.\textsuperscript{629}

\section*{Limited Cash and Asset Recoveries}

During this reporting period, no new information was available on recoveries of money stolen from the Kabul Bank.\textsuperscript{630} The sole source of that information, DAB—Afghanistan’s central bank—recorded $6.13 million in cash recoveries from June 30–September 30, 2013, bringing total recoveries to $174.5 million. This includes $16 million in Kabul Bank transfers that were scheduled, but not made after Kabul Bank went into conservatorship, as well as a $1.49 million court-ordered deposit and a $0.45 million loan adjustment. Total recoveries so far represent less than 20% of the stolen funds.\textsuperscript{631}

State INL said the Afghanistan’s pursuit of high-level corruption became less likely in the lead up to the April election. The AGO canceled scheduled meetings this quarter.\textsuperscript{632} Similarly, DOJ observed little political will to recover greater sums of stolen funds from Kabul Bank. For example, the Gas Group, which is owned by ex-Kabul Bank CEO Khalilullah Ferozi and received more than $100 million in improper loans, entered an agreement with the government to repay those loans in $20,000 monthly increments. The Kabul Bank Receivership reported to DOJ this quarter that Gas Group stopped making payments months ago. Despite the Receivership’s requests for intervention, the AGO has taken no punitive actions.\textsuperscript{633}

\section*{New Kabul Bank}

The sale of New Kabul Bank (NKB) to private investors has been a long-standing objective of Afghanistan’s central bank and the international community.\textsuperscript{634} The accounting firm Grant Thornton LLP’s calendar-year 2012 financial audit of NKB expressed concern regarding the bank’s ability to continue business without successful privatization. NKB lost an average of $1.85 million per month in 2012.\textsuperscript{635} According to Afghan officials, current monthly operational losses total $700,000 including depreciation.\textsuperscript{636}

\textbf{New Kabul Bank (NKB):} a temporary “bridge bank” containing the good assets and deposits from Kabul Bank. Privatizing NKB, which provides salary payment and direct deposit services to hundreds of thousands of government employees, is an ECF benchmark.
According to the IMF and Treasury, NKB’s lack of a lending portfolio, restrictions on developing lending before being offered for sale, and the need to maintain a conservative asset-management strategy mean it will continue to suffer modest operating losses prior to sale.637 One revenue stream available to NKB is its distribution of government salaries—approximately 450,000 accounts for the Ministries of Interior, Defense, and Education. NKB receives approximately $550,000–$600,000 per month from the MOF for this service.638

Afghanistan’s Council of Ministers has yet to endorse the MOF’s December 29, 2013, decisions on two bids to take over NKB.639 According to State, the Council of Ministers is concerned the bid offers were too low and that the government salary payment service was too important for a private bank to handle. They asked for a report detailing the costs to the government of maintaining ownership of NKB.640 Afghanistan’s central bank must also evaluate whether the winner satisfies “fit-and-proper” criteria. This process has reportedly begun, according to Treasury.641

The IMF defines “a fit and proper bidder” as one who is subject to high standards of corporate governance, including risk management and internal controls; is in a sound financial and risk-management state; and controls adequate resources and has the necessary capital and capability to ensure ongoing salary-payment services.642 In contrast, Afghanistan’s draft Banking Law defines “a fit and proper bidder” as someone that has not been “convicted by an authorized court of an offense for which he was sentenced to imprisonment unless such sentence was motivated by his religious or political views or activities.” According to Treasury, the FATF raised this as possibly presenting a subjective loophole in the criteria.643

**U.S. Economic Support Strategy**

The economic transition strategy in Afghanistan as called for in the 2013 U.S. Civil-Military Strategic Framework seeks to mitigate the negative economic impact of the withdrawal of most international security forces in 2014 and the expected accompanying reduction in donor assistance. It also seeks to help Afghanistan develop its resources for sustainable growth.644 Most ESF support is used for USAID’s development programs. Figure 3.34 on the following page shows USAID assistance by sector.

This quarter, USAID announced three new development initiatives worth almost $300 million intended to help prevent Afghanistan’s economy from reversing hard-won gains post-2014. The programs will focus on three areas:645

1. The agricultural sector, including agribusiness development and getting crops to market ($125 million)
2. Fiscal sustainability, including improved tax and revenue collection, and opening up Afghanistan to greater international trade and investment ($77 million)

3. The education sector, including funding to 10 Afghan universities—in partnership with three American universities—to train a young workforce in the practical skills needed for jobs in the public and private sectors (approximately $100 million)

**USAID On-Budget Assistance to the Afghan Government**

SIGAR continues to be concerned about U.S. implementing agencies’ ability to ensure adequate oversight of the U.S.-funded reconstruction effort as international combat forces withdraw from Afghanistan in 2014. In line with donor commitments made at the 2012 Tokyo Conference and the follow-up 2013 Senior Officials Meeting, the United States has been gradually increasing the amount of on-budget development assistance it provides to the Afghan government.

Most U.S. government agencies include as on-budget assistance direct, government-to-government transfers and multilateral trust-fund contributions to the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), and the Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund (AITF). These funds, which are managed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank, and the ADB respectively, support the Afghan national budget. The Afghan government provides input, guidance and oversight, and some projects are run through the government, but the funds are not fully under the control of the Afghan government. See page 67 for details about all U.S. on-budget funding to Afghanistan.
This quarter, USAID obligated approximately $117 million and disbursed $24 million in on-budget assistance—including ARTF—from prior fiscal-year funds. Cumulatively, USAID obligated $3 billion and disbursed $2.14 billion in on-budget assistance, as of March 31, 2014, as shown in Figure 3.35.647

**Figure 3.35**

**USAID ON-BUDGET ASSISTANCE SUBOBLIGATED AND DISBURSED, FY 2002-FY 2013, AS OF MARCH 31, 2014 (\$ MILLIONS)**

![Graph showing USAID on-budget assistance subobligated and disbursed, FY 2002-FY 2013, as of March 31, 2014.](image)

**Notes:** Numbers have been rounded. Subobligation is funding for project-level agreements.

- a Most FY 2012 USAID funding for on-budget assistance had not been disbursed as of March 31, 2014.
- b Spending in 2013 was done from prior fiscal year funds. Subobligations and Disbursements for FY 2013 are not yet known.

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 4/7/2014.

**Development of Natural Resources**

The United States, the Afghan government, and the international donor community count on the development of Afghanistan’s natural resources to underpin future economic growth in the face of declining external aid. Although mining has contributed less than 2% to the country’s GDP to date, the Afghan government expects to eventually receive significant revenues from large-scale investments in the Aynak (copper) and Hajigak (iron-ore) mines, and from oil and gas fields in the Afghan-Tajik basin.648

DOD maintains that Afghanistan’s mineral resources could generate significant revenue and create large numbers of jobs.649 However, SIGAR has long cautioned that the Afghan government may not be able to earn
substantial revenues from Afghanistan’s natural resources any time soon because of the considerable infrastructure investment required to develop them, especially given the difficult security environment.

This quarter, the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO) repeated its warning that the global mining economy is limiting new investment, and many companies and financiers view Afghanistan as too risky.650

**TFBSO Transition**

TFBSO, which will cease its activities in Afghanistan by the end of 2014, will turn over all of its projects to an Afghan ministry, a private business, or another U.S. government agency.651 In anticipation, Congress required in the FY 2014 National Defense Authorization Act that DOD develop a plan for transitioning TFBSO programs to either State or USAID to be reviewed, revised, and signed by the Secretary of Defense every 180 days.652 While no TFBSO programs have yet been proposed for transfer to USAID or any other U.S. government agency, transition reports are being prepared for many of its larger, non-mining programs.653

**New Minerals Law**

Last quarter, the long-delayed draft of the new minerals law passed through the Natural Resources Committee of the lower house but it still awaits consideration by the full parliament. Parliament was on a 45-day recess mid-January to end of February 2014. Although President Karzai said he would implement the new minerals law by decree in January during the legislative break, he failed to do so.654

Parliamentarians continue to seek clarification on components of the law from Ministry of Mines and Petroleum (MOMP) officials. TFBSO’s advisory team to the MOMP has helped answers questions, mostly dealing with tenure of mining rights and royalty rates. It also held several information sessions for interested members of parliament on geological and investment best practices.655

**Impediments to Investment**

Proposed revisions to the minerals law are meant to better protect Afghan resources, encourage investors, and align regulations to international best practices. Passing a new law is an important TMAF benchmark to improve Afghanistan’s revenues and overall fiscal and external sustainability.656 TFBSO believes delayed passage is likely due to parliamentarians’ unwillingness to take political risks, explaining that a lack of understanding of geological and other tender structures like royalty rates causes some parliamentarians to think the law is exploitative and weighted toward foreigners at the expense of Afghanistan. A vote for any legislation that can be construed as opening up the country to outside investment can be dangerous and detrimental to their position in their districts.657

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“Working on behalf of the Department of Defense and with concurrence of the Department of State, TFBSO identifies and develops strategic economic opportunities in conflict and post-conflict environments that enable the expansion of the private sector, thus setting conditions for long-term economic growth that is critical to sustainable stability.” Cumulative Appropriations total $804 million, as of March 31, 2014.

DOD’s TFBSO previously warned that without legislative reform that includes linking investor exploration with extraction rights, and institutes a formal and fixed royalty rate, many companies will not bid on new tenders. It is unclear if the latest draft law includes that linkage. Submitting amendments to the law and to the Ministry of Justice in order to develop a transparent fiscal regime for natural resources is an outstanding IMF structural benchmark.

TFBSO believes that the new minerals law must be comparable to those in other countries in order to attract Western investment. The law’s delayed passage is causing investors to be more cautious, but is not the only impediment to investment in Afghanistan’s extractive industries. Private mining companies are obviously concerned about the country’s lack of security. There is also a lack of available capital in the mining industry. If more money was available, TFBSO said passing a new mining law would be less of an issue.

While the law remains unpassed, a number of contracts remain unsigned, including Hajigak (iron ore, awarded in November 2011); Shaida (copper, November 2012); Badakhshan (gold, November 2012); Balkhab (copper, November 2012); and Zarkashan (gold, December 2012).

Assistance to the Ministry of Mines and Petroleum, Afghanistan Petroleum Authority, and the Afghanistan Geological Survey

The United States continued to provide technical assistance this quarter to the MOMP, the ministry’s Afghanistan Petroleum Authority (APA), and the Afghan Geological Survey (AGS), largely through TFBSO, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), and USAID. These organizations are supporting mineral and hydrocarbon tenders as well as oil-and-gas data management.

The USGS is conducting ongoing on-the-job training at the AGS, including data compilation and data packages on mining areas of interest using mapping and illustrative software, geophysics, and hyperspectral imaging training. Older Russian reports and maps produced in the 1970s and 1980s provide AGS geologists with locations for potential mineral wealth. On March 10, 2014, the USGS and TFBSO released 60 sets of hyperspectral maps that reveal detailed imagery of Afghanistan’s topographic layout and mineral wealth. The MOMP can use these maps to attract future investment. TFBSO said Afghanistan is now one of the most geologically mapped countries in the world.

TFBSO and USAID provide subject-matter-expert support to the APA. This includes technical (oil and gas engineering), legal (contract implementation), and financial (accounting and analysis) to assist in the oversight of the Amu Darya Exploration and Production Sharing Contract.

TFBSO had obligated $8.6 million in FY 2014 for mining sector development, as of March 31, 2014. TFBSO’s authority is scheduled to expire at the end of 2014.
SIGAR AUDIT

A SIGAR audit announced this quarter will focus on the extent to which TFBSO and USAID programs met their goals to develop Afghanistan’s extractives industry and the challenges, if any, to creating a stable and lasting source of extractives revenue for Afghanistan. For more information, see Section 2, page 30.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

Mining Investment and Development for Afghan Sustainability

USAID’s only mining program—the Mining Investment and Development for Afghan Sustainability (MIDAS)—is an $86.6 million program with on- and off-budget components. The $41.6 million off-budget Phase I is focusing on legal and regulatory reform, technical assistance to the MOMP, small- and medium-size enterprise development, and assistance in geo-science field investigation. It will provide other support as needed. The $45 million on-budget Phase II has not yet begun, but is designed to strengthen the MOMP so it can procure, implement, and monitor completion of mining tender packages. As of March 31, 2014, USAID had obligated $16 million and disbursed approximately $5.05 million to begin off-budget implementation.667

This quarter, MIDAS held several workshops for MOMP officials, communities, civil society, and the private sector, on topics ranging from mining basics, mineral economics, business value chains, and legal and regulatory reform. Exploration plans were completed for three areas and donor coordination meetings were held to reduce project overlap. The MOMP and MOF made limited progress on a memorandum of understanding for on-budget activities, and developing terms and conditions to be included in an Implementation Letter with USAID.668

Capacity of the Ministry of Mines and Petroleum

One part of TFBSO’s strategy for promoting economic growth in Afghanistan is developing Afghanistan’s natural resources. In its transition report to Congress, TFBSO claimed that, as a result of its strategy to partner with Afghans at every stage of project planning and execution, “Afghans will have the capability to handle on-going project requirements.”669 TFBSO reported that incremental progress is being made, saying the MOMP has either taken or is close to taking the lead in tender evaluation and award, and contract negotiation and award. As issues arise in these areas, TFBSO provides assistance and oversight, but not formal training.670

TFBSO acknowledged weaknesses in the ministry, especially with monitoring, and oversight. It recommended that USAID focus its MIDAS program in these areas. TFBSO said the MOMP’s lack of capable employees leaves most of the work in the hands of a small group of knowledgeable and capable, yet overworked employees. It suggests putting in place a long-term hiring and capacity-building program.671

Mine Security

On February 17, 2014, President Karzai directed the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF)—responsible for mine security—to be disbanded. The functions performed by the APPF will remain within the scope of the Afghan National Police under the Ministry of Interior (MOI). It is unclear
who will actually provide security for not only extractives sector sites, but also U.S. and international development projects and associated personnel more broadly.672

Currently, the MOI and APPF recruit and train security personnel after a contract is signed with the MOMP. As of this reporting period, the MOMP has only contracted APPF services for Mes Aynak, the northern Amu Darya Basin, and the Sheberghan gas fields.673 It is unclear how these APPF changes may affect extractives-sector site security.

The United States has spent $51.3 million cumulatively on the APPF, which has 22,727 personnel, as of March 31, 2014. Some 1,557 APPF are assigned to protect mining sites and more than 1,400 of those were at Mes Aynak in 2013.674 Former MOMP Minister Sharani estimated approximately 5,200 APPF would be needed for 11 major extractives sites across Afghanistan. However, since there are currently no major active mining sites in Afghanistan, TFBSO said heavy security is not needed at this time.675 For more information about the APPF, see pages 87 and 96.

**Aynak Copper Mine**

The Afghan government awarded the contract for extraction rights at the Mes Aynak copper mine in Logar Province to Metallurgical Corporation of China (MCC) in 2008.676 The contract’s details have never been fully disclosed, but according to the MOMP’s published summary, MCC’s total investment is to be $2.9 billion. Afghanistan is to receive $808 million upon approval of a feasibility study, $565.6 million upon commencement of commercial production, and a 19.5% maximum royalty rate.677

However, development of the Mes Aynak copper mine remains delayed by the discovery of cultural relics in the area and associated archeological work, difficulties in land acquisition, lack of primary infrastructure, and security concerns.678 TFBSO suspects other contributing factors include unwieldy contract terms, continuing volatility in the minerals market, and China’s penchant for arranging mineral projects, then “shelving” them for the future use.679 Media reports suggest that MCC intends to renegotiate the contract.680 Afghanistan’s FY 1393 national budget does not anticipate any revenue from Aynak, as opposed to the FY 1392 budget, which anticipated $50 million in revenues that never arrived.681

**Hajigak Iron-Ore Mine**

There is no reported change in contract negotiations for the Hajigak iron-ore concessions this quarter.682 The MOMP awarded three blocks to Afghan Iron and Steel Consortium (AFISCO), a seven-member consortium led by state-owned Steel Authority of India Ltd. in November 2011, and one block to Canadian Kilo Iron Ore, a subsidiary of Kilo Goldmines.683 New reports indicate that AFISCO is considering cutting its initial investment from $11 billion to $1.5 billion.684
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

Hydrocarbons
Afghanistan’s efforts to develop its oil and gas reserves focus on the Amu Darya Basin and Afghan-Tajik Basin, both in northern Afghanistan. Even with two operational refineries, Afghanistan lacks adequate refining capacity, and remains heavily import-dependent for fuels. The country imports 10,000 tons of oil products a day from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Russia, Pakistan, and Iran.

Amu Darya Basin
The three blocks of the Amu Darya Basin awarded to the China National Petroleum Corporation Watan Energy Afghanistan (CNPCI-W) in 2011 are estimated to contain 87 million barrels of crude oil. Production is currently stalled, but one of the three blocks has infrastructure in place to begin production of 5,000 barrels per day. CNPCI-W is in final negotiations with an undisclosed international company for a multi-year sale of 230,000 tons minimum per annum of its crude oil. The Afghan government has so far received less than $2 million in royalties from this award. Once full production starts, the government expects about $60,000 per day.

At the same time, the government is working on Cross Border Transit Agreements (CBTA) with neighboring countries. Negotiations with Uzbekistan continue that would allow Afghan oil to be transported there and be refined before coming back to Afghanistan to be sold. State reported an agreement was sent to Uzbekistan in February 2014, but will likely not be signed because of Uzbek concerns that the oil will be sold domestically instead of being re-exported to Afghanistan.

TFBSO explained these hydrocarbon CBTAs serve as import/export agreements that govern customs, import, and export fee rates when refined products made from Afghan crude are exported and reimported into Afghanistan. Their effect on revenue generation for the extractives sector itself is minimal and does not necessarily make Afghanistan more attractive for international oil companies. The undisclosed company with which CNPCI-W is negotiating its crude oil sale has not asked for a CBTA so TFBSO no longer considers CBTAs a priority.

On January 7, 2014, the MOMP officially opened a new tender for exploration, development, and production in the Totimaidan block, comprising 7,131 square kilometers in the Amu Darya Basin. The contract area contains 28 billion cubic meters of reserves in two known gas fields and more than 50 proven and prospective subsurface structures. Expressions of interest are due February 8, 2014. TFBSO followed up on its tender preparation assistance to the MOMP, providing technical, legal, commercial, and transparency advisory services, as it did with the Afghan-Tajik tender. A bidder conference was held on March 20, 2014, which all five prequalified bidders attended. Bids are due May 31, 2014.
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

AGRICULTURE

Agriculture continues to be the main source of employment and subsistence for the Afghan population. Only 12% of the land is arable and less than 6% is cultivated, yet the sector accounts for 31% of GDP and, according to the latest World Bank report, provides employment to about 50% of the labor force. Given its importance, agriculture could be a catalyst for GDP growth, improved food security, and more stable employment opportunities.

Between FY 2002 and FY 2012, USAID has provided approximately $2.46 billion for agricultural and alternative development funding to improve production, increase access to markets, and provide alternatives to poppy cultivation. Of that, USAID has obligated $54 million and disbursed $29 million in direct assistance to build capacity at the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (MAIL).

USAID is currently providing on- and off-budget assistance to the agriculture sector through several programs. USAID's three highest-priority programs, worth more than $350 million total, are:

- Agricultural Development Fund (ADF) and Agricultural Credit Enhancement (ACE)
- Incentives Driving Economic Alternatives-North, East, and West (IDEA-NEW)
- Commercial Horticulture and Agricultural Marketing Program (CHAMP)

Agricultural Credit Enhancement and Agricultural Development Fund

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>End Date</th>
<th>Total Estimated Cost ($)</th>
<th>Cumulative Disbursement, as of 3/31/2014</th>
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<td>Agriculture Development Fund</td>
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<td>$74,407,662</td>
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Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 4/7/2014.

On March 28, 2014, a suicide car bomber and four armed gunmen attacked Roots of Peace—an international humanitarian, nonpolitical organization—at its Kabul facility, killing a 16-year-old girl and a driver, along with the five attackers. Two APPF guards and one expatriate were injured. Roots of Peace is currently implementing two USAID agricultural efforts: the Commercial Horticulture and Agriculture Marketing Program (CHAMP) and the Afghan Agricultural Research and Extension Development (AGRED) program.

A SIGAR audit issued this quarter sought to determine the extent to which USAID met key objectives of the 2010 U.S. Inter-Agency Water Strategy for Afghanistan and the extent to which four USAID water projects implemented since 2010 are meeting their project goals and objectives. It found that a new water sector strategy for Afghanistan is needed with goals and objectives that reflect USAID’s water priorities; a performance measurement plan to evaluate the strategy; and clear lines of responsibility and accountability for those implementing it. For more information, see Section 2, page 28.
crucial to ADF operations, which has reached 68% due to returning clients. ADF has provided loans to 22,386 farmer households in 32 provinces.701

Incentives Driving Economic Alternatives-North, East, and West

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>End Date</th>
<th>Total Estimated Cost ($)</th>
<th>Cumulative Disbursement, as of 3/31/2014</th>
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<tr>
<td>and West</td>
<td></td>
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Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 4/7/2014.

Incentives Driving Economic Alternatives-North, East, and West (IDEA-NEW) is a cooperative-agreement project that provides agricultural assistance and economic alternatives to growing poppies in select provinces in eastern Afghanistan and in poppy regions in the northern and western parts of the country. This quarter, it was extended to a sixth year. IDEA-NEW is supposed to help farmers shift from growing poppies to legal agricultural production by increasing commercial opportunities, extending access to financial services, and promoting value-chain development for key regional industries and trade corridors. It also facilitates connections between producers, traders, and buyers through market-information activities and sales promotion.702

USAID reported that 14,027 hectares are under alternative crop cultivation due to IDEA-NEW, compared to 209,000 hectares of opium under cultivation in 2013.703 While USAID said thousands of people have benefited from agricultural productivity and business skills training, as well as program-supported agricultural inputs, it also acknowledged low crop production, limited food processing opportunities, and shifting security conditions as challenges in the Afghan agriculture sector that impede on the progress of IDEA-NEW.704

Commercial Horticulture and Agricultural Marketing Program

<table>
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<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
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Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 4/7/2014.

The Commercial Horticulture and Agricultural Marketing Program (CHAMP) aims to help farmers plant and operate more profitable orchards and vineyards by enhancing crop quality and promoting export and trade corridors. The program also works with traders to improve harvesting, packing, cool storage, and shipping methods.705
As CHAMP approaches the 2014 transition, USAID said it will shift focus to post-harvest commercialization of high-value crops. The program seeks to increase exports through marketing and to promote import substitution. However, USAID said insecurity continues to challenge full implementation of CHAMP. Insurgent groups threaten both CHAMP staff and farmers, particularly in Kandahar, Helmand, Zabul, Wardak, Logar, and Ghazni provinces.706

**Afghan Agriculture Research and Extension Development Program**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>End Date</th>
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<td>Development (AGRED)</td>
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</table>

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 4/7/2014.

Afghan Agriculture Research and Extension Development (AGRED) is an on-budget program (with an off-budget mechanism) in partnership with MAIL designed to increase agricultural production and benefit rural livelihoods through the use of improved agricultural technologies. AGRED is rehabilitating research and extension centers for MAIL and the Directorate of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (DAIL) and across seven provinces and 50 districts. AGRED also provides training to MAIL and DAIL personnel so that they can, in turn, provide technology and advisory services to Afghan farmers and herders.707

**Kandahar Food Zone**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
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<th>End Date</th>
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<th>Cumulative Disbursement, as of 3/31/2014</th>
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<td>7/30/2015</td>
<td>$19,695,804</td>
<td>$2,428,000</td>
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</table>

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 4/7/2014.

The Kandahar Food Zone (KFZ) program is designed to identify and address the drivers of poppy cultivation in seven targeted districts.708 It has two major components: capacity building at the Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN) and alternative livelihood projects. The capacity-building component seeks to build up the MCN’s ability to create, implement, and manage alternative livelihood projects. The alternative livelihood component aims to improve community infrastructure and increase legal economic opportunities.709 KFZ has completed its performance management plan, program design, staff training and orientation, district maps, and community outreach. As of December 31, 2013, KFZ had begun two community-level projects.710 The KFZ program objective is to engage with
communities to identify the social, political, and economic drivers of poppy cultivation, and then tailor appropriate projects to them.  

USAID reported that the KFZ office in Kandahar is closed because the APPF has not fulfilled its contractual obligations to provide uniforms and weapons to APPF guards. KFZ Kandahar staff are currently working out of their homes until that situation is resolved. Despite this impediment, USAID is pleased with KFZ collaboration across ministerial and provincial entities, and told SIGAR that the project identification process has been smooth.

**ESSENTIAL SERVICES/DEVELOPMENT**

Since 2002, the United States has provided reconstruction funds to increase electricity, build roads and bridges, and improve health and education. This section addresses key developments in U.S. efforts to improve the government’s ability to deliver essential services such as electricity, transportation, health, and education.

**Energy**

The latest World Bank report noted that Afghanistan has one of the lowest rates of electricity in the world, with only 28% of its population connected to the power grid. Of those who are connected, an estimated 77% live in urban areas.

Because electricity is critical to Afghanistan’s development, the United States, in collaboration with the Afghan government and the international community, has made developing an integrated energy sector one of its top reconstruction priorities since 2002. From FY 2002 to FY 2012, the United States spent more than $2 billion on Afghanistan’s power sector.

On March 27, 2014, the World Bank approved $526.5 million in transmission infrastructure grant and credit financing for the Central Asia-South Asia (CASA-1000) electricity transmission project. The Islamic Development Bank and USAID will also provide funding. Late last quarter, the United States committed $15 million. CASA-1000 will allow Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to sell their excess summer generation electricity to Afghanistan and Pakistan. As a consumer, Afghanistan would add 300 MW to its energy supply. As a transit country, it would generate revenue as electricity passed through its territory to Pakistan. The total estimated cost for CASA-1000 is $1.17 billion.

CASA-1000’s proposed transmission line routes and infrastructure, encompassing more than 746 miles, can be found in Figure 3.36.

In 2002–2011, USAID alone provided close to $2 billion from the ESF to build generators, substations, and transmission lines, and provide technical assistance to the sector. It plans to spend at least $500 million more over the next few years. In addition, DOD has provided approximately $292 million for electricity projects through the Commander’s Emergency Response
Program (CERP) and roughly $700 million through the Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (AIF), which is jointly managed by DOD and State. Afghanistan currently has nine separate power systems. The primary two are the Northeast Power System (NEPS) and the Southeast Power System (SEPS), as shown in Figure 3.37 on the following page. USAID has three projects to connect and increase the electricity supply in both systems—Sheberghan; the Kandahar-Helmand Power Project, which includes Kajaki Dam hydropower; and the Power Transmission Expansion and Connectivity Program. DOD is contributing to both NEPS and SEPS through AIF projects. The Afghan government, coordinating closely with USAID and DOD, prioritized these programs to increase the availability of affordable, grid-based power. Connecting the power grids is intended to promote the best use of lowest-cost generation, reduce the need for duplicative generating reserves, and improve system reliability.

Sheberghan Program

Afghanistan currently imports more than 70% of its energy, according to USAID. Together with the ADB, USAID is supporting the Sheberghan project to help Afghanistan identify and manage gas resources to be used for power generation. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation, which was slated to participate, likely will not, according to USAID. Gas reserves in northern Afghanistan are estimated to be capable of generating up to 10,000 MW per year for 25 years, according to USAID. A study to confirm that will be completed later this year.

USAID is implementing its part of the Sheberghan Program through two mechanisms: the $90 million, on-budget Sheberghan Gas Development Project (SGDP), and the $35 million, off-budget Sheberghan Gas Generation Activity (SGGA). USAID will pay $30 million on-budget through SGDP for the rehabilitation of two wells and the drilling of one well in the Juma and Bashikurd field in the Amu Darya Basin. An additional $7 million will come from Afghanistan’s national budget. The National Petroleum Company of Turkey signed a contract with the MOMP on December 14, 2013, to perform the work. If the wells have sufficient capacity to run a 200 MW gas-fired power plant, USAID will fund a gas gathering system and gas processing plant to fuel it with its remaining $60 million, on-budget through SGDP. No disbursements have yet been made.

The off-budget SGGA component is being implemented under a contract task order with Advanced Engineering Associates International to provide technical assistance to the MOMP to drill three gas wells and to help the MOMP tender the Engineering/Procurement/Construction contract for the gas-gathering system and gas-processing plant. As of March 31, 2014, approximately $23 million has been obligated, of which more than $13 million was disbursed.

OVERVIEW OF THE NORTHEAST POWER SYSTEM

Note: Locations and routes are representational. Source: DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 4/3/2014.

OVERVIEW OF THE SOUTHEAST POWER SYSTEM

Note: Locations and routes are representational. Source: DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 4/3/2014.
Kandahar-Helmand Power Project

The Kandahar-Helmand Power Project (KHPP) is intended to increase power supply and reliability in Kandahar and Helmand provinces. It was designed to support interim diesel power for critical needs, increase long-term sustainable hydropower, and reduce losses while strengthening the SEPS transmission and distribution system. USAID reported that the majority of KHPP components are closed or closing.

On October 29, 2010, USAID signed a $266 million contract with Black & Veatch to rehabilitate and build power substations, upgrade the medium-voltage distribution system in Kandahar City, install, test, and commission a third turbine at the Kajaki Dam, and design and install new diesel-powered generators for interim power supply until lower cost, more sustainable power becomes available from the Kajaki Dam and/or the NEPS-SEPS connector. The turbine parts, transported to the power station by a U.S.-British military mission that had to fight its way to the dam site in 2008, have remained unassembled in containers and under tarps ever since.

On April 22, 2013, USAID signed a bilateral, on-budget implementation letter with the Afghan government, and sub-obligated $75 million for installing, testing, and commissioning the third turbine at the Kajaki hydropower station, which had not yet occurred as required under the Black & Veatch KHPP contract. The turbine installation requirement contained within the Black & Veatch KHPP contract has been descoped.

Afghanistan's national utility, Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (DABS), has assumed responsibility for carrying out the terms and conditions of the implementation letter. On December 9, 2013, DABS signed a $6 million contract with Dubai-based GFA Consulting for the up-front engineering, procurement, and tendering services pertaining to the installation of Kajaki's third turbine, in addition to security and site support services. USAID negotiated a sole-source contract extension of KHPP with Black & Veatch for technical support services—ending in 2015—to DABS and USAID in support of the third turbine installation. Black & Veatch would provide project documentation and Kajaki hydropower plant design support. USAID based its decision on Black & Veatch's experience with the Kajaki hydropower plant.

DOD is using the AIF to fund fuel for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers-installed generators in Kandahar City through 2014. DABS is providing fuel for other existing generators in the area. The U.S. fuel subsidy may be extended, but USAID expects it to decrease as DABS takes the required steps to secure revenue needed to sustain the fuel costs. One step is contracting to install Kajaki's third turbine, which, when operational, should generate additional power and revenues.

Improving revenue collection, however, will be challenging. This quarter, USAID reported that it does not know about DABS' financial status, its ability to pay its bills without government subsidies or donor assistance after USAID's last visit to Kajaki Dam was in the fall of 2013. USAID and U.S. Embassy Chief of Mission (COM) personnel are currently not able to visit Kajaki due to Mission policy that requires U.S. military, NATO, or Embassy Protective Detail forces be in sufficient proximity during any COM travel around Afghanistan. With the withdrawal of U.S. Marines from Kajaki in 2013, these requirements cannot be met.

In an October 2013 letter to Secretary of State Kerry, Secretary of Defense Hagel, and USAID Administrator Shah, SIGAR expressed concern about the impact of the Coalition troop drawdown on security and the related implications for ensuring adequate oversight of U.S. reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan.

Sources: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 3/31/2014; USAID, response to SIGAR vetting, 4/12/2014; SIGAR, 14-4-SP Oversight Access Inquiry Letter to Department of Defense, Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development.
2014, or its plans to generate sufficient revenues. Additionally, USAID’s assistant to the administrator in the Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs stated in Congressional testimony that he cannot confirm that the revenues DABS generates covers its costs for providing fuel. This contrasts with USAID’s April 3, 2014, statement for the (congressional) record, which touted USAID’s assistance as helping put DABS on the path of self-sustainability.

Additionally, a SIGAR audit found that despite USAID investments that resulted in some commercialization successes for DABS-Kabul, including increasing cash collections by 60%, the Afghan utility is still operating at a financial loss. Also, DABS may not be able to pay its bills without continued government subsidies that are set to expire in 2014. As of March 1, 2014, USAID had obligated $228 million for the KHPP, and of that, approximately $217 million had been disbursed, an increase of $17.9 million from last quarter.

**Power Transmission Expansion and Connectivity Program**

The U.S.-funded Power Transmission Expansion and Connectivity (PTEC) program was designed to strengthen and expand the power-generation, transmission, and distribution systems. This program directly supports the National Energy Supply Program of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy, which calls for improving the collection rate against energy billings and increasing the supply of power. The $814 million PTEC programs includes $357.4 million for on-budget support to DABS—which is responsible for DABS PTEC contracts—and $37 million for off-budget support to the Ministry of Energy and Water, and educational institutions.

In addition to strengthening and expanding NEPS, a key component of PTEC is funding 304 miles of the 329 mile transmission line between Kabul and Kandahar to connect NEPS with SEPS. Connecting NEPS to SEPS is a multi-donor effort. The NEPS-SEPS connector will include eight substations located at major population centers along the way. This connection, together with the rehabilitation of the Kajaki Hydropower Plant, was identified in 2010 as the only viable, long-term solution to displace costly and unsustainable diesel-power generation in Kandahar.

As of March 31, 2014, USAID has obligated $180.3 million to AITF and disbursed $105 million of which $45 million was disbursed concurrently with the signing of the Program Contribution Agreement in March 2013 while $60 million was disbursed in December 2013 pursuant to an ADB request.

The ADB is responsible for the first 25-mile section from Kabul to Arghandi. USAID will fund construction of the next 75-mile section from Arghandi to Ghazni, which includes $101 million of DOD’s AIF that was transferred to USAID. USAID has also obligated $263.3 million in on-budget assistance to the MOF and DABS for PTEC and formalized the bilateral agreement for this segment in February 2013. This on-budget assistance
culminated in a $56.7 million contract award to construct the Arghandi to Ghazni transmission line. A public awareness campaign was also launched to help prevent attacks against the transmission line.746

Other DABS contracts signed this quarter using USAID’s on-budget assistance include:

- Two Corporate Management Support projects to help DABS manage contracts and improve its financial and corporate management—$17.9 million and $18.8 million749
- Construction of substations at Sayadabad (Wardak Province) and Ghazni—$48.1 million750
- Procurement and Billing Implementation Program “mPower,” billing, collections, revenue, connection, service, meter data, maintenance, and workforce management—$10 million751

USAID also plans to contribute $417.6 million from its $814 million PTEC project to ADB’s AITF with a portion used to construct the remaining 230 mile section of transmission line from Ghazni to Kandahar connecting NEPS with SEPS. Completion of the NEPS-SEPS connector will be delayed by two years to 2017/2018. Of USAID's contribution to AITF, approximately $290 million will be used to construct the remaining transmission line from Ghazni to Kandahar to complete the NEPS to SEPS connection.752

The ADB established the AITF in December 2010, to allow bilateral, multilateral, and individual contributors to partner with the ADB in financing infrastructure investments. AITF will fund projects on-budget through DABS or other Afghan government ministries. Current contributors to AITF also include the UK’s Department for International Development and the Japanese Embassy.753

DOD-Funded Programs

DOD has viewed establishment of reliable and sustainable power generation, transmission, and distribution as the linchpins to security, stability, and economic growth in Afghanistan. This quarter, DOD continued implementing several priority energy-sector projects using FY 2012 and FY 2013 AIF money. These included:754

- Kandahar Power Bridging Solution
- Kandahar–Durai Junction transmission lines
- Charikar–Bazirak and Charikar–Mahmood Raqi transmission lines and power substations
- Kajaki Dam to Musa Qalah transmission lines

Kandahar Power Bridging Solution

This project is providing fuel for the diesel generators in Kandahar City until affordable, sustainable power becomes available through the joint DOD-USAID effort to expand and connect NEPS and SEPS systems.755
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

The generators at Shorandam Industrial Park and Bagh-e-Pol have a combined average output of 8–13 MW. Funding levels have not changed from last quarter. FY 2012 funding remains at $79.8 million for fuel and operations and maintenance (O&M). The FY 2013 cost is $100 million, which includes $90 million for fuel and $10 million for O&M. DOD’s fuel contract is scheduled to taper off in the coming months and end on December 31, 2014. If DABS cannot secure funding for alternative power supplies, it may disconnect residential users until the third turbine at Kajaki Dam is installed.

Congress cut the President’s FY 2014 budget request of $279 million for AIF to complete DOD’s portion of the NEPS and SEPS to $199 million. Congress also set the following restrictions:

- No more than 50% of AIF funds can be used until 15 days after the Secretary of Defense certifies to Congress that the United States signed a Bilateral Security Agreement with Afghanistan that is in the national security interest of the United States.
- AIF funds in the FY 2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act cannot be used to plan, develop, or construct any project for which construction did not start before the legislation’s enactment (January 17, 2014).

DOD proposed to spend $100 million for the diesel power generators and to integrate prior DOD and USAID power projects. DOD will reevaluate this plan based on the final FY 2014 appropriation. This will improve overall power management in Kandahar by consolidating Kandahar’s “power islands” into an integrated grid. DOD plans to continue purchasing fuel and providing O&M support into FY 2015, but intended to transfer the generators to DABS in December 2013, along with six months of spare parts. DOD said it will provide technical support for one year following the transition. It sees this electricity as critical to the counterinsurgency strategy to help stabilize Kandahar by supporting economic development and improving citizens’ quality of life. DOD said the Kandahar Bridging Solution is central to the Afghanistan Electrification Plan and the State Department’s development plan for Afghanistan.

**Kandahar to Durai Junction Transmission Lines**

Part of the effort to expand SEPS, this project continues earlier efforts to install or repair transmission lines from Kandahar City to Durai Junction and to construct or repair substations at Maiwand and Pashmul. The cost for this project, awarded in 2012, remains $40 million in FY 2012 funds. This transmission line constitutes a key element for the larger PTEC project linking SEPS and NEPS and addresses the need for reliable electricity in Afghanistan’s south and southeast. DOD’s goal is to promote economic growth, security, stability, and capacity-building efforts within DABS to help it generate sufficient revenues to fund capital improvements to the grid.
Completion of this project is essential to distribute power generated by the third turbine awaiting installation at Kajaki Dam, according to DOD.\footnote{764}

**Charikar–Bazirak and Charikar–Mahmood Raqi Transmission Lines and Power Substations**

This project will install 52 miles of transmission lines from Charikar to Bazirak and from Charikar to Mahmood Raqi. It will also build three power substations to expand NEPS. DOD has allocated $38 million in FY 2012 funds and $33 million in FY 2013 funds for the project, for a total estimated cost of $71 million, according to a DOD notification to Congress last quarter. Annual estimated O&M costs for the transmission lines and substations are $580,000.\footnote{765}

DOD told Congress the project will bring reliable electricity to 1.15 million Afghans across three provinces and help fuel private-sector growth, especially in the agriculture, processing, manufacturing, and mining sectors. Consistent with all AIF-funded projects, and by formal agreement, this project will be transferred to the Afghan government upon completion. DABS will assume responsibility for O&M. Increased revenue from an expanded customer base and improved collection capabilities will help DABS provide long-term sustainment, according to DOD.\footnote{766} However, SIGAR has raised questions about DABS’ capacity, and other audits have said Afghanistan lacks the resources necessary to pay for O&M.\footnote{767}

**Kajaki Dam to Musa Qalah Transmission Lines**

This project is building new transmission lines from the Kajaki Dam hydropower plant to Musa Qalah in Helmand Province. The $12 million in FY 2013 funds allocated for Phase I of the project will construct approximately nine miles of new 110kV transmission line from Kajaki to a new substation that will join with the existing 20kV transmission line. Phase II plans to use $49 million in FY 2014 funds to build 23 miles of 110kV transmission line from the substation to Musa Qalah, build a new 110kV substation, and rehabilitate the existing 20kV substation at Musa Qalah. The project aims to benefit the approximately 60,000 residents of Musa Qalah, according to DOD.\footnote{768}

Other components of the project are designed to help integrate SEPS projects into a single, interconnected system. Consistent with all AIF-funded projects, and by formal agreement, this project will be transferred to the Afghan government upon completion. DABS will assume responsibility for O&M. Increased revenue from an expanded customer base and improved collection capabilities will help DABS provide long-term sustainment, according to DOD.\footnote{769} As noted above, SIGAR audits have raised concerns about DABS’ capacity and resources to undertake O&M.
PRIVATE-SECTOR DEVELOPMENT

The United States is supporting private-sector development through the ESF, TFBSO, and CERP. From FY 2002 to FY 2012, USAID appropriated $1.06 billion for economic growth in Afghanistan. USAID’s top ongoing economic-growth project, funded through the ESF, is Assistance in Building Afghanistan by Developing Enterprises (ABADE).

Assistance in Building Afghanistan by Developing Enterprises

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>End Date</th>
<th>Total Estimated Cost ($)</th>
<th>Cumulative Disbursement, as of 3/31/2014</th>
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<td>Assistance in Building Afghanistan by Developing Enterprises</td>
<td>10/16/2012</td>
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<td>$104,997,656</td>
<td>$16,839,439</td>
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Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 4/7/2014.

USAID’s $105 million Assistance in Building Afghanistan by Developing Enterprises (ABADE) program focuses on helping productive, Afghan-registered, small-to-medium enterprises add jobs, increase investment, and improve sales of domestic products and services through public-private alliances. It does so through three components: implementing public-private alliances once they are approved; identifying, selecting, and supporting the alliances; and working with the Afghan government to improve the environment for business.

Since ABADE’s launch in February 2013, USAID reported that 30 public-private alliances were finalized—compared to five reported seven months ago—and 10 applications are awaiting approval, as of March 31, 2014. Another 81 applications are in development and internal review. Additionally, business-outreach and government capacity efforts continued this quarter.

ABADE implementation continues to face restrictions from Presidential Decree 62, which requires the use of APPF and Risk Management Companies for security. The APPF has been unable to provide adequate mobile escort units or vehicles, making it difficult for ABADE staff to travel across the region, according to USAID. Since the Ministry of Interior announced the disbandment of the APPF this quarter, it is unclear who will provide security to international development projects and staff. For more information about the APPF, see pages 87 and 96.
TRANSPORTATION

Afghanistan’s lack of transportation infrastructure hinders internal commerce, foreign trade, and economic growth. The World Bank said restoring the transportation sector is imperative for economic development.775 Afghanistan’s infrastructure shortcomings particularly constrain the service and agriculture sectors, which currently contribute most to GDP. They also hold back the mining industry, whose future revenues the Afghan government and international donor community are counting on to offset declining aid.776 This quarter, the United States continued its efforts to assist Afghanistan in developing ministry capacity, sustaining operations and maintenance, and complying with international standards.777

Roads

While the United States has provided $2 billion cumulatively for road construction and O&M and currently spends about $5 million annually for O&M efforts, Afghanistan does not currently have sufficient funding and technical capacity to maintain its roads and highways, according to the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT).778 Moreover, the lack of a functioning Roads Authority has significantly affected road infrastructure across Afghanistan.779 Although the Cabinet and the President gave approval in August 2013 for the Ministry of Public Works (MOPW) to create a Road Authority and Road Fund, the authority has not yet been established.780DOT said the primary challenge for establishing a Road Authority is political—comprising an outdated transportation law, overlapping, unclear, and undefined institutional authorities, including roles and responsibilities of various ministries and local municipalities. Compounding these challenges are the uncertainties surrounding the April 2014 election, the resulting new government, funding, and coordination among donor countries.781DOT led an international donor coordination initiative to pursue an Afghan-led strategy and system approach to the construction, operation, and maintenance of Afghanistan’s roadways. This initiative was recently transferred to the MOPW to continue coordination among various donors.782 However, DOT said that Afghanistan’s road network will significantly degrade if the challenges outlined above are not properly mitigated soon.783

Road Sector Sustainability

USAID approved its Road Sector Sustainability (RSS) project design on July 14, 2013. The project has four main activities:784

- Activity 1—Emergency O&M ($5 million). A request for proposal was issued February 18, 2014, proposals were due March 18, and contracts are expected to be awarded in April.
- Activity 2—Technical Assistance to the MOPW for the creation of a Road Authority and Road Fund ($25 million phase I; $10 million phase II).

The U.S. Department of Transportation’s (DOT) primary function in Afghanistan is to provide strategic technical advice to Afghan transport ministries, U.S. government agencies, the U.S. military, and non-governmental organizations, as well as other international civil and military organizations in order to build sustainable Afghan-centric transportation systems. DOT receives funding from the State Department.

Phase I proposals were received January 29, 2014, technical and cost reviews are ongoing, and a contract is expected to be awarded in April.

- Activity 3-Capacity Building for the MOPW ($38 million). The Statement of Work is being developed based on a needs assessment that is underway. A contract is expected to be awarded by September 2014.
- Activity 4-Road O&M Activity. ($33 million) USAID funding—proposed for September 2014—will go through the AITF once an operations and maintenance incentive window is developed by the ADB.

Rail
Currently, Afghanistan has no meaningful railroad development, operational experience, or capacity. Only one completed rail line exists—a 47-mile line from Hairatan, on the border with Uzbekistan, to Mazar-e-Sharif.\textsuperscript{785} The country needs to expand the 47-mile line if it is to further the U.S. government’s “New Silk Road” vision of regional and economic connectivity. Development of an interlinking 249-mile line between Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan was inaugurated in June 2013.\textsuperscript{786}

EDUCATION
According to the most recent data available from the Ministry of Education’s (MOE) Education Management Information System (EMIS), Afghanistan had a total of 14,740 primary, lower-secondary, and upper-secondary schools in FY 1391 (March 21, 2012–December 20, 2012). The same data showed approximately 4.2 million students enrolled in primary, government lower-secondary, and government upper-secondary schools in FY 1391. There are 4.2 million enrolled students, 3.27 million categorized as present, and 931,347 students considered absent, according to EMIS records.\textsuperscript{787}

According to USAID, the total number of students attending school is derived by adding enrolled and present figures, which totals 7.48 million students in FY 1391. The MOE includes absent students in the enrollment total because they are considered to have only temporarily dropped out and have the potential to return to school. Absent students are kept in this category for three years before they are taken off the enrollment records. With absent students included, the MOE considers the total number of students in Afghanistan to be 8.4 million.\textsuperscript{788}

USAID has previously said it was concerned about the reliability of the MOE/EMIS, which is the only database tracking education metrics at the MOE. USAID relies primarily on EMIS for its information, but told SIGAR the data cannot be verified. With more USAID assistance now going on-budget, USAID is working to support the MOE to improve the reliability of EMIS data. USAID said it also uses internal reports from its officers, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), other donors, and implementing partners to help verify and check information.\textsuperscript{789}
Similarly, despite USAID efforts to strengthen the education-management capacities of the MOE, it said the ministry does not have an established system to track the number of school monitoring visits made by district education department officials, and when schools are visited, it is not reported to the MOE at the central level. Therefore, the number of schools visited, the percentage of students served by those schools, and percentage of teachers observed is unknown. Because of this, neither USAID nor the MOE have established targets against these indicators. Security issues are a factor, according to MOE officials, especially in the south and southeast.\textsuperscript{790} SIGAR remains concerned that U.S. government agencies and international donors are unable to verify Afghanistan’s oft-cited gains in education.

Since 2002, USAID has supported education through aid for building and refurbishing schools, developing curricula, and conducting teacher training. USAID’s ongoing priority programs in the education sector funded through the ESF this quarter include:

\begin{itemize}
  \item Basic Education, Literacy and Technical-Vocational Education and Training (BELT)
  \item American University of Afghanistan (AUAF)
\end{itemize}

### Basic Education, Literacy, and Technical-Vocational Education and Training

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<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>End Date</th>
<th>Total Estimated Cost ($)</th>
<th>Cumulative Disbursement, as of 3/31/2014</th>
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<td>Teacher Training</td>
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<td>11/6/2014</td>
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<td>10/29/2013</td>
<td>10/28/2017</td>
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Sources: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 4/7/2014; USAID, response to SIGAR vetting 4/14/2014.

Basic Education, Literacy, and Technical-Vocational Education and Training (BELT)—Community-Base Education aims to improve access to quality basic education in communities typically beyond the reach of the government. The program currently funds MOE textbooks for grades 1-6, provides teacher training, and community-based education programs.\textsuperscript{791} Two other components under design are: capacity-building for the MOE and Technical Vocational Education and Training (TVET) to meet unmet labor-market needs.\textsuperscript{792}

BELT Community-Based Education (CBE) provides accelerated and remedial education, allowing students to attend schools in remote locations outside the reach of MOE schools.\textsuperscript{793} A BELT CBE implementation letter signed with the MOE and MOF spells out substantive matters such as
This quarter, USAID reported that it recently awarded a contract to complete the remaining work and correct the deficiencies at Balkh University. Construction activities were expected to begin on April 10, 2014, for 180 calendar days and end on October 10, 2014. USAID informed the Ministry of Higher Education to have students and faculty vacate the facilities during the construction period.795

student targets, performance milestones, means of verification, and funding levels.796 However, USAID reported delays in the creation of an adequate work plan and implementation schedule for the CBE milestone by MOE.797

Other ongoing challenges are MOE’s capacity to design, procure, and implement on-budget activities in a timely fashion; and the MOF’s improper deduction of taxes on U.S. government assistance, which significantly delayed USAID payments for on-budget activities. USAID has since worked with the MOE and MOF to establish procedures for granting tax-exempt status for on-budget activities and returning withheld taxes to the MOE’s special account for BELT activities.798

The implementation letter USAID signed with the MOE in 2011 to print approximately 50 million textbooks through the BELT program obligates the MOE to make efforts to ensure that “approved texts address the needs of women and girls.” However, a USAID-funded gender assessment found that boys and men are mentioned more than twice as often as girls and women, and pictured almost three times as often. The report data indicates clear discrepancies in mentioning, naming, and picturing women and men, as well as in the contexts the pictures appear. It concludes that gender-equity efforts in textbooks have done little to promote girls’ and women’s active participation in society.799

Higher Education Project

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>End Date</th>
<th>Total Estimated Cost ($)</th>
<th>Cumulative Disbursement, as of 3/31/2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 4/7/2014.

Since the Higher Education Project (HEP) project began in 2006, it has supported the Ministry of Higher Education in executing its National Higher Education Strategic Plan. HEP’s latest phase, extended to February 28, 2014, provides technical assistance to increase ministry capacity through professional training, quality assurance and accreditation, curriculum review, university partnerships, academic policies, and regulation.800 This quarter, the Wolesi Jirga still did not approve the Higher Education Law, which grants, in part, public universities the autonomy to generate and manage revenues and donations. However, an associate-degree program for Kabul Polytechnic University was finalized with HEP’s assistance and the first class convened in January 2014.801

American University of Afghanistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>End Date</th>
<th>Total Estimated Cost ($)</th>
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</table>

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 4/7/2014.
USAID’s second, five-year cooperative agreement is designed to continue support for developing the American University of Afghanistan’s (AUAF) English-language undergraduate and continuing-education programs. The four components of this agreement aim to strengthen academic and professional development programs, expand programs for women, and increase financial self-sufficiency.802 AUAF met its cost-sharing goals, collecting $3,265,765 in tuition and donations from November 1, 2013, to January 31, 2014.803 USAID also reported that AUAF’s female undergraduate population is 31.9%, as of March 2014. However, security remains a concern, and attracting and retaining female students continues to be a challenge.804

Other Active USAID Education Programs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>End Date</th>
<th>Total Estimated Cost ($)</th>
<th>Cumulative Disbursement, as of 3/31/2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Global Partnership for Education</td>
<td>10/11/2012</td>
<td>3/31/2015</td>
<td>$2,500,000</td>
<td>$438,683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan Reads</td>
<td>6/1/2013</td>
<td>5/31/2014</td>
<td>$380,000</td>
<td>$300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan Technical Vocational Institute</td>
<td>6/15/2013</td>
<td>6/14/2015</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
<td>$475,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening Education in Afghanistan</td>
<td>8/8/2010</td>
<td>6/30/2014</td>
<td>$10,225,847</td>
<td>$9,949,051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Tuition Scholarship Program</td>
<td>8/21/2011</td>
<td>7/31/2017</td>
<td>$7,384,665</td>
<td>$5,311,003</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 4/7/2014.

HEALTH

Afghanistan has experienced significant improvements in its health indicators since 2002, according to USAID. Although the country still has one of the highest maternal- and child-mortality rates in the world, the USAID-funded Afghanistan Mortality Survey 2010 found that life expectancy has increased by as much as 20 years to an average of 62–64 years since 2002.805 However, other institutions have suggested that the gains are more modest. The CIA World Factbook gives the Afghan life expectancy from birth as 50 years, while the World Bank, which calculates life expectancy in 2012 at 60.5, starts from a base of 55.26 years in 2001—a 5.25-year gain. Moreover, in 1991, the World Bank determined life expectancy at 49.4 years, showing that they measure life expectancy in Afghanistan growing by about 5–6 years every decade, regardless of U.S. intervention efforts.806 From FY 2002 through FY 2012, U.S. on- and off-budget assistance to Afghanistan’s health sector totaled $1.06 billion.807 On-budget assistance to the MOPH includes salary payments to workers in U.S.-funded facilities, medical and non-medical supplies, in-service training, minor renovations of facilities, medical equipment, and monitoring and supervision. Off-budget
### SIGAR Investigation

In an ongoing investigation of MOPH’s Grants and Contracts Management Unit, which provides oversight and guidance to NGOs that operate health facilities, SIGAR is reviewing NGO invoices, funding for closed health facilities, solicitation of bribes, and falsified timesheets.

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**ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT**

Economic and Social Development assistance includes activities to strengthen health systems, engage the private sector, and procure pharmaceuticals and contraceptives.808

USAID’s highest-priority programs in the health sector this quarter include:
- Partnership Contracts for Health (PCH) Services
- Health Policy Project (HPP)
- Leadership, Management, Governance Project (LMG)

#### Partnership Contracts for Health Services

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>End Date</th>
<th>Total Estimated Cost ($)</th>
<th>Cumulative Disbursement, as of 3/31/2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partnership Contracts for Health Services</td>
<td>7/20/2008</td>
<td>1/31/2015</td>
<td>$236,455,840</td>
<td>$164,648,037</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 4/7/2014.

The host-country contract Partnership Contracts for Health (PCH) program supports the MOPH’s efforts to provide the Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS) and the Essential Package of Hospital Services (EPHS) in 13 provinces. The United States supports 641 of these health facilities, including:
- 5 Provincial Hospitals
- 27 District Hospitals
- 14 Comprehensive Health Centers+ (“+” indicates expanded services)
- 163 Comprehensive Health Centers
- 278 Basic Health Centers
- 144 Health Sub-Centers
- 10 Prison Health Facilities

USAID also supports 6,402 health posts throughout Afghanistan—48.5% of all health posts. On average, over 1.3 million patients are served each month.810

PCH delivers health care ranging from primary care to essential hospital services. It also supports the Community Midwifery Education program, which helps to increase the number of female healthcare workers and contributes to reducing maternal and child mortality.811

USAID reports the growing health demands of communities cannot be addressed through existing BPHS and EPHS. Furthermore, turnover of PCH staff within the Grants and Contracts Management Unit, as well as parliament’s late approval of the national budget and deteriorating security conditions, have temporarily closed health facilities, delayed management activities, staff deployment, monitoring, and supervision activities.812

PCH reports semi-annually to USAID.813 Yet, SIGAR’s audit of the MOPH found that USAID provides advance, incremental funding to cover operational expenses every 45 days. These and other MOPH internal-control deficiencies put U.S. funds provided under the PCH program at risk of fraud, waste, and abuse. The audit also noted that USAID officials said...
they have not verified what, if any, actions the MOPH has taken to address these deficiencies.814

**USAID Oversight**

USAID funds a team within MOPH’s Grants and Contracts Management Unit (GCMU), which is responsible for monitoring USAID-funded facilities through regular site visits and monthly reports from implementing NGOs. USAID reported that the GCMU team conducted 55 field monitoring visits in FY 2013, visiting 242—44% of total—health facilities supported by the PCH program. The NGOs are supposed to provide routine monitoring of each health facility and their monthly reports are supposed to document the number of active health facilities, and the number of staff on hand.815 The numbers of patients present, the type, quality, or outcome of health services were not included.

For now USAID relies on the MOPH’s Health Management Information System (HMIS) for Afghan health data, as it does for the MOE’s EMIS. Unlike with EMIS, USAID, through its Leadership, Management, and Governance (LMG) project is assisting the MOPH implement a data-quality assessment tool to better ensure that HMIS data is more complete, timely, and accurate. USAID also helped the MOPH conduct a data quality assurance sampling survey last quarter. Data collection was completed in October 2013 and LMG has issued a report in Dari.816 For more information about the LMG program, see page 130.

**Health Policy Project**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>End Date</th>
<th>Total Estimated Cost ($)</th>
<th>Cumulative Disbursement, as of 3/31/2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Health Policy Project</td>
<td>6/2012</td>
<td>10/2014</td>
<td>$28,000,000</td>
<td>$13,700,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Health Policy Project (HPP) is building the Ministry of Public Health’s (MOPH) capacity to address basic health needs through design, negotiation, and management of hospital public-private partnerships (PPPs). The project also aims to strengthen health financing and management of health resources, strengthen gender roles in health sector activities, and build the capacity of local private-sector organizations to partner with the Afghan government in generating demand for and delivery of high-quality health services through social marketing—an approach used to change people’s behaviors for the benefit of individuals and society.817

This quarter, USAID said continued insecurity, especially leading up to the elections, affected aspects of HPP’s work, while the uncertainty surrounding the election process had few international investors interested in PPPs with the MOPH. At the same time, limited availability of qualified international consultants willing to travel to Afghanistan to help train...
MOPH’s PPP unit is delaying PPP activities, as is getting Afghan government approval (district, provincial, and national) and security clearance to conduct gender-based violence workshops outside of Kabul.818

Despite these challenges, HPP worked with the MOPH to develop a promotional video encouraging private sector investment in three hospitals in Kabul with an accompanying investment promotion event, and developed two radio advertisements that discourage early marriage and gender discrimination in health service delivery. HPP-supported training programs also continued this quarter, centered on efforts aimed at reducing maternal and child mortality, and on understanding and improving the role of advocacy in private sector health policy development.819

**Leadership, Management, and Governance Project**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>End Date</th>
<th>Total Estimated Cost ($)</th>
<th>Cumulative Disbursement, as of 3/31/2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leadership, Management, and Governance</td>
<td>9/25/2011</td>
<td>9/24/2016</td>
<td>$26,000,000</td>
<td>$15,657,888</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 4/7/2014.

The Leadership, Management, Governance (LMG) Project works with the MOPH and the MOE at the provincial and central levels to build leadership, management, and governance capacity within Afghanistan’s health and education systems. It also aims to improve transparency and accountability within the MOPH and helps both ministries manage on-budget assistance.820

This quarter, Afghanistan’s Civil Service Commission granted human-resources autonomy—the right to hire and fire staff—to Kabul-based national hospitals.821 These hospitals’ internal staffing decisions were suffering from social and political interference that USAID said was challenging LMG efforts to provide technical assistance.822 USAID also reported that 14 of these hospitals as well as a blood bank and clinic closed out their most recent fiscal year with an average budget expenditure rate of 89%.823

USAID also noted several challenges, including heavy reliance on consultants and advisors by senior MOPH officials, inadequate MOPH response to provincial health development needs, coordination of MOPH health information components housed under multiple directorates, and field monitoring limitations due to logistics and security issues.824
Other Active USAID Health Programs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>End Date</th>
<th>Total Estimated Cost ($)</th>
<th>Cumulative Disbursement, as of 3/31/2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Polio Eradication Activities</td>
<td>9/30/1996</td>
<td>9/30/2022</td>
<td>10,750,000</td>
<td>9,415,102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TB = Field Support</td>
<td>9/29/2010</td>
<td>9/28/2015</td>
<td>4,600,000</td>
<td>1,252,370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Research = Field Support</td>
<td>9/30/2009</td>
<td>9/29/2014</td>
<td>13,950,000</td>
<td>12,950,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID Afghanistan University Support and Workforce Development Program</td>
<td>1/1/2014</td>
<td>12/31/2018</td>
<td>91,927,769</td>
<td>335,229</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 4/7/2014.

COMMUNICATIONS

Building an adequate national telecommunications infrastructure has been a top priority for the Afghan government since 2002. Over the past few years, the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sector has grown to become one of the largest revenue-generating sectors for the Afghan government, contributing roughly $167 million annually in revenue. In a forthcoming economic impact study, USAID found the ICT sector generated $1.8 billion in gross revenue in 2013, while employing an estimated 138,500 Afghans.

The MCIT has set priorities to increase mobile service coverage to the remaining 20% of the population without access, extend the fiber optic cable infrastructure, implement faster internet service, introduce electronic governance, and convert to a digital television system. Afghan Telecom—wholly owned by the MCIT and whose board of directors is chaired by MCIT Minister Amirzai Sangin and composed of MCIT, MOF officers, and other Afghan corporate representatives—is executing an aggressive expansion into the 3G market that will entail the construction of an expansive mobile tower network, including many in remote and dangerous areas where private operators do not engage. Many of these towers will replace those lost due to the closure of Coalition bases and provide around-the-clock service, unlike private operators who turn their towers off at night due to insurgent threats.

Afghan Telecom’s relationship with the MCIT could constitute a conflict of interest and its sole national unified license could give it an unfair advantage over other telecom operators. TFBSO said Afghan Telecom struggles to meet reliability, responsiveness, and availability demands, and cited Afghan Telecom’s fiber-optic network access monopoly as a challenge and risk to the ICT sector. The World Bank said Afghan Telecom’s management of the national backbone network that ties together interconnecting

SIGAR SPECIAL PROJECT

This quarter, SIGAR’s Office of Special Projects sent an inquiry letter to Secretary of State Kerry, Secretary of Defense Hagel, General Austin, and General Dunford expressing concern about six communications towers built in Afghanistan but never used. SIGAR’s letter requests information about the decision to build the towers, the cost to maintain them, and the plans to turn over the towers to DOD or the Afghan government. For more information, see Section 2, page 42.
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

SIGAR SPECIAL PROJECT
This quarter, SIGAR wrote a letter of inquiry to U.S. military commanders in Afghanistan about the current status of a 2009 MOI pilot program using mobile money technology to pay salaries to the Afghan National Police. SIGAR uncovered information that Afghan police commanders began registering their own phone numbers in lieu of those of their subordinates, and resumed their past practice of claiming a portion of the salaries paid out to individual police officers. For more information, see Section 2, page 46.

From January 1–March 31, 2014, eight personnel were assigned to the TAT—six civilian expeditionary workforce personnel and two contractors. Cost: $468,000. Funding organization: Defense Information Systems Agency.


networks helped keep internet prices artificially high compared to other countries in the region.831

Mobile Money
In an overall effort to help build a sustainable, diverse, and inclusive financial sector, USAID has sought to expand access to credit in Afghanistan through mobile money and branchless banking through its Financial Access for Investing in the Development of Afghanistan (FAIDA) project. Mobile money is the use of cell phones to store currency, pay for goods, and receive and transfer funds. Other aspects of FAIDA include agribusiness activities and capacity-building efforts at Afghanistan’s central bank.832

A USAID audit issued this quarter found that mobile money has not caught on in Afghanistan. Less than 1%—10,642 of almost 21 million people with mobile phones—were active mobile-money users (conducting at least 12 transactions per month). USAID said the commercial viability of mobile money in Afghanistan is 20% of mobile phone users using this service within four years. It went on to say that FAIDA did not significantly enhance the capacity and reach of mobile money, and 19 months into the project there was no improvement. Additionally, so little information exists on mobile money in Afghanistan, USAID found it difficult to determine what FAIDA’s results should have been in this area. USAID is planning a financial audit of this program in FY 2014.833 As of March 31, 2014, USAID has disbursed $73,462,780 for FAIDA, of which mobile money is one part.834

Assistance to the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology
The U.S. Defense Information System Agency supports Afghanistan’s telecommunications efforts through its support to DOD’s Afghanistan Telecom Advisory Team (TAT).835 The TAT trains, advises, and assists the MCIT in several areas; however it does not have or use quantifiable metrics to track progress or results. The TAT helped develop a business case analysis and strategy to broaden mobile service coverage to remote locations; contributed to the development of a national cyber security strategy for Afghan ministries and security institutions, and provided cyber security training; helped identify specific sources of interference affecting cellular network frequencies, although a resolution is still pending; and organized a joint MCIT, TAT, and Mobile Network Operator active monitoring program of specific interference points, which identified several commercially generated interference issues that are pending Afghan governmental resolution.836

The TAT also facilitated meetings between the Afghanistan National Army (ANA) and Afghan Telecom to prioritize ANA network expansion and secure connections to the fiber optic network; advanced ministerial meetings to solicit Ministry of Defense and MOI security support to the MCIT in high risk areas; promoted discussions between Afghan Telecom and the
international business unit of Turkish Telekom centered around reducing the price of IP transit services and Afghan internet services; and met with the U.S. Embassy Kabul and CSTC-A to discuss the option of using mobile money to pay the remaining 20% of ANSF (approximately 70,000 personnel) still paid in cash.837

USAID obligated $3.9 million for its on-budget E-Government Resource Center project with the MCIT. No funds have yet been disbursed as of March 31, 2014. The project is designed to build the MCIT’s capacity to provide timely, high-quality advice, training, consulting, and other electronic-governance (E-Gov) and cyber-security services to Afghan ministries.838 DOD’s TAT reported the E-Gov department at the MCIT started construction planning for a E-Gov complex. The staff at the complex will provide full electronic and in-person government services such as issuing e-taskera (electronic identity) cards and government licenses, and processing tax payments.839

Additionally, USAID commissioned a $150,000 ICT sector economic impact study (2001–2018) so MCIT can better understand past and anticipated economic effects, and plan accordingly.840

SIGAR AUDIT

Last quarter SIGAR initiated a sector-wide audit of U.S. government efforts to assist in the reconstruction and commercialization of Afghanistan’s information and communication technology (ICT) sector.
4 OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT
Photo on previous page
Afghanistan’s population is more than three-quarters rural, but many Afghans live in densely developed neighborhoods like this one in the eastern part of the country. (ISAF Regional Command East photo)
SIGAR’s enabling legislation requires it to keep the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense fully informed about problems relating to the administration of reconstruction programs, and to submit a report to Congress on SIGAR’s oversight work and on the status of the U.S. reconstruction effort no later than 30 days after the end of each fiscal quarter. Each quarter, SIGAR requests updates from other agencies on completed and ongoing oversight activities. This section contains these updates.

The descriptions appear as submitted, with minor changes to maintain consistency with other sections of this report: acronyms and abbreviations in place of full names; standardized capitalization, hyphenation, punctuation, and preferred spellings; and third-person instead of first-person construction.

These agencies perform oversight activities in Afghanistan and provide results to SIGAR:

- Department of Defense Office of Inspector General (DOD OIG)
- Department of State Office of Inspector General (State OIG)
- Government Accountability Office (GAO)
- U.S. Army Audit Agency (USAAA)
- U.S. Agency for International Development Office of Inspector General (USAID OIG)
OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT

COMPLETED OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

Table 4.1 lists the nine oversight projects related to reconstruction that participating agencies reported as completed this quarter.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Report Number</th>
<th>Date Issued</th>
<th>Project Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DOD OIG</td>
<td>DODIG-2014-045</td>
<td>3/10/2014</td>
<td>Shindland Pilot Training Contracts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAO</td>
<td>GAO-14-304</td>
<td>3/26/2014</td>
<td>Federal Contracting: Noncompetitive Contracts Based on Urgency Need Additional Oversight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAO</td>
<td>GAO-14-448F</td>
<td>3/13/2014</td>
<td>Afghanistan: Key Oversight Issues for USAID Development Efforts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAO</td>
<td>GAO-14-229</td>
<td>2/14/2014</td>
<td>Contingency Contracting: State and USAID Made Progress Assessing and Implementing Changes, but Further Actions Needed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID OIG</td>
<td>F-306-14-001-P</td>
<td>3/23/2014</td>
<td>Audit of USAID/Afghanistan’s Management Controls Over Overtime Compensation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID OIG</td>
<td>F-306-14-001-S</td>
<td>2/6/2014</td>
<td>Review of USAID/International’s Electoral Assistance Program</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


U.S. Department of Defense Office of Inspector General

During this quarter, DOD OIG issued three reports related to Afghanistan reconstruction.

Independent Auditor’s Report on the Examination of DOD Execution of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)–Contributing Countries’ Donations to Afghan National Army Trust Fund

(Report No. DODIG-2014-046, Issued March 24, 2014)

DOD OIG examined the Department’s March 31, 2013, financial schedule of NATO contributions to the Afghan National Army Trust Fund to determine whether the receipts and expenditures were fairly stated (accurately reported). The Department was not able to provide a financial schedule that was auditable (reconciled to supporting schedules and accounting data). Therefore, DOD OIG was unable to provide an audit opinion (issued a disclaimer of opinion) and was not able to determine if the financial schedule was accurate. Without audited statements, future donations from donor countries may be at risk. The lack of a timely completed audit may negatively affect the participation of NATO countries making donations to the trust fund. NATO countries have contributed over $600 million to the trust fund to date. DOD OIG identified internal control weaknesses related to the financial reporting processes and noncompliance with laws and regulations. However, DOD OIG did not identify any instances where contributions were applied to contracts that conflicted with donors’ intent.
Improvements Are Needed in Contractor Oversight, Mission Security, and Personnel Safety for the Afghanistan Rotary Wing Program Contracts
(Report No. DODIG-2014-044, Issued March 11, 2014)
This report is For Official Use Only.

Shindand Pilot Training Contracts
(Report No. DODIG-2014-045, Issued March 10, 2014)
This report is For Official Use Only.

U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General—Middle East Regions Operations
During this quarter, State OIG did not issue any reports related to Afghanistan reconstruction.

Government Accountability Office
During this quarter, GAO issued three reports related to Afghanistan reconstruction.

Federal Contracting: Noncompetitive Contracts Based on Urgency Need Additional Oversight
(Report No. GAO-14-304, Issued March 26, 2014)
The Departments of Defense (DOD) and State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) used the urgency exception to a limited extent, but the reliability of some federal procurement data elements is questionable. For fiscal years 2010 through 2012, obligations reported under urgent noncompetitive contracts ranged from less than one percent to about 12 percent of all noncompetitive contract obligations. During that time, DOD obligated $12.5 billion noncompetitively to procure goods and services using the urgency exception, while State and USAID obligated $582 million and about $20 million respectively, almost exclusively to procure services. Among the items procured were personal armor, guard services, and communications equipment to support missions in Afghanistan and Iraq. GAO found coding errors that raise concerns about the reliability of federal procurement data on the use of the urgency exception. Nearly half—28 of the 62 contracts in GAO’s sample—were incorrectly coded as having used the urgency exception when they did not. GAO found that 20 of the 28 miscoded contracts were awarded using procedures that are more simple and separate from the requirements related to the use of the urgency exception. Ensuring reliability of procurement data is critical as these data are used to inform procurement policy decisions and facilitate oversight.

For the 34 contracts in GAO’s sample that were properly coded as having used the urgency exception, agencies cited a range of urgent circumstances, primarily to meet urgent needs for combat operations or...
to avoid unanticipated gaps in program support. The justifications and approvals—which are required by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) to contain certain facts and rationale to justify use of the urgency exception to competition—generally contained the required elements; however, some were ambiguous about the specific risks to the government if the acquisition was delayed.

Ten of the 34 contracts in GAO’s sample had a period of performance of more than one year—eight of which were modified after award to extend the period of performance beyond one year. The FAR limits contracts using the urgency exception to one year in duration unless the head of the agency or a designee determines that exceptional circumstances apply. Agencies did not make this determination for the 10 contracts. The FAR is not clear about what steps agencies should take when a contract is modified after award to extend the period of performance over one year. Some contracting officials noted that these modifications are treated as separate contract actions and would not require the determination by the head of the agency or designee. Others considered them cumulative actions requiring the determination. Standards for internal controls in the federal government calls for organizations to maintain proper controls that ensure transparency and accountability for stewardship of government resources. The Office of Federal Procurement Policy—which provides government-wide policy on federal contracting procedures—is in a position to clarify when the determination of exceptional circumstances is needed to help achieve consistent implementation of this requirement across the federal government. Further, under the urgency exception, the FAR requires agencies to seek offers from as many vendors as practicable given the circumstances. For some contracts in GAO’s sample, lack of access to technical data rights and reliance on contractor expertise prevented agencies from obtaining competition.

Afghanistan: Key Oversight Issues for USAID Development Efforts
(Report No. GAO-14-448T, Issued March 13, 2014)
In 2010, the United States pledged to provide at least 50 percent of its development aid directly through the Afghan government budget within two years. This direct assistance is intended to help develop the capacity of Afghan government ministries to manage programs and funds. Using bilateral agreements and multilateral trust funds, the United States more than tripled its direct assistance awards to Afghanistan in the first year of the pledge, going from over $470 million in fiscal year (FY) 2009 to over $1.4 billion in FY 2010. USAID’s most current reporting shows that for FY 2012 the agency provided over $800 million in mission funds through direct assistance. In 2013, GAO reported that while USAID had established and generally complied with various financial and other controls in its direct assistance agreements, it had not always assessed the risks in providing direct assistance before awarding funds. USAID has taken steps in response
to GAO’s recommendations to help ensure the accountability of direct assistance funds provided to the Afghan government. Recently, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) reported that USAID determined that seven ministries were unable to manage direct assistance funds without a risk mitigation strategy in place. However, SIGAR reported that USAID approved assistance for the ministries, but did not mitigate for all identified risks.

USAID’s ability to conduct its mission and the challenges it has faced in providing oversight and monitoring of its development projects in Afghanistan are likely to be exacerbated by the planned withdrawal of U.S. and Coalition combat troops from Afghanistan at the end of 2014. The United States is currently transitioning from counterinsurgency and stability operations toward more traditional diplomatic and development activities. As U.S. combat troops withdraw from Afghanistan, provincial reconstruction teams will continue to decline in number, thus challenging USAID’s opportunities to directly monitor and evaluate programs in certain parts of Afghanistan. To prepare for the possible lack of USAID personnel in the field, USAID has undertaken various planning efforts to mitigate potential challenges. For example, USAID is planning to implement a remote monitoring program that will use contractors to verify activities that implementing partners have completed. As the United States plans for the withdrawal of its combat troops and the transition from an integrated civilian and military effort to a civilian-led presence, GAO believes it is important to have safeguards in place to help ensure sustainment of the gains made by U.S. and Coalition investments.

Contingency Contracting: State and USAID Made Progress Assessing and Implementing Changes, but Further Actions Needed
(Report No. GAO-14-229, Issued February 14, 2014)

The Department of State and USAID identified a number of changes needed to improve contract support in overseas contingency operations, but have not completed implementation efforts. As required by the Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization Act, both agencies determined that their organizational structures were effective, though State created a new regional Contract Management Office to better support contracting efforts in Iraq. In October 2013, State approved a number of actions to improve policies and procedures, including specific initiatives in acquisition planning and risk management, among others, and intends to institutionalize these changes in its Foreign Affairs Manual in 2014. State generally has not, however, developed plans to assess the impact of these initiatives. Federal internal control standards highlight the importance of managers comparing actual performance to expected results. Accordingly, continued management attention is needed to ensure that these efforts achieve their intended objectives. USAID focused its efforts on areas such
as improving contractor performance evaluations and risk management. GAO found that some USAID missions and offices that operate in contingency environments have developed procedures and practices, but USAID did not consider whether these should be institutionalized agency-wide because USAID officials interpreted the legislative requirement to include only a review of agency-wide policies. As a result, USAID may have missed opportunities to leverage its institutional knowledge to better support future contingencies. USAID established a new working group in October 2013 to develop lessons learned, toolkits, and training and is expected to complete its efforts in late 2014. This working group could further assess the policies and procedures developed by the missions and offices, thus potentially affording USAID an opportunity to better leverage its institutional knowledge. State and USAID have increased their acquisition workforce by 53 and 15 percent, respectively, from their 2011 levels and are in various stages of assessing their workforce needs for overseas contingency operations. Per Office of Management and Budget guidance, both agencies identified competency and skill gaps for their acquisition workforce in their 2013 acquisition human capital plans. State’s 2013 plan noted that in response to growth in contracting activity in areas such as Iraq and Afghanistan, additional acquisition personnel are needed. In October 2013, State’s Under Secretary for Management approved the formation of a multibureau working group that plans to further explore workforce needs for current and future contingency operations. USAID’s 2013 plan cited its greatest challenge as providing training for its acquisition workforce, as many personnel have five years or less of contracting experience. USAID established a training division in 2013 for its acquisition workforce. State noted in its Section 850 report that it will increase its focus on conducting risk assessments on the reliance, use, and oversight of contractors through the establishment of risk management staff. USAID’s Section 850 report did not address reliance on contractors, but in October 2013, USAID drafted a revision to its planning policy that will require a risk assessment and mitigation plan associated with contractor performance of critical functions in overseas contingency operations.

**U.S. Army Audit Agency**

The USAAA did not complete any audits related to Afghanistan reconstruction this quarter.

**U.S. Agency for International Development Office of Inspector General**

During this quarter, USAID OIG completed three reports related to Afghanistan reconstruction.
Audit of USAID/Afghanistan’s Financial Access for Investing in the Development of Afghanistan Project

Audit Objective:
• Is the FAIDA project building a sustainable, diverse, and inclusive financial sector that can generate and sustain quality employment by meeting the needs of micro, small, and medium enterprises throughout the country?

Review of USAID/Afghanistan’s Management Controls Over Overtime Compensation

Review Objective:
• Is USAID/Afghanistan following adequate control procedures for overtime compensation?

Audit of USAID/Afghanistan’s Electoral Assistance Program
(Report No. F-306-14-001-S, Issued February 6, 2014)

Audit Objectives:
• Has USAID’s assistance strengthened the ability of Afghan institutions and organizations to enable credible, inclusive, and transparent presidential and provincial council elections in 2014?
• Has USAID’s assistance contributed to Afghan solutions in the longer-term issues identified in OIG’s previous audit of electoral assistance?

ONGOING OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

As of March 31, 2014, the participating agencies reported 28 ongoing oversight activities related to reconstruction in Afghanistan. The activities reported are listed in Table 4.2 and described in the following sections by agency.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Project Number</th>
<th>Date Initiated</th>
<th>Project Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DOD OIG</td>
<td>D2014-D00SP0-0129.000</td>
<td>3/6/2014</td>
<td>Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Logistics and Maintenance Sustainment of the Afghan National Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD OIG</td>
<td>D2014-D00AS-0111.000</td>
<td>2/12/2014</td>
<td>Continuation of Audit of Mi-17 Cockpit Modifications Under Task Order W58RGZ-09-D-0130-0102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD OIG</td>
<td>D2014-D00FS-0088.000</td>
<td>12/24/2013</td>
<td>Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s Internal Controls Related to Direct Assistance Funding Provided by the DOD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD OIG</td>
<td>D2013-D00SP0-0181.000</td>
<td>6/13/2013</td>
<td>Assessment of U.S. Government Efforts to Transition Security Cooperation and Assistance Activities Supporting the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan from Department of Defense Authority to Department of State Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD OIG</td>
<td>D2013-D00SP0-0154.000</td>
<td>4/26/2013</td>
<td>Assessment of the U.S. Military and Coalition Efforts to Develop Effective and Sustainable Healthcare Capability for the Afghan National Police</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Continued on next page
Department of Defense Office of Inspector General

The Department of Defense continues to face many challenges in executing its Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO). The Department of Defense Office of Inspector General (DOD OIG) has identified priorities based on these challenges and high risks. In FY 2014, DOD OIG oversight focuses on overseas contingency operations with a majority of agency resources supporting operations in Afghanistan. The DOD OIG focus in Afghanistan primarily continued in the areas of the management and execution of the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, military construction, safety of personnel, and the administration and oversight of contracts supporting coalition...
forces. In addition, DOD OIG oversight in Afghanistan includes a focus on matters pertaining to the drawdown of forces in Afghanistan and transition of operations.

A top priority continues to be the monitoring and oversight of acquisition and contracting processes focused on training, equipping, and sustaining Afghanistan Security Forces (ASF). The DOD OIG planned oversight efforts address the administration and oversight of contracts for equipping ASF, such as rotary wing aircraft. The DOD OIG will also continue to review and assess the Department’s efforts to train and equip Afghan National Security Forces.

The DOD OIG led Southwest Asia Joint Planning Group assists in the coordination and deconfliction of Federal and DOD OCO related oversight activities. The DOD OIG continues to execute its portion of the FY 2014 Comprehensive Oversight Plan for Southwest Asia.

DOD OIG’s ongoing OEF related oversight addresses accountability of property; improper payments; contract administration and management including construction projects; transition planning; logistical distribution within Afghanistan; retrograde operations, health care; and acquisition planning and controls over funding for ASF.

Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Logistics and Maintenance Sustainment of the Afghan National Police
(Project No. D2014-D00SPO-0129.000, Initiated March 6, 2014)
The DOD OIG is assessing the planning and execution of Afghan National Police (ANP) logistics, supply, and maintenance systems developed and implemented by U.S. and Coalition forces in Afghanistan. Specifically, DOD OIG plans to evaluate:

- whether U.S. and Coalition goals, objectives, plans, guidance, and resources are sufficient to effectively develop, manage, and transition logistics, supply, and maintenance systems to the ANP in 2014,
- U.S. and Coalition plans to transition ANP logistics and maintenance processes to Afghan lead and to mitigate the impact of delays in supply transition, and
- whether U.S. and Coalition plans and resources will effectively support ANP logistics, supply, and maintenance systems sustainment and continued development beyond 2014.

Continuation of Audit of Mi-17 Cockpit Modifications Under Task Order W58RGZ-09-D-0130-0102
(Project No. D2014-D000AS-0111.000, Initiated February 12, 2014)
This is a continuation of Project No. D2013-D000AS-0097.000, “Follow-on Audit of Mi-17 Cockpit Modifications Under Task Order W58RGZ-09-D-0130-0102,” which began in February 2013. The DOD OIG is
determining whether DOD officials properly awarded and administered indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity contract W58RGZ-09-D-0130, Task Order 0102, in accordance with federal and DOD regulations and policies. The contract was for the modification of DOD-owned Mi-17 variant aircraft. The prior project (D2013-D000AS-0097.000) primarily addressed the contract administration of Mi-17 cockpit modifications under Task Order 0102. This project will primarily address the award of Task Order 0102.

**Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s Internal Controls Related to Direct Assistance Funding Provided by the DOD**

(Project No. D2014-D000FS-0088.000, Initiated December 24, 2013)

The DOD OIG is determining whether the Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s (GIROA) Ministries of Defense and Interior have controls in place to ensure a transparent and accountable fiscal process for the direct funding provided for the sustainment of the Afghan National Security Force. The Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) requested this audit.

**Assessment of U.S. Government Efforts to Transition Security Cooperation and Assistance Activities Supporting the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan from Department of Defense Authority to Department of State Authority**

(Project No. 2013-D00SPO-0181.000, Initiated June 13, 2013)

DOD OIG is assessing plans and activities that have been accomplished or implemented thus far to transfer the security cooperation and assistance activities in Afghanistan from DOD to State Department authority, and to make recommendations to facilitate or improve the transition of these functions to the State Department in accordance with existing security cooperation guidance and security assistance regulations that may pertain. Specific objectives are to determine whether:

- U.S. government goals, objectives, plans, and guidance are sufficient, issued and operative for the transition of CSTC-A security assistance activities in Afghanistan from DOD authority to a security cooperation organization under Department of State authority.
- Ongoing efforts by U.S. forces to provide security assistance to GIROA are adversely impacted by the implementation of drawdown plans for U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) and the transition of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and ISAF Joint Command (IJC) to a command organization under NATO authority.
Assessment of the U.S. Military and Coalition Efforts to Develop Effective and Sustainable Healthcare Capability for the Afghan National Police

(Project No. D2013-D00SPO-0154.000, Initiated April 26, 2013)

DOD OIG is assessing the progress of U.S. and Coalition efforts to develop effective and sustainable healthcare capability in support of the ANP. Specifically, the assessment will determine whether:

• plans to develop effective and sustainable healthcare services to the ANP are sufficiently comprehensive, coordinated with GIROA, and being implemented so as to meet the timeline for transition goals,

• advisory resources are sufficient and appropriate in order to develop the healthcare services necessary to support the medical needs of the ANP, and

• developmental efforts are on schedule and effective in ensuring there is adequate medical capability to provide proper medical support to ANP personnel from the point of injury to the next required level of care.

Mi-17 Cockpit Modifications under Task Order W58RGZ-09D-0130-0102

(Project No. D2013-D000AS-0097.000, Initiated February 8, 2013)

DOD OIG is conducting a follow-on audit to the Audit of Task Orders for Mi-17 Overhauls and Cockpit Modifications (Project No. D2012-D000AS-0075.000). In this follow-on audit, DOD OIG is determining whether DOD officials properly awarded and administered indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity contract W58RGZ-09-D-0130, Task Order 0102, for the modification of DOD-owned Mi-17 variant aircraft in accordance with federal and DOD regulations and policies. Under the prior project, DOD OIG reviewed the procurement of overhaul services and parts for Pakistan-owned Mi-17 variant aircraft, awarded by modification to Task Order 0102.

Department of State Office of Inspector General–Middle East Regions Operations

State OIG has five ongoing projects this quarter related to Afghanistan reconstruction.

Audit of Department of State Selection, Positioning, Training, and Oversight Responsibilities of Grants Officer Representatives

(Project No. 14AUD034, Initiated February 11, 2014)

Objective: To determine the extent to which the Department’s grant officer representatives (GORs) are selected, positioned, and trained to successfully perform their assigned grants administration and oversight responsibilities.

(Project No. 14AUD018, Initiated January 27, 2014)
Objective: Determine whether the Department of State’s administration and oversight of the Worldwide Protective Services (WPS) task order for the Kabul Embassy Security Force has been effective.

Audit of Contract Closeout Process for Contracts in Afghanistan

(Project No. 14AUD014, Initiated January 17, 2014)
Objective: To determine whether the Department of State was following prescribed procedures when closing out local and regional contracts in Afghanistan.

Audit of Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Counternarcotics Assistance to Afghanistan

(Project No. 13AUD082, Initiated June 20, 2013)
The audit objective is to evaluate the management and oversight of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) counternarcotics program for Afghanistan, including whether INL has achieved intended and sustainable outcomes and whether INL has applied adequate internal controls over the administration of direct assistance for the Afghanistan counternarcotics program.

Audit of Bureau of Diplomatic Security Worldwide Protective Services Contract Task Orders 2, 9, and 11 for Movement and Static Security Services in Jerusalem and Afghanistan

(Project No. 13AUD52, Initiated February 15, 2013)
The overall audit objective is to determine the effectiveness of the Department’s management and oversight of the WPS Contract Task Orders 2, 9, and 11. Specifically, the audit team will determine whether the contractor is performing in accordance with contract terms and conditions, the contractor’s work is adequately monitored, and invoice review and approval procedures are in place to ensure accuracy and completeness of costs.

Government Accountability Office
GAO has 11 ongoing projects this quarter related to Afghanistan reconstruction.

U.S. Civil-Military Strategic Framework for Afghanistan Update

(Project No. 321014, Initiated February 19, 2014)
The U.S. Civil-Military Strategic Framework for Afghanistan is intended to articulate the strategic vision guiding U.S. government efforts to achieve
U.S. national goals and to facilitate U.S. civilian and military cooperation and partnership in Afghanistan. The framework, originally known as the Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan, was first signed in August 2009. Section 1220 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2013 requires GAO to report on any substantial updates to the campaign plan/framework for Afghanistan. GAO will answer: How has the 2013 update to the Afghanistan framework changed from the October 2012 version?

Threats to Locally Employed Staff
(Project No. 100003, Initiated February 4, 2014)
U.S. agencies employ more than 44,000 locally employed staff (LES)—Foreign Service nationals and U.S. citizens—at over 270 posts worldwide. LES are a key element of the U.S. presence at these posts, often performing a range of programmatic, security, monitoring, maintenance, and other duties. However, due to their association with the United States, LES can be subject to harassment, intimidation, and death threats. Threats to LES are particularly acute at posts in countries with active terrorist networks and violent extremist groups, such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and Yemen. Such threats can potentially hamper U.S. efforts to recruit and retain LES. GAO was asked to review U.S. government efforts to monitor, share information about, and mitigate threats to LES serving at high-threat posts. Key questions: (1) What is the nature and extent of the threat that terrorist networks and other violent extremist groups pose to LES, including the number of threats and attacks; (2) To what extent have U.S. agencies established mechanisms to collect and disseminate information about threats to LES in an effective and timely manner; (3) What steps, if any, have U.S. agencies taken to mitigate threats to LES at high-threat posts and what barriers, if any, exist to mitigating such threats; and (4) How have these threats and attacks affected the recruitment and retention of LES at high-threat posts?

U.S. Civilian Presence in Afghanistan
(Project No. 320997, Initiated October 22, 2013)
U.S. civilian agencies in Afghanistan are in the process of planning for the transition by the end of 2014 from a predominantly military presence in Afghanistan to a civilian presence led by the Department of State. GAO will review: (1) How U.S. civilian agencies have planned for the transition, including post-transition programs and the staffing, security, and logistics needed to support them; (2) The estimated costs to maintain a civilian presence in Afghanistan after the transition; and (3) The factors that could affect these plans and any associated cost estimates.
Drawdown of DOD Contractors in Afghanistan
(Project No. 351851, Initiated August 16, 2013)
DOD has spent billions of dollars on contract support in Afghanistan and continues to employ many contractors to support its troops in Afghanistan. As DOD begins its drawdown of forces, which is to be completed by December 2014, it must also begin to drawdown contractors. GAO will determine: (1) The extent to which DOD is applying lessons learned from Iraq as it draws down contractors, and their equipment in Afghanistan; (2) The processes established by DOD and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) to drawdown its contractor workforce and associated equipment; (3) How DOD is considering cost for operational contract support drawdown decisions; and (4) What approach has USFOR-A taken to plan for the use of contractors post-2014?

U.S. Forces Reductions Impact on DOD’s Advising Mission in Afghanistan
(Project No. 351854, Initiated August 15, 2013)
As part of the U.S. plan to end the combat mission in Afghanistan by December 2014, DOD is reducing U.S. force levels to 34,000 troops by February 2014. Beyond 2014, remaining U.S. forces will advise Afghan forces, conduct counterterrorism activities, and support other U.S. agencies. Key questions: (1) To what extent has DOD identified the composition and missions of U.S. forces as it makes force reductions over the next year; (2) To what extent has DOD identified the support and security requirements for the remaining U.S. forces that will be engaged in the advising and additional missions as reductions occur; (3) What challenges, if any, does DOD face in providing support and security for the advising and other missions, and to what extent has it taken steps to mitigate any challenges?

Construction Efforts at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul
(Project No. 320990, Initiated July 24, 2013)
Since 2009 the State Department has awarded two contracts totaling about $700 million to construct additional housing and office facilities at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan. State has since terminated the first contract and expanded the scope, value, and timing of the second. Key questions: (1) What progress has State made in constructing new U.S. embassy facilities in Kabul since 2009, and what factors have contributed to any scope, cost, or schedule changes; and (2) To what extent does the present expansion match projected needs?

Use of Foreign Labor Contractors Abroad
(Project No. 320985, Initiated July 2, 2013)
The United States relies on contractors to provide diverse services overseas. Despite prohibiting the use of trafficked labor for all U.S. government
contracts, concerns remain about the protections afforded to foreign workers recruited by U.S. contractors because prevailing practices in some host countries diverge from U.S. standards. Key questions: (1) What are the practices of U.S. government contractors in recruiting foreign workers for work outside the United States? (2) What legal and other authorities do U.S. agencies identify as providing protection to foreign workers employed by U.S. government contractors outside the United States? (3) To what extent do federal agencies provide oversight and enforcement of such authorities?

**State Department’s Management of Grants and Cooperative Agreements**
(Project No. 320978, Initiated May 29, 2013)
Grants and cooperative agreements are key tools the Department of State uses to advance foreign policy. In FY12, State awarded approximately $1.6 billion worldwide in grants and cooperative agreements to nongovernmental organizations and other implementing partners. Key questions: (1) What policies and procedures does State have in place to administer and oversee grant and cooperative agreement awards; and (2) To what extent do State’s internal controls provide reasonable assurance that these funds are being used as intended in select countries?

**Costs of DOD’s Transition to the Afghan Public Protection Force**
(Project No. 351819, Initiated May 9, 2013)
The Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) began assuming security responsibilities in March 2012. Private security contractors (PSCs), used to secure military bases, were to have been replaced by either the APPF or military personnel by March 2013. Key questions: To what extent has: (1) DOD implemented the transition of security services from private security contractors to the APPF; (2) DOD developed cost estimates related to the transition to the APPF and what actions are being taken to minimize these costs; and (3) DOD assessed the current and potential security risks to U.S. personnel and logistics as a result of the transition to the APPF and taken measures to minimize these risks?

**DOD Container Management**
(Project No. 351805, Initiated March 1, 2013)
Shipping container management has been a longstanding challenge for DOD. GAO estimates that DOD will pay over $1 billion in detention fees from 2003 through 2013 for using commercial shipping containers beyond the time frame allotted in its contract with commercial shippers during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Key questions: (1) To what extent has DOD implemented corrective actions to address container management challenges affecting shipping containers used in the Afghan theater; and
(2) To what extent has DOD assessed the effect of its corrective actions on the accumulation of detention fees?

**Afghanistan Equipment Reduction and Base Closures**  
(Project No. 351798, Initiated January 22, 2013)  
DOD has stated that it will cost at least $5.7 billion to draw down an estimated 90,000 containers of material and 50,000 vehicles from Afghanistan. Given the large number of bases and difficult conditions in Afghanistan, an efficient and cost-effective drawdown will likely depend on DOD knowing how much equipment it has in Afghanistan and making cost-effective decisions about its disposition. Key Questions: (1) To what extent has DOD implemented base-closure procedures, including the accountability of equipment, to meet command-established objectives and timelines; (2) To what extent are command-established objectives and timelines for the Afghanistan equipment drawdown supported by DOD facilities and processes; and (3) To what extent is DOD using cost and other information to help ensure it is making cost-effective disposition decisions?

**U.S. Army Audit Agency**  
This quarter, the USAAA has no ongoing audits related to reconstruction initiatives.

**U.S. Agency for International Development Office of Inspector General**  
This quarter, USAID OIG has six ongoing audits related to reconstruction initiatives. Two projects included in the list below have been suspended.

**Review of USAID/Afghanistan’s Financial Management Controls for Government to Government Assistance**  
(Project No. FF100414, Initiated March 10, 2014)  
Review Objective:  
• Are financial management controls associated with USAID/Afghanistan’s government to government assistance designed and operating effectively?

**Review of USAID/Afghanistan’s Activities and Sustainability of Operations at Tarakhil Power Plant**  
(Project No. FF100914, Initiated December 18, 2013)  
Review Objective:  
• Is the Tarakhil Power Plant being operated and maintained in a sustainable manner that will protect USAID’s investment in this facility?
Review of USAID/Afghanistan’s Basic Education, Literacy, and Technical-Vocational Education and Training (BELT) Project
(Project No. FF100314, Initiated November 14, 2013)
Review Objective:
• Is USAID/Afghanistan improving access to quality basic education, literacy, technical-vocational education, and training for girls and other marginalized populations?
  (This review is currently suspended to de-conflict with SIGAR and GAO oversight activities.)

Audit of USAID/Afghanistan’s Afghan Civilian Assistance Program II
(Project No. FF100114, Initiated October 16, 2013)
Audit Objective:
• Is USAID/Afghanistan’s assistance through the Afghan Civilian Assistance Program II reaching its intended beneficiaries and having its intended impact?

Audit of USAID/Afghanistan’s Transition Plans
(Project No. FF100712, Initiated November 29, 2012)
Audit Objective:
• Does USAID/Afghanistan have plans to address contingencies related to the U.S. government’s transition in Afghanistan? (Note: this audit is currently suspended).

Follow-up on a DOD Audit of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program Funds Provided to USAID/Afghanistan
(Project No. FF101712, Initiated October 25, 2011)
Audit Objective:
• To determine whether the CERP funds provided by DOD to USAID/Afghanistan were used for their intended purposes, and in compliance with applicable laws and regulations.
APPENDICES
AND ENDNOTES
APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

CROSS-REFERENCE OF REPORT TO STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS

This appendix cross-references the pages of this report to the quarterly reporting and related requirements under SIGAR’s enabling legislation, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 1229 (Table A.1), and to the semiannual reporting requirements prescribed for inspectors general more generally under the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended (5 U.S.C. App. 3) (Table A.2).

| TABLE A.1 |
| CROSS-REFERENCE TO SIGAR QUARTERLY REPORTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER PUB. L. NO. 110-181, § 1229 |
| Public Law Section | SIGAR Enabling Language | SIGAR Action | Report Section |
| Purpose |
| Section 1229(a)(3) | To provide for an independent and objective means of keeping the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense fully and currently informed about problems and deficiencies relating to the administration of such programs and operations and the necessity for and progress on corrective action. | Ongoing; quarterly report | Full report |
| Supervision |
| Section 1229(e)(1) | The Inspector General shall report directly to, and be under the general supervision of, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense | Report to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense | Full report |
| Duties |
| Section 1229(f)(1) | OVERSIGHT OF AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION – It shall be the duty of the Inspector General to conduct, supervise, and coordinate audits and investigations of the treatment, handling, and expenditure of amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan, and of the programs, operations, and contracts carried out utilizing such funds, including subsections (A) through (G) below. | Review appropriated/available funds | Full report |
| | Review obligations and expenditures of appropriated/available funds | SIGAR Oversight Funding |
| | Review programs, operations, contracts using appropriated/available funds | SIGAR Oversight |
| | Review internal and external transfers of appropriated/available funds | Appendix B |
| | Review contracts using appropriated and available funds | Note 1 |
| | The maintenance of records on the use of such funds to facilitate future audits and investigations of the use of such fund[s] | Maintain audit records | SIGAR Oversight Appendix C Appendix D |
### CROSS-REFERENCE TO SIGAR QUARTERLY REPORTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER PUB. L. NO. 110-181, § 1229

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<tr>
<th>Public Law Section</th>
<th>SIGAR Enabling Language</th>
<th>SIGAR Action</th>
<th>Report Section</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Section 1229(f)(1)(F)</td>
<td>The monitoring and review of the effectiveness of United States coordination with the Governments of Afghanistan and other donor countries in the implementation of the Afghanistan Compact and the Afghanistan National Development Strategy</td>
<td>Monitoring and review as described</td>
<td>Audits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 1229(f)(1)(G)</td>
<td>The investigation of overpayments such as duplicate payments or duplicate billing and any potential unethical or illegal actions of Federal employees, contractors, or affiliated entities, and the referral of such reports, as necessary, to the Department of Justice to ensure further investigations, prosecutions, recovery of further funds, or other remedies</td>
<td>Conduct and reporting of investigations as described</td>
<td>Investigations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 1229(f)(2)</td>
<td>OTHER DUTIES RELATED TO OVERSIGHT — The Inspector General shall establish, maintain, and oversee such systems, procedures, and controls as the Inspector General considers appropriate to discharge the duties under paragraph (1)</td>
<td>Establish, maintain, and oversee systems, procedures, and controls</td>
<td>Full report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 1229(f)(3)</td>
<td>DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER INSPECTOR GENERAL ACT OF 1978 — In addition...the Inspector General shall also have the duties and responsibilities of inspectors general under the Inspector General Act of 1978</td>
<td>Duties as specified in Inspector General Act</td>
<td>Full report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 1229(f)(4)</td>
<td>COORDINATION OF EFFORTS — The Inspector General shall coordinate with, and receive the cooperation of, each of the following: (A) the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, (B) the Inspector General of the Department of State, and (C) the Inspector General of the United States Agency for International Development</td>
<td>Coordination with the inspectors general of DoD, DoS, and USAID</td>
<td>Other Agency Oversight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Support and Other Resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>Section 1229(h)(5)(A)</td>
<td>ASSISTANCE FROM FEDERAL AGENCIES — Upon request of the Inspector General for information or assistance from any department, agency, or other entity of the Federal Government, the head of such entity shall, insofar as is practicable and not in contravention of any existing law, furnish such information or assistance to the Inspector General, or an authorized designee</td>
<td>Expect support as requested</td>
<td>Full report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 1229(h)(5)(B)</td>
<td>REPORTING OF REFUSED ASSISTANCE — Whenever information or assistance requested by the Inspector General is, in the judgment of the Inspector General, unreasonably refused or not provided, the Inspector General shall report the circumstances to the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense, as appropriate, and to the appropriate congressional committees without delay</td>
<td>None reported</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE A.1 (CONTINUED)

| **CROSS-REFERENCE TO SIGAR QUARTERLY REPORTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER PUB. L. NO. 110-181, § 1229** |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Public Law Section** | **SIGAR Enabling Language** | **SIGAR Action** | **Report Section** |
| Section 1229(i)(1) | QUARTERLY REPORTS — Not later than 30 days after the end of each fiscal-year quarter, the Inspector General shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report summarizing, for the period of that quarter and, to the extent possible, the period from the end of such quarter to the time of the submission of the report, the activities during such period of the Inspector General and the activities under programs and operations funded with amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Each report shall include, for the period covered by such report, a detailed statement of all obligations, expenditures, and revenues associated with reconstruction and rehabilitation activities in Afghanistan, including the following — | Report – 30 days after the end of each calendar quarter | Full report Appendix B |
| | | Summarize activities of the Inspector General | |
| | | Detailed statement of all obligations, expenditures, and revenues | |
| Section 1229(i)(1)(A) | Obligations and expenditures of appropriated/donated funds | Obligations and expenditures of appropriated/donated funds | Appendix B |
| Section 1229(i)(1)(B) | A project-by-project and program-by-program accounting of the costs incurred to date for the reconstruction of Afghanistan, together with the estimate of the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the United States Agency for International Development, as applicable, of the costs to complete each project and each program | Project-by-project and program-by-program accounting of costs. List unexpended funds for each project or program | Funding Note 1 |
| Section 1229(i)(1)(C) | Revenues attributable to or consisting of funds provided by foreign nations or international organizations to programs and projects funded by any department or agency of the United States Government, and any obligations or expenditures of such revenues | Revenues, obligations, and expenditures of donor funds | Funding |
| Section 1229(i)(1)(D) | Revenues attributable to or consisting of foreign assets seized or frozen that contribute to programs and projects funded by any U.S. government department or agency, and any obligations or expenditures of such revenues | Revenues, obligations, and expenditures of funds from seized or frozen assets | Funding |
| Section 1229(i)(1)(E) | Operating expenses of agencies or entities receiving amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan | Operating expenses of agencies or any organization receiving appropriated funds | Funding Appendix B |
| Section 1229(i)(1)(F) | In the case of any contract, grant, agreement, or other funding mechanism described in paragraph (2)* — (i) The amount of the contract or other funding mechanism; (ii) A brief discussion of the scope of the contract or other funding mechanism; (iii) A discussion of how the department or agency of the United States Government involved in the contract, grant, agreement, or other funding mechanism identified and solicited offers from potential contractors to perform the contract, grant, agreement, or other funding mechanism, together with a list of the potential individuals or entities that were issued solicitations for the offers; and (iv) The justification and approval documents on which was based the determination to use procedures other than procedures that provide for full and open competition | Describe contract details | Note 1 |

*Note 1*
### CROSS-REFERENCE TO SIGAR QUARTERLY REPORTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER PUB. L. NO. 110-181, § 1229

<table>
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<th>Report Section</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Section 1229(i)(3)</td>
<td>PUBLIC AVAILABILITY – The Inspector General shall publish on a publicly available Internet website each report under paragraph (1) of this subsection in English and other languages that the Inspector General determines are widely used and understood in Afghanistan</td>
<td>Publish report as directed at <a href="http://www.sigar.mil">www.sigar.mil</a> Dari and Pashtu translation in process</td>
<td>Full report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 1229(i)(4)</td>
<td>FORM – Each report required under this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex if the Inspector General considers it necessary</td>
<td>Publish report as directed</td>
<td>Full report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 1229(i)(1)</td>
<td>Inspector General shall also submit each report required under subsection (i) to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense.</td>
<td>Submit quarterly report</td>
<td>Full report</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note 1: Although this data is normally made available on SIGAR’s website (www.sigar.mil), the data SIGAR has received is in relatively raw form and is currently being reviewed, analyzed, and organized for all future SIGAR purposes.

* Covered “contracts, grants, agreements, and funding mechanisms” are defined in paragraph (2) of Section 1229(i) of P.L. No. 110-181 as being—

*any major contract, grant, agreement, or other funding mechanism that is entered into by any department or agency of the United States Government that involves the use of amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan with any public or private sector entity for any of the following purposes: To build or rebuild physical infrastructure of Afghanistan. To establish or reestablish a political or societal institution of Afghanistan. To provide products or services to the people of Afghanistan.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IG Act Section</th>
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<th>SIGAR Action</th>
<th>Section</th>
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<td>Section 5(a)(1)</td>
<td>Description of significant problems, abuses, and deficiencies</td>
<td>Extract pertinent information from SWA/JPG member reports</td>
<td>Other Agency Oversight</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>List problems, abuses, and deficiencies from SIGAR audit reports, investigations, and inspections</td>
<td>See Letters of Inquiry at <a href="http://www.sigar.mil">www.sigar.mil</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 5(a)(2)</td>
<td>Description of recommendations for corrective action...with respect to significant problems, abuses, or deficiencies</td>
<td>Extract pertinent information from SWA/JPG member l reports</td>
<td>Other Agency Oversight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>List recommendations from SIGAR audit reports</td>
<td>See Letters of Inquiry at <a href="http://www.sigar.mil">www.sigar.mil</a></td>
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<td>Section 5(a)(3)</td>
<td>Identification of each significant recommendation described in previous semiannual reports on which corrective action has not been completed</td>
<td>List all instances of incomplete corrective action from previous semiannual reports</td>
<td>In process</td>
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<tr>
<td>Section 5(a)(4)</td>
<td>A summary of matters referred to prosecutive authorities and the prosecutions and convictions which have resulted</td>
<td>Extract pertinent information from SWA/JPG member reports</td>
<td>Other Agency Oversight</td>
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<td>List SIGAR Investigations that have been referred</td>
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<td>Section 5(a)(5)</td>
<td>A summary of each report made to the [Secretary of Defense] under section 6(b)(2) (instances where information requested was refused or not provided)</td>
<td>Extract pertinent information from SWA/JPG member reports</td>
<td>Other Agency Oversight</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>List instances in which information was refused SIGAR auditors, investigators, or inspectors</td>
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<tr>
<td>Section 5(a)(6)</td>
<td>A listing, subdivided according to subject matter, of each audit report, inspection report and evaluation report issued...showing dollar value of questioned costs and recommendations that funds be put to better use</td>
<td>Extract pertinent information from SWA/JPG member reports</td>
<td>Other Agency Oversight</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>List SIGAR reports</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Section 5(a)(7)</td>
<td>A summary of each particularly significant report</td>
<td>Extract pertinent information from SWA/JPG member reports</td>
<td>Other Agency Oversight</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Provide a synopsis of the significant SIGAR reports</td>
<td>A full list of significant reports can be found at <a href="http://www.sigar.mil">www.sigar.mil</a></td>
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<td>Section 5(a)(8)</td>
<td>Statistical tables showing the total number of audit reports and the total dollar value of questioned costs</td>
<td>Extract pertinent information from SWA/JPG member reports</td>
<td>See reports of SWA/JPG members</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Develop statistical tables showing dollar value of questioned cost from SIGAR reports</td>
<td>In process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 5(a)(9)</td>
<td>Statistical tables showing the total number of audit reports, inspection reports, and evaluation reports and the dollar value of recommendations that funds be put to better use by management</td>
<td>Extract pertinent information from SWA/JPG member reports</td>
<td>See reports of SWA/JPG members</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Develop statistical tables showing dollar value of funds put to better use by management from SIGAR reports</td>
<td>In process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 5(a)(10)</td>
<td>A summary of each audit report, inspection report, and evaluation report issued before the commencement of the reporting period for which no management decision has been made by the end of reporting period, an explanation of the reasons such management decision has not been made, and a statement concerning the desired timetable for achieving a management decision</td>
<td>Extract pertinent information from SWA/JPG member reports</td>
<td>See reports of SWA/JPG members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Provide a synopsis of SIGAR audit reports in which recommendations by SIGAR are still open</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IG Act Section</td>
<td>IG Act Language</td>
<td>SIGAR Action</td>
<td>Section</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 5(a)(11)</td>
<td>A description and explanation of the reasons for any significant revised management decision</td>
<td>Extract pertinent information from SWA/JPG member reports</td>
<td>See reports of SWA/JPG members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Explain SIGAR audit reports in which significant revisions have been made to management decisions</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 5(a)(12)</td>
<td>Information concerning any significant management decision with which the Inspector General is in disagreement</td>
<td>Extract pertinent information from SWA/JPG member reports</td>
<td>See reports of SWA/JPG members</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Explain SIGAR audit reports in which SIGAR disagreed with management decision</td>
<td>No disputed decisions during the reporting period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 5(a)(13)</td>
<td>Information described under (Section 804(b)) of the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 (instances and reasons when an agency has not met target dates established in a remediation plan)</td>
<td>Extract pertinent information from SWA/JPG member reports</td>
<td>No disputed decisions during the reporting period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Provide information where management has not met targets from a remediation plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 5(a)(14)(A)</td>
<td>An Appendix containing the results of any peer review conducted by another Office of Inspector General during the reporting period; or</td>
<td>SIGAR has posted in full the results of, and reports from, SIGAR's most recent peer reviews (completed during July 2010, prior to the current reporting period), on its Web site</td>
<td>Posted in full at <a href="http://www.sigar.mil">www.sigar.mil</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 5(a)(14)(B)</td>
<td>If no peer review was conducted within that reporting period, a statement identifying the date of the last peer review conducted by another Office of Inspector General</td>
<td>15 July 2010</td>
<td>Posted in full at <a href="http://www.sigar.mil">www.sigar.mil</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 5(a)(15)</td>
<td>A list of any outstanding recommendations from any peer review conducted by another Office of Inspector General that have not been fully implement, including a statement describing the status of the implementation and why implementation is not complete</td>
<td>None – all peer review recommendations effectively addressed, and remedial measures implemented, by 30 September 2010</td>
<td>Recommendations and related materials posted in full at <a href="http://www.sigar.mil">www.sigar.mil</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 5(a)(16)</td>
<td>Any peer reviews conducted by SIGAR of another IG Office during the reporting period, including a list of any outstanding recommendations made from any previous peer review . . . that remain outstanding or have not been fully implemented</td>
<td>Not applicable (SIGAR did not conduct, or participate in the conduct, of a peer review of another Office of Inspector General during the reporting period)</td>
<td>SIGAR Oversight</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX B

U.S. FUNDS FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION ($ MILLIONS)

Table B.1 lists funds appropriated for Afghanistan reconstruction by program, per year, as of March 31, 2014.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.S. FUNDING SOURCES</th>
<th>AGENCY</th>
<th>TOTAL FY 2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SECURITY</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF)</td>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>57,325.44</td>
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<tr>
<td>Train &amp; Equip (DD)</td>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>440.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Military Financing (FMF)</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>1,059.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Military Education and Training (IMET)</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>14.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total - Security</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>58,839.40</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GOVERNANCE &amp; DEVELOPMENT</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP)</td>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>3,669.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (AIF)</td>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>1,223.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO)</td>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>804.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Support Fund (ESF)</td>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>17,533.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development Assistance (DA)</td>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>885.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan Freedom Support Act (AFSA)</td>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>550.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child Survival &amp; Health (CSH + GHAI)</td>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>554.58</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commodity Credit Corp (CCC)</td>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>31.65</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID (other)</td>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>49.26</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Proliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining &amp; Related (NADR)</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>650.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team Advisors</td>
<td>USDA</td>
<td>5.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasury Technical Assistance</td>
<td>Treasury</td>
<td>4.45</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total - Governance &amp; Development</strong></td>
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<td><strong>25,961.63</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>COUNTER-NARCOTICS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>International Narcotics Control &amp; Law Enforcement (INCLE)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Drug Interdiction &amp; Counter-Drug Activities (DOD CN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)</td>
<td>DOJ</td>
<td>200.97</td>
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<td><strong>Total - Counter-Narcotics</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>HUMANITARIAN</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>P.L. 480 Title I</td>
<td>USDA</td>
<td>5.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.L. 480 Title II</td>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>949.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disaster Assistance (IDA)</td>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>522.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition Initiatives (TI)</td>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>36.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration &amp; Refugee Assistance (MRA)</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>892.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary Peacekeeping (PKO)</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>69.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Refugee &amp; Migration Assistance (ERMA)</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>25.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food for Progress</td>
<td>USDA</td>
<td>109.49</td>
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<tr>
<td>416(b) Food Aid</td>
<td>USDA</td>
<td>95.18</td>
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<td>Food for Education</td>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>50.49</td>
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<td>Emerson Trust</td>
<td>USDA</td>
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<td><strong>Total - Humanitarian</strong></td>
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<td><strong>INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Oversight</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>281.77</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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<td><strong>7,764.07</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total - International Affairs Operations</strong></td>
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<td><strong>8,045.84</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL FUNDING</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>103,172.49</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Numbers have been rounded. FY 2014 figures for State and USAID accounts reflect draft allocation amounts and are subject to final Congressional approval. DOD reprogrammed $1 billion from FY 2011 ASFF. DOD reprogrammed $1 billion from FY 2012 ASFF. DOD reprogrammed $1.78 billion from FY 2013 ASFF. DOD transferred $104 million from FY 2011 AIF to FY 2011 ESF to fund an infrastructure project to be implemented by USAID.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total - counter-narcotics</td>
<td>7,547.20</td>
<td>60.58</td>
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<td>Total - governance &amp; development</td>
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<td>Total - international affairs operations</td>
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<td>Oversight</td>
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<td>Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) DOD</td>
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<td>Migration &amp; Refugee Assistance (MRA) State</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transition Initiatives (TI) USAID</td>
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<td>Disaster Assistance (IDA) USAID</td>
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<td>P.L. 480 Title II USAID</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID (other) USAID</td>
<td>49.26</td>
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<tr>
<td>Child Survival &amp; Health (CSH + GHAI) USAID</td>
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<td>Development Assistance (DA) USAID</td>
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<tr>
<td>Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO) DOD</td>
<td>804.39</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>International Military Education and Training (IMET) State</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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APPENDIX C

SIGAR WRITTEN PRODUCTS

SIGAR AUDITS

Completed Performance Audits
SIGAR completed three performance audits during this reporting period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Report Identifier</th>
<th>Report Title</th>
<th>Date Issued</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SIGAR 14-52-AR</td>
<td>Afghanistan’s Water Sector: USAID’s Strategy Needs to Be Updated to Ensure</td>
<td>4/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Appropriate Oversight and Accountability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGAR 14-47-AR</td>
<td>Afghan Customs: U.S. Programs Have Had Some Successes, but Challenges Will</td>
<td>4/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Limit Customs Revenue as a Sustainable Source of Income for Afghanistan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGAR 14-33-AR</td>
<td>Afghan National Security Forces: Actions Needed To Improve Plans for</td>
<td>2/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sustaining Capability Assessment Effort</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

New Performance Audits
SIGAR initiated six performance audits during this reporting period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Audit Identifier</th>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Date Initiated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SIGAR 097A</td>
<td>U.S. Efforts to Develop Afghanistan’s Extractives Industry</td>
<td>2/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGAR 096A</td>
<td>U.S. Efforts to Assist Afghan Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons</td>
<td>2/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGAR 095A</td>
<td>U.S. Efforts to Develop Afghanistan’s Rule of Law</td>
<td>2/2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIGAR 094A</td>
<td>Status of SIGAR’s Recommendations to USAID</td>
<td>2/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGAR 093A</td>
<td>Status of SIGAR’s Recommendations to State</td>
<td>2/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGAR 092A</td>
<td>Status of SIGAR’s Recommendations to DOD</td>
<td>2/2014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ongoing Performance Audits
SIGAR had 11 audits in progress during this reporting period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Audit Identifier</th>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Date Initiated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SIGAR 091A</td>
<td>U.S. Government Efforts to Develop and Strengthen the Capacity of the</td>
<td>12/2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan’s (CNPA) Provincial Units</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGAR 090A</td>
<td>Audit of ANA National Engineer Brigade’s Engineering Equipment</td>
<td>11/2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGAR 088A</td>
<td>U.S. Government Efforts to Assist in Reconstruction and Commercialization</td>
<td>11/2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of Afghanistan’s Information and Communication Technology Sector</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGAR 087A</td>
<td>Women’s Initiatives</td>
<td>8/2013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Completed Financial Audits
SIGAR completed two financial audits during this reporting period.

**COMPLETED SIGAR FINANCIAL AUDITS AS OF APRIL 30, 2014**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Report Identifier</th>
<th>Report Title</th>
<th>Date Issued</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SIGAR Financial Audit 14-39-FA</td>
<td>USAID’s Strategic Provincial Roads Program: Audit of Costs Incurred by International Relief and Development Inc.</td>
<td>2/2014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### New Financial Audits
SIGAR initiated 27 financial audits during this reporting period.

**NEW SIGAR FINANCIAL AUDITS AS OF APRIL 30, 2014**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Audit Identifier</th>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Date Initiated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F-067</td>
<td>DOD Contract with New Century Consulting Limited for technical support to Afghanistan Source Operation Management (ASOM)</td>
<td>4/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-066</td>
<td>DOD Contract with Raytheon Technical Services Company LLC for ANA depot support</td>
<td>4/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-065</td>
<td>DOD Contract with Special Operations Technology for non-personal services to provide technical intercept unit early warning system support</td>
<td>4/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-064</td>
<td>DOD Contract with DRS Technical Services, Inc. for ANA Communications equipment service mentoring, systems engineering, technical assistance, training, and maintenance</td>
<td>4/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-063</td>
<td>DOD Contract with L-3 Services, Inc for support services to the MOI and ANP</td>
<td>4/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-062</td>
<td>DOD Contract with Dyncorp, International, LLC for mentoring and training services in support of the ANSF</td>
<td>4/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-061</td>
<td>State contract with PRE Government Services Incorporated for technical support to the Justice Sector Support Program (JSSP)</td>
<td>3/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-060</td>
<td>State Grants with Global Rights for increasing access to justice for family law clients and strengthening the capacity of civil society/ young lawyers to protect human rights in Afghanistan</td>
<td>3/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-059</td>
<td>State Grants with Women for Afghan Women for technical support for the promotion and protection of Afghan women’s rights</td>
<td>3/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-058</td>
<td>State Grants with Clear Path International (CPI) for technical support to the Integrated Victim Assistance and Capacity Building Program</td>
<td>3/2014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## NEW SIGAR FINANCIAL AUDITS AS OF APRIL 30, 2014 (CONTINUED)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Audit Identifier</th>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Date Initiated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F-057</td>
<td>State Grants with Organization for Mine Clearance and Afghan Rehabilitation (OMAR) for mine and unexploded ordnance clearance</td>
<td>3/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-056</td>
<td>USAID Task Order with Management Systems International, Inc (MSI) for technical support to the Measuring Impact of Stabilization Initiative (MISTI)</td>
<td>3/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-055</td>
<td>USAID Task Order with University Research Co. LLC for technical support to the Health Care Improvement (HCI) project</td>
<td>3/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-054</td>
<td>USAID Cooperative Agreement with University of Massachusetts for technical support to the Higher Education Project (HEP) in Afghanistan</td>
<td>3/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-053</td>
<td>USAID Cooperative Agreement with Consortium For Elections and Political Process (CEPPS) for support to subnational government institutions in Regional Command-East and Regional Command-South</td>
<td>3/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-052</td>
<td>USAID Contract with AECOM International Development Inc. for technical support to Stabilization in Key Areas (SIKA)-West</td>
<td>3/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-051</td>
<td>USAID Contract with AECOM International Development Inc. for technical support to Stabilization in Key Areas (SIKA)-East</td>
<td>3/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-050</td>
<td>USAID Contract with TetraTech for technical support to the Rule of Law Stabilization-Formal Component</td>
<td>3/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-049</td>
<td>USAID Contract with International Relief and Development, Inc. (IRD) for Engineering, Quality Assurance and Logistical Support (EQUALS)</td>
<td>3/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-048</td>
<td>USAID Cooperative Agreement with Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) for technical support to the Improving Livelihoods and Governance through Natural Resource Management Project (ILG-NRMP)</td>
<td>3/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-047</td>
<td>USAID Cooperative Agreement with Democracy International for technical support for Electoral Reform and Civic Advocacy (AERCA)</td>
<td>3/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-046</td>
<td>USAID Contract with AECOM International Development Inc. for technical support to Stabilization in Key Areas (SIKA)-South</td>
<td>3/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-045</td>
<td>USAID Cooperative Agreement with Consortium For Elections and Political Process (CEPPS) to support increased electoral participation in Afghanistan</td>
<td>3/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-044</td>
<td>USAID Cooperative Agreement with Internews Network for support to the Afghan Media Development and Empowerment Project (AMDEP)</td>
<td>3/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-043</td>
<td>USAID Contract with TetraTech to support Land Reform in Afghanistan</td>
<td>3/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-042</td>
<td>USAID Cooperative Agreement with International Relief and Development, Inc. for technical support to the Afghanistan Civilian Assistance Program (ACAP II)</td>
<td>3/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-041</td>
<td>USAID Cooperative Agreement with International Relief and Development, Inc. for technical support to the Southern Regional Agriculture Development Program (SRADP)</td>
<td>3/2014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ongoing Financial Audits

SIGAR had 18 financial audits in progress during this reporting period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Audit Identifier</th>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Date Initiated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F-040</td>
<td>DOD Contract with A-T Solutions for support to Freedom of Maneuver program</td>
<td>12/2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-039</td>
<td>DOD Contract with Jorge Scientific Corp for support to Legacy East program</td>
<td>12/2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-038</td>
<td>DOD Contract with CACI Technologies Inc. for technical engineering, logistical engineering and fielding efforts</td>
<td>12/2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-037</td>
<td>USAID Task Order with Tetra Tech ARD for technical support to the Rule of Law Stabilization Program—Formal</td>
<td>9/2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-036</td>
<td>State Grant with Sayed Majidi Architecture and Design (SMAD) for project management services for architectural and engineering design of the new national museum in Kabul</td>
<td>9/2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-035</td>
<td>State Cooperative Agreement and Grant with CETENA Group for support to the Afghan TV Content Production Manager project and the Nationwide Adult Literacy project</td>
<td>9/2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-034</td>
<td>State Grants with the Mine Clearance Planning Agency to provide support for the removal of land mines and unexploded ordnance</td>
<td>9/2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-033</td>
<td>State Task Order with PAE for technical support to the Civilian Police Program</td>
<td>9/2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-032</td>
<td>USAID Task Order with IRG (now part of Engility) for technical support to the Afghan Clean Energy Program (ACEP)</td>
<td>9/2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-031</td>
<td>USAID Cooperative Agreement with ICMA for technical support to the Afghanistan Municipal Strengthening Program (AMSP)</td>
<td>9/2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-030</td>
<td>USAID Task Order with Tetra Tech DPK for technical support to the Rule of Law Stabilization Program—Formal</td>
<td>9/2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-029</td>
<td>USAID Cooperative Agreement with CARE International for technical support to the Partnership for Advancing Community-based Education in Afghanistan (PACE-A)</td>
<td>9/2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-028</td>
<td>USAID Task Order with AECOM for technical support to the Afghanistan Social Outreach Program (ASOP)</td>
<td>9/2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-027</td>
<td>USAID Cooperative Agreement with PACT to strengthen the independent media sector in Afghanistan</td>
<td>9/2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-026</td>
<td>USAID Task Order with ARD (now part of Tetra Tech) to provide technical support to the Sustainable Water Supply and Sanitation (SWSS) project</td>
<td>9/2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-025</td>
<td>USAID Cooperative Agreement with IRD to implement the Afghanistan Vouchers for Increased Production in Agriculture (AVPA) program</td>
<td>9/2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-024</td>
<td>USAID Contract with Chemonics for technical support to the Afghanistan Stabilization Initiative (ASI) and Accelerated Sustainable Agriculture Program (ASAP)</td>
<td>7/2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-023</td>
<td>USAID Contract with Development Alternatives Inc for technical support to the Afghan Small and Medium Enterprise Development (ASMED) Project &amp; Afghanistan Stabilization Initiative (ASI)</td>
<td>7/2013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SIGAR INSPECTIONS

Completed Inspections
SIGAR completed two inspections during this reporting period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Report Identifier</th>
<th>Report Title</th>
<th>Date Issued</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SIGAR Inspection 14-41-IP</td>
<td>Camp Monitor: Most Construction Appears to Have Met Contract Standards, but It Is Unclear If Facility is Being Used as Intended</td>
<td>3/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGAR Inspection 14-31a-IP</td>
<td>Salang Hospital: Comments from USFOR-A</td>
<td>2/2014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Inspection Alert Letters
SIGAR issued two inspection alert letters during this reporting period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Letter Identifier</th>
<th>Letter Title</th>
<th>Date Issued</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SIGAR Alert Letter 14-42-AL</td>
<td>FOB Sharana Incinerators</td>
<td>3/2014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

New Inspections
SIGAR initiated five new inspections during this reporting period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Identifier</th>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Date Initiated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I-019</td>
<td>Inspection of the Shoramad Industrial Park</td>
<td>4/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-018</td>
<td>Inspection of the Gorimar Industrial Park</td>
<td>4/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-017</td>
<td>Inspection of ANA Slaughterhouse Facility</td>
<td>2/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-016</td>
<td>Inspection of ANA Camp Commando Complex</td>
<td>2/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-015</td>
<td>Inspection of Ministry of Defense Headquarters</td>
<td>2/2014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SIGAR SPECIAL PROJECTS

Completed Special Projects
SIGAR completed 10 Special Project products this reporting period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Report Identifier</th>
<th>Report Title</th>
<th>Date Issued</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SIGAR Special Project 14-51-SP</td>
<td>Inquiry Letter: USDA Soybean Program</td>
<td>4/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGAR Special Project 14-49-SP</td>
<td>Fact Sheet: Department of State Assistance to Afghanistan: $4 Billion Obligated between 2002 and 2013</td>
<td>4/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGAR Special Project 14-44-SP</td>
<td>Inquiry Letter: Cancelled USAID Contracts</td>
<td>4/2014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDICES

COMPLETED SIGAR SPECIAL PROJECTS AS OF APRIL 30, 2014 (CONTINUED)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Report Identifier</th>
<th>Report Title</th>
<th>Date Issued</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SIGAR Special Project 14-40-SP</td>
<td>Inquiry Letter: Kajaki Unit 2 Project</td>
<td>3/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGAR Special Project 14-38-SP</td>
<td>Inquiry Letter: 64,000-Square-Foot Building Review Document Preservation</td>
<td>2/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGAR Special Project 14-37-SP</td>
<td>Inquiry Letter: Communications Towers</td>
<td>2/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGAR Special Project 14-35-SP</td>
<td>Inquiry Letter: Mi-17 Crash and Demolition</td>
<td>2/2014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OTHER SIGAR WRITTEN PRODUCTS

The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, John F. Sopko, testified before the Congress once this reporting period.

NEW SIGAR TESTIMONY AS OF APRIL 30, 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Testimony Identifier</th>
<th>Testimony Title</th>
<th>Testimony Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SIGAR 14-46-TY</td>
<td>Lessons Learned from Oversight of USAID’s Efforts in Afghanistan</td>
<td>4/3/2014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX D

SIGAR INVESTIGATIONS AND HOTLINE

SIGAR Investigations
This quarter, SIGAR opened 60 new investigations and closed 40, bringing the total number of open investigations to 338. Of the new investigations, most involved money laundering and procurement fraud, as shown in Figure D.1. Of the closed investigations, most were closed due to unfounded allegations, as shown in Figure D.2.

SIGAR Hotline
Of the 99 Hotline complaints received this quarter, most were received electronically, as shown in Figure D.3. In addition to working on new complaints, the Investigations directorate continued its work this quarter on complaints received prior to January 1, 2014. This quarter, the directorate processed 148 complaints, most of which were closed, as shown in Figure D.4.
Suspensions and Debarments From SIGAR Referrals

SIGAR’s referrals for suspension and debarment as of March 31, 2014, are shown in chronological order in Table D.1.

### TABLE D.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUSPENSIONS AND DEBARMENTS AS OF MARCH 31, 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Suspensions</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Watan Construction Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basirat Construction Firm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brophy, Kenneth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naqibullah, Nadeem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rahman, Obaidur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campbell, Neil Patrick</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borcata, Raul A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close, Jarred Lee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistical Operations Worldwide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robinson, Franz Martin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taylor, Zachary Dustin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aaria Group Construction Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aaria Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aaria Herai General Trading</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aaria M.E. General Trading LLC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aaria Middle East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aaria Middle East Company LLC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aaria Middle East Company Ltd.–Herat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUSPENSIONS AND DEBARMENTS AS OF MARCH 31, 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Suspensions</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aaria Supplies Company LTD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aaria Supply Services and Consultancy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aftech International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aftech International Pvt., Ltd.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alam, Ahmed Farzad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albahar Logistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Aaria Company LLC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Aaria LLC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barakzai, Nangjalai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formid Supply and Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greenlight General Trading</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabul Hackle Logistics Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharpway Logistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States California Logistics Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yousef, Najjeebullah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rahimi, Mohammad Edris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wooten, Philip Steven</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domineck, Lavette Kaye</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Markwith, James</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Points International Distributors, Inc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cipolla, James</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hercules Global Logistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schroeder, Robert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AISC LLC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American International Security Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brothers, Richard S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David A Young Construction &amp; Renovation Inc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force Direct Solutions LLC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harris, Christopher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hernando County Holdings LLC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hide-A-Wreck LLC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panthers LLC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper Mill Village, Inc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shroud Line LLC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spada, Carol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taylor, Michael</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welventure LLC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Wide Trainers LLC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young, David</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Espinoza, Mauricio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long, Tony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Thru Business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pudenz, Adam Jeff Julius</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## TABLE D.1 (CONTINUED)

### SUSPENSIONS AND DEBARMENTS AS OF MARCH 31, 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Suspenions</th>
<th>Debarments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elham, Yaser, a.k.a. &quot;Najibullah Saadullah&quot;</td>
<td>Safi, Matullah*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Everest Faizy Logistics Services</td>
<td>Sahak, Sher Khan*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faizy Elham Brothers, Ltd.</td>
<td>Shaheedi, Murad*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faizy, Rohullah</td>
<td>Shirzad, Daulet Khan*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hekmat Shadman General Trading LLC</td>
<td>Uddin, Mehrab*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hekmat Shadman, Ltd., d.b.a. &quot;Hikmat Shadman, Ltd.&quot;</td>
<td>Alam, Ahmed Farzad*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hikmat Shadman Construction and Supply Company</td>
<td>Greenlight General Trading*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saif Hikmat Construction Logistic Services and Supply Co.</td>
<td>Aaria Middle East Company Ltd. – Heart*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivera-Medina, Franklin Delano</td>
<td>Aaria Middle East*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Barakzai, Nangialai*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Formid Supply and Services*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aaria Supply Services and Consultancy*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kabul Hackle Logistics Company*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yousef, Najeebullah*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aaria Group*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aaria Group Construction Company*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aaria Supplies Company LTD*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rahimi, Mohammad Edris*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All Points International Distributors, Inc. *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hercules Global Logistics*</td>
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<td>Schroeder, Robert*</td>
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<td>Zadran, Mohammad</td>
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<td>Afghan Mercury Construction Company, d.b.a. &quot;Afghan Mercury Construction &amp; Logistics Company&quot;</td>
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<td>Mirzali Naseeb Construction Company</td>
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<td>Naseeb, Mirzali</td>
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<td>Robinson, Franz Martin*</td>
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<td>Smith, Nancy</td>
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<td>Sultani, Abdul Anas a.k.a. &quot;Abdul Anas&quot;</td>
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<td>Faqiri, Shir</td>
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<td>Hosmat, Haji</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Jim Black Construction Company</td>
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### TABLE D.1 (CONTINUED)

#### SUSPENSIONS AND DEBARMENTS AS OF MARCH 31, 2014

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Suspensions</th>
<th>Debarments</th>
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<tr>
<td>Arya Ariana Arayaee Logistics, d.b.a. “AAA Logistics,” d.b.a. “Somo Logistics”</td>
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<td>Mukhtar, Abdul a.k.a. “Abdul Kubar”</td>
<td>Noor Mahgir Construction Company</td>
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<td>Noor, Sherin Agha</td>
<td>Long, Tonya*</td>
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<td>Isranuddin, Burhanuddin</td>
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<td>Matun, Wahidullah</td>
<td>Navid Basir Construction Company</td>
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<td>Navid Basir JV Gagar Baba Construction Company</td>
<td>NBCC &amp; GBCC JV</td>
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<tr>
<td>Noor, Navid</td>
<td>Asmatullah, Mahmood, a.k.a. “Mahmood”</td>
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<td>Khan, Gul</td>
<td>Khan, Solomon Sherdad, a.k.a. “Solomon”</td>
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<td>Ali, Esrar</td>
<td>Gul, Ghanzi</td>
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<td>Luqman Engineering Construction Company, d.b.a. “Luqman Engineering”</td>
<td>Safiullah, a.k.a. “Mr. Safiullah”</td>
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<td>Sarfraz, a.k.a. “Mr. Sarfraz”</td>
<td>Wazir, Khan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Akbar, Ali</td>
<td>Crystal Construction Company, d.b.a. “Samitullah Road Construction Company”</td>
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<tr>
<td>Samitullah (Individual uses only one name)</td>
<td>Gurvinder, Singh</td>
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<tr>
<td>Riders Constructions, Services, Logistics and Transportation Company</td>
<td>Riders Group of Companies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspensions</td>
<td>Debarments</td>
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<td>-----------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>Domineck, Lavette Kaye*</td>
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<td>Markwith, James*</td>
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<td>Martinez, Rene</td>
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<td>Maroof, Abdul</td>
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<td>Qara, Yousef</td>
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<td>Royal Palace Construction Company</td>
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<td>Bradshaw, Christopher Chase</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boulware, Candice a.k.a. &quot;Candice Joy Dawkins&quot;*</td>
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<td>Dawkins, John</td>
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<td>Mesopotamia Group LLC</td>
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<td>Nordloh, Geoffrey</td>
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<td>Kieffer, Jerry</td>
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<td>Johnson, Angela</td>
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<td>CNH Development Company, LLC</td>
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<td>Johnson, Keith</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Military Logistic Support, LLC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eisner, John</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Taurus Holdings LLC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brophy, Kenneth Michael*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * indicates previously in suspended status following criminal indictment. Final debarment imposed following criminal conviction in U.S. federal district court.
## APPENDIX E

### ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACRONYM OR ABBREVIATION</th>
<th>DEFINITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4A</td>
<td>Assistance to Afghanistan’s Anti-Corruption Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAN</td>
<td>Afghan Analysts Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABADE</td>
<td>Assistance in Building Afghanistan by Developing Enterprises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABP</td>
<td>Afghan Border Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACD</td>
<td>Afghan Customs Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACE</td>
<td>Agricultural Credit Enhancement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACU</td>
<td>Anticorruption Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADF</td>
<td>Agricultural Development Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AERCA</td>
<td>Afghanistan Electoral Reform and Civic Advocacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFN</td>
<td>afghans (currency—Afghan nationals are Afghans)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGO</td>
<td>Attorney General’s Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGS</td>
<td>Afghan Geological Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIF</td>
<td>Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIHRC</td>
<td>Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJTF</td>
<td>Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALBA</td>
<td>Assistance to Legislative Bodies of Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>Afghan Local Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMDEP</td>
<td>Afghanistan Media Development and Empowerment Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANA</td>
<td>Afghan National Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANCOP</td>
<td>Afghan National Civil Order of Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>Afghan National Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANSF</td>
<td>Afghan National Security Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APA</td>
<td>Afghanistan Petroleum Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPF</td>
<td>Afghan Public Protection Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APRP</td>
<td>Afghan Peace and Reintegration Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARTF</td>
<td>Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANSF</td>
<td>Afghan National Security Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASF</td>
<td>Afghan Security Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASFF</td>
<td>Afghanistan Security Forces Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUF</td>
<td>American University of Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUP</td>
<td>Afghan Uniform Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAF</td>
<td>Bagram Airfield</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Continued on the next page
## APPENDICES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACRONYM OR ABBREVIATION</th>
<th>DEFINITION</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BCP</td>
<td>border crossing point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BELT</td>
<td>Basic Education, Literacy, and Technical-Vocational Education and Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMTF</td>
<td>Border Management Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSA</td>
<td>Bilateral Security Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAC</td>
<td>counter/anticorruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBP</td>
<td>Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security (U.S.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDC</td>
<td>Community Development Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEK</td>
<td>Corps Engineer Kandak (Afgh)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Central Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERP</td>
<td>Commander’s Emergency Response Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAMP</td>
<td>Commercial Horticulture and Agricultural Marketing Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency (U.S.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDNE</td>
<td>Combined Information Data Network Exchange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIIGIE</td>
<td>Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJIAF</td>
<td>Combined Joint Interagency Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJTF</td>
<td>Counter Narcotics Tribunal and the Criminal Justice Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-JTSCC</td>
<td>U.S. Central Command’s Joint Theater Support Contracting Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CM</td>
<td>capability milestone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNA</td>
<td>Center for Naval Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNCE</td>
<td>Counter Narcotics Community Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CND</td>
<td>Commission on Narcotic Drugs</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNJC</td>
<td>Counternarcotics Justice Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNPA</td>
<td>Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNPCI-W</td>
<td>China National Petroleum Corporation Watan Energy Afghanistan, Ltd.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO</td>
<td>contracting officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>COR</td>
<td>contracting officer’s representative</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPC</td>
<td>Criminal Procedure Code</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSTC-A</td>
<td>Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>CUAT</td>
<td>Commander’s Unit Assessment Tool</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAB</td>
<td>Da Afghanistan Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>DABS</td>
<td>Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCIS</td>
<td>Defense Criminal Investigative Service (U.S.)</td>
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<td>DCMA</td>
<td>Defense Contract Management Agency (U.S.)</td>
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<td>DEA</td>
<td>Drug Enforcement Administration (U.S.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DI</td>
<td>Democracy International</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense (U.S.)</td>
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<td>DOD CN</td>
<td>Department of Defense Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities fund (U.S.)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Continued on the next page
## APPENDICES

### ACRONYM OR ABBREVIATION | DEFINITION
---|---
DOD OIG | Department of Defense Office of Inspector General
DOJ | Department of Justice (U.S.)
ECC | Electoral Complaints Commission
ECF | Extended Credit Facility
EMIS | Ministry of Education’s Information Management System (Afghan)
ESF | Economic Support Fund
EVAW | Elimination of Violence Against Women law (Afghan)
FATF | Financial Action Task Force
FBI | Federal Bureau of Investigation (U.S.)
FEFA | Fair Election Forum of Afghanistan
FOB | forward operating base
FRIC | Force Reintegration Cell (ISAF)
FY | fiscal year
GAGAS | Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards
GAO | Government Accountability Office (U.S.)
GDP | gross domestic product
GDPDC | General Directorate of Prisons and Detention Centers
GLE | Governor-Led Eradication
GPI | Good Performer’s Initiative
GSCC | General Support Contracting Command
HEP | Higher Education Program
HMIS | Health Management Information System
HOO | High Office of Oversight for Anti-Corruption (aka “HOOAC”) (Afghan)
HPP | Health Policy Project
IARCSC | Independent Appointment Board of the Civil Service Commission
ICC | International Coordinating Committee
IDEA-NEW | Incentives Driving Economic Alternatives-North, East, and West
IDLG | Independent Directorate of Local Governance (Afghan)
IDP | internally displaced person
IEC | Independent Election Commission (Afghan)
IED | improvised explosive device
UC | International Security Assistance Force Joint Command
IMF | International Monetary Fund
INCLE | International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (U.S.)
INL | Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (U.S.)
IOCC | Interagency Operations Coordination Center
IPA | Independent Public Accountant

*Continued on the next page*
## APPENDICES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACRONYM OR ABBREVIATION</th>
<th>DEFINITION</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>IRD</td>
<td>International Relief and Development (an NGO)</td>
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<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<td>JCMJ</td>
<td>Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board</td>
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<td>JTP</td>
<td>Justice Training Transition Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>KAF</td>
<td>Kandahar Airfield</td>
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<td>KCI</td>
<td>Kabul City Initiative</td>
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<td>KFZ</td>
<td>Kandahar Food Zone</td>
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<td>KHPP</td>
<td>Kandahar-Helmmand Power Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>killed in action</td>
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<tr>
<td>LMG</td>
<td>Leadership, Management, Governance Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>LotFA</td>
<td>Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan</td>
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<td>MAI</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (Afghan)</td>
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<td>MCC</td>
<td>Metallurgical Corporation of China</td>
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<td>MCN</td>
<td>Ministry of Counternarcotics (Afghan)</td>
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<td>Major Crimes Task Force</td>
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<td>MEC</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (Afghan)</td>
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<td>MIDAS</td>
<td>Mining Investment and Development for Afghan Sustainability</td>
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<td>MISTI</td>
<td>Measuring Impacts of Stabilization Initiatives</td>
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<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense (Afghan)</td>
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<td>MOF</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance (Afghan)</td>
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<td>MOI</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior (Afghan)</td>
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<td>MOMP</td>
<td>Ministry of Mines and Petroleum (Afghan)</td>
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<td>MOPH</td>
<td>Ministry of Public Health (Afghan)</td>
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<td>MORE</td>
<td>Ministry of Women’s Affairs Organizational Restructuring and Empowerment Project (Afghan)</td>
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<td>MOWA</td>
<td>Ministry of Women’s Affairs (Afghan)</td>
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<td>MRRD</td>
<td>Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development</td>
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<td>NAT-C</td>
<td>NATO Air Training Command-Afghanistan</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NCO</td>
<td>noncommissioned officer</td>
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<td>NDAA</td>
<td>National Defense Authorization Act</td>
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<td>NDI</td>
<td>National Democratic Institute</td>
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<td>NEB</td>
<td>National Engineer Brigade (Afghan)</td>
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<td>NEPS</td>
<td>Northeast Power System</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>nongovernmental organization</td>
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<td>NKB</td>
<td>New Kabul Bank</td>
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<td>NPP</td>
<td>National Priority Program</td>
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</table>

Continued on the next page
### APPENDICES

**ACRONYM OR ABBREVIATION** | **DEFINITION**
--- | ---
NTM-A | NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan
O&M | operations and maintenance
OCD | overseas contingency operations
OECD | Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OHCHR | Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OMB | Office of Management and Budget
OSD | Office of the Secretary of Defense
PAS | Political Affairs Section (U.S.)
PBGF | Performance Based Governance Fund
PCH | Partnership Contracts for Health Services
PFM | public financial management
PGO | Provincial governor's office
PJST | Provincial Joint Secretariat Teams
PM/WRA | Bureau of Political-Military Affairs-Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (U.S.)
PPP | public-private partnership
PROMOTE | Promoting Gender Equality in the National Priority Program
PSC | private security contractor
PTEC | Power Transmission Expansion and Connectivity
RAMP-UP | Regional Afghan Municipalities Program for Urban Populations
RASR | Regional Command ANSF Assessment Report
RC | recurrent cost
RLS-F | Rule of Law Stabilization-Formal
RLS-I | Rule of Law Stabilization-Informal
SEPS | Southeast Power System
SGDP | Sheberghan Gas Development Program
SIGAR | Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
SIKA | Stability in Key Areas
SMW | Special Mission Wing (Afghan)
SPECS | Supporting Political Entities and Civil Society Program
State OIG | Department of State Office of the Inspector General
STEP-UP | Strengthening Tertiary Education Program-University Partnerships
STRATCOM | Office of Strategic Communications
SWSS | Sustainable Water Supply and Sanitation
SY | solar year
TFA | Trade Accession and Facilitation for Afghanistan
TAT | Telecom Advisory Team
TFBSO | Task Force for Business and Stability Operations in Afghanistan

*Continued on the next page*
## APPENDICES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACRONYM OR ABBREVIATION</th>
<th>DEFINITION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TMAF</td>
<td>Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework</td>
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<td>TMR</td>
<td>Transportation Movement Request</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TVET</td>
<td>Technical Vocational Education and Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>UN Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
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<td>USAAA</td>
<td>U.S. Army Audit Agency</td>
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<td>USACE</td>
<td>U.S. Army Corps of Engineers</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>U.S. Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
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<td>USAID OIG</td>
<td>USAID Office of the Inspector General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USFOR-A</td>
<td>U.S. Forces-Afghanistan</td>
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<td>USGS</td>
<td>U.S. Geological Survey</td>
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<tr>
<td>USIP</td>
<td>U.S. Institute for Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VSO</td>
<td>Village Stability Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>wounded in action</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


17. Integrity Watch Afghanistan, media release, “Corruption remains among the top-three biggest concerns of Afghans, despite a reduction in personal experiences of corruption,” 3/30/2013.

18. Integrity Watch Afghanistan, media release, “Corruption remains among the top-three biggest concerns of Afghans, despite a reduction in personal experiences of corruption,” 3/30/2013.


32. In its quarterly reports to Congress, SIGAR frequently reports on the DOD and State assessments of the AEO.


ENDNOTES

43 See Appendix B of this report.
46 DOD, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/20/2013.
48 See Appendix B of this report.
49 DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 4/15/2014.
50 DOD, responses to SIGAR data call, 4/15/2014 and 1/23/2014.
52 P.L. 112-74, Section 9009, 12/23/2011; Deputy Secretary of Defense, Afghanistan Resources Oversight Council (AROC) memorandum, 8/3/2011.
53 DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 4/15/2014.
54 DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 4/15/2014.
57 See Appendix B of this report.
58 DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 4/17/2014.
61 See Appendix B of this report.
64 See Appendix B of this report.
68 DOD, responses to SIGAR data call, 4/16/2014 and 1/22/2014.
71 USAID, responses to SIGAR data call, 4/7/2014 and 1/7/2014.
72 State, response to SIGAR data call, 10/13/2009.
74 State, responses to SIGAR data call, 4/11/2014 and 1/13/2014.
75 SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the U.S. Congress, 7/30/2010, p. 51.
87 DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 4/15/2014.
101 DOD, response to SIGAR vetting, 4/18/2014.  
103 DOD, response to SIGAR vetting, 4/18/2014.  
104 DOD, response to SIGAR vetting, 4/18/2014.  
105 DOD, response to SIGAR vetting, 4/18/2014.  
111 DOD, response to SIGAR vetting, 4/18/2014.  
117 DOD, Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 12/2012, p. 56.  
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SIGAR's oversight mission, as defined by the legislation, is to provide for the independent and objective

- conduct and supervision of audits and investigations relating to the programs and operations funded with amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan.
- leadership and coordination of, and recommendations on, policies designed to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of the programs and operations, and to prevent and detect waste, fraud, and abuse in such programs and operations.
- means of keeping the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense fully and currently informed about problems and deficiencies relating to the administration of such programs and operations, and the necessity for and progress on corrective action.

Afghanistan reconstruction includes any major contract, grant, agreement, or other funding mechanism entered into by any department or agency of the U.S. government that involves the use of amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan.


(For a list of the congressionally mandated contents of this report, see Section 3.)